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This thesis investigates the relationship between interpretation biases, social anxiety and 
paranoia. The overarching hypothesis is that differences in the manner of interpretation of 
emotionally ambiguous information may determine the type of symptoms which 
predominate, perhaps even which pathology emerges. For example, an interpretation which 
assumes an intent of harm (e.g. seeing two people whispering while looking at you means 
‘they are plotting against me’) is likely to precipitate negative paranoid thoughts, perhaps 
ultimately persecutory delusions. In contrast, an interpretation of the same ambiguity, but 
which assumes the self is being negatively evaluated by others (e.g. seeing two people 
whispering while looking at you means ‘they are talking about my faults’) is likely to 
precipitate socially anxious thoughts and perhaps ultimately social anxiety disorder. 
Experiment 1 (n=84) examined the form and strength of the associations between the 
hypothesised different types of interpretation bias (socially anxious resolutions/paranoid 
resolutions) and the traits of social anxiety versus paranoia. The results showed that there 
was a significant association between different types of interpretation bias and its content 
specific emotion trait. The negatively evaluated (socially anxious resolutions) interpretation 
bias was more strongly associated with social anxiety than the persecutory (paranoid 
resolutions) interpretation bias. Conversely, the persecutory (paranoid resolutions) 
interpretation bias was more strongly associated with paranoia than the negatively evaluated 
(socially anxious resolutions) interpretation bias. 
Experiment 2 (n= 80) extended Experiment 1 by altering the task design to directly contrast 
paranoid and socially anxious interpretations (rather than contrasting paranoid versus non 
paranoid and, separately, socially anxious versus non-socially anxious).  Under this forced-
choice experimental design, the results revealed that there was a significant association 
between persecutory interpretation and its content specific emotion (paranoia). However, 
both types (negatively evaluated and persecutory) of interpretation bias were significantly 
associated with social anxiety. 
Experiment 3 (n = 71) was a longitudinal follow up study (for which Experiment 1 served as 
the baseline). This study tested whether content specific interpretation biases would predict 
corresponding traits six months later, as an indirect test of the causal role of interpretation 
biases in precipitating social anxiety and paranoia. The results showed that negatively 
evaluated interpretation bias predicted subsequent social anxiety traits, and likewise 
persecutory interpretations predicted subsequent paranoia traits. Moreover, there was an 
interaction effect between the two types of bias suggesting that the predictive power of 
paranoid interpretation bias was especially strong when coexisting with a strong socially 
negative interpretation bias, which lends support to some theories of clinical paranoia. 
Experiment 4 used a combination of existing and new data collected over a six-month period 
to test the hypothesis of reciprocal causality (do traits contribute to the exacerbation of 
congruent biases in addition to biases maintaining traits, such that a vicious cycle is 
established?). The data showed a reciprocal causality of the trait social anxiety in 
corresponding negatively evaluative interpretation bias, while there was an absent 
contribution of the trait paranoia to persecutory interpretation bias, which was instead due to 
the trait social anxiety. 
Experiment 5 recruited a large clinical sample plus healthy controls (n= 102) to examine 
similar questions to those tested in the previous subclinical samples. The results revealed a 
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pattern broadly consistent with the content specific interpretation biases in both social 
anxiety and paranoid psychosis patients. 
Findings of this thesis confirm the cognitive theories of psychopathology in social anxiety 
and early psychosis. The study demonstrates a reciprocal causality between social anxiety 
and both persecutory and negatively evaluated interpretation bias. It has confirmed the 
vicious circle proposed by cognitive theories of social anxiety, and suggested a mechanism 
for the maintenance of persecutory interpretation bias in paranoia. Although content-specific 
interpretation bias was weighted the most in the prediction of its corresponding trait 
characteristics, the effects from the content-unmatched interpretation bias could not be 
neglected. This finding extends previous observations using similar methods in subclinical 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Cognitive Vulnerability to Psychopathology  
Research on emotional and psychotic disorders has identified various cognitive factors 
associated with such conditions. Some ask whether identifying cognitive vulnerability might 
help predict mental health disorders (Casey et al., 2013; Fiszdon & Reddy, 2012; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) – identifying vulnerable individuals by their 
defective cognitive processing manners, for example, and aiming to reduce their presenting 
subclinical symptoms before they develop psychosis (McGorry et al., 2002; Morrison et al., 
2004).  
Cognitive vulnerability refers to defective beliefs or information processing biases developed 
long before the patient presents with a mental health problem (Riskind & Black, 2005). It is 
proposed as a predictor of disorder onset, and an accumulation factor for preventive 
intervention (Sarfati & Hardy-Bayle, 2002). Cognitive vulnerability ranges from basic 
information process dysfunction, including biased attention, interpretation, reasoning and 
memory, to associated cognitive consequences, such as emotional reactions, negative 
beliefs and anomalous experiences (e.g., Yiend, 2004; MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004). 
Cognitive vulnerability is present on a continuum in all populations, including both subclinical 
and clinical individuals (Gibb et al., 2004).  
“Disorder-congruent” information processing bias has been proposed as the core 
characteristic of cognitive vulnerability (Beck & Clark, 1997; Riskind & Black, 2005). The 
content of cognitive vulnerability and the ways in which it is engaged reflect the disorder-
dominated mood and beliefs of the individual. Interactions among mood and beliefs 
contribute to the development and maintenance of psychopathology (Williams et al., 1988; 
Beck & Clark, 1997). Blanchette and Richards (2010) recently clarified four key emotional 
cognitive domains associated with emotional disorders: interpretation, judgement, decision-
making and reasoning. Savulich, Shergill and Yiend (2017) considered attention, reasoning 
and interpretation the most aetiologically significant cognitive processes in psychotic 
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disorders. For example, anxiety could lead to selective attention to threatening over neutral 
facial expressions (Gutierrez-Garcia & Calvo, 2014; Yiend et al., 2015). Patients with 
psychotic delusions responded more quickly and with reduced attention to threatening facial 
features (Moritz & Laudan, 2007; Miskovic & Schmidt 2010). Stages of processes and 
content differ in different cognitive processes and mental health disorders (Riskind & Alloy, 
2006). 
1.1.1 Cognitive Vulnerability in Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
Cognitive vulnerability is positively associated with different dimensions of symptomatology. 
For example, negative and interpersonally sensitive beliefs of ambiguity are associated with 
social anxiety (Amin et al., 1998, 1998; Constans et al., 1999; Voncken et al., 2003), while 
threatening and self-referent interpretations of ambiguity are associated with psychosis 
(Zimmerman et al., 1986), especially  paranoid psychosis (Savulich et al., 2015 2015; Bentall 
& Kaney, 1996). Almost two-thirds of individuals with paranoia have a threatening 
interpretation style (Birchwood, 1999; Startup et al., 2015). Evidence suggests that specific 
cognitive content might contribute to specific disorders (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Williams et 
al., 1988). The relative contribution of psychotherapy (Morrison et al., 1995) and whether 
specific disorders are characterised by specific cognitive content and vulnerabilities remain 
unclear. It is important to differentiate which factors and type of pathology are associated 
with which symptoms, in order to develop early interventions and treatments. 
Both social anxiety and paranoia involve perceived threat. In clinical and subclinical 
samples, Freeman, Pugh and Garety (2008) found that paranoid and anxious thoughts are 
both associated with the anticipation of threat. Paranoia was defined as interpreting 
ambiguous stimuli in the direction of intent to cause harm (e.g., "People are out to get me"). 
Paranoid symptoms are observed in the general population as well as being associated with 
persecutory ideations at clinical levels (Freeman, 2007a). Social anxiety is also implicated in 
misinterpreting ambiguous information, and is particularly relevant to negative evaluations 
(e.g., "People are laughing at my outfits"; Clark & Wells). Common factors reflect different 
experiences. Socially anxious and paranoid individuals interpret the same information in 
different ways. This might enhance the perception of threat, increasing negative emotions 
and hallucinations and perpetuating the disorder. 
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1.1.2 Clinical Interventions in Cognitive Bias 
Clinical interventions in early psychosis suggest an aetiological role for cognitive bias in both 
its development and maintenance (Gumley et al., 2006). Appraisals and interpretations of 
prodromal symptoms play a role in the development of psychotic disorders and in how willing 
individuals are to seek treatment (Garety et al., 2001). Compared to individuals presenting 
with a first episode of psychosis, those with an At Risk Mental State (ARMS) for psychosis 
were better able to appraise anomalous experiences as symptoms of illness and more 
willing to seek and accept clinical help (Lappin et al., 2007). Early intervention in ARMS can 
arrest deterioration, in part by minimising neurobiological changes, improving the prognosis, 
delaying the onset of psychosis and preventing illness (Yung et al., 2008; Ruhrmann & 
Schultze-Lutter, 2003). 
Many of the disabilities associated with psychotic disorders are difficult to treat (McGorry et 
al., 2009), emphasising the significance of early intervention, at the prodromal stage, before 
the first episode of psychosis (McGorry et al., 2003, 2001). Successful attempts at cognitive 
intervention have lent credibility to a cognitive focus in psychotic disorders. Cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) is the most common intervention, typically combined with 
antipsychotic medication. The focus of CBT is to change the thought processes of 
individuals in order to help them better manage their symptoms and distress, as well as to 
improve their cognitive and social functioning. The efficacy of CBT in psychosis has been 
demonstrated (e.g., Pilling et al., 2002; Zimmermann et al., 2005; Wykes et al., 2008). A 
growing number of studies also suggest it may be effective in the ARMS group. In a 
randomised controlled trial combining CBT and antipsychotic medication, the onset of 
psychosis was delayed in an ARMS sample, although the relative contribution of each type 
of treatment was unidentified (McGorry et al., 2002). In a comparison of CBT with 
antipsychotics, the former significantly reduced the likelihood of symptoms developing into 
psychosis (Morrison et al., 1995). These results were replicated in later studies that 
integrated treatments such as social skill training and psychoeducation (e.g., Nordentoft et 
al., 2006) and in a longitudinal study over a three-year period (French et al., 2007). Recent 
experimental work suggests that computer-based techniques for cognitive intervention are 
also useful. Cognitive bias modification (CBM) is conducted using a computer-based training 
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program to induce attention and interpretation bias. Studies have thus far focused 
exclusively on affective disorders (Yiend, 2004). The possibility of inducing interpretation 
bias in ambiguous statements has been observed in subclinical volunteers (Yiend et al., 
2005) and clinical patients (Hayes et al., 2014). Individuals who score highly on the anxious 
trait produce increasingly positive interpretations of ambiguity when receiving induction 
training in positive interpretations (Mathews et al., 2007). Positive inductions improve mood 
(Holmes et al., 2006) and reduce vulnerability to external stressors (Hoppitt et al., 2010). The 
training procedure itself reduces general anxiety (Clerkin et al., 2015), social anxiety (Beard, 
Weisberg & Amir, 2011), depression (Joormann, Waugh & Gotlib, 2015) and psychosis 
(Steel et al., 2010). These findings are cause for optimism. Other research indicated the 
successful integration of CBM into existing Internet-based CBT programs (Williams et al., 
2015). However, studies with larger samples and in populations other than individuals with 
affective disorder are required.  
1.2 Interpretation Bias in Disorders 
1.2.1 Interpretation Bias as a Cognitive Process 
Interpretation refers to the process whereby ambiguous information is transformed into 
mental concepts, symbols or statements (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Biased 
interpretation refers to the process whereby information is interpreted according to mood. It 
may lack a neutral outlook or consistently favour a particular stimulus in the information 
provided. It implies distortion and misinterpretation of the content, or something imagined 
that might be caused by temporary negligence, subjective presuppositions or an objective 
grasp of reality (Funder, 1987; Taylor & Brown, 1988). In biased interpretations, cognitive 
processing is based more on mood-congruent information than on evidence. It is 
characterised by incomplete data gathering and shortcuts, as opposed to unbiased 
interpretation, in which individuals make more accurate inferences and interpretations 
according to a logical, identifiable process (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Biased interpretation is 
not only typical of emotionally-disordered individuals; positive bias is also observed in 
emotionally stable populations (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). There is ample literature on the 
presence of positive, self-serving biases in the general population (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In 
 20 
particular, prior expectations and self-serving interpretations weigh heavily into the social 
judgment process. For example, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found that non-depressed 
college students systematically overestimated their actual control of desirable outcomes in 
the judgement of response-outcome contingency experiment. A review of over 266 studies 
by Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde and Hankin (2004) confirmed the pervasive self-serving 
attribution bias: people are more likely to attribute positive events to themselves than they 
are negative events (cf. Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).  
Mood-congruent information processing bias is the most central concept to the cognitive 
theories of emotional disorders (Yiend & Mackintosh, 2004; Koster, Fox & MacLeod, 2009). 
Vulnerable individuals interpret ambiguous information in a mood-dependent way, based on 
their beliefs or expectations. This biased interpretation further contributes to the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology, strengthening beliefs and reinforcing 
relevant memories (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). Interpretation 
bias, attention bias, memory bias and other cognitive vulnerabilities are common in 
emotional disorders, although they present differently in different disorders. Interpretation 
bias refers to the process whereby information is interpreted according to mood (Blanchette 
& Richards, 2010). Attention bias refers to the preferential attention to information that is 
associated with mood (Mathews et al., 1997). Memory bias refers to the tendency to 
selectively recall memories that are congruent with a current emotional state (Bower, 1981). 
Specific forms of biased processing predict the risk of developing particular disorders 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). For example, theories of psychosis assign primary importance 
to reasoning bias in the formation of delusional beliefs (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & 
Bebbington, 2002; Blackwood, Howard, Bentall & Murray, 2001), whereas theories of social 
anxiety emphasise negative interpretational bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) and theories of depression emphasise the salient role of biased attribution 
style (Beck, 1976; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling & Tibbs, 1992).  
Interpretation bias in different emotional disorders has been comprehensively studied using 
various strategies: resolution of homophones (Eysenck, MacLeod & Mathews, 1987; Lawson 
et al., 2002), homograph (Richards & French, 1992; Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec 2004), 
ambiguous sentence (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards & Mathews, 1991; MacLeod & Cohen, 
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1993), ambiguous scenarios (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992) and, 
more recently, the resolution of ambiguous stimuli online (Beard & Amir, 2010), morphed 
ambiguous facial expressions (Richards et al., 2002 Webb, Fox & Young, 2002), and the 
manipulation of interpretation (Yiend, Mackintosh & Mathews, 2004). These experiments 
involve stimuli with threatening or neutral meaning (e.g., the homophones weak/week), as 
well as tasks of spelling or evaluation probability, reaction time, lexical decision speed and 
naming latency. Results are generally consistent and yield strong evidence for emotion-
related differences in interpreting threatening versus nonthreatening meanings of ambiguous 
stimuli. Emotionally disordered individuals are more likely than the general population to 
access the threatening meaning of ambiguous information. They might interpret ambiguity in 
a more negative or threatening way and/or reflect an absence of positive thinking.  
1.2.2 Cognitive Bias to be considered as Interpretation Bias 
In addition to interpretation bias, different types of cognitive bias have been considered in 
the literature, including memory recall bias, judgment bias, attribution bias, reasoning bias, 
jumping to conclusions and data gathering bias. Interpretation bias refers to the process 
whereby information is interpreted according to mood (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
Memory recall bias refers to the tendency to selectively recall memories that are congruent 
with a current emotional state (Bower, 1981). Judgment bias is defined as the tendency to 
make judgments by overestimating or underestimating the cost and probability of content-
specific events (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Foa, Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996). Attribution 
bias is a cognitive process whereby individuals interpret stimuli by making causal attributions 
(Teglasi & Fagin, 1984). Reasoning bias, sometimes referred to as ‘jumping to conclusions’ 
(Peters & Garety, 2006; So, Freeman & Garety, 2008) and data gathering bias (Black, 
Howard, Bentall & Murray, 2001; Broome et al., 2007) pervades the literature. It refers to an 
information processing style whereby individuals reach a decision or make interpretations 
based on minimal information in situations in which comprehensive sources are available 
(Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). These biases have been examined in the context of various 
emotional disorders. Results consistently show that individuals with emotional disorders 
prefer a specific interpretation style.  
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1.2.2.1 Judgment Bias 
Judgment bias is defined as the tendency to make judgments by overestimating or 
underestimating the cost and probability of content-specific events (Butler & Mathews, 1983; 
Foa, Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996). Biased estimates of risk might be made based on 
judgemental heuristics such as the availability of one’s own memory and the 
representativeness of the event (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Factors such as self-
evaluation of performance (Cane & Gotlib, 1985), overall life satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983) and subjective anticipation of future events (Butler & Mathews, 1983) may also 
contribute to biased judgements. Although vulnerable individuals consistently display a less 
positive judgment style, judgment bias is not uniquely associated with emotional disorders 
(Williams et al., 1988; Mathews, 1988). Non-depressed students exhibited biased judgment, 
overestimating their control of their responses over outcomes (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). 
Nevertheless, affective factors such as depression, anxiety and phobias are also associated 
with judgment bias. In the same series of early studies (Benassi & Mahler, 1985), depressed 
students were less optimistic but more accurate judges than were non-depressed students 
when asked to judge the degree of personal control they had over certain outcomes. Both 
depressed and non-depressed students overestimate the control others have over outcomes 
(Martin, Abramson & Alloy, 1984). Aided by self-referential judgments, depressed patients 
recalled more emotionally negative than positive events in a homograph recall task (Hertel & 
Brozovich, 2010). Anxious individuals interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening. Patients 
with social anxiety disorders overestimate the probability and cost of negative social 
outcomes (Amin et al., 1998; Stopa & Clark, 1993, 2000). Individuals with social anxiety 
exhibited higher future probabilities for negative social events and lower probabilities for 
positive events (Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin & Foa, 2000). Individuals vulnerable to panic 
dramatically overestimate the proportion of fear-relevant stimuli and aversive outcomes 
(Sutton, Mineka & Tomarken, 1991). These results suggest that judgment bias is pervasive 
in emotionally vulnerable individuals, and that such bias consolidates pathological beliefs.  
1.2.2.2 Attribution Bias 
Attribution bias is a cognitive process whereby individuals interpret stimuli by making causal 
attributions (Teglasi & Fagin, 1984). Studies suggest that estimated control over an event 
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(Weiner, 1985), comparison with others (Kelley, 1967), self-esteem, and the internality, 
stability and global nature of the cause (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978) all 
contribute to developing the bias. Cognitive theories of emotional disorder suggest that this 
biased attribution might determine how an individual evaluates their own competence, in 
order to cope with future unexpected incidents (Stopa & Clark, 1993). According to cognitive 
theories of depression, the tendency to make negative, self-related and future-related 
interpretations after aversive life events is a crucial feature of these disorders (Abramson, 
Metalsky & Alloy, 1989). Attribution bias has been investigated extensively in depression, to 
a lesser extent in anxiety and more recently in psychosis.  The Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) is one of the most frequently used to test 
attribution bias (Garety & Freeman, 1999). It is primarily employed to investigate attribution 
bias in depression. The questionnaire includes various categories of events. Respondents 
are required to write down a major cause of the event as well as to rate it in dimensions of 
internality, stability and globalness. Extending the ASQ in the internality dimension, 
Kinderman and Bentall (1996b) developed a new scale, the Internal Personal and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ), which includes three distinct attribution categories: 
internal, external-personal and external-situational. In addition to the Social Attributions 
Questionnaire (SAQ; Bentall et al., 1991), the IPSAQ is also frequently used to investigate 
attribution bias. As opposed to  a self-referential task, it involves judging social interactions 
between two hypothetical persons. In the depression literature, an internal attribution style 
for negative life events has been identified as a causal factor in depression and low self-
esteem, particularly if it is interpreted as stable, thus diminishing hope for the future (Riskind 
& Alloy, 2006; Alloy et al., 1999, 2006). Social anxiety points to negative internal 
characteristics, and is associated with the belief that threatening social events may result in 
the negative evaluations of others (Wilson & Rapee, 2004; Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin & 
Foa, 2000). Attribution style in psychosis is central to delusional ideation (Allen, Freeman, 
Johns & McGuire, 2006; Johns, Gregg, Allen & McGiure, 2006; Bentall, 1994). These results 
suggest that people with psychosis have a biased attribution style, attributing self-referential 
threatening events to external causes, particularly to people as opposed to the environment 
and to chance (Garety & Freeman, 1999).  
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1.2.2.3 Reasoning Bias, Jumping to Conclusion and Data Gathering Bias 
Reasoning bias, sometimes referred to as ‘jumping to conclusions’ (Peters & Garety, 2006; 
So, Freeman & Garety, 2008) and data gathering bias (Black, Howard, Bentall & Murray, 
2001; Broome et al., 2007) pervades the literature. It refers to an information processing 
style whereby individuals reach a decision or make interpretations based on minimal 
information in situations in which comprehensive sources are available (Huq, Garety & 
Hemsley, 1988). Increased state of anxiety may contribute to reasoning bias, and interact to 
influence the development of psychosis (Lincoln et al., 2010; Exner & Moritz, 2009). The 
beads task (Huq et al., 1988, 1988), based on the classical paradigm by Philips and 
Edwards (1966) is most commonly used to test reasoning bias. Participants were asked to 
decide from which jar randomly drawn beads had come, after being shown mixed coloured 
beads. Fewer beads required before reaching a decision implies a greater tendency to jump 
to conclusions. Numerous studies have replicated and modified this task for use in subtypes 
of psychosis. Results consistently suggest that reasoning bias contributes to acquiring and 
reinforcing delusional beliefs (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine, Gardner, Craigie & Gold, 2007; 
Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2007). Individuals with symptoms of delusion form 
conclusions by gathering less evidence than do normal controls and demonstrate difficulties 
with using sequential information and weaknesses in formal logic. Reasoning bias is also 
observed in other disorders. For example, patients with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
demonstrated a rational and logical decision-making style, and experienced greater difficulty 
making decisions (Brosnan, Chapman & Ashwin, 2014). Individuals with social anxiety 
exhibit a deductive reasoning style, reaching decisions by endorsing prior plausible beliefs 
rather than by considering standard logic (Vroling & Jong, 2009). 
1.2.2.4 Lack of Alternative Interpretation 
Biased interpretation has been understood as a lack of alternative interpretations, or as a 
lack of neutral alternatives (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg & Foa, 2005; Freeman et al., 
2004) and investigating alternative interpretation is fundamental to psychological and 
psychiatric intervention (Freeman et al., 2004; Kuipers, Bebbington & Dunn, 2004). A lack of 
knowledge, the inability to gather alternatives and the unacceptability of consequences make 
it difficult to generate alternative interpretations. The relevance of stimuli to the previous 
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experience of the individual might limit the extent to which they consider alternative 
interpretations (Eysenck et al., 1987, 1987). Recent work on psychosis reveals that a lack of 
willingness to consider alternative interpretations is associated with the severity of the 
delusion (Garety et al., 1997; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001). 
Isolation from social situations and reduced access to alternative, normal interpretations 
might contribute to psychotic appraisals (White et al., 2000). In a study of 100 patients, 
three-quarters did not have available alternative interpretations for their experiences; 
delusions were their only explanation (Freeman et al., 2004). Patients also demonstrated a 
more hasty reasoning style than participants with accessible alternative interpretations. 
Patients with emotional disorders are taught to generate alternative interpretations for 
ambiguous social scenarios using cognitive bias modification, successfully reducing 
information processing bias (Hirsch, Hayes & Mathews, 2009; McManus, Clark & 
Hackmann, 2000). 
1.2.3 Cognitive Theories of Interpretation Bias 
1.2.3.1 Beck’s Schema Model  
Based on systematic clinical observations of depressed and non-depressed patients during 
psychotherapy, Beck employed the term ‘schema’ to designate a cognitive-affective model of 
depression. According to the model, the thoughts and affects typical of depression are 
characterised by specific cognitive patterns. The schema includes all aspects of processing, 
such as attention, reasoning and memory (Beck, 1964; Beck et al., 1979). Characteristic 
thoughts affect how the salient features of information are labelled and recognised, 
influencing beliefs and attitudes and determining responses to events (Beck, 1964). The 
content of schemas reflects the typical cognitive process biases (Beck, 1964). Anxiety and 
depression are characterised by cognitive biases, which differ in content. Anxious individuals 
process anxiety-related stimuli (anticipation of threat); depressed individuals, depression-
related stimuli (self-depreciation). Studies on the Beck (1964) model yield mixed results. 
Depression appears associated primarily with later-stage cognitive bias, such as memory; 
anxiety with early-stage cognitive bias, such as attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mathews, 
1990; Williams et al., 1988). These results suggest that psychotherapy might most effectively 
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be conducted by focusing on modifying the underlying biased cognition, helping the patient 
to consider alternative, more realistic hypotheses when making interpretations. 
1.2.3.2 Bower’s Network Theory  
Later work focused on the development and maintenance of state dependent cognition. 
Bower et al. (1981) introduced an associative network theory, in which anxiety, depression 
and happiness are conceptualised as distinct cognition units with characteristic cognitive 
patterns. The affect activates retrieval of primarily positive or negative memories associated 
with a stimulus, biasing subsequent cognitive processes by priming mood (Bower, 1981). 
Rather than trait emotion, Bower was particularly interested in how state emotion (current 
mood) and cognition work on each other. Implied by the network model (Bower, 1981), the 
current emotional state affects the associated cognitive processes: the interpretation of 
ambiguity and the salience of congruent emotional material. Current mood influences the 
way in which individuals elaborate on inferences from ambiguous events and whether their 
interpretations and predictions are positive or negative (Bower, 1981). State mood therefore 
biases the interpretation of ambiguous material, since such a mood is primed. For example, 
a happy person seems ready to provide an optimistic interpretation, whereas a grouch 
prefers to find fault. However, Bower argued that whether the priming of the mood is 
‘automatic’ or happens by ‘demand’ is still not clear, and could be an important item on the 
research agenda. 
Beck’s schema model and Bower’s network model generate a common hypothesis: that 
depression and anxiety are characterised by mood-congruent bias in all aspects of cognitive 
processing, including attention, reasoning and memory. The content of each determines the 
cognitive processes with which they are associated: anxiety with threat and depression with 
failure (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Anxiety involves attention to and interpretation bias for 
threat-related information (MacLeod et al., 1986; Eysenck, 992); depression involves 
memory bias for negative information (Mathews & Bradley, 1983). Some authors argue that 
cognitive bias in anxiety prevails during the early stages of cognitive processing; depression 
at a later, controlled stage (Mogg et al., 1993). 
 27 
1.2.3.3 Affective Decision Mechanism, Resource Allocation Mechanism and Cognitive 
Motivational Analysis  
Williams et al. (1988) introduced a revised cognitive theory of anxiety and depression, based 
on two mechanisms: the Affective Decision Mechanism (ADM) and the Resource Allocation 
Mechanism (RAM). Consistent with previous theories, each emotional disorder was 
associated with a specific biased cognitive pattern. The ADM works to evaluate whether a 
stimulus is positive or negative by recognising both the nature of the stimulus and the pre-
attentive, automatic biased mood of the individual. The ADM output feeds into the RAM, 
allowing the trait emotion to allocate pre-attentive bias to threat stimuli. For instance, highly 
anxious individuals might tend to endorse threat elements of a stimulus, whereas non-
anxious individuals might shift their attention from the threat. Such distinct mechanisms have 
significant implications for psychotherapy. RAM bias determines individual differences in 
vulnerability to symptoms, so treatment could specifically target this mechanism by 
correcting the bias (Mogg et al., 1998). The hypothesis that pre-attentive and attention bias 
determine subsequent cognitive vulnerability to clinical symptoms is also a key feature of 
Eysenck’s (1991) theory of anxiety. He also suggested that trait anxiety is associated with 
information scanning. The high trait anxiety individual displays a broadening attention before 
recognising a stimulus, and might narrow the attention once the stimulus has been labelled. 
Mogg et al. (1993) conducted a series of studies to test the hypothesis that pre-attentive bias 
dominates in anxiety. The results support Williams et al. (1988), in that pre-attentive bias is 
observed in anxiety, and anxiety differs cognitively from depression. Focusing mainly on pre-
attentive and attention processes, Mogg and Bradley (1998) provided a systematically 
theoretical account of anxiety, suggesting that biased cognitive processes play an important 
role both in determining cognitive behavioural responses and in generating and maintaining 
state emotion. Better theories and models might lead to more effective interventions for 
emotional disorders (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
These theories all emphasise the crucial role of biased cognition in developing and 
maintaining emotional disorders. There is ample work on attention and memory in this field, 
but little on interpretation bias.  
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1.2.3.4 Selective Processing in Anxiety 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) described a cognitive model of selective processing in 
anxiety that not only suggests a critical role for competition and prediction of degrees of 
threat in attention bias, but also accounts for interpretation bias. According to the model, 
anxiety states are associated not only with biased attention to threat, but also with a 
tendency for interpreting ambiguity negatively. They proposed a Threat Evaluation System 
(TES) similar to the ADM (Williams et al., 1988). Both positive and negative stimuli arising 
from ambiguous information are matched using the TES. After competitive emotional 
evaluation in the system, during which output is enhanced by current mood, a positive or 
negative interpretation prevails (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). A more threatening 
interpretation may be enhanced by a prevailing anxious mood in anxious individuals, and a 
more positive interpretation consolidated by positive current emotions in others. 
1.2.4 Interpretation Bias in Emotional Disorders 
According to cognitive theories, biases in interpreting mood-congruent information play a 
role in emotional disorders (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Beck, 1988; Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). The most 
commonly observed interpretation bias is that highly emotionally vulnerable individuals 
interpret emotionally ambiguous material in threatening or less neutral ways. Ambiguity has 
been presented in homophones (Butler & Mathews, 1983), homographs (Hazlett-Stevens & 
Borkovec, 2004), sentences, scenarios, facial expressions (Richards et al., 2002; Webb, Fox 
& Young, 2002) and video actions, with interpretations operationalised as participant 
recognition, self-report, similarity ratings, lexical decisions and reaction time. Recent 
research supports these findings in anxiety disorders, especially social anxiety disorders 
(Constans, Penn, Ihen & Hope, 1999; Stopa & Clark; 2000; Calvo & Castillo, 2001; Voncken, 
Bögels & de Vries, 2003; Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip & Mathews, 2003). When asked to rate 
video social interactions, highly socially anxious students rated ambiguous videos more 
negatively than did non-anxious, dysphoric students (Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005). The 
findings of a reaction time paradigm were similar (Amir, Beard & Przeworski, 2005). Rather 
than responses to a single interpretation, responses to an open-ended task were examined 
in another study of patients with social phobia, and the findings were consistent (Franklin, 
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Huppert, Langner, Leiberg & Foa, 2005). Using similar task strategies, Vassilopoulos (2006) 
found that a subclinical population yielded the same results. This bias could indicate 
negative personal characteristics and be associated with depression (Wilson & Rapee, 
2005). Examining the multiple interpretations of participants for each ambiguous social 
scenario, revealed that highly socially anxious individuals presented more negative and less 
positive responses than did controls (Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa and Mathews, 2007). Using a 
facial expression task, Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, Vaknin, Marom and Hermesh (2008) 
demonstrated negative bias in both socially anxious and depressed individuals; both also 
found it difficult to generate positive interpretations. According to another study, highly 
socially anxious individuals overestimate the social cost of social interaction (Schofield, 
Coles & Gibb, 2007). This biased interpretation is arguably content-specific for socially-
relevant events, and might distinguish socially anxious from depressed patients (Voncken, 
Bögels & Peeters, 2003). All these studies used classical offline, self-report measures. 
Interpretation bias in social anxiety has also been studied using event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs), revealing a negative and lack of positive bias in the socially anxious group 
(Moser et al., 2008). Beard and Amir (2010) confirmed this finding in a mixed methodology 
study of self-report and reaction time paradigms. This lack of positive bias was replicated in 
clinical samples.  However, patients with social phobia do not demonstrate a negative 
interpretation bias with reaction time measure (Amir, Prouvost & Kuckertz, 2012). Another 
study provided support for the cognitive model of social phobia: that interpretation bias 
mediates the relationship between state and trait anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2009). Apart from 
the trait and state mood, biased attention and anxiety-related negative interpretation were 
linked and similar mixed methodology revealed a lack of positive bias in social phobic and 
depressed patients (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim & Fox, 2011). Interpretation bias is thus 
evident in anxiety and depression in both clinical and subclinical populations, and manifests 
as both a negative and a lack of positive interpretation. However, a lack of positive bias does 
not confirm a negative interpretation; these are independent (Amir et al., 2012, 2012).  
Interpretation bias has also been observed in other emotional disorders, notably depression 
and panic disorders. In depression, interpretation bias refers to a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous everyday events negatively and is proposed as the central mechanism of 
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continued depressed mood (Lawson, MacLeod & Hammond, 2002; Rude, Valdez, Odom & 
Ebrahimi, 2003; Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 2010; Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; 
Berna, Lang, Goodwin & Holmes, 2011). In panic disorders, vulnerable individuals only 
make biased interpretations when the scenario matches specific concerns related to their 
panic; such panic-related interpretation bias might contribute to the development and onset 
of panic disorder (Richards, Austin & Alvarenga, 2001; Teachman, Smith-Janik & Saporito, 
2007; Rosmarin, Bourque, Antony & McCabe, 2009). In eating disorders, the interpretation 
bias tends towards appearance concern, maintaining and exacerbating the concern 
(Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy, 2002; Fairburn, Cooper & Shafran, 2003; Rosser, Moss & 
Rumsey, 2010). Biased interpretation has also been observed in post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), in which patients are more likely to interpret current experiences in relation 
to their trauma (Buckley, Blanchard & Neill, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Amir, Coles & Foa, 
2002; Karl, Malta & Maercker, 2006), and in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; 
Rachman, 1997). 
1.2.5 Interpretation Bias in Psychotic Disorders 
Cognitive theories of psychosis suggest that biased cognitive processing in emotional 
disorders might also contribute to the development and maintenance of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis (Bentall et al., 2001; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Freeman et al., 
2002; Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 1998). Specific biases towards negative, threatening, 
and/or persecutory interpretations play an important role in the distress associated with 
these symptoms. Previous work has focused on the interpretation of voices (Morrison, 
Nothard, et al., 2004 Bowe & Wells, 2004), facial expressions (Wout et al., 2007) and virtual 
reality (Freeman et al., 2008), measured using semi-structured interviews and self-reports. 
Earlier research on auditory hallucinations (see Morrison, 2001 for a review) consistently 
show that misinterpreting auditory hallucination as threatening can cause distress, which is 
maintained by safety behaviours (Morrison et al., 1995; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994). In a 
series of studies on auditory hallucination, batteries of self-report questionnaires and a 
structured clinical interview revealed that psychotic patients with auditory hallucinations 
make more threatening interpretations than do psychiatric patients and controls, and that 
they perceived this biased interpretation as more distressing and less controllable (Morrison 
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& Baker, 2000). Psychotic patients are more worried and form more negative interpretations 
about danger and uncontrollability than do patients with persecutory delusions and normal 
controls (Morrison & Wells, 2003). Patients with hallucinations interpret the voices more 
negatively and have a greater tendency to experience hallucinations (Morrison, Nothard, 
Bowe & Wells, 2004). A unique association between distress and interpreting voices in a 
dominating, insulting manner was found (Vaughan & Fowler, 2004). Similar to the research 
strategy used in studies on emotional disorders, the computerised facial expression task was 
used to investigate interpretation and attribution styles in schizophrenia. Results suggest that 
patients are much less accurate recognising facial expression, misinterpreting negative facial 
emotion as neutral (Premkumar et al., 2008). By combining facial expression with audio as 
well as reality environment, Freeman et al. (2008) demonstrated the links between paranoia 
and cognitive vulnerability with affective disturbances in the general population, and 
suggested that threatening interpretation might be due to anomalous experiences 
accompanied by affective disturbances. Biased interpretation has also been observed in 
bipolar disorders. Recent research suggests that patients with bipolar disorder have a 
different interpretation intention than do non-patient groups, favouring ambiguous and angry 
interpretations and hostile, aggressive, guilty intentions (Lahera et al., 2012). 
1.3 Interpretation Bias in Paranoia 
1.3.1 Paranoia 
1.3.1.1 Paranoia in Everyday Life 
The term paranoia is derived from the Greek, "madness" (Lewis, 1970), and describes an 
inclination to be touchy, hostile and aggressive (Pavlovský, 2005). It was reintroduced as a 
prominent condition in persecution delusions in the 19th century (Randall et al., 2003). 
Persecutory beliefs were defined as a perception that one is psychologically or physically 
threatened by others (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Patients might believe such persecution is 
undeserved (“poor me”) or deserved (“bad me”); that one is an innocent victim or punished 
for one's misdemeanours (Trower & Chadwick, 1995). These symptoms occur in milder form 
in everyday psychology, and are prevalent in non-clinical people. Fenigstein and Vanable 
(1992) developed a valid and reliable Paranoia Scale for use in the general population, on 
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which more than half (62%) of participants endorsed a paranoid scale item as at least 
slightly self-descriptive, and the mean total was 42.7 (range: 20-100, SD=10.2) with no 
significant gender differences. Subclinical paranoia was defined as biased self-referential 
thoughts, with features such as mistrust, self-focused thought, suspiciousness, feelings of ill-
will or hostility and conspiratorial intent (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Fenigstein, 1997). 
Results from a three-year epidemiological study of 7075 Dutch citizens indicated that 4.2% 
of the general population showed evidence of delusions or hallucinations, and 17.5% of the 
population reported psychosis-like experiences (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000). In a 
15-year cohort study of 761 New Zealand residents, 12.6% were diagnosed paranoid by the 
age of 26 years (Poulton et al., 2000). In a sample of 324 college students, 47% to 70% 
reported paranoia: a perception that others intended to harm them (Ellett, Lopes & 
Chadwick, 2003). In an online questionnaire administered to 1202 individuals, 15 to 20% of 
the sample reported thoughts of paranoid content, 5% suspected a conspiracy against them 
and 20% were distressed at these thoughts (Freeman et al., 2005). In a recent virtual reality 
study,  over 40% of the general population sample reported paranoid thoughts (Freeman et 
al., 2008). Taken together, these findings reveal high levels of paranoia and paranoid 
thoughts in the general population (Combs, Penn & Fenigstein, 2002; Combs, Michael & 
Penn, 2006). Paranoid beliefs are associated with social circumstances, such as 
powerlessness and victimisation (Harper, 1994; Janssen et al., 2003); demographic risk 
factors, including lower educational levels, younger age and isolation (Marcelis et al., 1998; 
van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000); public self-consciousness and self-attention 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); perceptual abnormalities (Phillips et al., 1999; Peer et al., 
2004); lower self-esteem and negative self-evaluation (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2006); 
and higher distress, worry and anxiety (Freeman et al., 2008; van Os et al., 2000). The 
interaction of these social and cognitive factors with paranoid experiences predicts the onset 
of psychotic illness and other severe disorders in the general population (Chapman et al., 
1994; Kwapil et al., 1997). 
1.3.1.2 Paranoid Psychosis  
Paranoia ranges from daily paranoid beliefs in the general population to clinical symptoms, 
including paranoid delusions in paranoid psychosis (Combs & Penn, 2003; Fenigstein & 
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Vanable, 1992). The most common psychotic symptom is delusions (Breier & Berg, 1999; 
Loch et al., 2011). In nearly half the cases, persecutory delusions involve suspiciousness or 
persecution (Freeman, 2007b). Paranoid schizophrenia is categorised as a subtype of 
schizophrenia in the fifth edition Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-V). Its dominant symptoms are delusions or auditory hallucinations. Typical delusions 
present with persecutory and suspicious ideation and are associated with affective and 
cognitive disturbance. In persecutory ideation, “the individual believes that harm is occurring, 
or is going to occur, to him or her, and that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm” 
(Freeman & Garety, 2000, p.427). Paranoid psychosis is less prevalent in the general 
population. Based on DSM-IV criteria, there is a lifetime prevalence of approximately 1.5% 
for psychosis (Kessler et al., 2005; Gureje, Olowosegun, Adebayo & Stein, 2010). The 
prevalence of persecutory delusions is approximately 0.4% (Gureje, Olowosegun, Adebayo 
& Stein, 2010), with males demonstrating significantly higher lifetime rates than females 
(Morgan et al., 2013). Some argue that paranoid psychosis might exist on a continuum (van 
Os et al., 2000; Johns, 2005; Loch et al., 2011). Approximately 10% of the non-clinical 
population reported symptoms of clinical psychosis, such as paranoid ideation (Freeman, 
2007a). In a general population sample of 7076 individuals, 2.1% met the criteria for 
psychosis, and 17.5% reported at least one positive psychotic symptom (Van Os et al., 
2000). When 1464 Sao Paulo residents were interviewed using the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI), 1.9% of the total sample met the criteria for diagnosis of ICD, 
while 38% reported at least one symptom of psychosis  (Loch et al., 2011). Copious 
research reveals an association between affective symptoms and increased risk of 
developing symptoms of paranoid psychosis. There is strong evidence for the link between 
anxiety and paranoid beliefs (Freeman et al., 2005a; Fowler et al., 2006) and anxiety and 
persecutory delusions (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002; Huppert & 
Smith, 2005). Anxiety arguably contributes to all stages of the development and 
maintenance of paranoia (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Anxiety disorders and psychosis are 
highly comorbid (Michail & Birchwood, 2009, 2013) and low self-esteem and depression are 
also associated with psychosis (Freeman et al., 2001; Bentall & Kaney, 2005; Hartley, 
Barrowclough & Haddock, 2013; Lyon et al., 2014). Both paranoia and low self-esteem are 
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the result of negative internal and external beliefs, which are correlated with the distress of 
paranoid experiences (Freeman, 2007a). Finally, cognitive vulnerability is also significantly 
correlated with psychosis. Biased attentions (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; 
Yiend, 2010), biased reasoning styles (Van Dael et al., 2006; Ellett, Freeman & Garety, 
2008; Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2008; So et al., 2012), biased interpretations (Morrision, 
Northard, Bowe & Wells, 2004), biased attribution styles (Jolley et al., 2006; Ambrojo & 
Garety, 2009).  
1.3.2 Cognitive Theories of Paranoia 
Considering the nature of paranoia, which ranges from suspicious beliefs to persecutory 
delusions, cognitive theories of persecutory delusions were reviewed here in order to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the development and maintenance of paranoia. 
 
1.3.2.1 Mechanisms of the Risk of Paranoia 
Bentall et al. (1994) suggested three types of mechanism that might contribute to the risk of 
paranoia: perceptions of abnormal experiences (e.g., the individual believes his partner has 
been replaced by a impostor), impaired reasoning processes (e.g., jumping to conclusions) 
and biased attribution styles. These authors argue that attribution bias is the core element of 
the paranoia model. Paranoid individuals tend exaggeratedly to attribute negative events to 
external causes. By blaming others for negative outcomes, negative perceptions about the 
self are prevented from reaching consciousness. This attribution triggered defensive 
explanatory bias, and defence against low self-esteem by minimising discrepancies between 
self-representation (actual self) and how one perceives others view the self. These 
interactions are cyclical, affecting one’s self-representations and beliefs about the mental 
states of others and about the outside world, influencing their future attributions and 
contributing to the development of cognitive vulnerability to paranoid thinking.  
1.3.2.2 Garety & colleagues and Freeman & colleagues 
Freeman et al. (2002) incorporated the attribution mechanism proposed by Bentall et al. 
(1994). Rather than focus on defensive attribution, however, a stress-vulnerability framework 
was proposed that assumed that emotional processes, especially anxiety, contribute 
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significantly to the development and maintenance of persecutory delusions. According to this 
model (referred to figure 5.2 for the formation of a persecutory delusion), the formation of 
persecutory delusion begins with an internal or external event (e.g., life-event, drug effect), 
occurring in the context of emotional distress. Vulnerable individuals might experience a 
series of internal anomalies, ranging from abnormal voices and unconscious behaviour to 
subtle cognitive dysfunction and emotional disturbance. Vulnerable people search for 
explanations for external events and anomalous experiences. Individuals with persecutory 
ideas believe that they are vulnerable and others are threatening. Anxiety underlies this 
process and is directly associated with the content of persecution beliefs (Freeman et al., 
2002). Anticipated anxiety typically reflects the persecutory beliefs of an individual, triggering 
anomalous experiences and exacerbating anxiety. Furthermore, higher levels of anxiety lead 
to greater use of safety behaviours, protecting persecutory beliefs by discarding alternative 
explanations. Incorporating other theories, Freeman et al. (2002) also emphasised the 
influence of cognitive bias in the formation and maintenance of persecution beliefs. An 
attention bias for threatening information was noted: the jumping to conclusion bias, in which 
limited information is considered in forming explanations; confirmation bias, in which only 
belief-consistent information is considered; interpretation bias, which involves threatening 
reference and persecution; reasoning bias, the tendency to jump to conclusions; and 
memory bias, where evidence of threat beliefs is provided. These biased cognitions manifest 
differently among individuals, as social factors (e.g., interactions with others). The 
personality of the individual is also influential. 
 
1.3.2.3 Other Recent Cognitive Theories 
The cognitive approach taken by Morrison focused on interpreting abnormal experiences in 
psychosis. In the model, positive psychotic symptoms, such as delusions and hallucinations, 
are considered intrusions into awareness. Interpreting such intrusions was suggested as the 
key cognitive factor in maintaining abnormal experiences. The interpretation of intrusive 
thoughts was influenced by one’s experience, beliefs and knowledge. Misinterpretations 
were associated with faulty self and social understanding conceptualised as a psychotic 
phenomenon. For example, a psychotic individual may misinterpret a television license 
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inspector as evidence of a government conspiracy. These misinterpretations may increase 
emotional distress (e.g., anxiety), physiological dysfunction (e.g., sleep difficulty) and 
cognitive behavioural responses (e.g., safety behaviours), which lead to further abnormal 
experiences. 
Reichenberg (2005) focused on more generic deficits in cognitive functions, suggesting that 
cognitive deficits represent a core impairment in psychosis. Consistent with Frith (1992), 
Reichenberg (2005) emphasised the role of abnormal cognitive functioning in persecutory 
delusions. Abnormal cognition impairs the ability to represent the mental states of others and 
to comprehend social complexities. This may lead to misinterpretation, paranoia and 
isolation. 
In summary, different cognitive models of persecutory delusions are consistent with the role 
of cognitive dysfunction in persecutory beliefs. Attention bias, attribution bias, reasoning 
bias, interpretation bias, information-processing impairment and memory bias are the major 
components of each theoretical mechanism. In particular, negative interpretation is critical to 
the emotional distress associated with persecutory symptoms. However, theories are not yet 
reconciled as to the content of biased information. According to Bentall et al. (1996), 
persecutory delusions reflect an attributional defence; Freeman et al. (1999) argue such 
delusions reflect emotions. The terms used to describe similar stages of biased information 
processing are inconsistent, and distinctions between reasoning bias, attribution bias and 
interpretation bias must be clarified. 
In the next section, the empirical evidence for biased information processing in paranoia will 
be summarised and discussed, with a focus on interpretation bias. In addition to studies on 
paranoia, relevant research on persecutory delusions and paranoid psychosis will be 
examined.  
1.3.3 Recent Evidence on Interpretation Bias in Paranoia  
Interpretation biases matching the concerns of a psychopathology have been implicated in 
the aetiology of emotional disorders, but little research has investigated their presence in 
psychosis. The most relevant works of interpretation bias in paranoia are from our own 
laboratory. In a nonclinical setting, Savulich, Freeman, Shergill and Yiend (2015) 
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investigated pathology-congruent interpretation bias in individuals with high levels of trait 
paranoia. They used one set of material permitting broadly positive/negative (valenced) 
interpretations, while another enabled more or less paranoid interpretations, thus allowing an 
investigation into the content specificity of interpretation biases associated with paranoia. 
They found that individuals with high trait paranoia interpreted ambiguous information more 
negatively than those with low trait paranoia and, crucially, that this effect was more 
pronounced for information directly related to paranoid concerns. This finding reveals that 
interpretation of paranoia-related information might underlie paranoid symptoms in 
individuals with higher vulnerability. Subsequently, a more comprehensive and 
methodologically rigorous investigation was conducted into interpretation bias in a clinical 
sample of patients with psychosis (Savulich, Shergill and Yiend, 2017). This study 
investigated paranoia-relevant interpretation biases in patients with schizophrenia, with and 
without paranoid symptoms, and matched healthy controls. Similar materials to those in the 
above subclinical study were used, including: the Similarity Rating Task, which measures 
interpretation bias with emotionally ambiguous passages; and the Scrambled Sentences 
Task, which measures interpretation bias by requiring participants to reorder strings of words 
to construct grammatically correct statements. This study also included a measure of data-
gathering bias (the Jumping to Conclusion task) to illustrate the important conceptual 
differences between data-gathering biases (which have been widely investigated in 
psychosis populations) and the interpretation biases in emotion processing. Results showed 
negatively biased interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information in both patient 
groups compared to the healthy controls. Paranoid patients showing a stronger bias on 
material permitting paranoid interpretations than on other types of ambiguous information, 
however, mixed with evidence that this content-specific effect applied only to the paranoid 
patient group. This suggested biased interpretation specifically related to paranoia, and 
deserves further detailed empirical investigation as a putative causal and maintaining factor 
for psychosis symptoms. 
Effects of cognitive bias on emotion processing have also been investigated in psychosis. 
These studies suggest interactions among interpretation bias, emotional distress and 
anomalous experiences (Freeman et al., 2002). The interpretation of abnormal experiences 
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and associated emotions was the primary focus. Both structured clinical interview and 
cognition questionnaires are typically used to measure interpretations of abnormal 
experiences, and baseline scales are usually included, to assess general levels of emotional 
distress. Psychotic patients reported auditory hallucinations and interpreted them as more 
uncontrollable and unacceptable more frequently than did the control group (Morrison & 
Baker, 2000). Interpretations of auditory hallucinations were associated with reported 
distress, and in fact predicted levels of distress. Similar results were replicated in other 
experiments. For example, Gaag, Hageman and Birchwood (2003) found that malevolent 
interpretation of voices is associated with anxiety and depression. Vaughan and Fowler 
(2004) then suggested that the contents of these malevolent voices independently liked with 
distressing emotional reactions. Other studies also found that beliefs about voices and 
contents of these voices were predictors of emotional characteristics of voices. Furthermore, 
the metaphysical beliefs were also predictors of voice-hearer’s emotional status (Morrison et 
al., 2004; Close & Garety, 1998).  In summary, interpretations of auditory hallucinations are 
directly associated with emotional distress, and the content of the interpretations may predict 
affect and behaviour.  
The beads task is a classic tool used to assess reasoning bias. Huq, Garety and Hemsley 
(1986) first wrote on reasoning bias, which they termed “jumping to conclusion bias”. 
Participants were presented with a series of different coloured beads and asked to guess 
from which of two jars beads were drawn. The results indicate that, compared to healthy 
participants and other clinical controls, participants with delusions collected less information 
before arriving at a conclusion. This interpretation style of jumping to conclusions is similar to 
data gathering reasoning bias. Results have been replicated using a modified task in similar 
group settings (Fine et al., 2007; Lincoln, et al., 2010; Peters & Garety, 2006; So & Kwok, 
2015), in individuals at risk of mental disorder (Broome et al., 2007; Colbert & Peters, 2002) 
and in first episode psychosis (Falcone et al., 2010). Consistent results have also been 
found with an emotionally salient version of the task, in which positive or negative comments 
are presented to participants (Menon et al., 2008 & Kapur, 2008) and when using pictures of 
black and white fish, assumed to be caught from different lakes (Wood et al., 2009).  
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In addition to the above findings, the significance of emotion in reasoning bias and 
anomalous experiences such as delusions has also been demonstrated. Exposure to a 
stressful urban environment may increase paranoia, anxiety and the jumping to conclusion 
bias, and individuals with psychosis make more negative interpretations about others and 
the environments (Ellett, Freeman & Garety, 2008). Low IQ and emotional bias may also 
contribute to reasoning bias in more complex situations (Jolley et al., 2006) and state anxiety 
may increase jumping to conclusion bias and paranoid beliefs in healthy individuals (Lincoln, 
Ziegler, et al., 2010). Reasoning bias was significantly associated with higher levels of 
delusional conviction; however, the relationship was independent of emotional distress 
(Garety et al., 2005). Freeman and Garety (2008) suggest a direct link between jumping to 
conclusion bias and delusional beliefs. Further research on aetiology, perhaps focusing on 
content in order to test interpretation and reasoning styles, was suggested. 
1.4 Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety 
1.4.1 Social Anxiety 
1.4.1.1 Social Anxiety in Everyday Life 
Social anxiety is pervasive in contemporary society. It is typically understood in lay 
terminology as shyness, and involves the fear and anxiety of being judged and evaluated in 
social situations that involve interaction with other people or performing in public (Heiser et 
al., 2009). It is associated with notions of psychological discomfort, such as being nervous, 
isolated, aloof, withdrawn and inhibited. The Fear of Negative Evaluation and Social 
Avoidance and Distress Scale (FNE & SADS, Watson & Friend, 1969) are widely used to 
measure these concepts in the general population. They measure expectation and anxiety 
related to the negative evaluation of others, as well as avoidance and distress stemming 
from social interactions. The social interaction anxiety scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) is 
another commonly used measure to assess cognitive, affective and behavioural reactions to 
general social interactions. 20 to 48% of the adult American population describes 
themselves as shy (Carducci et al., 2007). The prevalence of social phobia among shy 
people is 18%, significantly higher than the 2–8% in the general population (Henderson, 
Gilbert & Zimbardo, 2014). Gender differences have been implicated, but results are 
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inconsistent when social situation is controlled for (MacKenzie & Fowler, 2013). Cross-
cultural differences in social anxiety have also been found: East Asia has a higher 
prevalence compared to other areas, for example (Schreier et al., 2010). The discomfort 
socially anxious people experience can seriously impact their vocational performance and 
social functioning, causing, for example, difficulty joining social events, establishing intimate 
relationships and presenting work, which can affect academic and career advancement 
(Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer & Klein, 1985). These individuals also tend to avoid social 
situations or abuse drugs or alcohol to alleviate their anxiety and distress when they have to 
be in such situations (Buckner, Schmidt & Eggleston, 2006).  
1.4.1.2 Social Anxiety as a Disorder 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) was officially recognised as a diagnostic entity in the third 
edition of the DSM-III (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Its relatively late 
addition to the official psychiatric nomenclature was due to insufficient disability and high 
comorbidity with personality disorder (Iancu et al., 2011). Clinical and epidemiological 
research on SAD dramatically increase thereafter, and it was recognised as the third most 
common psychiatric disorder in the US after major depression and alcohol dependence 
(Kessler et al., 2005). The lifetime prevalence of SAD is 5 to 12% in the general population, 
the most common period of onset is during adolescence (ages 14 to 17), and the mean 
duration is 16.3 years. Women, individuals with low income and individuals living in rural 
areas were more vulnerable (Kessler et al., 2005; Cox et al., 2008; Rosellini et al., 2013). In 
the latest DSM (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the default term social 
anxiety disorder was used, and it was categorised as persistent and intense fear and 
avoidance of social or performance situations in which embarrassment or humiliation may 
arise. Clinical interviews are most commonly used to diagnose SAD. The Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, DiNardo & Barlow, 1994) and the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First, Spitzer Williams & Gibbon, 1997) 
are the most commonly used structured interviews. The Liebowitz Social Phobia Scale 
(LSPS; Liebowitz, 1987) is recommended as the most popular clinician-rated assessment 
instrument in clinical trials of SAD, and has been increasingly used in a self-report format. 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI; Turner et al., 1989) is another popular self-report 
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measure to assess the critical features of SAD. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Conner 
et al., 2000) is a self-report measure that includes an interview-based scale, the Brief Social 
Phobia Scale (BSPS; Davidson et al., 1991), an assessment specific to the physiological 
symptoms of social anxiety. Individuals diagnosed with SAD scored high on cognitive 
vulnerability, including attention bias (Yiend & Matthews, 2001; MacLeod et al., 2002; 
Sposari & Rapee, 2007; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015), interpretation bias 
(Stopa & Clark, 2000; Wilson & Rapee, 2005; Huppert et al, 2007; Beard & Amir, 2010) and 
memory bias (Mitte, 2008; LeMoult & Joormann, 2012). A substantial comorbid 
psychopathology was also found (Ruscio et al., 2008): 20–50% of patients also had 
substance dependence disorders (Buckner et al., 2013; Cougle et al., 2015) and more than 
50% had at least one other anxiety disorder (Ohayon & Schatzberg, 2010; Raffray & 
Pelissolo, 2011). Social anxiety disorder frequently co-occurred with major depression, also 
a significant risk factor for the subsequent onset of major depression (Beesdo et al., 2007; 
Stein & Stein, 2008). A high prevalence of Axis II disorders, especially avoidant personality 
disorder, was also found in this population (Grant et al., 2005). The high comorbidities and 
lack of treatment lead to functional impairment and negative outcomes, including damaged 
self-esteem, impaired relationships, isolation, financial dependency and suicidal ideation 
(Crozier & Alden, 2001; Ruscio et al., 2008).  
1.4.2 Cognitive Theories of Social Anxiety 
Mechanisms that determine and maintain fears and anxieties are fundamental to 
understanding the psychopathology of social anxiety disorder. Various theories and models 
have been proposed to explain these mechanisms, from the physiological to the 
psychological. Here, the focus is on cognitive approaches that can be incorporated into 
theories of social anxiety disorder.  
Contemporary models proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
have been widely used to explain the cognitive mechanism of social anxiety. Other 
productive theories and frameworks have recently been proposed (Hofmann & Barlow, 2002; 
Kimbrel, 2008; Moscovitch, 2009). In this chapter, the focus is on biased information 
processes, especially biased interpretation and its equivalents. To better understand how 
interpretation bias works, each model is summarised separately.   
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1.4.2.1 Clark and Wells 
The key component of the cognitive behavioural model proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) 
is the function of interoceptive information, when socially anxious individuals try to construct 
internal evaluations. Using interoceptive information, they possess a range of beliefs and 
assumptions, including excessively high standards of social performance (e.g., “I must 
always attract others’ attention”), negative self-evaluations (e.g., “I am weird”), and negative 
social evaluations (e.g., “People think I am weird and avoid me because I am quiet”). These 
beliefs and assumptions function cyclically across stages: prior to, in and after social 
situations. Before entering social situations, socially anxious individuals have already 
developed anxious symptoms, based on a series of negative assumptions. They 
automatically recollect early poor experiences, appraise social situations as threatening and 
make negative predictions about their future performance. On entering social situations, by 
combining past experiences and interoceptive information, they maintain their negative 
beliefs about the social situation and themselves. They believe social situations are 
threatening and perceive their own behaviours as inappropriate or unfavourable, and for 
which others will judge or reject them. They evaluate themselves with a high 'self-focus 
attention' (Clark & Wells, 1995, p. 72), shifting their attention from social interaction to self-
observation, which they monitor with their interoceptive information (e.g., distorting 
observable self-image in mind). To reduce the negative evaluations of others and prevent 
feared catastrophes, socially anxious individuals engage in a series of 'safety behaviours' 
(Clark & Wells, 1995, p. 73), such as keeping quiet to avoid saying something stupid, which 
in fact increase the chance of feared catastrophes, as others may perceive them as 
unfriendly or provoked when they look distant or uninterested as a result of focusing too 
intently on self-monitoring. In addition, safety behaviours maintain negative beliefs, as the 
socially anxious attribute the non-occurrence of feared catastrophes to their safety 
behaviours rather than to their own abilities. After escaping social situations, socially anxious 
people feel their anxiety decline immediately; however, the processing of interoceptive 
information continues. Interactions are selectively retrieved in detail, concluded to be more 
negative than they actually are, and encoded in memory. Predictions of future performances 
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are based on recalling the memory when next entering social events. These steps maintain 
a close cycle of social anxiety, causing socially anxious people to avoid social interaction. 
1.4.2.2 Rapee and Heimberg 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) use the term “audience” to describe anyone who may perceive 
the appearance or behaviour of socially anxious people. According to their model, biased 
cognition processes are important in generating and maintaining social anxiety. The notion 
that socially anxious individuals perceive others as evaluating them negatively was also 
emphasised. However, these processes are similar, regardless of which stages of social 
interactions socially anxious individuals actually encounter. At each stage of social event, 
socially anxious individuals allocate attention to the 'mental representation' (p. 742) of their 
self-image as seen by others, and to potential external evaluations. They then estimate the 
probability of receiving negative evaluations by comparing internal representations with 
appraisals of the audience’s expected standard. This cycle maintains the anxiety and 
progresses symptoms from cognitive behavioural to physical.  
1.4.2.3 Other Cognitive Theories 
The psychological maintenance model proposed by Hofmann (2007) extended previous 
theories by emphasising central elements of social mishap and mistake-rumination. He 
proposed that socially anxious individuals tend to interpret neutral social situations as 
mishaps, because they perceive their social skills negatively and overestimate the negative 
results of their social engagements. They commonly avoid or use safety behaviour to avoid 
social mishaps. However, both strategies involve processing and mistake-ruminations, which 
disturb social interaction, leading to more mistakes and further anticipation of social mishap. 
Kimbrel (2008) proposed a unified model, integrating a wide range of factors from biological 
and environmental to cognitive. The model suggested that shyness or an inhibited 
temperament is a key aetiological factor in social anxiety. Cognitive bias towards socially 
negative information mediated the effect of behaviour inhibition style on social anxiety when 
anticipating socially threatening scenarios. Biased processes interact with perceptions of 
social threat, contributing to the maintenance of negative beliefs and expectancies. 
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Moscovitch (2009) conceptualised the core fear of social anxious patients as exposure of 
self-attributes, which they believe are deficient according to the social expectations of 
potential observers. Socially anxious individuals perceive flaws in their social skills and 
performance, in concealing their anxious symptoms, in their general appearance and 
character. The author suggests that focusing on each of these concepts might facilitate pre-
treatment assessment and enhanced treatment outcomes.  
Pescharda and Philippota (2015) proposed a conceptual framework for social anxiety with 
working memory as its central concept (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). In 
this framework, attentional control interacts with factors like task goals (e.g., high self-
standard for social performance), stimulus salience (e.g., critical verbal insults), selection 
history (e.g., effects of information in recent experience) and long-term memory to determine 
which content enters working memory. Furthermore, biased intention leaves limited 
resources to monitor neutral information, exacerbating the tendency to form biased 
memories of social threatening information. Memory biases may then work back to the cycle 
by heightening sensitivity to social threats, that maintain social anxiety. 
In summary, different cognitive theories are consistent with the significance of biased 
information processing in maintaining social anxiety disorder. Interpretation, attention and 
memory are the key mechanisms of these theories. However, theories have not yet reached 
consensus on content specification of biased information processing. Furthermore, biased 
information processing does not contribute to social anxiety in the same way in all models. 
Finally, it is unclear whether biased processing happens at all or only at certain stages of 
information processing.  
In the next section, the empirical evidence for biased information processing, with a special 
focus on biased interpretation and evaluation of cognitive behavioural approaches to social 
anxiety disorders, are summarised and discussed. 
1.4.3 Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety 
There is ample evidence that interpretation bias is closely related to social anxiety. Verbal 
social ambiguities displayed in homographs (e.g., Amir, Beard & Przeworski, 2005), 
sentences (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2010; Amir, Prouvost & Kuckertz, 2012) and scenarios (e.g., 
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Stopa & Clark, 2000; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; Hupperta et al., 2007) are the most common 
strategies used to examine interpretation bias in social anxiety. The major finding of these 
studies is that socially anxious individuals experience and interpret social information 
negatively, but to different degrees. Early results indicated that community volunteers 
interpreted socially threatening information in emotionally congruent ways (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997). The same applies in clinical settings (Amin et al., 1998). Participants were 
presented with social scenarios, each followed by positive, negative and neutral 
interpretations, and were asked to rank them according to likelihood. Socially anxious 
individuals made more negative than positive interpretations, but only in self-relevant 
scenarios, suggesting an interpretation bias for self-related social information in social 
anxiety as opposed to anxiety disorders in general. These results were replicated in studies 
that measured interpretation bias by ratings of ambiguous or threatening social information 
(Stopa & Clark, 2000; Huppert et al., 2003; Voncken, Bogels & Vries, 2003; Wilson & Rapee, 
2005) and positive social information (Vassilopoulos, 2006; Laposa, Cassin & Rector, 2010). 
Interpretation biases ranged from negative to catastrophic in response to how socially 
threatening were the presented scenarios (Stopa & Clark, 2000). In addition to negative 
interpretation bias, socially anxious individuals also tend to provide fewer benign and 
positive interpretations than non-socially anxious individuals (Amir et al., 2012, 2012; 
Constans et al., 1999; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; Huppert et al., 2007).   
Ecologically non-verbal stimuli have also been commonly used to demonstrate interpretation 
bias in socially anxious individuals. Emotional facial expressions (EFE) are the most widely 
used. Socially anxious individuals were able to identify EFE as accurately as non-socially 
anxious individuals, without interpretation bias (Philippot & Douilliez, 2005; Schofield et al., 
2007, 2007). However, they were more sensitive to angry face cues in ambiguous pictures. 
For example, Richards et al. (2002) used computer-manipulated images of six blended facial 
expressions ranging from happiness to anger (happiness, surprise, angry, fear, disgust and 
sadness). Different proportions of happy or angry expressions were presented to each 
participant for classification. Results showed that socially anxious individuals categorised 
more ambiguous faces as expressing fear than did non-socially anxious individuals. Similar 
results were found in other studies (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Kuckertz & Amir, 2015), by 
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using different methodologies, such as by testing reaction/response time (Yoon & Zinbarg, 
2008), by showing lack of positive bias in socially anxious individuals (Moser et al., 2008), by 
employing positive facial expressions (Heuer, Rinck & Becker, 2007), and by providing a 
crowd of faces in each single trial (Douilliez et al., 2012). The findings were replicated in a 
clinical sample (Mohlman, Carmin & Price, 2007). Amir, Beard and Bower (2005) 
investigated interpretation bias using videos of an actor or actress approaching the audience 
and commenting on the audience. Participants were asked to rate the emotional valance of 
each video; how they would feel in each situation. Results revealed that socially anxious 
individuals rated the valance of ambiguous social interactions more negatively than did non-
socially anxious individuals.  
Socially anxious individuals thus tend to interpret ambiguous, social information negatively. 
These biases emerge in response to both semantic and vivid expression stimuli, when 
stimuli are restricted to socially relevant information.  
1.5 Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
1.5.1 Links between Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
31% of first-episode psychosis patients meet the criteria for social phobia. Although social 
phobia and paranoid disorders are organised under two separate categories in the DSM-V, 
empirical evidence suggests an aetiological overlap in both the clinical and general 
population (Gilbert et al., 2005; Rietdijk et al., 2009). Social phobia is conceptualised as a 
co-morbid or prodromal symptom of schizophrenia (Cassano et al., 1998; Pallanti et al., 
2004). They might share common psychological cognitive processes (Beck et al., 1985; 
Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and paranoid ideation might precede the development of social 
phobia (Rietdijk et al., 2009). Social anxiety can be the result of a psychotic episode 
(Birchwood et al., 2006). 
Paranoid thinking and anxiety-related processes are linked. Patients with social anxiety 
disorder sometimes report psychotic-like experiences (Gilbert et al., 2005). The role of 
anxiety in psychosis has been increasingly recognised (Freeman et al., 2005a; Fowler et al., 
2006; Johns et al., 2004; Martin & Penn, 2001). Anxiety contributes to the formation of 
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thoughts with paranoid content, maintaining the distress associated with paranoia (Freeman 
et al., 2001; Freeman & Garety, 2000). A close relationship has been established between 
social anxiety and paranoia (Martin & Penn, 2001; Johns et al. 2004; Freeman et al. 2008). 
Social anxiety and paranoia share many of the same predictive factors, such as 
interpersonal sensitivity (negative beliefs about self and others), social evaluative concerns 
and socially phobic behaviour (Freeman et al., 2008). Nevertheless, social anxiety and 
paranoia differ experientially (Freeman et al., 2008) and the direction of these causal factors 
predict their nature and extent. Socially anxious individuals are afraid of negative evaluation, 
whereas paranoid individuals are afraid of persecution (Rietdijk et al., 2009). In a virtual 
reality study, Freeman et al. (2008) found that the anticipation of threat increased the risk of 
paranoid reactions but decreased the risk of social anxiety. The identification of causal 
factors that predict these experiences suggests the possibility of differentiating pathology. A 
key impetus of this study is therefore to identify which aetiological factors distinguish social 
anxiety from paranoia. 
1.5.2 Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety and Psychosis 
Disorder-congruent information processing bias is aetiologically significant. It involves 
selectively prioritising cognitive processing, thus maintaining pathological beliefs. Of 
particular interest is selective attention, which contributes to developing and maintaining 
social anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Beck et al., 1979; Mogg & Bradley, 1988; 
Eysenck, 1992) and psychotic disorders (Morrison, 2001; Mackintosh et al., 2006). It is a 
tendency consistently to favour a particular stimulus. According to the literature, the 
tendency is to interpret ambiguous information as less positive, negative or threatening 
(Butler & Mathews, 1983, Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006). In the classical 
cognitive model (Beck, 1964), it affects the way individuals label and recognise salient 
features of information, contributing to one’s beliefs and attitudes and determining responses 
to events. More specifically, an interpretation style might reflect a characteristic emotional 
trait (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). Anxiety and psychosis are arguably each characterised 
by a cognitive bias, which differs in content. Anxious individuals prefer to process anxiety-
related stimuli (anticipation of threat) (Clark & Wells 1995), whereas psychotic individuals 
prefer the paranoid-related stimulus (anticipation of persecution) (Freeman, 2007). 
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Identifying causal factors that differentially predict these experiences suggests the possibility 
of different underlying pathologies. There are as yet no studies on interpretation bias in 
social anxiety and psychosis. Paranoia is accompanied by a feeling of oddness that may 
lead to interpreting stimuli as threatening (Freeman et al., 2008). Interpretation bias has long 
been associated with social anxiety. For instance, individuals may overhear someone 
whisper when they pass them in a corridor. From the many possible interpretations of this 
scenario, anxious individuals tend to be biased towards making a negative interpretation, 
such as ‘they are gossiping about me’. In contrast, non-anxious individuals may interpret it 
as, ‘they are just chatting’. Interpretation has been widely studied, based on the hypothesis 
that anxious individuals will interpret ambiguous information in a more threatening way. 
1.6 Study Aims 
This aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between interpretation bias, social 
anxiety and paranoia. The hypothesis is that different styles of interpreting emotionally 
ambiguous information are causally associated with specific symptomatology and pathology 
emerges. For example, an interpretation that assumes intent of harm (e.g., seeing two 
people whispering while looking at you means, ‘they are plotting against me’) is likely to 
precipitate negative paranoid thoughts, possibly ultimately persecutory delusions. 
Conversely, the same ambiguity may be interpreted to mean that others are subjecting one 
to negative evaluation (e.g., seeing two people whispering while looking at you means, ‘they 
are talking about my faults’). This is likely to precipitate socially anxious thoughts, and 
possibly ultimately social anxiety disorder. 
1.7 Outline of Current Experiments 
This thesis consists of five experiments, which are designed to test different aspects of the 
hypothesis: one longitudinal study (incorporating two separate experimental questions) plus 
three cross-sectional studies (one of which recruited a large clinical sample of patients with 
social anxiety disorder, paranoid psychosis and non-paranoid psychosis, as well as healthy 
controls). A range of tests of interpretation bias were administered to improve the validity of 
the findings (specifically, the Similarity Ratings Task, the Scrambled Sentences Task and the 
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Word-Sentence Association Paradigm) and a number of self-report measures of social 
anxiety and paranoia traits, as well as clinical diagnostic interviews for the patient samples. 
In Experiment 1 (n=84), the form and strength of the associations between the hypothesised 
different types of interpretation bias (socially anxious resolutions/paranoid resolutions) and 
the traits of social anxiety versus paranoia were examined. A significant association between 
different types of interpretation bias and their content-specific emotion traits was anticipated. 
The negatively evaluated (socially anxious resolutions) interpretation bias will be more 
strongly associated with social anxiety than the persecutory (paranoid resolutions) 
interpretation bias. Conversely, the persecutory (paranoid resolutions) interpretation bias will 
be more strongly associated with paranoia than the negatively evaluated (socially anxious 
resolutions) interpretation bias. 
Experiment 2 (n= 80) is an extension of Experiment 1. The task design is altered in order to 
directly contrast paranoid and socially anxious interpretations (rather than contrasting 
paranoid versus non-paranoid and socially anxious versus non-socially anxious 
interpretations). Under this forced-choice experimental design, a significant association 
between persecutory interpretation and its content-specific emotion (paranoia) is anticipated, 
as well as a significant association between negatively evaluated interpretation and its 
content-specific emotion (social anxiety). 
Experiment 3 (n = 71) is a longitudinal follow-up study, for which Experiment 1 served as the 
baseline. This study tests whether content-specific interpretation bias predicts corresponding 
traits six months later, as an indirect test of the causal role of interpretation bias in 
precipitating social anxiety and paranoia. We expect negatively evaluated interpretation bias 
to predict subsequent social anxiety traits, and persecutory interpretations to predict 
subsequent paranoia traits. Moreover, the interaction effects between the two types of bias 
in predicting corresponding trait emotions (social anxiety/paranoia) will be tested. 
In Experiment 4, a combination of existing data and new data collected over a six-month 
period is used to test the hypothesis of reciprocal causality (do traits exacerbate congruent 
bias in addition to bias-maintaining traits, such that a vicious cycle is established?). The data 
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is expected to be consistent with this model in the case of trait social anxiety and its 
congruent biases, and in the case of trait paranoia and paranoid bias.   
In Experiment 5, a large clinical sample and healthy controls (n= 102) will be recruited to 
examine questions similar to those in the previous subclinical samples. A pattern broadly 
consistent with content-specific interpretation bias in both social anxiety and paranoid 
psychotic patients was anticipated.
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Chapter 2 Experiment 1: Investigation of Interpretation Bias 
in Social Anxiety and Paranoia 
2.1 Experiment Overview 
There is evidence that the psychological mechanisms of social anxiety and paranoia over lap 
(Gilbert, Boxall, Cheung & Irons, 2005). Both socially anxious and paranoid individuals feel 
vulnerable (Salvatore et al., 2012) and make biased, emotionally ambiguous interpretations 
(Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). While the two disorders 
share a common aetiology, they are, however, driven by different motives (Rietdijk, Van Os, 
Graaf, Delespaul & Gaag, 2009). The socially anxious fear negative evaluation, whereas the 
paranoid fear persecution. Biased interpretations are of aetiological significance in both, and 
contribute towards maintaining the disorders (Amin, Foa & Coles, 1998; Bentall et al., 2009; 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Morrison, 
2001; Stopa & Clark, 2000). Using a cross-sectional design and a broad population, the 
association between biased interpretations in social anxiety and paranoia is examined in this 
experiment. Biased interpretations are tested using three cognitive experimental tasks. Each 
task consists of socially anxious congruent/benign and paranoid congruent/benign content. A 
typical ambiguous situation might be a stare from a stranger or strangers. Socially anxious 
congruent indices are conveyed by presenting this ambiguous situation in a sentence; for 
example, “the strangers are gossiping about me”. Paranoid congruent indices are conveyed 
by presenting the situation by means of a suspicious sentence, “the stranger is stalking me”. 
Regression analyses are used to examine the predictive value of interpretation bias in social 
anxiety and paranoia.  
2.1 Background 
Social anxiety refers to negative beliefs about the threatening evaluations of others (Mattick 
& Clarke, 1998). Paranoia involves persecutory beliefs about being threatened or harmed by 
others (Freeman, Garety & Phillips, 2000). They both concern threats and interpretation 
processes in identifying threats. According to both cognitive models of social anxiety and 
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paranoia, vulnerability is maintained by interpreting emotional ambiguities as threatening. 
First, biased interpretations occur as pre-existing anomalous beliefs to deal with ambiguous 
situations (Close & Garety, 1998; Amir, Prouvost & Kuckertz, 2012). For example, in the 
situation when entering a party without receiving attention, socially anxious individuals with 
beliefs such as “I am boring” might interpret this as they are being boring, whereas paranoid 
individuals with beliefs such as “I am isolated” might interpret this as others being suspicious 
of them. Rather than producing biased interpretation based on external feedback at the time 
of an actual social event, vulnerable individuals often report stereotyped, pre-existing 
interpretations. Second, confusion and emotional changes typically accompany these 
interpretations, and drive a search for the meaning of such emotional ambiguities (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). For example, in the same situation, both types of vulnerable individuals 
may feel anxious and self-conscious. Such negative feelings increase the tendency towards 
biased interpretations and avoidance behaviours at social events, leading to confirmatory 
evidence and maintenance of threatening beliefs. To our knowledge, these biases have not 
yet been empirically distinguished, as the two are measured separately without comparisons 
(Amir, Prouvost & Kuckertz, 2012; Savulich, Freeman, Shergill & Yiend, 2015). A paradigm 
that measures both negative (social anxiety indices) and suspicious (paranoia indices) 
interpretations would differentiate between the two interpretation biases. 
Most interpretation paradigms have been developed in order to study emotional disorders, 
generally distinguishing between interpretations based on pre-existing beliefs (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000). Interpretations are made when emotional ambiguities are first encountered. 
Paradigms usually measure pre-existing interpretation by using recall or question answering. 
Typically, ambiguous information is presented (e.g., scenarios), followed by possible 
interpretations. Participants are asked to respond to a range of interpretations in different 
ways, for example by rating how closely the interpretations relate to the scenarios, (Eysenck, 
Mogg, May, Richards & Mathews, 1991), or by ranking the accuracy of alternative 
interpretations in relation to emotional ambiguities (Stopa & Clark, 2000). The Similarity 
Rating Task (SRT; Eysenck et al., 1991) is the classical paradigm used to measure 
interpretation bias, established in anxiety studies. The researchers presented groups of 
participants, who ranged from none to severe on a social anxiety measure, with ambiguous 
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scenarios that could be understood in a negative or a positive way; for example, “Your boss 
asked you for a talk”. Alternative extensions of these sentences are generated, rendering 
them unambiguously threatening or relatively positive (e.g., by referring to being promoted 
versus being fired). Participants then rated how consistent the interpretations were with the 
original sentences. The results of the two SRT experiments (Eysenck et al., 1991) indicated 
that anxious participants showed more negative beliefs on socially ambiguous scenarios 
than healthy controls; their biased interpretation reflects their anxious mood. This is the only 
task so far used in both social anxiety and psychosis studies. The SRT allows interpretation 
bias and response bias to be separated, validating the difference in interpretation bias 
between vulnerable individuals and healthy controls. However, experimental material 
matching other emotional information is limited, and the non-threatening can be subdivided 
into precise subtypes (e.g., positive or benign). To test the pre-existing beliefs on 
interpretation processes, Beard and Amir (2010) developed the Word Sentence Association 
Paradigm (WSAP) for a study on social anxiety. They presented possible interpretations 
before the ambiguous stimuli. Threatening (e.g., avoid) and benign (e.g., greet) primes were 
displayed first, followed by ambiguous sentences (e.g., you see a group of people 
approaching). This design imitates the priming effects of pre-existing interpretations. In 
addition to the self-report, Beard and Amir (2010) included a measure of reaction time, which 
was recorded to indicate how quickly a participant accepted or rejected a priming 
interpretation. A biased interpretation style was observed in reaction time and self-report 
data. This was the first comprehensive paradigm of interpretation bias to measure both self-
report and reaction time. Reaction time records the time participants spend on determining 
how the prime and ambiguous stimuli relate. The Scrambled Sentence Task (Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998) elicits the initial interpretations of ambiguous information. The SST is well 
established and widely used in depression studies. Its reliability in both clinical and 
subclinical populations has been established. Participants are presented with strings of six 
words (e.g., interesting me people boring other find) and asked to unscramble them to form 
five-word statements. The valence of the statement can be positive (e.g., other people find 
me interesting) or negative (e.g., other people find me boring). In addition, participants are 
asked to memorise a six-digit number while unscrambling the words. The hypothesis is that, 
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the more an individual suppresses negative interpretations, the more they will produce 
interpretation bias. The results of a recent SST study (Savulich et al., 2015) revealed a 
negative interpretation bias in individuals with paranoia. The SST is the most sensitive 
measure for testing interpretation in paranoia. Memorising numbers during the task 
ostensibly reduces the cognitive distraction of unwanted thoughts. It is arguably difficult, 
however, to identify the cognitive processes active in SST. The selection of words is possibly 
due to an attention bias. Most studies focus only on one type of the interpretation bias. Using 
measurements in multiple dimensions will ensure that our experiment covers all stages of 
biased interpretation processing. Our results will be enhanced if different tasks yield similar 
results and using various tasks helps balance the strengths and limitations of each. For 
example, using SST will ameliorate the limitation of SRT: its relatively exclusive focus on 
interpretation biases. This allows a broader scope of cognitive processes to be tested. 
In the current experiment, we assessed interpretation bias in both social anxiety and 
paranoia using three paradigms: the Similarity Rating Task (SRT), the Word Sentence 
Association Paradigm (WSAP) and the Scrambled Sentences Task (Husstedt et al., 2002). 
This design differs from previous studies in three ways. First, it includes both a social anxiety 
and a paranoia related content in each cognitive paradigm. This allows content specificity to 
be tested, as well as two interpretation biases to be compared in terms of their 
corresponding symptoms. Content specificity in interpretation bias is related to biases in 
favor of one’s emotional concerns, matching core psychopathological traits (e.g., interpreting 
ambiguous social events as negative, exacerbating social anxiety) (Mathews & MacLeod, 
1994). Second, we employed measures of interpretations in multiple dimensions, allowing 
testing of both pre-existing stereotype interpretations and encountered interpretations in a 
social context. Both self-reported and reaction time measures are included, allowing implicit 
measurement of interpretation bias. Third, data is analysed not only according to the 
precedent set by the literature, but also according to the major research interests here. The 
precedent in the literature on anxiety and depression compares interpretation bias in 
individuals with different emotional traits. This is a typical design, directly testing the existing 
cognitive theory of social anxiety, according to which socially anxious individuals produce 
more negative (trait-matched) interpretation bias than do healthy controls. In this design, the 
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emotional trait is used as the independent variable, in order to test how it relates to 
interpretation bias. The aim in the current thesis is to confirm whether the current results are 
consistent with previous findings in the literature. The proposed aetiological role of 
interpretation bias has been developed from the following theoretical rationale: if emotionally 
vulnerable individuals differ in interpretation bias, the direction of interpretation bias may 
predict the potential bias-congruent emotional trait. In the current thesis, the major research 
interest is the aetiological importance of interpretation bias in identifying corresponding 
emotional traits or symptoms. Although we are unable to test the aetiological role of 
interpretation bias in the current cross-sectional setting, we will investigate separately the 
association of interpretation bias in relation to the social anxiety and paranoia traits.  
Our hypothesis is stated in two parts:  
Part 1: Testing the precedent in the literature: there is a direct, content-specific association 
of emotional traits towards trait-congruent interpretation bias 
I. Social anxiety is more strongly associated with the negatively-evaluated (social 
anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias than paranoia  
II. Conversely, paranoia is more strongly associated with the persecutory (paranoia 
congruent content) interpretation bias than social anxiety. 
Part 2: Testing the major research interest of the project: there is content-specific 
association of interpretation bias towards its content-congruent emotional traits. 
III. The negatively-evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias is 
more strongly associated with social anxiety than the persecutory (paranoia 
congruent content) interpretation bias. 
IV. Conversely, the persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias is more 
strongly associated with paranoia than the negatively-evaluated (social anxiety 
congruent content) interpretation bias. 
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Experiment Design 
We tested individuals with a wide range of scores on social anxiety and paranoia using a 
battery of self-report personality measures and tests of interpretation bias. In order to 
measure interpretation biases for socially-ambiguous information (“negative evaluation”) 
versus paranoia-relevant information (“persecution”), three cognitive experimental tasks (the 
Scrambled Sentences Task (SST), the Similarity Rating Task (SRT) and the Word-sentence 
Association Task (WSAP)) were developed, each containing material reflecting both types of 
content.  
2.2.2 Participants 
84 non-clinical volunteers (59 female, 25 male) were eligible for participation and completed 
all experiment procedures. Participants consisted mainly of students and staff at King’s 
College, London, and were recruited by circular email after meeting inclusion criteria for the 
study. The inclusion criteria were (a) being over 18 years of age, (b) fluent in English and (c) 
not having been diagnosed with any psychological or psychiatric disorder and not currently 
receiving treatment for any psychological or psychiatric disorders, including 
psychopharmacological medication. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (n = 54), 
with the sample also including participants of Asian (n = 10), Black/African/Caribbean (n = 8) 
and other (n = 12) origins. Ages ranged from 18 to 60 years (M = 29.06, SD = 12.22). The 
educational attainments of participants ranged from high school (n = 14) to university (n = 
69); only one participant indicated "other". 
2.2.3 Recruitment 
This study was approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics 
Subcommittee. Ethical conduct was adhered to, as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research. Recruitment began in June 2011 and 
lasted for four months. Internal circular emails and posters on local public notice boards at 
KCL were used. Volunteers were sent a study information sheet, and completed a 
recruitment questionnaire, which included contact details, demographic information and two 
mood questionnaires: the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
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and the Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). Inclusion criteria were to 
be fluent in English and aged between 18 and 60 years. The exclusion criterion was 
currently receiving or having previously received treatment or counselling for mental health 
problems. Participants with a wide range of scores on the mood questionnaires were 
selected. Eligible volunteers were invited to participate in the study using the contact details 
provided. 
2.2.4 Materials 
2.2.4.1 Measures of Emotional Trait 
A thorough literature review was conducted to identify measures of social anxiety and 
paranoia. We reviewed instruments used in same area of research, checking whether items 
suited the specific needs of this study, including the specific population and psychological 
mechanism under study. Five social anxiety measures and three paranoia measures were 
finally selected. These were designed to measure the relevant emotional traits, were 
sensitive to the relevant population and were suitable in length. 
Measures of social anxiety 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) and Social Avoidance and Distress (SADS) 
Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) These two scales were developed to measure the 
exclusion criteria of two constructs reflecting social evaluative anxiety: the FNE, which 
included 30 true/false items assessing the expectation and distress related to the negative 
evaluation of others. The Cronbach alpha rating for the internal reliability of FNE was 0.94 
to 0.98; the test-retest reliability, 0.78 to 0.94 (Watson & Friend, 1969). The SADS consists 
of 28 true/false items, which assess distress at and avoidance of social situations. The 
SADS is highly reliable in college students, with an internal consistency of 0.94 and test-
reliability of 0.68 (Watson & Friend, 1969).  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Ayesa-Arriola et al.) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998) The SIAS is composed of 20 items and scored on a five-point 
scale: 0 (not at all characteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me). It assesses 
anxiety at initiating and maintaining interactions with people in social situations. The SPS is 
designed to assess anxiety symptoms related to performing various tasks (writing, drinking, 
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eating in public) while observed by other people. It consists of 20 items. Each SPS item is 
rated on a five-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all characteristic or true of me) to 4 
(extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS and SPS have good internal consistency, 
with a Cronbach alpha rating of 0.88 to 0.94 and test re-test reliability of 0.92 and 0.93 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998). Correlation coefficients with scores on other social anxiety indices 
ranged from 0.53 to 0.77, and the convergent validity of SIAS was moderate to strong (e.g., 
Hughes et al., 2006; Mattick & Clarke, 1998), 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS, Liebowitz, 1987) This measure is used to screen 
participants for social anxiety disorder, and has been widely used to assess a full range of 
performance and social difficulties. It includes two subscales, producing indices of fear and 
avoidance of social interaction (11 items) and performance (13 items). Each consists of a 
four-point scale ranging from 0 to 3. Scores represent how participants have felt during the 
past weeks, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. Its internal consistency and re-
test reliability are excellent, at 0.95 to 0.98 (Heimberg et al., 1999; Masia-Warner et al., 
2003) and 0.92 (Mattick and Clarke, 1998), respectively. Good convergent validity has also 
been found (Heimberg et al., 1999; Masia-Warner et al., 2003). 
Measures of paranoia 
Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (GTPS, Green et al., 2008) This scale consists of 
two subscales that assess ideas of social reference and ideas of persecution rated on five-
point Likert-type scales, from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Totally). Four items from each dimension 
(conviction, preoccupation and distress) were chosen and four items simply reflecting a 
statement of a paranoid thought. Cronbach alpha values for the GTPS are 0.83 in the non-
clinical population and 0.82 in the clinical population (Green et al., 2008). Convergent 
validity with scores of other paranoia measures ranged between 0.43 and 0.71 in non-
clinical samples and 0.39 and 0.81 in clinical samples (Green et al., 2008). 
Self-report Paranoia Scale (PS, Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) This scale was designed to 
measure the incidence of paranoia in a non-clinical college population. Participants rate 
their agreement with each of 20 items on a five-point scale (1 - not at all applicable, 5 - 
extremely applicable). Scores can range from 20 to 100, with higher scores indicating 
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greater paranoid ideation. It is the most widely used dimensional measure of paranoia. The 
Cronbach alpha of the PS ranged from 0.81 to 0.87 across four non-clinical samples 
between 1985 and 1988, indicating a substantial degree of internal consistency. Its test re-
test reliability was at 0.70, indicating good stability (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). The 
convergent validity of the PS with the Paranoia checklist ranged from 0.58 to 0.71 (Freeman 
et al., 2005).  
Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999) This inventory is used to assess 
delusional ideation in the non-clinical population on a behavioural measure, including 
measures of distress, preoccupation and conviction. In non-clinical samples, Cronbach’s 
alpha for the PDI ranges from 0.77 to 0.82, suggesting satisfactory internal reliability (Jones 
& Fernyhough, 2007; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 2004), with a test re-test reliability ranging 
from 0.78 to 0.81). Convergent validity with the Delusions-Symptoms-State Inventory was 
estimated at 0.61 (Foulds & Bedford, 1975; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 2004).    
2.2.4.2 Tasks of Interpretation Bias 
The Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; adapted from Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998)  
The SST used for this study was a modified version of the original task developed by 
Wenzlaff and Bates (1998), which assesses the tendency to interpret ambiguous information 
in positive or negative ways. It was commonly used in depressed populations, in which the 
internal reliability ranged from 0.69 to 0.79, and the validity in relation to other similar tasks 
was medium to high (Novovic et al., 2014). There were two sets of materials. In each set, 
participants were asked to rearrange a group of mixed up words. There were two possible 
solutions: a paranoid or benign interpretation in one set of SST, testing persecutory 
interpretation bias, and a socially anxious or benign interpretation in the other set of SST, 
testing negative interpretation bias. Participants rearrange the mixed up words, with two 
possible solutions: a paranoid or socially anxious interpretation. Participants unscramble five 
words to form grammatically correct sentences, placing a number over each of the five 
words to indicate the order of the words. 20 items were developed in each set. As seen in 
Figure 2.1, in the paranoia set, each scrambled sentence contained a word reflecting 
paranoia and a neutral word. In the social anxiety set, each scrambled sentence contained a 
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word that reflected social anxiety, and a neutral word. Responses yielded scores for social 
anxiety and paranoia bias. These scores were calculated based on whether participants 
disambiguated the sentences to form statements that  matched the original sentences 
exactly.  
Figure 2.1 Example items of SST 
SST used in Exp 1 
Set 1: testing persecutory interpretation  
Scrambled words: 
feel tend I welcomed watched to 
↓ 
I tend to feel watched 
- negative statement  
I tend to feel welcomed 
- benign statement 
 
Set 2: testing negative  interpretation 
Scrambled words: 
usually most like people me dislike ↓ 
Most people usually dislike me 
- negative statement  
Most people usually like me 
- benign statement 
 
 
Note: negative statement reflected social anxiety related meaning; persecutory statement reflected 
paranoia related meaning; benign statement reflected a neutral meaning which most healthy 
population believed.   
The Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, adapted from Eysenck et al. 1991)  
The SRT was originally developed by Eysenck and colleagues (1991) and is arguably the 
most methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias (Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 
2015). Participants interpret emotionally ambiguous passages of text representing both 
paranoid and social anxiety scenarios. 20 ambiguous scenarios are presented and each 
scenario ends in a word fragment. An example of a scenario used in the task is the following: 
 
Lecture  
You are required to attend a Statistics lecture twice a week. You enjoy sitting with a 
group of friends you made last term. You greet them all but one of them does not 




Once the word fragment was correctly completed, participants were asked a comprehension 
question about the scenario ("Are you attending a lecture?"), to which they responded by 
pressing Y for yes or N for no on the testing computer keyboard. Following their response, a 
correct or incorrect answer message was displayed on the screen. In the second part of the 
SRT, the titles of each scenario (e.g., Lecture) were presented, with four possible 
interpretations: two target interpretations, in which content is relevant to the previous 
passage, and two foil interpretations, in which content is irrelevant to the previous passage 
(see Figure 2.2). The interpretations represent either positive or benign explanations of the 
scenarios. Participants were asked to rate how similar in meaning each sentence was to the 
original scenarios on a four-point scale (1 = very different in meaning, 4 = very similar in 
meaning). The SRT takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
Figure 2.2 Example items of SRT 
SRT used in Exp 1 
Set 1: testing persecutory interpretation  
Lecture 
You are required to attend a Statistics lecture twice a week. You enjoy sitting with a group of 
friends you made last term. You greet them all but one of them does not answer b-ck [back].   
1) Your friend in the Statistics lecture is deliberately snubbing you 
- target persecutory interpretation  
2) Your friend did not hear you 
- target benign interpretation  
3) Your friend in the library is distracted you  
- foil paranoid interpretation 
4) Your friend in the library didn’t hear you  
- foil negative interpretation  
 
Set 2: testing negative  interpretation 
Local pub 
You have just moved to a new area and your neighbour asks if you would like to go to your 
local pub that evening. When you arrive, they are not yet there. You imagine what they think 
about you after your earlier c-nvers-t-on [conversation] 
1) After your earlier conversation, they probably thought you were likeable.  
- target negative interpretation  
2) After your earlier conversation, they probably thought you were dull.  
- target benign interpretation  
3) Your find the new area pleasant  
- foil negative interpretation  
4) You find the new area unpleasant  
- foil benign interpretation  
 
 
Note: negative interpretation reflected social anxiety related meaning; persecutory interpretation 
reflected paranoia related meaning; benign interpretation reflected a neutral meaning which most 
healthy population believed.   
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The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, adapted from Beard & Amir, 2010) 
This paradigm includes both reaction time and self-report measures to assess interpretation. 
Participants must decide as quickly as possible whether or not a word (implying a 
persecutory/benign or negative/benign interpretation) related to an ambiguous sentence. 
Each trial consisted of four steps. First, participants observed a fixation cross in the middle of 
the screen, to alert them that a trial would begin. Thereafter, a word appeared in the centre 
of the computer screen for a certain time, followed by a sentence that appeared and 
remained on the screen until participants press the space bar, indicating that they have 
finished reading the sentence. Finally, participants were asked, “Was the word related to the 
sentence?” They could press #1 on the number pad to affirm or #3 to deny: 
 
Figure 2.3 Example items of WSAP 
Word-sentence examples: 
 Word Ambiguous 
sentence 
Paranoia items Mugger 
---- PARANOID 
Friend 
---- NON PARANOID 
 
You can hear 








A friend comments on 




The experiment session lasted for approximately one to one-and-half hours, varying among 
individuals. Participants were reminded of inclusion criteria before starting. As illustrated by 
Diagram 1, they were then asked to complete the consent form and demography 
questionnaire, followed by self-report measures. This took approximately 20 to 30 minutes. 
Finally, to measure interpretation biases representing negative interpretation (social anxiety 
related) and persecutory interpretation (paranoia related), three cognitive experimental tasks 
were used, each consisting in two sets of materials reflecting both types of content. Two 
parallel versions of each task were developed and counterbalanced in order across 
participants. All measures were presented to participants ahead of interpretation tasks. Self-
report measures and tasks were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed orders across 
participants. A random/counterbalanced design minimises order effects and the influence of 
other potentially confounding factors. 
Figure 2.4 Experimental procedure 
 
 
Note: The self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of tasks, and they were 
presented in two counterbalanced, fixed order. LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-
report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et 
al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence association 
paradigm (WSAP, Based on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
2.2.6 Design of Analysis 
A cross-sectional design was used. We tested participants across a wide range of scores on 
emotional trait measures. Our key concerns when conducting analyses included the 
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correlational relationships of participant ratings on three cognitive tasks measuring 
interpretation bias and their responses on emotional trait measures. First, raw data was 
analysed, following the literature. Raw scores from measures and tasks were used to 
determine the preliminary results of each computer-based task. Second, the composite 
scores based on raw data were calculated to test our hypothesis directly. Composite scores 
were used to enhance clarity. The results of composite score analysis should reflect the 
results of individual score analysis. 
Figure 2.5 Analytical approach 
 
Note: The self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of tasks, and they were 
presented in two counterbalanced, fixed order. LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-
report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et 
al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence association 
paradigm (WSAP, Based on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
The correlation coefficients among task scores and corresponding trait scores were 
calculated. Further, hierarchical regression using each task score as dependent variable was 
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performed and their corresponding trait measure scores used as predictors. Only measures 
that correlated significantly with the dependent variable from the correlation analysis, were 
tested.  
To test the hypothesis, composite scores were calculated for social anxiety and paranoia 
measures, and for social anxiety and paranoia related bias. We generated composites by 
standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) scores, then averaging them. They represented the social 
anxiety trait, paranoia trait, social anxiety related interpretation bias and paranoia related 
interpretation bias. Then, using the composites, bivariate correlation and hierarchical 
regression were run, to test our hypothesis directly.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Participant Characteristics 
Data cleaning 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity were not violated. In order to recruit participants with wide-ranging scores 
on all scales, only the reaction time data from WSAP was filtered. To remove the influence of 
outlier response times, we excluded data from trials with reaction times shorter than 50ms or 
longer than 1500ms. This time limitation was based upon the design of the original WSAP 
(Beard & Amir, 2010) and resulted in the elimination of 6.16% trials. There were 26 missing 
data points, which were treated by pairwise deletion. The inspection of missing data did not 
suggest any systematic problems with measurement tools or methods, and missing data 
appeared randomly distributed. 
Bias scores calculation 
In order to compare reaction time or rating indices with self-report indices, bias scores were 
calculated for social scenario sentences. Bias scores from each task were calculated using 
the equations listed below (see Table 2.1). Two bias scores were calculated for each task, 
reflecting the social anxiety and paranoia related content.  Larger bias scores indicate more 
bias toward threat interpretations, and greater discrepancies with benign interpretations.  
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Bias score  Equations Range of 
values 
SST Negative bias Interpretation Bias=(Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias=(Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed)*100 % 
0, 100 
SRT Negative bias Interpretation Bias= Mean of ratings on all 





Interpretation Bias= Mean of ratings on all 
Target Paranoia -Mean of ratings on all Target 
Benign 
-3, 3 
WSAP Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Reaction times (Social 





Interpretation Bias = reaction times (Paranoia 
meaning reject – Paranoia meaning endorse) 
-1500, 1500 
 
Note: negative bias represents social anxiety related interpretation; persecutory bias represents social 
anxiety related interpretation. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The scores of five self-report measures (FNE, SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS) were used to 
reflect the emotional traits of social anxiety. Scores of three self-reported measures 
(Feinstein’s PS, G-PTS and PDI) were used to reflect the emotional traits of paranoia. 
Scores from three tasks (WSAT, SST and SRT) represented the interpretation bias in both 




Table 2.2 Means and standard deviations of trait scores and bias   scores (n = 84) 
Mean (SD) 
   Social anxiety Paranoia   
Emotional 
traits 
FNE 12.20(4.50)  PS 33.55(13.02) 
SADS 6.61(6.28) GTPS 48.60(23.28) 
 LSAS 36.01(20.96) GPTS_SocialReference 25.35(11.53) 
 
LSAS_Anxiet
y 19.54(11.09) GPTS_Persecution 23.25(12.36) 
 
LSAS_Avoida
nce 16.75(11.08) PDI 52.69(42.93) 
 SIAS 19.74(11.94) PDI_YesNo 6.23(4.35) 
 SPS 11.36(11.02) PDI_distress 14.29(13.23) 
   PDI_preoccupation 14.46(13.42) 
      PDI_conviction 17.71(13.48) 
Interpretatio
n bias 
SST (%) 21.87(16.50) SST (%) 28.08(18.03) 
SRT 1.95(0.45) SRT 1.86(0.46) 
  WSAP 
 -
27.82(115.31) WSAP   -44.17(108.01) 
 
Note: n=84; FNE: Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; SADS: Social Avoidance and Distress (SADS) 
Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969); LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: 
Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; 
Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, Based 
on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
Means and standard deviations for each measure and task are presented in Table 2.2. To 
test the hypothesis that interpretation bias is more strongly associated with content-specific 
emotional traits and vice versa around, correlational analysis and linear regression were 
conducted. Rather than test the predictive role on each direction, regressions focusing on 
the correlational relationship of the traits and bias were conducted. 
2.3.2 Relationship between Putative Predictors (trait measures) 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), independent variables with a bivariate correlation 
of more than .80 should not be included in multiple regression analysis. Correlation 
coefficients between predictors in this study reveal that the constructs of social anxiety (SA) 
and paranoia (PA) traits are not so highly correlated that separating them is impossible. Most 
R values are < 0.8, meaning it is feasible to assess them as potentially different constructs 
and therefore different predictors.  
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Table 2.3 Correlation coefficients between measures of SA and PT 
  FNE  SADS   LSAS  SIAS  SPS 
 r p r  p r p r p r p 
GTPS 0.04 0.69 0.32*  0.003 0.53** <.001 0.51** <.001 0.63** <.001 
  PS 0.11 0.32 0.49**  <.001 0.67** <.001 0.65** <.001 0.69** <.001 
PDI 0.02 0.89 0.35*  0.001 0.59** <.001 0.52** <.001 0.69** <.001 
 
Note: *p <0.05, **p <0.01, N= 79. FNE: Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; SADS: Social Avoidance 
and Distress (SADS) Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969); LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-
report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et 
al., 1999).  
 
As seen in Table 2.3, all R-values are < 0.7. It is therefore acceptable to assess social 
anxiety and paranoia as different constructs, and to use these as independent variables to 
test interpretation bias. 
2.3.3 Analyses driven by Previous Literature 
Consistent with previous studies of interpretation bias, hierarchical regression analyses were 
performed to assess the correlational relationship between interpretation bias and its 
content-specific trait in either social anxiety trait (ST) or paranoia trait (PT). Negatively 
evaluated bias (SB) reflecting socially anxious interpretation styles, while persecutory bias 
(PB) reflecting paranoia related meaning. From the independent variables (trait measures), 
only significant variables from bivariate correlation analyses were entered. The model 
explaining each direction of interpretation bias (SA/PA) was tested using significant variables 
from bivariate correlation analyses in two analyses (see Figure 2.6). In Analysis 1, the 
content-matched trait scores were entered as independent variables first, and the conversed 
(content incongruent) trait scores second. For example, in explaining the SA interpretation 
bias, the SA trait scores were entered in the first block and the PA trait scores in the second. 
In Analysis 2, the conversed trait scores were entered as independent variables first, and the 
content matched trait scores second. Following the example above, we entered PA trait 
scores in the first block, and SA trait scores in the second. Analysis 2 allowed a strength test 
of the trait scores, explaining content-matched interpretation bias when controlling the 
converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted R² values. The change of ∆ Adjusted R² in the two 
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approaches indicates that the additional variance in the task bias scores is accounted for by 
the trait scores over the other. Which of the Adjusted R² values is greater reveals which trait 
scores explain the most variance in the outcome interpretation bias scores. 
Figure 2.6 Analyses driven by previous literature 





Analysis 1 Step 1 Enter the content matched trait 
scores (e.g., SA trait) 
Model 1 Interpretation 
bias (e.g., SB) 
 Step 2 Enter the conversed (content 
incongruent) trait scores  
(e.g., PA trait) 
Model 2  
Analysis 2 Step 1 Enter the conversed (content 
incongruent) trait scores  
(e.g., PA trait) 
Model 3 Interpretation 
bias (e.g., SB) 
 Step 2 Enter the content matched trait 
scores (e.g., SA trait) 
Model 4  
 
Note: PAtrait=paranoia trait; SAtrait=social anxiety trait; PAbias=paranoia bias; SAbias=social anxiety 
bias 
 
2.3.3.1 Similarity Ratings Task (SRT) 
Bivariate correlations were assessed between the scores of SRT and individual trait 
measures. Table 2.4shows the correlation coefficients. Of the social anxiety trait measures, 
only the SPS was significantly correlated with the negatively evaluated biasof the SRT. All 
social anxiety measures, excluding FNE, were significantly correlated with the persecutory 
biasof SRT. The SPS correlated most strongly with the SRT in the negatively evaluated bias. 
The SADS correlated most strongly with the SRT in the persecutory bias. Of the paranoia 
trait measures: all scores correlated significantly with both SRT score in negatively evaluated 
biasand persecutory bias. The PS score correlated most strongly with the SRT in the 
negatively evaluated bias. The PDI score correlated most strongly with the SRT in the 




Table 2.4 Correlation coefficients of SRT scores and trait measures 
 SRT 
 Negatively evaluated 
bias 
Persecutory bias 
 r p r p 




-0.05 0.65 0.02 0.84 
SADS 
 
0.19 0.08 0.34** 0.002 
LSAS 
 
0.21 0.62 0.33** 0.003 
SIAS 
 
0.16 0.17 0.28* 0.01 
SPS   0.31** 0.004 0.31** 0.006 
Paranoia measures 
  
PS 0.39** 0.03 0.24* <.001 
GTPS 
 
0.28** 0.009 0.36** 0.001 
PDI 
 
0.31** 0.004 0.37** 0.001 
 
Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia 
Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: 
Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters 
et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991) 
 
To assess the correlational relationship between social anxiety content-specific interpretation 
bias and its matched traits, hierarchical regression analyses were performed. Following 
Analysis 1, the negatively evaluated bias (SB) of SRT was set as the dependent variable. 
The social anxiety measures, including the SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS were entered in the 
first block, and all paranoia measures including the PS, GTPS and PDI were entered in the 
second block. The results showed that only model 1(entering: SA measures) was significant, 
and that the model was no longer significant after adding paranoia measures. Model 1 
indicated that 7.58% of the variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by 
social anxiety measures (Adjusted R² = 0.0758, F (4, 76) = 2.64, p < .05). Thus, trait social 
anxiety significantly explained the variance in the SRT reflected negatively evaluated bias. 
The SPS explained most of the variance in the dependent variable. Therefore, only social 
anxiety measures significantly explained the variance in the negatively evaluated bias of the 
SRT, and paranoia measures did not contribute to variance in the dependent variable. In 
sum, the results suggested that only participants with higher scores on social anxiety 
measures showed a preference for rating socially anxious interpretations when completing 
the SRT. The same interpretation bias was not found in participants with higher scores on 
paranoia measures. 
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Following Analysis 2, PA trait scores were entered in the first block and SA trait scores in the 
second block. The results showed that model 3 (entering: PA trait scores) only reached 
marginal significance, and model 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA trait scores) was not 
significant. Therefore, only SA trait scores significantly explained the variance in the SRT 
negatively evaluated bias. In sum, participants with higher scores on social anxiety 
measures rated sentences reflecting socially anxious meaning highly. 
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Table 2.5 Statistical predictors of SRT: negatively evaluated bias  
  R R² 
Adjusted 
R² Independent measures B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.3492 0.122 0.0758* 
ST 
SADS 0.01 0.20 1.25 0.22 
  LSAS -0.001 -0.05 -0.23 0.82 
      SIAS -0.01 -0.27 -1.30 0.20 
      SPS 0.02 0.44 2.40 0.02 
 Model 2 0.3806 0.1448 0.0628 
ST 
SADS 0.02 0.21 1.32 0.19 
  LSAS -0.001 -0.05 -0.26 0.80 
      SIAS -0.01 -0.29 -1.34 0.18 
      SPS 0.01 0.32 1.59 0.12 
     
PT 
PS -0.002 -0.07 -0.28 0.78 
     GTPS 0.003 0.14 0.56 0.58 
      PDI 0.001 0.12 0.57 0.57 
The model was only significant when ST alone were entered  
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.3048 0.0929 0.0576 
PT 
PS 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.96 
  GTPS 0.07 0.1 0.001 0.001 
      PDI 0.001 0.22 1.14 0.26 
 Model 4 0.3806 0.1448 0.0628 PT PS 0.0001 -0.07 -0.28 0.78 
   GTPS 0.16 0.22 0.0001 0.01 
      PDI 0.0001 0.12 0.57 0.57 
     
ST 
SADS 0.02 0.21 1.32 0.19 
     LSAS 0.0001 -0.05 -0.26 0.80 
      SIAS -0.01 -0.29 -1.34 0.18 
      SPS 0.01 0.32 1.59 0.12 
None of the two models were significant 
SB was only explained by ST at 7.58%  
 
Note: The dependent variable= SRT negatively evaluated bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety 
related meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991). ST = social 
anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory interpretation bias scores 
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Results indicating the correlational relationship between paranoia content-specific 
interpretation bias and its matched traits are presented in Table 2.6. Following Analysis 1, 
the persecutory biasof SRT was set as the dependent variable. Paranoia measures were 
entered in the first block, and social anxiety measures in the second block. The results 
indicated that both model 1 (entering: PA measures) and model 2 (entering: PA measures 
and SA measures) were significant. Model 1 revealed that 14.24% of the variance in the 
dependent variable could be accounted for by paranoia measures (Adjusted R² = 0.1424, F 
(3, 72) = 5.15, p = .003). Thus, trait paranoia significantly explained the variance in the SRT 
reflected persecutory bias. No significant measure emerged at this stage. After adding the 
social anxiety measures into the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggests that social 
anxiety measures decreased 0.72% of variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 
0.1352, F (7, 68) = 2.68, p = .02). Therefore, although both social anxiety and paranoia 
measures explain a significant amount of the variance in the persecutory bias of SRT, 
significance was reduced after adding social anxiety measures. In sum, the results suggest 
that participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures and those with higher scores 
on paranoia measures rate paranoia interpretations more highly when completing the SRT.  
Following Analysis 2, SA trait scores were entered in the first block and PA trait scores in the 
second block. Model 3 (entering: SA trait scores) and model 4 (entering: SA trait scores and 
PA trait scores) are both significant. When PA trait scores are added to the model, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggests that PA trait scores account for an additional 2.41% of 
variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.1352, F (2, 81) = 2.68, p < .0001). The 
∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is greater than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 
and 2 at ∆Adjusted R² change = 0.0313. Therefore, although both SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores explaining a significant amount of variance in the SRT negatively evaluated bias, 
PA trait scores contribute more than SA trait scores to variance in the dependent variable. In 
sum, participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures and those with higher 
scores on paranoia measures rated sentences reflecting paranoid meaning highly, while 
participants with higher scores on paranoia measures had higher ratings. 
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Table 2.6 Statistical predictors of SRT-persecutory bias  
 R R² Adjusted 
R² 
Independent measures B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.4204 0.1768 0.1424* PT PS 0.011 0.315 1.476 0.144 
  
LSAS -0.001 -0.061 -0.254 0.800 
     
 PDI 0.002 0.189 1.025 0.309 
 Model 2 0.4647 0.2159 0.1352* PT PS 0.007 0.20 0.81 0.42 
  
 LSAS 0.001 0.03 0.13 0.90 
     
 PDI 0.002 0.16 0.78 0.44 
     
ST SADS 0.02 0.27 1.72 0.09 
     
LSAS 0.003 0.13 0.62 0.54 
     
 SIAS -0.007 -0.19 -0.91 0.36 
     
 SPS -0.002 -0.04 -0.22 0.83 
Adding ST decreases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0072)=0.72% 
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.3981 0.1585 0.1111** ST SADS 0.02 0.28 1.82 0.07   
LSAS 0.07 0.19 0.94 0.35 
   SIAS -0.01 -0.14 -0.70 0.48 
     
 SPS 0.01 0.13 0.72 0.47 
 Model 4 0.4647 0.2159 0.1352** ST SADS 0.02 0.27 1.72 0.09   
 LSAS 0.003 0.13 0.62 0.54      
 SIAS -0.007 -0.19 -0.91 0.36 
     
 SPS -0.002 -0.04 -0.22 0.83 
     
PT PS 0.007 0.20 0.81 0.42 
     
GTPS 0.001 0.03 0.13 0.90 
     
 PDI 0.002 0.16 0.78 0.44 
Adding PT increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0241)=2.41% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits more variance in PB was explained by PT (2.41%) than ST (-0.72%)     
 
Note: The dependent variable= SRT persecutory bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; persecutory bias= 
scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 
1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory 
interpretation bias scores 
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2.3.3.2 Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) 
Bivariate correlations  
Bivariate correlations between SST scores and individual trait measures were examined. 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2.7. Of the social anxiety trait measures, FNE 
scores did not correlate significantly with SST scores. FNE was thus excluded from the next 
step of analysis. All other social anxiety trait measures correlated significantly with both SST 
task scores. The SPS correlated most strongly with the negatively evaluated biasof SST. 
The SIAS correlated most strongly with the persecutory biasof SST. Of the paranoia trait 
measures: all scores correlated significantly with both the SST score in negatively evaluated 
biasand in the persecutory bias. The GTPS and PDI score correlated most strongly with the 
negatively evaluated biasof SST. The PDI score correlated most strongly with the 
persecutory biasof SST.  




    Negatively evaluated bias Persecutory bias 
  r p r p 
Social anxiety measures 
  
FNE -0.05 0.65 -0.11 0.34 
SADS .41** <.001 .47** <.001 
LSAS .41** <.001 .47** <.001 
SIAS .41** <.001 .53** <.001 
SPS .45** <.001 .48** <.001 
Paranoia measures 
  
  PS .39** <.001 .43** <.001 
GTPS .40** <.001 .47** <.001 
PDI .40** <.001 .49** <.001 
 
Note: N= 80. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia 
Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: 
Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters 
et al., 1999). SST: Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) 
 
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to assess the correlational relationship 
between social anxiety content-specific interpretation bias and matched trait scores. 
Following Analysis 1, the negatively evaluated biasof SST was set as the dependent 
variable. Social anxiety measures, including the SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS were entered 
in the first block and all paranoia measures, including the PS, GTPS and PDI were entered 
in the second block. Models 1 (entering: SA measures) and 2 (entering: SA measures and 
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PA measures) were significant. Model 1 indicated that 20.95% of variance in the dependent 
variable could be accounted for by the social anxiety measures (Adjusted R² = 0.2095, F(4, 
78)= 6.43, p < .0001). Thus, trait social anxiety explained variance in the SST reflected 
negatively evaluated bias. In model 1, the t-test for the SPS reached only marginal 
significance, and appeared to explain most of the variance in the dependent variable. When 
paranoia measures were added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested that the 
paranoia measures accounted for less than 0.04% of variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.2091, F(7, 75)= 4.10, p < .001). As shown in Table 2.8, the SADS reached 
only marginal significance in the final model. Therefore, although social anxiety measures 
explained a significant amount of the variance in the negatively evaluated biasof SST, the 
paranoia measures also contributed to variance in the dependent variable. In sum, the 
results suggest that both participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures and 
those with higher scores on paranoia measures demonstrated a preference for socially 
anxious words when completing the SST, reflecting a socially anxious interpretation bias. 
Following Analysis 2, PA trait scores were entered in the first block and SA trait scores in the 
second block. Models 3 (entering: PA trait scores) and 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores) were both significant. When SA trait scores were added to the model, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggests that SA trait scores account for an additional 4.71% of 
variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.2076, F(2, 81) = 6.23, p < .001). The 
∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is greater than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 
and 2 at ∆Adjusted R² change = 0.0427. Therefore, although both SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores explain a significant amount of the variance in the SST negatively evaluated 
bias, the SA trait scores contribute more than do PA trait scores to variance in the 
dependent variable. In sum, both participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures 
and those with higher scores on paranoia measures chose unscramble sentences reflecting 
socially anxious meaning. Participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures 
unscrambled more
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Table 2.8 Statistical predictors of SST: negatively evaluated bias (SB)   




B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.498 0.2481 0.2095** ST 
 
SADS 0.61 0.23 1.62 0.11   
 LSAS 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.83 
     
SIAS 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.98 
     
SPS 0.45 0.3 1.81 0.07  
Model 2 0.526 0.2767 0.2091** ST SADS 0.68 0.26 1.78 0.08 
  
  LSAS 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.81 
     
 SIAS -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.96 
     
 SPS 0.28 0.18 1 0.32 
     
PT PS -0.15 -0.12 -0.57 0.57 
     
 GTPS 0.16 0.22 1.03 0.31 
     
 PDI 0.03 0.08 0.42 0.68 
Adding PT reduces variance explained (∆R²= -0.0004)=-0.04%  
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.4373 0.1912 0.1605** PT PS 0.21 0.16 0.91 0.37   
 GTPS 0.15 0.1 0.48 0.64      
 PDI 0.08 0.21 1.16 0.25 
 
Model 4 0.5246 0.2752 0.2076** PT PS -0.11 -0.08 -0.4 0.69 
  
 GTPS 0.16 0.22 1.04 0.30      
 PDI 0.04 0.11 0.61 0.55      
ST SADS -0.35 -0.09 -0.92 0.36      
 LSAS 0.68 0.26 1.79 0.08      
 SIAS 0.08 0.11 0.62 0.54      
 SPS 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.82 
Adding ST increases variance explained (∆R²= 0.0471)=4.71%  
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits more variance in SB was explained by ST (4.71%) than PT (-0.04%)  
Note: The dependent variable= SST negatively eveluated bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in 
social anxiety related meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green 
et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings 
Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory interpretation bias 
scores 
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The correlational relationship between paranoia content-specific interpretation bias and its 
matched traits is presented in Table 2.9. Following Analysis 1, the persecutory biasof SST 
was set as the dependent variable. Paranoia measures were entered in the first block and 
social anxiety measures in the second block. Models 1 (entering: paranoia measures) and 2 
(entering: paranoia measures  and social anxiety measures) were significant. According to 
model 1, 23.61% of variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the paranoia 
measures (Adjusted R² = 0.2361, F(3, 79) = 9.45, p < .0001). Paranoia measures thus 
significantly explains the variance in the SST reflected persecutory bias. In model 1, the t-
test for the PDI reached only marginal significance, and appeared to explain most of the 
variance in the dependent variable. After adding the social anxiety measures into the model, 
the change in R² suggested that social anxiety measures accounted for an additional 
10.14% of variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.3375, F(7, 75) = 6.97, p < 
.0001). As shown in Table 2.9, the SADS reached marginal significance in the final model. 
Therefore, although the paranoia measures explaining a significant amount of the variance 
in the persecutory biasof SST, the social anxiety measures also contributed to variance in 
the dependent variable. In sum, the results suggest that both participants with higher scores 
on social anxiety measures and those with higher scores on paranoia measures indicate a 
preference for paranoia words when completing the SST, reflecting a paranoid interpretation 
bias. 
Following Analysis 2, SA trait scores were entered in the first block and PA trait scores in the 
second block. Models 3 (entering: SA trait scores) and 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores) were both significant. When PA trait scores were added to the model, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggested that PA trait scores account for an additional 4.45% of 
variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.2930, F(2, 81) = 9.49, p < .0001). The 
∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is less than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 
2 at ∆Adjusted R² change = -0.0569. Although both SA trait scores and PA trait scores 
explain a significant amount of variance in the SST negatively evaluated bias, SA trait scores 
contributed more than PA trait scores to the variance in the dependent variable. In sum, both 
participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures and those with showing higher 
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scores on paranoia measures chose unscramble sentences reflecting paranoia meaning, 
while participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures unscrambled more.
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Table 2.9 Statistical predictors of SST: persecutory bias 
  R R² 
Adjusted 
R² Independent measures B 
 
 Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.5139 0.2641 0.2361** PT PS 0.14  0.10 0.57 0.57 
   LSAS 0.03  0.14 0.11 0.16 
      PDI 0.13  0.31 1.82 0.07 
 Model 2 0.6278 0.3941 0.3375** 
PT 
PS -0.36  -0.26 -1.38 0.17 
  LSAS 0.04  0.28 0.22 0.15 
      PDI 0.09  0.21 1.21 0.23 
     
ST 
SADS 0.66  0.23 1.74 0.09 
     LSAS 0.03  0.04 0.22 0.83 
      SIAS 0.35  0.23 1.31 0.20 
      SPS 0.06  0.04 0.21 0.83 
Adding ST increases variance explained (∆R²= 0.1014)=10.14%  
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.5723 0.3275 0.2930** 
ST 
SADS 0.54  0.19 1.38 0.17 
  LSAS 0.03  0.04 0.02 0.15 
   SIAS 0.35  0.23 0.36 0.28 
      SPS 0.34  0.21 1.32 0.19 
 Model 4 0.6278 0.3941 0.3375
** 
ST 
SADS 0.66  0.23 1.74 0.09 
  LSAS 0.16  0.22 0.03 0.15 
      SIAS 0.35  0.23 1.31 0.20 
      SPS 0.06  0.04 0.21 0.83 
     
PT 
PS -0.36  -0.26 -1.38 0.17 
     GTPS 0.22  0.28 1.44 0.15 
      PDI 0.09  0.21 1.21 0.23 
Adding PT increases variance explained (∆R²= 0.0445)=4.45%  
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits less variance in PB was explained by PT (4.45%) than ST (10.14%) 
 
Note: The dependent variable= SST persecutory bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; persecutory 
bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; 
Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991) 
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2.3.3.3 Word-Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP) 
The bivariate correlations of WSAP and individual trait measures were assessed. Table 2.10 
shows the correlation coefficients. Of the social anxiety trait measures, only the SADS and 
SIAS were significantly correlated with the negatively evaluated biasof the WSAP. The 
SADS was significantly correlated with the persecutory biasof the WSAP. Of the paranoia 
trait measures, the PS and GTPS correlated significantly with both WSAP scores in the 
negatively evaluated biasand the persecutory bias. The PDI was not significantly correlated 
with any of the WSAP scores. FNE, LSAS, SPS and the PDI were therefore excluded from 
the next step of analysis.  
Table 2.10 Correlation coefficients of WSAP scores and trait measures 
   WSAP   
      Negatively evaluated bias Persecutory bias 





FNE  0.14 0.24 0.11 0.34 
SADS  0.29
** 0.009 0.36** 0.001 
LSAS  0.19 0.11 0.14 0.24 
SIAS  0.36
** 0.001 0.22 0.06 




PS 0.39** 0.02 0.26* 0.02 
GTPS  0.24
* 0.03 0.27* 0.02 
PDI  0.11 0.32 0.12 0.29 
 
 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social 
Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 
2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions 
Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). WSAP: The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, 
Based on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
To assess the correlational relationship between social anxiety content-specific interpretation 
bias and its matched traits, hierarchical regression analyses were performed. The negatively 
evaluated bias of WSAP was set as the dependent variable. Social anxiety measures, 
including SADS and SIAS, were entered in the first block and paranoia measures, including 
PS and GTPS were entered in the second block. Models 1 (entering: SA measures) and 2 
(entering: SA measures and PA measures) were significant. Model 1 indicated that 11.34% 
of variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by social anxiety measures (Adjusted 
R² = 0.1134, F(2, 72)= 5.73, p = .005). Trait social anxiety thus significantly explains the 
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variance in the WSAP reflected negatively evaluated bias. In model 1, the t-test for the SIAS 
significantly explained the variance in the dependent variable. Adjusted R² decreased by 
1.79% when paranoia measures were added to the model (Adjusted R² = 0.0955, F(4,70) = 
2.95, p = .03). As shown in Table 2.11, none of the measures were significant. Therefore, 
although both social anxiety and paranoia measures significantly explain the variance in the 
WSAP negatively evaluated bias, social anxiety measures contributed most to the variance 
in the dependent variable. In sum, both participants with higher scores on social anxiety 
measures and those with higher scores on paranoia measures were quicker to relate to 
socially anxious words on the WSAP. 
Following Analysis 2, PA trait scores were entered in the first block and SA trait scores in the 
second block. Only model 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA trait scores) was significant. 
When SA trait scores are added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggests that SA 
trait scores account for an additional 5.20% of variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² 
= 0.0960, F(2, 81) = 2.95, p < .05). The ∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is greater 
than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 2 at ∆Adjusted R² change = 0.0699. Therefore, 
only SA trait scores significantly explain the variance in the WSAP negatively evaluated bias. 
In sum, the results suggest that only participants with higher scores on social anxiety 
measures had quicker reaction times on the WSAP when endorsing words with socially 
anxious meaning, while participants with higher scores on paranoia measures did not. 
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Table 2.11 Statistical predictors of WSAP: negatively evaluated bias 
  
R R² Adjusted 
R² Independent  
measures B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.3706 0.1374 0.1134* 
ST 
SADS 1.35 0.07 0.48 0.64 
  SIAS 0.03 0.04 3.08 1.53 
 Model 2 0.3800 0.1444 0.0955* 
ST 
SADS 1.72 0.09 0.58 0.56 
  SIAS 0.04 0.05 2.83 1.75 
     
PT 
PS -1.00 -0.11 -0.43 0.67 
     GTPS 0.81 0.16 0.70 0.49 
Adding PT reduces the variance explained (∆R²= -0.0179)=-1.79 
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.2650 0.0700 0.0440 
PT PS 2.42 0.27 1.17 0.25 
      GTPS -0.77 -0.28 -1.44 0.15 
 Model 4 0.3800 0.1440 0.0960* 
PT 
PS -1.00 -0.11 -0.43 0.67 
  GTPS 0.16 0.22 0.81 1.16 
     
ST 
SADS 1.72 0.09 0.58 0.56 
     SIAS 2.83 0.29 1.62 0.11 
Adding ST increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0520)=5.20% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits more variance in SB was explained by ST (5.20%) than PT (-1.79%) 
  
Note: The dependent variable= WSAP negatively evaluated bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety 
related meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report 
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). WSAP: The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, 
Based on Beard & Amir, 2010). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory interpretation bias scores 
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The correlational relationship between paranoia content-specific interpretation bias and its 
matched traits are presented in Table 2.12. The WSAP persecutory biaswas set as the 
dependent variable. Paranoia measures were entered in the first block and social anxiety 
measures in the second block. Models 1 (entering: PA measures) and 2 (entering: PA 
measures and SA measures) were significant. According to Model 1, 5.86% of variance in 
the dependent variable could be accounted for by paranoia measures (Adjusted R² = 0.29, 
F(3, 72) = 3.30, p = .04). Trait paranoia thus significantly explains the variance in the WSAP 
reflected persecutory bias. After adding the social anxiety measures into the model, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggests that social anxiety measures account for an additional 
8.27% of variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.1413, F(4, 70) = 4.04, p = .005). 
As seen in Table 2.12, the SADS explains most of the variance in the WSAP target variable, 
reflecting a paranoid interpretation bias. Therefore, although paranoia measures explain a 
significant amount of the variance in the persecutory biasof the WSAP, social anxiety 
measures also contributed significantly to the model. In sum, both participants with higher 
scores on social anxiety measures and those with higher scores on paranoia measures had 
quicker WSAP reaction times when endorsing words with paranoid meaning. 
Following Analysis 2, SA trait scores were entered in the first block and PA trait scores in the 
second block. Models 3 (entering: SA trait scores) and 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores) were both significant. When PA trait scores were added to the model, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggested that SA trait scores accounted for an additional 2.48% of 
the variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.1413, F(2, 81) = 4.04, p < .0001). The 
∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is greater than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 
and 2 at ∆Adjusted R² change = -0.0579. Therefore, although both SA trait scores and PA 
trait scores explain a significant amount of variance in the WSAP negatively evaluated bias, 
SA trait scores contribute more than do PA trait scores to variance in the dependent 
variable. In sum, both participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures and those 
with higher scores on paranoia measures responded more quickly to WSAP items when 
endorsing words with paranoid meaning, while socially anxious participants were even 
faster.
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Table 2.12 Statistical predictors of WSAP: persecutory bias 
 
 R R² 
Adjusted 
R² 
Independent measures B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.29 0.084 0.0586* 
PT 
PS 
1.16 0.14 0.60 0.55 
    GTPS 
0.75 0.16 0.70 0.49 
 Model 2 0.433 0.188 0.1413* 
PT 
PS -0.80 -0.10 -0.38 0.71 
  GTPS 0.04 GTPS 1.48 1.05 
     ST 
SADS 7.86 0.46 2.93 0.01* 
     SIAS -1.90 -0.21 -1.19 0.24 
Adding ST increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0827)=8.27% 
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.4178 0.1086 0.1165** 
ST 
SADS 7.36 0.43 2.77 0.01* 
    SIAS -0.80 -0.09 -0.56 0.58 
 Model 4 0.433 0.188 0.1413** 
ST 
SADS 7.86 0.46 2.93 0.01* 
  SIAS 0.16 
0.21 -1.90 1.60 
     
PT 
PS -0.80 -0.10 -0.38 0.71 
     GTPS 1.48 0.32 1.41 0.16 
Adding PT increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0248)=2.48% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits less variance in PB was explained by PT (2.48%) than ST (8.27%) 
  
Note: The dependent variable= WSAP persecutory bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related 
meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report 
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). WSAP: The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, 
Based on Beard & Amir, 2010). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory interpretation bias scores 
 86 
2.3.4 Hypothesis-Driven Analyses 
Composite scores were calculated based on raw data, to test our hypothesis directly. 
Composite scores were used to achieve greater clarity. The results of composite score 
analysis should be consistent with that using individual scores. In order to test our 
hypothesis directly, models explaining each emotional trait (SA/PA trait) were tested using 
two analyses. In analysis one, the content-matched interpretation bias was entered as an 
independent variable first; the conversed (content-incongruent) interpretation bias, second. 
For example, in explaining the SA trait, the SB was entered in the first block and the PB in 
the second block. In analysis two, the conversed interpretation bias was entered as an 
independent variable first; the content-matched interpretation bias, second. Following the 
example above, PB was entered in the first block, and SB in the second block. Analysis two 
allowed a strength test of content-specific bias in explaining its matched trait composite, 
when controlling for the converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted R². The change in 
∆Adjusted R² between the two analyses indicated that the additional variance in the trait 
composite is accounted for by one bias composite, over and above the other. Which 
Adjusted R² value is greater indicates which direction of the interpretation bias explains the 
most variance in the outcome emotional trait. 
Composites scores were created for emotional traits and interpretation bias. Four composite 
scores represented the social anxiety (SA) trait, paranoia (PA) trait, social anxiety related 
(SAR) bias and paranoia related (PA) bias. Composites were generated by standardising (M 
= 0, SD = 1) participant scores on each measure and task, then averaging these. The 
composite score representing the SA trait was calculated by averaging the Z scores of the 
SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS. The FNE was excluded, as it was not significantly correlated 
with any of the tasks in preliminary analyses (see Section 2.4.3.1, 2.4.3.2 and 2.4.3.3). The 
composite score representing the PA trait was calculated by averaging the PS, GTPS and 
PDI. The social anxiety related bias scores from the SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to 
generate a composite score for social anxiety related interpretation bias. The paranoia 
related bias scores from the SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to generate a composite 
score for paranoia related interpretation bias (see Table 2.1).  
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2.3.4.1 Bivariate Correlations between Composite Scores 
Correlations among independent bias composites and between bias composites and 
dependent measures, are presented in Table 2.13. The correlation coefficient of the 
independent variables was < 0.8. It was therefore appropriate to assess SB and PB 
composites as distinct constructs, which will both be used as independent variables to test 
interpretation bias. 
Table 2.13 Correlation coefficients of the composite scores 
  ST  PT  SB  PB  
 r p r p r p r p 
ST 1        
PT .69** <.001 1      
SB .55** <.001 .51** <.001 1    
PB .51** <.001 .51** <.001 .68** <.001 1  
 
Note: PT=paranoia trait; ST=social anxiety trait; PB=paranoia bias; SB=social anxiety bias; 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80.  
 
2.3.4.2 Hierarchical Regression 
To test the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses were performed in order to assess 
the association of interpretation bias in predicting its content matched emotional trait. To 
predict SA trait and following Analysis 1, the composite of interpretation bias reflecting social 
anxiety meaning (SB) was entered in the first block and the composite of interpretation bias 
reflecting paranoia meaning (PB) in the second block. Models 1 (entering: SB) and 2 
(entering: SB and PB) were both significant. Model 1 indicated that 29.60% of the variance in 
the dependent variable could be accounted for by SB (Adjusted R² = 0.2960, F(1, 82) = 
35.82, p < .0001). SB composite thus significantly explained the variance in the SA trait 
composite. When the PB composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² 
suggested that the PB accounted for an additional 2.60% of the variance in the outcome 
variable (Adjusted R² = 0.32.20, F(2, 81) = 20.73, p < .001). As shown in Table 2.14, both 
SB composite and PB composite were significant predictors. Following Analysis 2, PB was 
entered in the first block and SB in the second block. Models 3 (entering: PB) and 4 
(entering: PB and SB) were both significant. Model 3 indicated that 25.36% of the variance in 
the dependent variable could be accounted for by PB (Adjusted R² = 0.2536, F(1, 82) = 
35.82, p < .0001). When SB composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² 
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suggests that SB accounts for an additional 6.87% of variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.3223, F(2, 81) = 20.73, p < .001). Again, both SB and PB composite were 
significant predictors. The ∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is greater than the 
∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 2 at ∆Adjusted R² = 0.0427. Therefore, although both 
SB and PB composite explain a significant amount of variance in the SA trait composite, the 
SB composite contributes more to the variance in the dependent variable than does PB. In 
sum, both participants exhibiting interpretation bias in the direction of SA and those 
exhibiting interpretation bias in the direction of PA were highly vulnerable to social anxiety, 




Table 2.14 Statistical predictors of the ST composite  
 R R² Adjusted R² Independent  
measures 
B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.55 0.30 0.2960** SB 0.74 0.55 5.99 <0.0001*
* 
 Model 2 0.58 0.34 0.3220** SB 0.51 0.38 3.05 <0.0001*
*  
PB 0.29 0.26 2.06 0.04* 
Adding PB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0260)=2.60% 
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.51 0.26 0.2536** PB 0.58 0.51 5.40 <0.0001*
* 
 Model 4 0.58 0.34 0.3223** PB 0.29 0.25 2.06 0.04* 
SB 0.51 0.38 3.05 <0.0001*
* 
Adding SB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0687)=6.87% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative bias more variance in ST was explained by SB (6.87%) than PB (2.60%)  
 
Note: The dependent variable= the SA trait (ST) composite. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. ST= the composite of social anxiety trait measures: 
the SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and the SPS; PT= the composite of paranoia trait measures: the PS, GTPS, and the PDI; SB= the composite 
of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP; PB= the composite of persecutory interpretation 
bias scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP. 
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To predict PT and following Analysis 1, the composite of interpretation bias reflecting 
paranoia meaning (PB) was entered in the first block and the composite of interpretation bias 
reflecting social anxiety meaning (SB) in the second block. Models 1 (entering: PB) and 2 
(entering: PB and SB) were both significant. Model 1 indicated that 25.49% of variance in the 
dependent variable could be accounted for by PB (Adjusted R² = 0.2549, F(1, 82) = 29.39, p 
< .0001). PB composite thus significantly explains the variance in the PA trait composite. As 
shown in Table 2.15, when SB composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted 
R² suggested that SB accounts for an additional 3.66% of variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.2915, F(2, 81) = 18.07, p < .001). As shown in Table 2.15, both PA and SB 
composites are significant predictors. Following Analysis 2, SB was entered in the first block 
and PB in the second block. The results showed that models 3 (entering: SB) and 4 
(entering: SB and PB) were both significant. Model 3 indicated that 24.62% of variance in the 
dependent variable could be accounted for by SB (Adjusted R² = 0.2462, F(1, 82) = 35.82, p 
< .0001). When PB composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² 
suggested that PB accounts for an additional 4.53% of the variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.2915, F(2, 81) = 20.73, p < .001). Again, both SB composite and PB 
composite were significant predictors. The ∆Adjusted R² from Models 3 to 4 is greater than 
the ∆Adjusted R² from Models 1 to 2, at ∆Adjusted R² = 0.0087. Therefore, both SB and PB 
composite explain a significant amount of the variance in the PA trait, and PB composite 
contributes more to the variance of the dependent variable than does SB composite. In sum, 
participants exhibiting interpretation bias in the direction of paranoia and those exhibiting 
interpretation bias in the direction of social anxiety were both highly vulnerable to paranoia, 







Table 2.15 Statistical predictors of PT composite  
 R R² Adjusted R² Independent  
measures 
B Beta t Sig.  
 Model 1 0.51 0.26 0.2549** PB 0.62 0.51 5.42 <0.01** 
 Model 2 0.55 0.31 0.2915** PB 0.38 0.32 2.5 0.02* 
 
SB 0.42 0.29 2.29 0.03* 
Adding SB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0366)=3.66% 
 Model 3 0.51 0.26 0.2462** SB 0.73 0.51 5.30 0.001** 
 Model 4 0.56 0.31 0.2915** SB 0.42 0.29 2.29 0.02* 
PB 0.38 0.32 2.50 0.01* 
Adding PB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0687)=4.53% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative bias more variance in PT was explained by PB (4.53%) than SB (3.66 %)  
 
Note: The dependent variable= the PA trait (PT) composite. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. ST= the composite of social anxiety trait measures: the SADS, LSAS, SIAS, 
and the SPS; PT= the composite of paranoia trait measures: the PS, GTPS, and the PDI; SB= the composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias 
scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP; PB= the composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP.
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Taken together, both the SA and PB composites significantly predict SA trait composite. The SB 
composite was most heavily weighted in the predictive model. Similarly, both SA and PB 
composites were significantly associated with the PA trait composite, while the PB composite 
was weighted only slightly higher in the predictive model. Thus, both participants exhibiting 
negative interpretation bias and persecutory interpretation were highly vulnerable to social 
anxiety, while those exhibiting interpretation bias in the direction of social anxiety were more 
vulnerable. Likewise, participants with negative interpretation bias and those with persecutory 
interpretation were both highly vulnerable to paranoia, while those with interpretation bias in the 
direction of paranoia were more vulnerable. 
2.4 Discussion  
In this study, two related questions were addressed. First, consistent with the existing literature, 
the question of whether individuals with different levels of trait paranoia and social anxiety differ 
correspondingly in their interpretation of emotionally ambiguous information, was examined. 
Some of the ambiguous information was particularly relevant to social anxiety; other of it was 
more relevant to paranoia. Second, in this study, the central hypothesis of the thesis - whether 
there is a content-specific association of interpretation bias in relation to its content-congruent 
emotional traits - was examined. According to this hypothesis, negatively evaluated (social 
anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias will be more strongly associated with social 
anxiety than with paranoia. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation 
bias will be more strongly associated with paranoia than with social anxiety. Three experimental 
cognitive tasks reflecting the same cognitive process (interpretation of ambiguity) were analysed 
separately, in order to address the first question, and were analysed by creating a composite in 
order to address the second question. Each question is discussed here in turn. Results are 
summarised in tabular form, then interpreted. Unanticipated findings, limitations and the 
implications of the study are discussed.  
2.4.1 Analyses Driven by Previous Literature 
Based on previous literature, we expected that individual differences in trait characteristics 
would be associated with corresponding differences in related interpretation biases; that is, that 
trait social anxiety would be more strongly associated with the negatively evaluated (social 
anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias than with the persecutory (paranoia congruent 
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content) interpretation bias. Conversely, trait paranoia would be more strongly associated with 
the persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias than with the negatively 
evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias.  
2.4.1.1 Summary and Interpretation of Results 





better explain the 
variance in the 
related, (i.e. content 
matched) bias? 
SRT SB SB was only explained by ST  at 7.58% YES 
 PB when controlling for the alternative traits more 
variance in PB was explained by PT (2.41%) 
than ST (-0.72%) 
YES 
SST SB when controlling for the alternative traits more 
variance in SB was explained by ST (4.71%) 
than PT (-0.04%) 
YES 
 PB when controlling for the alternative traits less 
variance in PB was explained by PT (4.45%) 
than ST (10.14%) 
NO 
WSAP SB when controlling for the alternative traits more 
variance in SB was explained by ST (5.20%) 
than PT (-1.79%) 
YES 
 PB when controlling for the alternative traits less 
variance in PB was explained by PT (2.48%) 
than ST (8.27%)  
NO 
 
Note: social anxiety content matches are shown on grey rows, and paranoid ones are shown on white 
rows. SB= negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory interpretation bias. SA trait 
measures= the SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and the SPS; PA trait measures=the PS, GTPS, and the PDI. 
 
A summary of the key findings is presented in Table 2.16. The first question addressed was 
whether individuals with different levels of trait paranoia and social anxiety differ 
correspondingly in their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information. In the test of 
negative evaluated interpretation bias (SB), we found that only the social anxiety trait explained 
the variance, while paranoia traits contributed nothing or weakened the model. Results across 
all three tasks confirmed what we proposed at the beginning: that trait social anxiety is more 
strongly associated with negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation 
bias than with persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias. Individuals 
vulnerable to social anxiety therefore prefer to interpret an emotionally ambiguous social 
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scenario in a negative rather than a persecutory way. This is consistent with the previous 
findings (e.g., Eysenck et al., 1991; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Calvo & Castillo, 1997; Beard & 
Amir, 2010). Using the most methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias, the SRT, 
Eysenck et al. (1991) conducted group analysis of participants whose scores ranged from none 
to severe anxiety on this scale. They found that anxious participants selected the negative 
(Calvo & Dolores Castillo, 2001) interpretation of an ambiguous scenario more often than did 
either non-anxious controls or recovered anxious participants. This was not, however, a direct 
test of social anxiety, and the group design of the experiment does not evidence a linear 
association between trait anxiety and the negative interpretation bias. Moreover, their analysis 
did not include a test of commonly comorbid emotional traits in the experiment. The results 
therefore do not directly address the content specificity of interpretation bias towards social 
anxiety as opposed to towards other emotional traits. Extending previous findings, our 
experiment showed promising results on the SRT and other two cognitive tasks: social anxiety 
vulnerable individuals generated more negative (social anxiety-congruent) interpretation bias of 
emotionally ambiguous information than did paranoia vulnerable individuals. Social anxiety 
levels exacerbate the negative interpretation bias: the more socially anxious one is, the more 
negative interpretation bias one generates. Content specific interpretation bias is thus clear in 
individuals vulnerable to social anxiety, as is a linear relationship between the trait of social 
anxiety and negative interpretation bias. 
In the test of persecutory interpretation bias (PB), paranoia traits contribute significantly to the 
variance on one of three tasks; on the other two, social anxiety accounts for more of the 
variance than do paranoia traits. The most methodologically robust measure of interpretation 
bias, the SRT, supports the initial proposition: that paranoia is more strongly associated with 
persecutory interpretation bias than is negatively evaluated interpretation bias, consistent with 
previous findings of interpretation bias in paranoia (Savulich et al., 2015). Savulich et al. (2015) 
investigated the content specificity of interpretation bias in both regression design and group 
comparisons (high vs. low paranoid). The modified SRT was used to test positive/negative 
interpretations, and more/less paranoid interpretations. The regression results reveal that trait 
paranoia and trait anxiety predicted persecutory interpretation bias. In the group comparisons, 
although no clear content specificity in interpretation bias related to paranoia was found, the 
results did suggest that the group with high levels of trait paranoia generally made negative 
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interpretations. SRT results in the current study confirmed these findings. In addition, the 
content specificity of interpretation bias in paranoia was demonstrated. This also confirmed the 
original proposition of the study, that paranoia is more strongly associated with persecutory 
(paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias than with negatively evaluated (social anxiety 
congruent content) interpretation bias. The findings from the SST and WSAP were, however, 
unexpected. Results showed that individuals vulnerable to paranoia generated both negative 
and persecutory interpretation bias of emotionally ambiguous information, generating even less 
persecutory (paranoia-congruent) interpretation bias than social anxiety vulnerable individuals. 
Although this finding contradicts the proposed content specificity of persecutory interpretation 
bias, the notable contributions of trait social anxiety in predicting persecutory interpretation bias 
nevertheless support the cognitive model of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002). High levels of pre-
existing anxiety comorbid with social ambiguity constitute a particularly significant cognitive 
component of paranoid individuals: the cognitive content of anxiety centres on the fear of 
impending threat, later reflected in paranoid thought (Freeman et al., 2002).  
How did single trait scores relate to bias task results? SPS and SIAS scores most efficiently 
predicted the negative (social anxiety congruent) interpretation bias, while PDI scores most 
efficiently predicted the persecutory (paranoia congruent) interpretation bias. What was 
unexpected was that the FNE was excluded from the regression model, owing to its negative 
correlation with most task scores. The SADS also yielded a contradictory result, in that its 
scores marginally predicted both negative and persecutory interpretation bias.  Scores on the 
LSAS, PS and GTPS did not emerge as significant predictors in any of the task results. 
2.4.2 Hypothesis-Driven Analyses 
According to the key hypothesis of the thesis, a content-specific association between 
interpretation bias and its content-congruent emotional trait was proposed here. The hypothesis 
is therefore that the negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias is 
more strongly associated with trait social anxiety than with paranoia. Conversely, the 
persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias is more strongly associated with 
trait paranoia than with social anxiety.   
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Results Does the corresponding bias better 
explain the variance in the related (i.e. 
content matched) traits? 
SA trait when controlling for the alternative 
bias more variance in ST was 




PA trait when controlling for the alternative 
bias more variance in PT was 




Note: social anxiety content matches are shown on grey rows, and paranoid ones are shown on white 
rows. Fenigstein PS SA trait= the composite of social anxiety trait measures: the SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and 
the SPS; PA trait= the composite of paranoia trait measures: the PS, GTPS, and the PDI; SB= the 
composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP; PB= the 
composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT, and the WSAP. 
 
2.4.2.1 Summary and Interpretation of Results 
According to the regression results of the social anxiety trait composite, the social anxiety bias 
composite was significantly associated with the social anxiety trait composite. After adding the 
paranoia bias composite, we found that both social anxiety and the paranoia bias composites 
were significantly associated with the social anxiety trait composite. This suggests that 
participants were vulnerable to social anxiety, regardless of the interpretation bias content 
(negatively evaluated or persecutory) they produced. 
Further, the positive ∆Adjusted R² change value extended our conclusions. There was a higher 
significance level and a greater ∆Adjusted R² value after controlling for paranoia bias 
composite, when testing the relationship between social anxiety bias composite and its content 
congruent trait composite. This finding strengthens the association between the social anxiety 
bias composite in predicting its content congruent trait composite. It suggests that participants 
were more vulnerable to social anxiety when they produced more negatively evaluated 
interpretation than when they produced persecutory interpretation. 
The regression results of the paranoia trait composite showed that the paranoia bias composite 
was significantly associated with the paranoia trait composite. After adding the social anxiety 
bias composite, we found that both social anxiety and paranoia bias composites were 
significantly associated with the paranoia trait composite. This suggests that participants were 
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vulnerable to paranoia regardless of the interpretation bias content (negatively evaluated or 
persecutory) they produced. 
In addition, the positive ∆Adjusted R² change value extended our conclusions. There was a 
strengthened significance level and greater ∆Adjusted R² value after controlling for social 
anxiety bias composite, when testing the predictive relationship between paranoia bias 
composite and its content congruent trait composite. This finding enhanced the association of 
the paranoia bias composite in predicting its content congruent trait composite, suggesting that 
participants were more vulnerable to paranoia when they produced more persecutory 
interpretations than when they produced negatively evaluated interpretations. 
The second addressed question was whether there is a content-specific association of 
interpretation bias in relation to its content-congruent emotional trait. The results support the 
hypothesis. There were associations between social anxiety bias composite and its content-
matched trait composite and  associations between the paranoia bias composite and its 
content-matched trait composite. Although direct evidence of a content-specific predictive 
relationship between interpretation bias and the emotional trait is lacking, owing to the cross-
sectional nature of the study, the results of comparing the linear relationship of different 
interpretation content (negatively evaluated versus persecutory) and its content matched traits 
was promising. Participants were more vulnerable to social anxiety when they produced 
negatively evaluated as opposed to persecutory interpretations of emotionally socially 
ambiguous information, while participants were more vulnerable to paranoia when they 
produced persecutory interpretations as opposed to negatively evaluated interpretations. 
Overall, our results support cognitive theories of psychopathology (Beck, 1971; Williams et al., 
1988; Eysenck et al., 1991), indicating that, at a subclinical level, each emotional trait can be 
characterised by a cognitive bias content specific to that trait. By comparing different contents 
(negatively evaluated/persecutory) of interpretation bias that show a match the relevant 
emotional vulnerability (social anxiety/paranoia) to a greater or lesser extent, it emerged that 
negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias matches social 
anxiety better than paranoia. Conversely, the persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias more closely matched paranoia than social anxiety.  
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2.4.2.2 Unexpected Findings and Possible Explanations  
Although the results were promising, the significant contribution from the “content-unmatched” 
interpretation cannot be ignored. For example, in the predictive model of social anxiety, not only 
negatively evaluated interpretation but also persecutory interpretation contributed significantly, 
similar to the prediction of paranoia. These question the discriminant validity of task items of 
interpretation and trait measures. First, participant ratings on possible interpretations were not 
based on a direct comparison between a negatively evaluated and persecutory interpretation. 
Each of our tasks presented different interpretations by showing two separate versions (social 
anxiety/paranoia). For example, participants could only select between a negatively evaluated 
and a neutral interpretation in the social anxiety version, and between a persecutory and a 
neutral interpretation in the paranoia version. Their choice was not between a negatively 
evaluated or persecutory interpretation. A proportion of participants might always choose a 
threatening interpretation, selecting negatively evaluated interpretations in the social anxiety 
version, and persecutory evaluated interpretations in the paranoia version. The even preference 
for non-neutral interpretations would then lead to poor discriminant validity. Second, the same 
problems were considered in trait measures. Current models of social anxiety and paranoia 
suggest that these two constructs are conceptually related and co-occur meaningfully. Although 
our correlation analysis of trait measures showed it was feasible to assess social anxiety and 
paranoia as different constructs, a number of items from one trait measure were still endorsed 
by individuals high on the other trait. For example, the item “I have often felt that strangers were 
looking at me critically” from the Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) also 
has a socially anxious meaning. Perceiving others as critical towards them is typical of socially 
anxious individuals (Hirsch & Clark, 2004). It was difficult to find measures that discriminated 
well between the traits of social anxiety and paranoia. 
2.4.3 Limitations 
The results confirm a content specific (negatively evaluated) interpretation bias in socially 
anxious individuals. Further, they confirm its association with the social anxiety trait. However, 
the results for persecutory interpretation bias were less conclusive. Although an association of 
content specific interpretation bias towards the paranoid trait was confirmed, only SRT revealed 
a content specific interpretation bias in paranoid individuals. Unexpectedly, the SST and WSAP 
failed to yield a content specific interpretation bias, but both found significant negatively 
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evaluated and persecutory interpretation biases in paranoid individuals. The negatively 
evaluated interpretation was weighted slightly more heavily. 
First, the inconsistent results brought into question the efficacy of some of the tasks in 
differentiating the two interpretation biases. For example, SST and WSAP results showed that 
paranoid participants tend towards both negatively evaluated interpretation and persecutory 
interpretation, slightly favouring the negatively evaluated one. Although this result did not 
support our content specific hypothesis, one could argue that it constitutes an actual 
representation of the paranoid individuals. This is consistent with the cognitive theory proposed 
by Freeman et al. (2002), according to which paranoia is based upon common, socially 
emotional concerns. They suggest that high levels of pre-existing anxiety and distress 
coexisting with social ambiguity is a particularly salient cognitive component of paranoid 
individuals. The cognitive content of anxiety centres upon impending threat, which may later 
manifest as paranoia thought (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001). 
Moreover, their hierarchy of paranoia ranged from the mild end of social evaluative concerns 
(e.g., fears of criticism) to the severe end of life threatening concerns (e.g., fear of harm) 
(Freeman et al., 2005). The mild end of paranoia might interact with the negatively evaluated 
interpretation bias, typically accompanied by social anxiety. Nevertheless, the SRT did 
demonstrate a content specific interpretation bias in paranoia, which balanced our findings, and 
supported our hypothesis. Overall, the results fail to yield consistent findings of content specific 
interpretation bias in paranoia; its cognitive overlap with social anxiety is, however, confirmed.  
Second, some of the tasks might lack interference controls in the pre- and post-information 
process of interpretation. For example, both the SST and the WSAP used a “word” format 
stimulus (e.g., unhelpful/constructive, sabotage/support) to represent the biased interpretation. 
First, one could argue that responses might easily be interfered with by selective attention. 
Rather than generating an interpretation, participants might quickly choose what negatively 
attracted their attention. However, this was extended to the edge of interpretation bias we 
tested: even the positive results our finding. However, the SRT showed that the interpretation 
bias of target stimuli (negative and related in meaning to the ambiguity) was much higher than 
the foil stimuli (negative but unrelated in meaning to the ambiguity), confirming that the results 
were not due to the response bias. Second, one’s pre-existing negative ideation of social 
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ambiguities might be another factor affecting the interpretation process. Rather than a direct 
interpretation of social scenarios, socially anxious individuals rely upon pre-existing negative 
ideation to resolve ambiguity (Beard & Amir, 2010b). Hemsley (1998) also suggested that poor 
use of contextual information can disrupt one’s ability to process ongoing information. However, 
the WSAP present primes representing persecutory/negatively evaluated interpretations before 
the ambiguous stimuli have better imitated the priming effects of pre-existing ideation on 
interpretation processes. Overall, using different tasks to measure interpretation bias balanced 
the weaknesses of each task. The results from composites across different tasks enhanced our 
findings. 
Third, there was arguably a lack of direct comparison of negatively evaluated interpretation and 
persecutory interpretation. For example, there were two separate versions for each of the 
cognitive tasks: one version represented a negatively evaluated and benign interpretation; the 
other represented persecutory and benign interpretation. That is, the selection that a participant 
made was from negative or benign rather than negative or persecutory. The conclusion with 
regard to content specificity is thus an indirect finding. Tasks that represent negatively 
evaluated interpretation and persecutory interpretation at the same time are preferable.  
Fourth, response bias was not considered in the SST and WSAP. Participants might only have 
responded to the non-positive/benign stimuli, not actively differentiating between negative and 
persecutory meaning. Moreover, the paranoia related interpretations that reflected the idea of 
reference shared common content with negatively evaluated interpretations. The SRT was the 
only task that distinguished the idea of reference interpretation from persecutory interpretation 
in items, which the SST and WSAP were not. This might have weakened the sensitivity of the 
test in persecutory (paranoia related) interpretation bias from negative evaluated (social anxiety 
related). 
Fifth, screening participants for a wide range representation of emotional trait scores is also a 
potential limitation. Participants were screened for a normal distribution on trait scores to form 
the testing sample. This was to ensure the sample would not be overloaded with any specific 
range of individuals. One might argue that the sample are more likely to be representative of the 
population if we did not screen out any participants. However, the normal distributed sample is 
essential for the correlation analysis of this study. Analysis based on abnormal distributed data 
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may result in substantial distortions of parameter and statistic estimates.  The results based on 
this analysis may not well present the actual trend in a wide range of population, but only the 
weighted majority. Future study may explore same research topic on each specific range of 
population. 
Finally, the cross-sectional design of this experiment could arguably limit the extent to which 
inferences can be drawn from regression models. The predictive relationship and content 
specificity were only the outcome in a time of the relationship between the tested variables; a 
causal conclusion of the content-specificity of emotional trait and interpretation bias cannot be 
drawn based on these results. Additional longitudinal studies are therefore essential.   
2.4.4 Implications  
The experiment has theoretical implications for cognitive models of paranoia and social anxiety. 
First, the content specificity of interpretation bias in relation to paranoia could be examined in 
future studies. By controlling for negatively evaluated bias and preventing it from confounding 
persecutory bias, it appears that social anxiety related cognitive content plays a critical role in 
the statement of trait paranoia. Second, this is consistent with the cognitive model (Freeman et 
al., 2002) in its direct link of paranoia and the reflection of emotions, which confirmed the role of 
social anxiety in persecutory beliefs. Other comorbid emotional vulnerability should be 
considered in building up detailed structures of the formation and maintenance of paranoia. 
Moreover, future research could examine in which stage of social interactions biased 
interpretations occur or dominate, and the differences between paranoia and social anxiety. For 
example, by providing interpretations prior to social ambiguity, the results of the WSAP suggest 
that an instant, negatively evaluated interpretation dominates both social anxiety and paranoia. 
Conversely, by providing interpretations after the social ambiguity, the results of SRT revealed 
only persecutory interpretations in paranoia, and that negative interpretations dominate social 
anxiety. This implies that different directions of the interpretation may apply differently when a 
paranoid participant encounters social ambiguities. For instance, both negatively evaluated and 
persecutory interpretations dominate pre-existing beliefs (prior to entering a social ambiguity), 
while only persecutory interpretations are produced when encountering social ambiguity. Finally, 
the current findings might be extended in future studies by examining the role of interpretation 
bias in predicting future levels of emotional distress, such as in depression and distress (e.g., 
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Rude et al., 2002; Pury, 2002). Although our results were unable to suggest any causal role for 
content specific interpretation bias in developing paranoia or social anxiety, there were 
promising findings that clearly indicated the direction of interpretation biases in content specific 
emotional traits. A longitudinal design may therefore be applied in future research. 
Our results also have practical implications for clinical interventions in paranoia and social 
anxiety. First, interventions of paranoia may be more effective if they recognise the ubiquity of 
trait social anxiety. Although it is much more common now to consider the particular association 
of anxiety, distress and social isolation in the development and maintenance of paranoid 
ideation in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) (Kuipers et al., 2006), our results suggest a 
direction of attention to a particular anxiety subtype (social anxiety) for interventions in paranoia. 
For example, introducing scheduled behavioral therapies to interrupt the cycle of social anxiety 
and distress might improve affect and social support and reduce isolation. Moreover, it is 
important to apply interventions to reduce interpretation bias; on acknowledgment and training, 
such positive or unthreatening interpretations become credible. For example, introducing 
Cognitive Behavioral Modification (CBM) procedures using a computer-based technique to 
assist in reducing interpretation bias by the repetitive practice of alternative positive 
interpretations of emotional ambiguities. Negative information processes are the main focus in 
anxiety (e.g., Brosan et al., 2011), social anxiety (Turner et al., 2011), depression (Lee et al., 
2015) and paranoia (Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 2015). Here, the possibility of more attention to 
interpretation bias is suggested and the focus on reducing negative interpretation bias extended 
to a wider range of comorbid trait congruent interpretations. For example, both paranoia and 
social anxiety congruent interpretations could be targeted in cognitive interventions for paranoia. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Consistent with the existing literature, this study confirmed a content specific (negatively 
evaluated) interpretation bias in socially anxious individuals. Results of the most 
methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias, the SRT, confirmed the content 
specificity of interpretation bias in paranoid individuals. With respect to the main research 
question here, a significant association was demonstrated between interpretation and its 
content specific emotion (paranoid/social anxiety) trait. Overall, the results of this cross-
sectional experiment generated promising findings relevant to the subclinical population. The 
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next experiment may extend these findings by demonstrating the content specificity of 
interpretation bias in a forced alternative design, facilitating a direct comparison between the 
two interpretation biases.      
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Chapter 3 Experiment 2: The Content Specificity of 
Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety and Paranoia 
3.1 Experiment Overview 
The findings of Experiment 1 revealed content specificity for interpretation bias in socially 
anxious and paranoid individuals: they were biased in the direction of the emotional concerns 
related to their psychopathological trait (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Both socially anxious and 
paranoid individuals interpret emotionally social ambiguities in a biased way: socially anxious 
individuals experience themselves as negatively evaluated; paranoid individuals, as persecuted. 
Biased interpretation is an important aetiological factor in the development and maintenance of 
affective disorders (Clark & McManus, 2002), and paranoid psychosis (Freeman et al., 2008). 
Recent studies reveal the clinical potential of early identification and induction, which may 
improve mood and ameliorate symptoms (Lester et al., 2011; Yiend et al., 2014). In this 
experiment, a cross-sectional design is applied in a broad population in order to examine the 
content specificity of biased interpretations associated with social anxiety and paranoia. Three 
cognitive experimental tasks are used to test two alternative forced choice designs (Bogacz et 
al., 2006) with either socially anxious or paranoid congruent content. Rather than presenting 
each task with separate versions of negative (social anxiety trait matched)/benign content or 
persecutory (paranoia trait matched)/benign content, here participants are forced to make a 
two-alternative selection between socially anxious or paranoid interpretation on SST and RJT 
task, or rate without benign content but only interpretation of socially anxious/paranoid contents. 
An ambiguous stimulus (e.g., a stranger is standing across the street) is presented with a 
negative (social anxiety congruent) interpretation, such as “the stranger is laughing at me”, and 
a persecutory (paranoia congruent) interpretation, such as “the stranger is stalking me”. 
Hierarchical regression analysis is used to examine the content-specific association between 
interpretation biases and social anxiety/paranoia.  
3.2 Background 
Affective disorders can be characterised by cognitive content specific to that disorder (Beck, 
1971). The cognitive processes of a socially anxious individual, including interpretations, 
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attention and imagery, thus center on the theme of being negatively or threateningly evaluated 
by others (Foa et al., 1996). Paranoia is characterised by the theme of persecutory beliefs: a 
misinterpretation of experiences as posing either a psychosocial or physical threat, and an 
overestimation of both the intensity and probability of anticipated harm in ambiguous situations 
(Freeman et al., 2002). Emotionally ambiguous information may have positive or negative 
emotional consequences. For example, one might experience the whisper of a stranger as 
praise or disrespect, thus experiencing either encouragement or distress (Savulich et al., 2015). 
Psychologically vulnerable individuals often generate biased interpretations when dealing with 
such information (Beck, 1971). Interpretation bias is the tendency to interpret information 
consistently with one's pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses, rather than considering alternative 
explanations. Biased interpretations facilitate the endorsement of emotionally threatening 
content, reinforcing pathological emotional traits (Murphy et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2006). The 
content of biased interpretation is central to the cognitive theory of psychopathology in social 
anxiety and paranoia.  
According to the content-specificity effect, the concerns of psychologically vulnerable individuals 
consist primarily of emotional information that matches the core symptoms of a 
psychopathology (Beck, 1971). The more highly the match is prioritised, the more likely it is that 
the pathology and its emotional trait will be maintained (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Paranoid 
individuals are concerned primarily with suspicious information, which maintains their paranoia; 
socially anxious individuals maintain schemas of negative evaluative information, which 
maintains their social anxiety. Beck et al. (1971) tested the content-specificity hypothesis of their 
proposed cognitive psychopathological model in depression and anxiety. Depressed and 
anxious patients were asked to rate the frequency of a pool of cognitive statements reflecting 
anxiety (e.g., I won’t know what to say) or depression (e.g., I’m a social failure). The findings 
firmly supported the content-specificity hypothesis of the cognitive model of psychopathology. 
Another multiple regression study confirmed this finding: beliefs of failure (depressed cognition) 
are specially associated with depression; beliefs of threat, uniquely predictive of anxiety (Clark, 
Beck & Brown, 1989). Based on regression design, Alford et al. (1995) suggested a predictive 
role for distinct cognitive content in specific psychological disorders, while Greenberg and Beck 
(1989) confirmed content specificity in a group design study. By contrast, in a study of young 
anxious and depressed patients, Laurent and Stark (1993) did not find sufficient support for 
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content specificity: participants differed only on depressed and not on anxious cognition. Beck 
et al. (1987) identified both disorder-specific and shared cognitive concerns, suggesting that the 
disorders are both distinct and related in longitudinal data. Extending these findings with a focus 
on general cognitive content, research further suggests that content specificity occurs at the 
product level of information processing, such as interpretations and beliefs (Lamberton & Oei, 
2008). A meta-analysis of the content specificity of attention bias in anxiety indicated that 
attention bias is more closely associated with disorder-congruent than -incongruent threat 
stimuli (Pergamin-Hight et al., 2015). To date, most cognitive content specificity research has 
focused on affective disorders, and not on psychosis. Savulich et al. (2012) proposed the 
theoretical importance of cognitive content specific bias in the development and maintenance of 
paranoid psychosis and found moderate evidence of the cognitive content specificity of 
psychopathology in paranoia, in that negative bias was related to paranoia (Savulich et al., 
2015). However, the cognitive mechanism informing this specificity remained unclear.  
Most content specificity tasks were developed for a general cognitive process; fewer focus 
specifically on interpretation. Beck (1987) used a cognition checklist to measure the content 
specificity of general cognition. Cognitive content was presented as sentences (e.g., people will 
reject me), extracted from encounters typical of the disorders. Participants rated how often 
those cognitive contents occurred to them in the context of a specific situation (e.g., 
physical/social). Similar questionnaires have been developed to test anxiety-related cognition, 
such as the Anxious Self-Statements Questionnaire (Kendall & Hollon, 1989) and depression-
related cognition, such as the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). 
Studies of interpretation bias typically employ the similarity rating task (Eysenck et al., 1991) 
and the scramble sentence task (Wenzlaff, 1993).  Focusing on the content specificity of 
interpretation bias, Savulich et al. (2015) used three cognitive measures to test groups of 
participants ranging from non-paranoid to paranoid. The similarity rating task is the most 
methodologically robust task of interpretation bias. An emotionally ambiguous passage 
describing commonly experienced social scenarios is presented. Participants are asked to rate 
how similar the disambiguated sentences are to the original text passage. Paranoid or non-
paranoid interpretations are presented in one set of material, and positive or negative 
interpretations in another. Results revealed only a general negative interpretation bias with no 
clear content specificity in paranoia. The Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; Savulich et al., 
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2015), in which participants unscramble sentences with target words representing 
paranoid/non-paranoid or negative/positive meaning, indicated a higher degree of content 
specificity: trait paranoia was associated only with paranoid interpretation bias and not with 
negative interpretation bias. Content specificity was also not observed on the facial emotion 
recognition task; associations between emotion recognition and paranoia were limited. 
However, none of above tasks tests content specificity directly, by providing alternative target 
interpretations in one set of material; for example, presenting anxiety-related interpretations with 
paranoia-related interpretations rather than in separate sets. Moreover, although a number of 
studies investigated the content specificity of different affective disorders, none included 
psychiatric disorders. Paranoia and socially anxiety are highly comorbid in the prodromal stage 
of psychosis, and their cognitive content specificity might play a crucial role in the development 
and maintenance of related emotional traits and disorders. 
In the current experiment, the content specificity findings of Experiment 1 were tested. Three 
paradigms, the Similarity Rating Task (SRT), the SST (Husstedt et al., 2002) and the 
Relatedness Judgment Task (RJT; Savulich & Yiend, 2012) were developed to test 
interpretation bias in paranoia and social anxiety. The design of this experiment differs from that 
of Experiment 1 in three respects. First, rather than completing tasks with separate sets of 
paranoia/positive or social anxiety/positive stimuli, Experiment 2 presents only socially anxious 
or paranoid interpretations without positive alternatives for participants to select or rate. This 
allowed for a direct test of content specificity of interpretation bias in paranoia and social anxiety 
and represents a main strength of the study. Participants directly compared social anxiety and 
paranoia related interpretations and made selections. Second, the image-based RJT was used 
in order to enrich the testing dimensions, revealing whether the content specificity of 
interpretation bias applies to media other than text. Data analysis is similar to in Experiment 1. 
First, the data is analysed following the precedent set in the literature, comparing the 
interpretation content of individuals with different emotional traits (e.g., anxiety/depression). This 
classical design allows a direct test of the content specificity of interpretation bias, whereby 
anxious individuals produce more anxiety-related (trait-matched) interpretation bias than do 
depressed individuals, and vice versa. Interpretation bias is used as the dependent variable, 
testing its content-specific association to related emotional traits. Confirming whether the 
current results are consistent with the literature is fundamental here. The proposed aetiological 
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role of content specificity in interpretation bias has been developed from the following 
theoretical rationale: if individuals with different emotional vulnerabilities differ in their 
emotionally congruent interpretation biases, such bias might predict bias-congruent emotional 
traits. The major research interest here is  the aetiological importance of interpretation bias in 
identifying corresponding emotional traits. Although it is impossible to test the aetiological role of 
interpretation bias using a cross-sectional design, content-specific interpretation bias in social 
anxiety and paranoia is investigated. 
Our hypothesis is stated in two parts:  
Part 1: Testing the precedent in the literature: there is a direct content-specific association of 
emotional traits and their trait-congruent interpretation bias. 
I. Social anxiety is more strongly associated with negatively-evaluated (social anxiety 
congruent content) interpretation bias than is paranoia.  
II. Conversely, paranoia is more strongly associated with persecutory (paranoia congruent 
content) interpretation bias than is social anxiety. 
Part 2: Testing the major research interest of the project: there is content-specific association of 
interpretation bias and content-congruent emotional traits. 
III. Negatively-evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias is more strongly 
associated with social anxiety than is persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias. 
IV. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias is more strongly 
associated with paranoia than is negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) 
interpretation bias 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Experimental Design 
In a design similar to Experiment 1, 80 participants were administered self-report personality 
questionnaires in order to measure emotional traits. Cognitive tasks were used to test 
interpretation bias. The major differences in experimental design included using the RJT instead 
of the Word Sentence Association Task and using a two-alternative forced choice design on 
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each participants had to choose between paranoid and social anxious interpretation rather than 
selecting between benign and paranoid interpretations or benign and socially anxious 
interpretations. 
3.3.2 Participants 
80 non-clinical volunteers (65 female, 15 male) were eligible for participation and completed all 
experiment procedures. Participants consisted mainly of students and staff at King’s College, 
London, and were recruited by circular email after meeting inclusion criteria for the study. The 
inclusion criteria were (a) being over 18 years of age, (b) fluent in English and (c) not having 
been diagnosed with any psychological or psychiatric disorder and not currently receiving 
treatment for any psychological or psychiatric disorders, including psychopharmacological 
medication. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (n = 50), with the sample also including 
participants of Asian (n = 6), Black/African/Caribbean (n = 10) and other (n = 14) origins. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 41 years (M = 25.82, SD = 6.17). The educational attainments of participants 
ranged from high school (n = 6) to university (n = 73). 
3.3.3 Recruitment 
Participants were selected to have wide-ranging scores on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
(SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and the Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992). Eligible participants were invited to participate using the contact details provided.  
3.3.4 Materials 
3.3.4.1 Measures of Emotional Traits 
The Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987), SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and 
Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) were used to measure social anxiety. The 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) and Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; 
Watson & Friend, 1969) were excluded. In Experiment 1, these two measures were inefficient in 
distinguishing the two emotional traits: the FNE was not correlated with any of the cognitive 
tasks; the SADS correlated with tasks related both to social anxiety and paranoia. The Green 
Paranoid Thought Scales (GPTS; Green et al., 2008), self-report Paranoia Scale (PS; 
Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999) were 
used to measure paranoia. 
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Social anxiety  
The LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987) has been widely used to assess a full range of performance and 
social difficulties in people with social anxiety disorder. It includes two subscales, which yield 
indices of fear and avoidance of social interaction (11 items) and performance (13 items). Each 
is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 to 3. Scores indicate how participants have 
felt over the previous weeks, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. 
The SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) consists of 20 items and is scored on a five-point Likert-type 
scale, from 0 (not at all characteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me), assessing 
anxiety related to initiating and maintaining interactions with people in social situations.  
The SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was designed to assess anxiety symptoms related to 
performing various tasks (writing, drinking and eating in public) while observed by others. It 
consists of 20 items. Each SPS item is rated on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 
(not at all characteristic or true of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic or true of me). 
Measures of paranoia 
The GTPS (Green et al., 2008) include two subscales and assess ideas of social reference and 
persecution, rated on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Totally). 
Four items from each dimension (conviction, preoccupation and distress) were chosen and four 
items simply reflecting a statement of a paranoid thought. 
The PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) was designed to measure the incidence of paranoia in a 
non-clinical college population. Participants rate their agreement with each of 20 items on a 
five-point scale (1 = not at all applicable, 5 = extremely applicable). The total score can range 
from 20 to 100; higher scores indicate greater paranoid ideation. This scale is the most widely 
used dimensional measure of paranoia. 
The PDI (Peters et al., 1999) is a behavioural measure used to assess delusional ideation in 
the general population, and includes measures of distress, preoccupation and conviction. 
3.3.4.2 Tasks of Interpretation Bias 
Three cognitive experimental tasks were used to measure interpretation bias: the SRT, the SST 
and the RJT. Both the SRT and RJT are computer-based; the SST is a pen-and-paper task.  
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The Similarity Ratings Task (SRT; based on Eysenck et al. 1991) 
The SRT, originally developed by Eysenck et al. (1991), is purportedly the most 
methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias (Savulich, Shergill, & Yiend, 2015). 
Participants are required to interpret emotionally ambiguous passages of text, which represent 
both paranoid and social anxiety related scenarios. Participants are presented with 20 
ambiguous scenarios, each ending in a word fragment. An example of a scenario used in the 
task is the following: 
Lecture  
You are required to attend a Statistics lecture twice a week. You enjoy sitting with a 
group of friends you made last term. You greet them all but one of them does not 
answer b-ck [back].   
 
 
Once the word fragment is correctly completed, participants are asked a comprehension 
question about the scenario ("Are you attending a lecture?"), and respond by pressing Y for yes 
or N for no on the keyboard. Following their response, a correct or wrong answer message is 
displayed on the screen. In the second part of the SRT, the titles of each scenario (e.g., 
Lecture) are presented with four possible interpretations: two target interpretations, with content 
relevant to the previous passage, and two foil interpretations, with content irrelevant to the 
previous passage. Interpretations are either positive or benign explanations of the scenarios. 
Participants are asked to rate how similar in meaning each sentence is to the original scenarios, 
on a four-point scale (1= very different in meaning, 4 = very similar in meaning). The SRT takes 
approximately twenty minutes to complete. 
The SRT used in this study was based on the version used in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, 
following the example above, a paranoid target interpretation was presented (e.g., Your friend in 
the Statistics lecture is deliberately snubbing you), and a benign interpretation (e.g., Your friend 
did not hear you), testing persecutory interpretation bias. In another set, a socially anxious 
target interpretation (e.g., Your friends are criticising your birthday plans) and a benign 
interpretation (e.g., Your friends are planning a surprise party) are presented, testing negative 
interpretation bias. However, in this experiment, we extend the SRT in Experiment 1 by 
presenting both a persecutory (reflecting paranoia) and negative (reflecting social anxiety) 
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interpretation in one single task set. Following the example above, four possible interpretations 
are presented (see Figure 3.1). This forced choice task design allows a direct test of content 
specificity in the two interpretations. It shows how participants interpret the social ambiguity if 
only negative and persecutory explanations are presented. 
Figure 3.1 Example items of SRT in Experiments 1 and 2 
SRT used in Exp 1  
 
SRT used in Exp 2 
Set 1: testing persecutory interpretation  
Lecture 
You are required to attend a Statistics 
lecture twice a week. You enjoy sitting with 
a group of friends you made last term. You 
greet them all but one of them does not 
answer b-ck [back].   
5) Your friend in the Statistics lecture is 
deliberately snubbing you 
- target persecutory interpretation  
6) Your friend did not hear you 
- target benign interpretation  
7) Your friend in the library is distracted 
you  
- foil paranoid interpretation 
8) Your friend in the library didn’t hear you  
- foil negative interpretation  
 
Testing persecutory interpretation and 
negative interpretation  
Lecture 
You are required to attend a Statistics 
lecture twice a week. You enjoy sitting 
with a group of friends you made last 
term. You greet them all but one of them 
does not answer b-ck [back].   
1) Your friend in the statistics lecture is 
deliberately snubbing you  
- target persecutory interpretation  
2) Your friend in the statistics lecture 
thinks you are worthless  
- target negative interpretation  
3) Your friend in the library is distracted 
you  
- foil paranoid interpretation 
4) Your friend in the library didn’t hear 
you  
- foil negative interpretation  
 
 
Set 2: testing negative interpretation 
Local pub 
You have just moved to a new area and 
your neighbour asks if you would like to go 
to your local pub that evening. When you 
arrive, they are not yet there. You imagine 
what they think about you after your 
earlier c-nvers-t-on [conversation] 
5) After your earlier conversation, they 
probably thought you were likeable.  
- target negative interpretation  
6) After your earlier conversation, they 
probably thought you were dull.  
- target benign interpretation  
7) Your find the new area pleasant  
- foil negative interpretation  
8) You find the new area unpleasant  
- foil benign interpretation  
 
Note: Negative interpretation reflects a social anxiety related meaning; persecutory interpretation reflects a 






The Scrambled Sentences Task (based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998)  
The SST used for this study was a modified version of the original task developed by Wenzlaff 
and Bates (1998), which assesses the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in positive 
or negative ways. The SST used here was based on the version used in Experiment 1. There 
were two sets of materials in Experiment 1. In each, participants were asked to rearrange a 
group of mixed up words, which had two possible solutions. A paranoid or benign interpretation 
in one set of SST tested persecutory interpretation bias; a socially anxious or benign 
interpretation in the other tested negative interpretation bias. However, in this experiment, we 
extend the SST in Experiment 1 by presenting both persecutory (reflecting paranoia) and 
negative (reflecting social anxiety) interpretation in one single task set. This required 
participants to rearrange mixed up words with two possible solutions, a paranoid or socially 
anxious interpretation. Participants had to unscramble five words to form grammatically correct 
sentences, placing a number over each of the five words to indicate the order of the words. 20 
items were developed with each scrambled sentence containing a word that reflected paranoia 
(persecution), such as "stalking", and another that reflected social anxiety (negative evaluation 
by others), such as "disapproving". “Feel tend I disliked watched to” is an example of an item 
used on this version of the SST; this sentence could be disambiguated towards either a socially 
anxious ("I tend to feel disliked") or a paranoid ("I tend to feel watched") interpretation. 
Participants attained scores reflecting social anxiety bias and paranoia bias, based on whether 
they disambiguated sentences to form statements that matched the original sentences.  
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Figure 3.2 SST example items in Experiments 1 and 2 
SST used in Exp 1  
 
SST used in Exp 2 
Set 1: testing persecutory interpretation  
Scrambled words: 
feel tend I welcomed watched to 
↓ 
I tend to feel watched 
- negative statement  
I tend to feel welcomed 
- benign statement 
Testing persecutory interpretation and 
negative interpretation  
 
Scrambled words: 
feel tend I disliked watched to 
↓ 
I tend to feel disliked 
- negative statement  
I tend to feel watched 
- persecutory statement 
 
 
Set 2: testing negative interpretation 
Scrambled words: 
usually most like people me dislike ↓ 
Most people usually dislike me 
- negative statement  
Most people usually like me 
- benign statement 
 
Note: Negative statement reflected social anxiety related meaning; persecutory statement reflected 
paranoia related meaning; benign statement reflected a neutral meaning, to which most of the healthy 
population subscribed  
 
The Relatedness Judgment Task (Savulich & Yiend, 2012) 
In the RJT, participants are asked to judge whether a picture was related to the sentence that 
followed. It consists of 20 items, and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. For 15 of the 
items, participants are presented with a choice of two sentences reflecting a paranoid or socially 
anxious interpretation and asked to rate how similar each individual sentence is to its 
associated picture, on a four-point scale (1 = very similar, 4 = very dissimilar). Pictures were 
chosen to reflect either a paranoid or socially anxious interpretation. A benign choice was added 
to the final five items to identify participants who still endorsed a paranoid or socially anxious 
interpretation, even when a benign choice was available. 
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Figure 3.3 Example item of RJT in Experiment 2 
 
3.3.5 Procedure 
An experimental session lasts approximately one to one-and-a-half hours. All participants were 
reminded of the inclusion criteria before starting. As shown in Diagram 1, they were then asked 
to complete the consent form and the demographic questionnaire, followed by the self-report 
measures. This took approximately 20 to 30 minutes. To measure interpretation bias for 
negative (social anxiety related) and persecutory (paranoia related) interpretations, three 
cognitive experimental tasks were administered. Self-report measures and tasks were 
presented in countbalanced, fixed order across participants. A random/counterbalanced design 
reduces the chance of order effects and other confounding variables. 
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Figure 3.4: Experimental procedure 
Note: Self-report measures were presented to participants before the tasks, in countbalanced, 
fixed order. LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 
1998); GTPS (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); 
PDI (Peters et al., 1999); SRT (based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST (based on Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998); RJT (Savulich & Yiend, 2012) 
 
3.3.6 Study Design  
A cross-sectional design was used. Participants were tested across a wide range of scores on 
emotional trait measures. Key concerns included the correlation between participant ratings on 
three cognitive tasks measuring interpretation bias and their responses on emotional trait 
measures. First, preliminary analysis was conducted on the raw data, following the precedent in 
the literature (see Diagram 2). Raw scores from measures and tasks were used to determine 
preliminary results for each computer-based task. Second, composite scores were calculated 






Figure 3.5 Analytical approach 
 
Note: The self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of tasks, and they were 
presented in two countbalanced, fixed order. LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia 
Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 2008); PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); 
PDI (Peters et al., 1999). SRT (based on Eysenck et al. 1991); the SST (based on Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998); the RJT (Savulich & Yiend, 2012) 
 
To conduct the preliminary analysis, the correlation coefficients between task scores and 
corresponding trait scores were calculated. Hierarchical regression was performed, using each 
task score as a dependent variable, and its corresponding trait measure score as a predictor. 
Only employed measures that correlated significantly with the dependent variables were used.  
To test the hypothesis, composites were calculated for social anxiety/paranoia measures and 
for social anxiety/paranoia related bias. Composites were generated by standardising (M = 0, 
SD = 1) and then calculating an average of all participant scores. Each participant thus had a 
composite score for social anxiety, paranoia, social anxiety related interpretation bias and 
paranoia related interpretation bias. Bivariate correlation and hierarchical regression analysis 
was then performed on the composites.   
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Participant Characteristics 
3.4.1.1 Data Cleaning 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity were not violated. In order to recruit participants with wide-ranging scores on 
all scales, data was not filtered. There were three missing data points; these were treated by 
pairwise deletion. Inspection of missing data did not suggest any systematic problems with 
measurement tools or methods. The missing data appeared randomly distributed. 
3.4.1.2 Calculating Bias Scores  
In order to compare reaction time or rating with self-report indices, bias scores were calculated 
for the social scenario sentences. Bias scores for each task were calculated using the equations 
presented in Table 3.1. We calculated two bias scores for each task: a negatively evaluated 
biasand a persecutory bias. Larger bias scores indicate a stronger bias towards threat 
interpretations over benign interpretations. The mean rating for all target items constituted the 
SRT interpretation bias scores in this study, as opposed to in Experiment 1, in which scores 
were based on the mean rating for all target social anxiety items minus the mean ratings for all 
target benign items .   
 
Table 3.1 Bias score equations 
Task 
name 
Bias score  Equations Range of values 
SST Negative bias Interpretation Bias = (Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias = (Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed)*100 % 
0, 100 
SRT Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 





Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 
Target Paranoia - Mean of ratings on all Target 
social anxiety 
-3, 3 
RJT Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias = Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed*100 % 
0, 100 
 
Note: Negative bias represents social anxiety related interpretation; persecutory bias represents 
paranoia related interpretation 
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3.4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The emotional traits of social anxiety were operationalised as the combined average score of 
the three self-report measures (LSAS, SIAS and SPS), the emotional traits of paranoia as the 
combined average score of the three self-report measures (PS, GPTS and PDI) and 
interpretation bias in reaction time self-rating conditions as the combined average score of the 
three cognitive tasks (WSAT, SST and SRT). 
Table 3.2 Means and standard deviations of trait scores and bias index scores 
    Social anxiety Paranoia   
Emotional traits Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 LSAS 35.05 20.18 PS 30.28 9.57  
LSAS_Anxiety 19.39 10.65 GTPS 39.91 11.33 
 




SIAS 20.01 13.27 GPTS_Persecution 19.15 6.07 
 
SPS 9.96 8.26 PDI 36.65 33.41 
 
   PDI_YesNo 5.65 9.75 
 
   PDI_distress 9.90 9.32 
  
  PDI_preoccupation 10.31 10.19 
      PDI_conviction 13.15 12.17 
Interpretation bias  
 SST (%) 51.79 15.61 SST (%) 33.02 13.89  
SRT 1.70 0.46 SRT 1.69 0.48 
  JRT (%) 70.31 11.86 JRT (%) 29.69 11.86 
 
Note: N=80; SD=standard deviations 
 
The means and standard deviations of all measures are presented in Table 3.2. In order to test 
the hypothesis that direction of interpretation bias is significantly associated with content-
specific emotional traits, correlational analysis and linear regression analysis were performed. 
Rather than test the predictive role in each direction, regression analysis of the correlational 
relationship between traits and bias was performed. 
3.4.2 Relationships among Putative Predictors (trait measures) 
Independent variables with a bivariate correlation of greater than .70 should be excluded from 
multiple regression analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Correlation coefficients among 
predictor variables in this study reveal that the constructs of social anxiety (SA) and paranoia 
(PA) are not so highly correlated that they become indistinguishable. Most R-values are <0.8 
and thus feasible to as potentially different constructs and predictors. 
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Table 3.3 Correlation of SA and PA 
  LSAS SIAS SPS 
 r p r p r p 
GTPS .52** <.001 .40** <.001 .66** <.001 
PS .49** <.001 .42** <.001 .59** <.001 
PDI .49** <.001 .35** <.001 .60** <.001 
Note: *p <0.05, **p <0.01, N= 80. 
 
The results presented in Table 3.3 show that all R-values are <0.7. It is therefore feasible to 
assess social anxiety and paranoia as distinct constructs, which will then be used as 
independent variables to test interpretation bias. 
3.4.3 Analyses Driven by the Literature 
Consistent with previous work on interpretation bias, hierarchical regression was performed to 
assess the correlation between interpretation bias and content-specific traits in social anxiety 
and paranoia. The term negatively evaluated biaswas used to describe the task score reflecting 
socially anxious interpretation styles; the term persecutory biasto describe the task score 
reflecting paranoia related meaning. Only significant variables from bivariate correlation 
analyses were entered as independent variables (trait measures). There were therefore four 
types of variables: social anxiety related bias (SB) and paranoia related bias (PB),  social 
anxiety trait (ST) and paranoia trait (PT).  Models for each of the two directions in interpretation 
bias (SB/PB) were tested using two analyses. In the first, content-matched trait scores were 
entered as independent variables first and converse (content-incongruent) trait scores second. 
For example, in explaining the SA interpretation bias, SA trait scores were entered in the first 
block and PA trait scores in the second. In the second analysis, converse trait scores were 
entered as independent variables first and content-matched trait scores second. As before, PA 
trait scores were entered in the first block and SA trait scores in the second. The second 
analysis facilitated a strength test of the trait scores in explaining content-matched interpretation 
bias, when controlling for the converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted R²-values. The change in 
∆Adjusted R² from the first to the second analysis indicates that trait scores accounted for the 
additional variance in task bias scores: greater Adjusted R²-value explains the most variance in 
outcome interpretation bias score. 
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3.4.3.1 Similarity Ratings Task 
The bivariate correlations of SRT and individual trait measure scores were calculated (see 
Table 3.4). Of the social anxiety trait measures, all scores were significantly correlated with SRT 
score in both the social anxiety and persecutory bias. SPS correlated most strongly with SRT in 
the negatively evaluated bias. Of the paranoia trait measures, all scores were significantly 
correlated with SRT score in both the social anxiety and persecutory bias. PS score correlated 
most strongly with SRT in the persecutory bias. All measures were used in the next step of 
analysis.  





      Negatively evaluated bias Persecutory bias 
   r p r p 
Social anxiety 
measures 
LSAS  0.35* 0.001 0.35* 0.001 
SIAS 
 
0.26* 0.01 0.26* 0.01 
SPS 
 
0.28** 0.006 0.33* 0.002 
Paranoia 
measures  
PS 0.56** <.001 0.59** <.001 
GTPS 
 
0.48** <.001 0.48** <.001 
PDI 
 
0.42** <.001 0.45** <.001 
Note: *p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety 
related meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 
2008); PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters et al., 1999). SRT (based on 
Eysenck et al. 1991) 
 
To assess the correlation between content-specific social anxiety interpretation bias and its 
matched traits, hierarchical regression analyses were performed. Following Analysis 1, the 
negatively evaluated biasof SRT was set as the dependent variable. Social anxiety measures, 
including LSAS, SIAS and SPS, were entered in the first block, and all paranoia measures, 
including PS, GTPS and PDI, were entered in the second block. Models 1 (entering: SA 
measures) and 2 (entering: PA measures) were significant, and ceased to be so after adding 
paranoia measures. According to Model 1, 8.47% of the variance in the dependent variable 
could be accounted for by social anxiety measures (Adjusted R² = 0.0847, F(3, 77) =3.38, p = 
.02). Thus, trait social anxiety accounted for the variance in SRT in the negatively evaluated 
bias. After adding the paranoia measures to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested 
that paranoia measures accounted for an additional 20.07% of variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.2854, F(6, 77) = 6.13, p < .001). The results indicate that participants who 
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scored higher on social anxiety and on paranoia measures tended to select the socially anxious 
meaning of the ambiguous SRT passage. 
Following Analysis 2, PA trait scores were entered in the first block and SA trait scores in the 
second block. Models 3 (entering: PA trait scores) and 4 were significant. When SA trait scores 
were added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested that SA trait scores accounted 
for less than 0.03% of the variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.2854, F(3, 77) = 
11.27, p < .001). ∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 is less than that between Models 1 and 
2. Thus, although both SA trait and PA trait scores explain the variance in SRT negatively 
evaluated bias, PA trait scores contribute more than SA trait scores to the variance in the 
dependent variable. The variance explained by SA trait scores was insignificant. Participants 
who scored higher on social anxiety and paranoia measures tended to select the socially 
anxious meaning of the ambiguous SRT passage. Participants who scored higher on paranoia 
measures rated more sentences as social anxiety in meaning than did participants who scored 
higher on social anxiety measures. 
 123 
Table 3.5 Statistical predictors of SRT: negatively evaluated bias 




B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 .3470 .1204 .0847* ST 
 
LSAS .008 .33 1.71 .09 
  SIAS .003 -.06 -.3225 .74 
   
 
 SPS .005 .08 .50 .62 
Model 2 .5841 .3411 .2854** ST LSAS 0.003 0.13 0.70 0.49 
  
SIAS 0.001 0.0312 0.18 0.85 
     
 SPS -0.01 -0.27 -1.68 0.09 
     
PT PS 0.03 0.54 2.71 0.008 
     
GTPS 0.002 0.05 0.28 0.78 
     
 PDI 0.001 0.09 0.63 0.53 
Adding PT increases the variance explained (∆R² = 0.2007) = 20.07% 
Analysis 2 Model 3 .5600 .3136 .2857** PT 
 
PS 0.025 0.49 2.55 0.01 
 GTPS 0.001 0.04 0.21 0.84 
   
 
 PDI 0.001 0.06 0.44 0.67 
Model 4 .5841 .3411 .2854** PT PS 0.027 0.54 2.71 0.01 
 
GTPS 0.002 0.22 0.28 0.78 
     
 PDI 0.001 0.09 0.63 0.53 
     
ST LSAS 0.003 0.13 0.70 0.49 
     
SIAS 0.001 0.03 0.19 0.85 
     
SPS -0.015 -0.27 -1.68 0.10 
Adding ST reduces the variance explained (∆R²= -0.0003) = -0.03% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits more variance in SB was explained by PT (20.07%) than ST (-0.03%) 
Note: The dependent variable= SRT negatively evaluated bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia 
Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory 
(PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; 
PB= persecutory interpretation bias scores 
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The correlations between content-specific paranoia interpretation bias and its matched traits are 
presented in Table 3.6. Following Analysis 1, the persecutory bias of SRT was set as the 
dependent variable. Paranoia measures were entered in the first block; social anxiety measures 
in the second block. Models 1 (entering: PA measures) and 2 (entering: PA measures and SA 
measures) were significant. According to Model 1, paranoia measures accounted for 32.65% of 
the variance in the dependent variable (Adjusted R² = 0.3265, F(3, 77) = 13.44, p < .001). Trait 
paranoia thus accounted for the variance in the SRT reflected persecutory bias. In Model 1, the 
PS t-test was significant, accounting for most of the variance in the dependent variable. After 
adding the social anxiety measures into the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested that 
social anxiety measures accounted for less than 1.67 % of variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.3089, F(6, 77) = 6.74, p < .001). As shown in Table 3.6, PS significantly 
accounted for the outcome variable. Therefore, although scores on both social anxiety and 
paranoia measures explained a significant amount of the variance in the SRT persecutory bias, 
the significance was decreased after adding social anxiety measures. Participants who scored 
higher on social anxiety and paranoia measures tended towards the paranoia interpretations. 
Following Analysis 2, SA trait scores were entered in the first block and PA trait scores in the 
second. Models 3 (entering: SA trait scores) and 4 (entering: SA trait scores and PA trait 
scores) were significant. When PA trait scores were added to the model, the change in Adjusted 
R² suggested that SA trait scores accounted for an additional 20.05% of the variance in 
outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.3089, F(6, 77) = 6.74, p < .0001). The ∆Adjusted R² between 
Models 3 and 4 is greater than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 2. Therefore, although 
both SA and PA trait scores explained a significant amount of the variance in the SRT 
negatively evaluated bias, PA trait scores contributed more than did SA trait scores to variance 
in the dependent variable. SA trait scores did not contribute significantly to variance in SA and 
PA interpretation bias on the SRT. Participants who scored higher on social anxiety and 
paranoia measures tended to select the paranoid meaning of the ambiguous passage. 
Participants with higher scores on paranoia measures interpreted more sentences as paranoid 
in meaning than did participants with higher scores on social anxiety measures. 
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Table 3.6 Statistical predictors of SRT: persecutory bias  




B Beta t Sig.  
Analysis 1 Model 1 .5939 .3527 .3265** PT 
 
PS 0.001 0.10 0.75 0.45 
 
  
-0.08 -0.44 0.66 
   
 
 PDI  0.031 0.58 3.15 <.001 
Model 2 .6023 .3627 .3089** PT PS 0.002 0.12 0.88 0.38 
  
GTPS -0.003 -0.07 GTPS 0.70 
     
 PDI  0.033 0.62 3.19 <.001 
     
ST LSAS 0.001 0.06 0.32 0.75 
     
SIAS 0.0003 0.01 0.08 0.94      
 SPS -0.009 -0.16 -1.03 0.31 
Adding ST reduces the variance explained (∆R²= -0.0167)=-1.67% 
Analysis 2 Model 3 .3654 .1335 .0984* ST 
 
LSAS 0.007 0.19 0.94 0.16 
 SIAS 0.0003 -0.09 -0.49 0.63 
  SPS -0.009 0.19 1.12 0.23 
Model 4 .6023 .3627 .3089** ST LSAS 0.001 0.06 0.32 0.75 
  
SIAS 0.0004 0.01 0.08 0.94 
     
 SPS -0.009 -0.16 -1.03 0.31 
     
PT PS 0.033 0.62 3.19 <.001 
     
GTPS -0.003 -0.07 -0.38 0.70 
     
 PDI 0.002 0.12 0.88 0.38 
Adding PT increases the variance explained (∆R² = 0.2105) = 21.05% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative traits more variance in PB was explained by PT (21.05%) than ST(-1.67%)  
 
Note: The dependent variable= SRT persecutory bias. *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, N= 82. *p <0.05, **p <0.01.  Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety related meaning; persecutory bias= 
scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 
1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991). ST = social anxiety trait; PT paranoia trait; SB = negatively evaluated interpretation bias; PB= persecutory 
interpretation bias scores 
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3.4.3.2 Scrambled Sentences Task   
Bivariate correlations were examined between the scores of SST and the individual trait 
measures. The correlation coefficients were found in Table 3.4. Of the social anxiety trait 
measures, none of the social anxiety trait measures were neither significantly associated 
with the SST scores in negatively evaluated bias nor in persecutory bias. Of the 
paranoia trait measures: a significant positive correlation was found between the PDI 
and the SST scores in persecutory bias (r = 0.20, p < 0.05). None of the social anxiety 
measures significantly correlated with the SST scores in persecutory bias. Regression 
analysis will only be run for persecutory bias SST scores, for which only the PDI will be 
entered. 











LSAS 0.03 0.41 0.12 0.15 
SIAS 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.38 
SPS -0.09 0.22 0.17 0.06 
Paranoia 
measures  
PS -0.16 0.08 0.17 0.06 
GTPS -0.09 0.21 0.17 0.06 
PDI -0.10 0.19 0.20* 0.04 
 
Note: *p <0.05, **p <0.01. Note, for PS, N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in 
social anxiety related meaning; persecutory bias= scores in paranoia related meaning; 
LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
GTPS (Green et al., 2008); PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters et al., 1999); 
SST (based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) 
 
The results indicating the correlational relationship between paranoia content-specific 
interpretation bias and its matched trait (the PDI) were presented in Table 3.8. The 
results showed that the model only reached a marginal significance. 2.67% of the 
variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by the paranoia measure 
(PDI) (Adjusted R² = 0.0267, F(1, 79) = 3.17, p = 0.079). Thus, the PDI measured trait 
paranoia was marginally significantly explaining the variance in the SST reflected 
persecutory bias. A scatterplot summarised the regression trend of the two variables: 
increases in the PDI score were correlated with increases in the SST scores in 
persecutory bias.  
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Table 3.8 SST-paranoia index predictors 
R R² Adjusted R² Independent 
measures 
B Beta t Sig.  
0.1976 0.0391 0.0267 PDI 0.08 0.19 1.78 0.07 
Analysis summary: The SA bias was neither explained by SA traits nor PA traits; the PA 
bias was only explained by a PA trait measure (the PDI), but not by any SA trait measures. 
 Note: Dependent variable = SST social anxiety index *p <0.05, **p <0.01. PDI (Peters et 
al., 1999); SST (based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) 
 
SST social anxiety index score was neither significantly associated with the social 
anxiety trait measures nor the paranoia trait measures; while the SST paranoia index 
score was only significantly associated with one paranoia trait measure: the PDI, but not 
significantly associated with any of the social anxiety trait measures. 





3.4.3.3 Relatedness Judgment Task  
Bivariate correlations between the scores of RJT and individual trait measures were 
assessed (see Table 3.9). Social anxiety trait measures were not significantly correlated 
with either the social anxiety or the persecutory bias of the RJT. Paranoia trait measures 
did not correlate significantly with either the paranoia or the negatively evaluated bias of 
the RJT. Regression analysis was thus not performed on RJT data. 
Table 3.9 Correlation between RJT and trait measures 
   
RJT 
 
      Negatively evaluated bias Persecutory bias 
 




LSAS  -0.05 0.32 0.05 0.32 
SIAS 
 
0.03 0.39 -0.03 0.39 
SPS 
 




PS -0.09 0.21 0.09 0.21 
GTPS 
 
0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48 
PDI 
 
-0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 
 
Note: *p <0.05, **p <0.01. N= 80. Negatively evaluated bias= scores in social anxiety 
related meaning; paranoia inde x= scores in paranoia related meaning; LSAS (Liebowitz, 
1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 
2008); PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters et al., 1999); RJT (Savulich & Yiend, 
2012) 
 
3.4.4 Hypothesis-Driven Analyses 
Composite scores were calculated from the raw data, as this allowed for a more direct 
test of the hypothesis, and they should reflect individual scores. There were therefore 
four composite scores representing social anxiety related bias (SB) and paranoia related 
bias (PB), social anxiety trait (ST) and paranoia trait (PT). The model explaining each 
emotional trait (ST/PT) was analysed in two ways. In Analysis 1, content-matched 
interpretation bias was entered as the first independent variable, and content-
incongruent interpretation bias as the second. To examine ST, SB was entered in the 
first block; PB in the second. In Analysis 2, the converse interpretation bias was entered 
as the first independent variable; content-matched interpretation bias as the second. As 
above, PB was entered in the first block; SB in the second block. The design of Analysis 
2 facilitated a strength test of content-specific bias in explaining its matched trait 
composite, when controlling for the converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted R² values. 
∆Adjusted R² between the two analyses indicated that additional variance in the trait 
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composite is accounted for by one bias composite. Which Adjusted R² value and which 
direction of interpretation bias explains most variance in emotional trait? 
In order to answer this question, composite scores on emotional traits and interpretation 
bias were generated: social anxiety trait (ST), paranoia trait (PB), social anxiety related 
bias (SB) and paranoia related bias (PB). We generated composites by standardising (M 
= 0, SD = 1) scores on each measure, and averaging these. The ST composite score 
was calculated by averaging the Z scores of the LSAS, SIAS and SPS. The PT 
composite score was calculated by averaging the PS, GTPS and PDI. The social anxiety 
related bias scores from the SST and the SRT were averaged to generate a composite 
score for social-anxiety related interpretation bias. The paranoia related bias scores 
from the SST and the SRT were averaged to generate a composite score for paranoia-
related interpretation bias (see Table 3.1). 
3.4.4.1 Bivariate Correlations between Composite Scores 
The results of correlations between independent bias composites and between bias 
composites and dependent measures are presented in Table 3.10 The correlation 
coefficient for independent variables was < 0.8. It is therefore feasible to assess the SB 
and PB composites as different constructs, and use both as independent variables to 
test interpretation bias. 
Table 3.10 Correlations among composite scores 
  ST PT SB PB 
 r p r p r p r p 
ST 1.00        





SB 0.26* 0.05 0.28* 0.06 1.00  
 
 
PB 0.29* 0.02 0.46** <.001 0.17** 0.004 1.00  
 
Note: PT = paranoia trait; ST = social anxiety trait; PB = paranoia bias; SB = social 
anxiety bias; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. N= 80.  
 
3.4.4.2 Hierarchical Regression 
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine to what extent 
interpretation bias predicts content-matched emotional traits. To predict social anxiety 
trait and following Analysis 1, the composite of interpretation bias reflecting social 
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anxiety meaning (SB) was entered in the first block and the composite of interpretation 
bias reflecting paranoia meaning (PB) in the second. The results showed that model 
1(entering: SB) and model 2 (entering: SB and PB) were both significant. Model 1 
indicated that 5.31% of the variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by 
SB (Adjusted R² = 0.0531, F(1, 79) = 5.43, p = .02). Thus, the SB composite significantly 
accounted for the variance in the ST composite. When the PB composite was added to 
the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested that PB accounted for an additional 
5.03% of variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 10.34, F(2,79) = 5.56, p = 
.006). As shown in Table 3.11, both the SB and the PB composite were significant 
predictors. Following Analysis 2, the PB was entered in the first block and SB in the 
second block. The results showed that Models 3 (entering: PB) and 4 (entering: PB and 
SB) were both significant. Model 3 indicated that 7.02% of the variance in the dependent 
variable could be accounted for by PB (Adjusted R² = 0.0702, F(1, 79) = 6.96, p = .01). 
When the SB composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested 
that SB accounted for an additional 3.32% of the variance in the outcome variable 
(Adjusted R² = 0.1034, F(2, 79) = 5.56, p = .006). Again, both SB and PB composites 
were significant predictors. ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 2 was greater than ∆ 
Adjusted R² between Models 3 and 4 (∆Adjusted R² = 0.0171). Therefore, although both 
SB and PB composite explain a significant amount of variance in the ST composite, the 
PB composite contributed more to the variance in the dependent variable. Participants 
demonstrating interpretation bias in the direction of social anxiety and those 
demonstrating interpretation bias in the direction of paranoia were highly vulnerable to 
social anxiety. The latter were more vulnerable to social anxiety. 
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.2551 .0651 .0531* SB 0.35 0.25 2.33 0.02 
Model 
2 
.3551 .1261 .1034* SB 0.29 0.21 1.97 0.05 
 
PB 0.27 0.25 2.32 0.02 





.2863 .0820 .0702* PB 0.32 0.29 2.64 0.01 
Model 
4 
.3551 .1261 .1034* PB 0.28 0.25 2.32 0.02 
SB 0.29 0.21 1.97 0.05 
Adding SB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0332)=3.32% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative bias more variance in ST was 
explained by PB (5.03%) than SB (3.32%) 
 
Note: Dependent variable = PT *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. ST = composite of social anxiety 
trait measures: the LSAS, SIAS and SPS; PT = composite of paranoia trait measures: 
PS, GTPS and PDI; SB = composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of 
the SST and SRT; PB = composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of SST and 
SRT. 
 
To predict paranoia trait (PT) and following Analysis 1, the PB composite was entered in 
the first block and the SB composite in the second. The results showed that Models 1 
(entering: PB) and 2 (entering: PB and SB) were both significant. According to Model 1, 
19.72% of the variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by PB 
(Adjusted R² = 19.72, F(1, 79) = 20.40, p < .001). Thus, the PB composite significantly 
accounted for the variance in the PT composite. As shown in Table 3.12, when the SB 
composite was added to the model, the change in Adjusted R² suggested that SB 
accounted for an additional 3.25% of the variance in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² 
= 0.2297, F(2, 79) = 12.78, p < .001). As shown in Table 3.12, both SB and PB 
composite were significant predictors. Following Analysis 2, SB was entered in the first 
block and PB in the second. The results showed that Models 3 (entering: SB) and 2 
(entering: PB and SB) were both significant. According to Model 3, 6.55% of the 
variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by SB (Adjusted R² = 0.0655, 
F(1, 79) = 6.54, p = .01). When the PB composite was added to the model, the change 
in Adjusted R² suggested that SB were accounting for an additional 16.42% of variance 
in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.2297, F(2, 79) = 12.78, p < .001). Again, both 
SA and PB composite were significant predictors. The ∆Adjusted R² between Models 3 
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and 4 is greater than the ∆Adjusted R² between Models 1 and 2 (∆Adjusted R² = 13.17). 
Therefore, although both SB and PB composites explained a significant amount of the 
variance in the PT composite, the former contributed less than did SB to the variance in 
the dependent variable. Participants demonstrating interpretation bias in the direction of 
both social anxiety and paranoia were highly vulnerable to paranoia. The latter were 
more vulnerable to paranoia. 
Table 3.12 Statistical predictors of PA trait composite 
 


















PB 0.47 0.42 4.19 <.001 
 
SB 0.29 0.21 2.07 0.04 












SB 0.29 0.21 2.07 0.04 
PB 0.47 0.42 4.19 <.001 
Adding PB increases the variance explained (∆R² = 0.1642) = 16.42% 
Analysis summary: when controlling for the alternative bias, more variance in PT was 
explained by PB (16.42%) than SB (3.25%) 
 
Note: Dependent variable = ST *p < 0.05, **p <0.01. ST = composite of social anxiety 
trait measures: LSAS, SIAS and SPS; PT = the composite of paranoia trait measures: 
PS, GTPS and PDI; SB = composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of 
SST and the SRT; PB = composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of SST and 
SRT 
 
SB and PB composites were both significantly associated with the ST composite. 
However, the PB composite was most weighty in the predictive model. Similarly, both 
the SB and PB composite were significantly associated with the PT composite, while the 
PB composite weighted higher in the predictive model. Thus, individuals demonstrating 
interpretation bias in both directions (paranoia/social anxiety) were more vulnerable to 
paranoia than to social anxiety. 
3.5 Discussion  
This study represented an extension of Experiment 1, whereby the content specificity of 
interpretation bias was tested directly by using a two-alternative forced choice design for 
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the cognitive tasks. Consistent with Experiment 1, this study addressed two related 
questions. First, in line with the previous literature, whether individuals with different 
levels of trait paranoia and social anxiety differed correspondingly in their interpretations 
of emotionally ambiguous information was examined. Some ambiguous information was 
particularly relevant to social anxiety and other ambiguous information to paranoia. 
Second, the key hypothesis of the thesis was examined. Experiment 1 was extended by 
focusing on the content-specific association of interpretation bias and its content-
congruent emotional traits. Negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) 
interpretation bias will be more strongly associated with social anxiety than will paranoia. 
Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias will be more 
strongly associated with paranoia than will social anxiety. Three experimental cognitive 
tasks reflecting the same cognitive process (interpretation of ambiguity) were analysed 
separately in order to address the first question; a composite score was created to 
address the second question. In this discussion, each question was dealt with in turn, 
first providing a summary of the results in tabulated form and an interpretation thereof, 
followed by explanations of unexpected findings and a discussion of the study limitations 
and implications.  
3.5.1 Analyses Driven by Existing Literature 
Based on previous work, we expected that individual differences in trait characteristics 
would be associated with corresponding differences in related interpretation bias: trait 
social anxiety would be more strongly associated with negatively evaluated (social 
anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias than would persecutory (paranoia 
congruent content) interpretation bias. Conversely, trait paranoia would be more strongly 
associated with persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias than with 





3.5.1.1 Results summary and interpretation  
Table 3.13 Key findings 
Dependent 
variable 
Results Does the 
corresponding trait 
better explain the 
variance in the 
relating bias? 
SRT SB When controlling for alternative traits, more 
variance in SB was explained by PT (2%) than 
by ST (-0.03%) 
NO 
 PB When controlling for alternative traits, more 
variance in PB was explained by PT (21.05%) 
than by ST (1.67%) 
YES 
SST SB SB was explained by neither SA nor PT - 
 PB PB was only explained by a PA trait measure 
(the PDI), but not by any SA trait measures 
YES 
RJT SB None of the SA trait measures correlated 
significantly with SB 
- 
 PB None of the PA trait measures correlated 
significantly with PB 
- 
 
Note: Social anxiety content matches are shown on grey rows; paranoid matches on 
white rows. SB = negatively-evaluated interpretation bias; PB = persecutory 
interpretation bias; SA trait measures = LSAS, SIAS and SPS; PA trait measures = PS, 
GTPS and PDI 
 
The key findings are presented in Table 3.13. The first question was whether individuals 
with different levels of trait paranoia and social anxiety differ correspondingly in their 
interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information. On the test of negative evaluated 
interpretation bias (SB), SA accounted for the variation in negative interpretations in only 
one of the three tasks (the SRT). SA was not a significant predictor in either of the other 
two tasks. On the SRT, PA contributed more than SA in the predictive model of negative 
interpretation bias. Negative interpretation and SA and PT were not significantly related 
on either the SST or the RJT, suggesting that these tasks have poor discriminant 
validity. Only the SRT yielded significant results for negative interpretation bias: 
persecutory interpretations were considered more similar in meaning to emotionally 
ambiguous social passages than were negative interpretations, inconsistent with the 
SRT results in Experiment 1. 
On the test of PB, PT contributed significantly to explaining the variance on two of three 
tasks. Persecutory interpretations and SA and PA were not significantly associated on 
the RJT. The most methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias, the SRT 
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result, supports the original proposal, that paranoia is more strongly associated with 
persecutory interpretation bias than is social anxiety. This is consistent with the results 
of Experiment 1, and the forced choice task design of Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, 
when controlling for alternative traits, variance in PB was accounted for more by PT 
(2.41%) than by ST (0.72%). In Experiment 2, when controlling for alternative traits, 
variance in PB was accounted for more by PT (21.05%) than by ST (1.67%). The figure 
was increased by 20 times from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, as a result of the forced 
choice task design. A significant association between the paranoia trait measure, PDI, 
and persecutory interpretation emerged on the SST. Paranoid participants unscrambled 
words to form more sentences in persecutory interpretation than in negative 
interpretation. This finding consolidated the initial hypothesis, especially in terms of the 
content specificity of interpretation bias, that paranoid individuals favour trait-congruent 
interpretation bias. 
How did individual trait scores relate bias task results? SPS and SIAS scores better 
predicted negative (social anxiety congruent) interpretation bias. This result was, 
however, only marginally significant. The PDI and the PS most accurately predicted 
persecutory (paranoia congruent) interpretation bias.  
3.5.2 Hypothesis-Driven Analyses 
In answer to the key hypothesis of the thesis, content-specific interpretation bias is 
associated with correspondingly content-congruent interpretation bias. Negatively 
evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias is more strongly 
associated with trait social anxiety than is paranoia. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia 
congruent content) interpretation bias is more strongly associated with trait paranoia 




Table 3.14 Key findings 
Dependent 
variables 
Results Does the corresponding trait 
better explain the variance in the 
relating bias? 
SA trait When controlling for alternative 
traits, more variance in SA trait was 
explained by PB (5.03%) than by 
SB (3.32%) 
NO 
PA trait When controlling for alternative 
bias, more variance in PT was 




Note: Social anxiety content matches are shown in grey rows; paranoid matches in 
white rows. SA trait = composite of social anxiety trait measures: SADS, LSAS, SIAS 
and SPS; PA trait = composite of paranoia trait measures: PS, GTPS and PDI; SB = 
composite of negatively-evaluated interpretation bias scores on SST and SRT; PB = 
composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores on SST and SRT 
 
3.5.2.1 Results Summary and Interpretations 
Regression analysis of the social anxiety trait composite revealed that SB composite 
was significantly associated with SA trait composite. After adding the PA composite, 
both were significantly related to SA trait composite. This was initially interpreted as 
participants' being vulnerable to SA regardless of  interpretation bias content. However, 
the negative ∆Adjusted R² value contributed new information to this question. After 
controlling for the paranoia bias composite in the relationship between social anxiety 
bias composite and its content congruent trait composite, both significance and 
∆Adjusted R² were reduced. 
Persecutory interpretation bias was slightly more related to trait SA than was negative 
interpretation bias. Although both negative and persecutory interpretation bias is 
associated with the vulnerability of SA, individuals who tend towards negatively-
evaluated interpretations are more vulnerable to social anxiety than are those who 
choose persecutory interpretations. This contradicts the initial hypothesis; content 
specific interpretation bias in SA was not observed here.  
Regression analysis of paranoia trait composite scores revealed a significant 
association between paranoia bias composite and paranoia trait composite. After adding 
the social anxiety bias composite, both SA and PB composites were significantly 
associated with the paranoia trait composite. Participants were thus vulnerable to 
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paranoia regardless of interpretation bias content. The positive ∆Adjusted R² value 
again impacted the conclusions. Controlling for social anxiety bias composite in the 
predictive relationship between paranoia bias composite and its content congruent trait 
composite increased the significance and ∆Adjusted R² value. This finding enhanced the 
association of the paranoia bias composite in the prediction of its content congruent trait 
composite. Participants who make persecutory interpretations are thus more vulnerable 
to paranoia than those who make negatively evaluated interpretations. 
The second question was whether content-specific association interpretation bias is 
related to its content-congruent emotional trait. A close association between the social 
anxiety bias composite and its content-matched trait composite was observed, as well 
as between the paranoia bias composite and its content-matched trait composite. 
Analysis of the relationship between interpretation content (negatively evaluated versus 
persecutory) and content matched traits revealed that persecutory interpretations are 
highly related to vulnerability in both social anxiety and paranoia. However, persecutory 
interpretation bias appears more strongly associated with paranoia than with social 
anxiety. The content specificity of persecutory interpretation in paranoia was thus 
confirmed. Although negative interpretation bias is associated with vulnerability in SA, 
this is more weakly so than in persecutory interpretation. The role of negative 
interpretation content specificity in SA thus remains unclear.  
The results support the initial hypothesis, that persecutory interpretation bias is more 
strongly associated with paranoia than with social anxiety, consistent with the results of 
Experiment 1. However, the negative interpretation bias results contradicted the initial 
hypothesis: the negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation 
bias will be more strongly associated with social anxiety than with paranoia. When 
participants were forced to choose between persecutory and negative interpretations, 
those vulnerable to social anxiety interpreted emotionally ambiguous social scenarios as 
persecutory rather than negative. Although there was insufficient evidence to support 
the content specificity of interpretation in SA, a general interpretation bias in SA 
individuals was observed. This finding was also inconsistent with the results from our 
first experiment. As in Experiment 1, the SRT and SST were used in Experiment 2 to 
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test interpretation bias. However, the measures were Adjusted to test the content 
specificity of interpretation bias directly. In both experiments, participants were 
presented with similar ambiguous materials, followed by the choice of different 
interpretations. When given a choice between negative/positive interpretations in one 
set of materials and between persecutory/positive interpretations in another, SA 
participants in Experiment 1 preferred negative to positive interpretations and 
persecutory to positive interpretations. SA participants preferred negative to persecutory 
interpretations. However, when given a choice between negative/persecutory 
interpretations in same set of materials, socially anxious participants of Experiment 1 
preferred persecutory to negative interpretations. SA individuals thus prefer to interpret 
ambiguous social information congruently with their emotional trait. However, when 
forced to choose between two threatening interpretations, SA individuals prefer 
persecutory to negative interpretations. The significant associations between trait social 
anxiety and negative/persecutory interpretations confirm that there is interpretation bias 
in SA. In one study, non-clinical paranoia was conceptualised as a type of anxious fear 
(So et al., 2008); indeed, a close association between SA and persecutory thoughts has 
been established (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). The current results confirm that 
increased SA is related to more aggressive or threatening interpretation styles, 
consistent with the theories of processing bias, according to which, when two or more 
meanings compete for processing resources, individuals with high levels of trait anxiety 
are more likely to interpret ambiguous information as threatening (Mathews & MacLeod, 
1994). In the hierarchy of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005), severity of threatened harm 
escalates from SA worry (common suspiciousness) to severe harm and conspiracy. To 
avoid potential negative evaluations, SA individuals withdraw or restrain their behaviour 
at social events (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993). In extreme instances, SA 
individuals may even translate negative evaluations into a desire to hurt the 
“perpetrators”, acting aggressively towards others (Kashdan & McKnight, 2010). 
Consistent with previous findings, the severity of interpretations increased with SA 
levels: the more socially anxious one is, the more severe the interpretation one 
generates. Compared to worries about being negatively evaluated, the results indicated 
that increased SA levels indicate persecutory beliefs: believing people are trying to 
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irritate you or cause you social or psychological harm. Alternative interpretations were 
limited, however, and therefore this conclusion is highly tentative. 
3.5.2.2 Unexpected Finding and Possible Explanations  
The association between trait SA and persecutory interpretation bias was central to the 
results. First, although persecutory interpretation predicting trait SA better than did 
negative interpretation, the ∆Adjusted R² value was only 1.71%. This difference was 
statistically real, but too small to generate a meaningful effect and potentially due to 
chance. Second, the discriminant validity of the amended cognitive tasks is considered. 
There are 22 items on the SRT. Analysis of SRT responses revealed an unexpected 
association between persecutory interpretation and trait SA. On six of the 22 
interpretation items, sentences were not sufficiently distinct. For example, after an 
ambiguous passage, the sentence, “The group is gossiping about your football skill”, has 
a persecutory meaning and the sentence, “The group thinks your previous football 
performance was bad”, has a negative meaning. Feeling that others are gossiping about 
or negatively evaluating oneself constitutes threat anticipation, which indicates both SA 
and PA beliefs (Bentall et al., 2009). The other important groups of items were those on 
which meaning was interpreted as rejection. For example, “She cancelled the trip 
deliberately”, “Your friend in the hockey team is rejecting you”, “Your friends are trying to 
exclude you from roller boarding” and "Your friend in the Statistics lecture is deliberately 
snubbing you”. All these sentences were developed to reflect moderate paranoid beliefs 
(Freeman et al., 2005). Cognitive theories and work on SA, however, suggest that 
beliefs about rejection are also important. Further to a fear of negative evaluation during 
social events, socially anxious individuals, especially those with severe conditions, are 
likely to assume that such evaluations would have disastrous long-term consequences 
for themselves, such as being rejected (Stopa & Clark, 2000). Fear of rejection is a 
common interpretation bias in both SA and PA. It therefore is not a distinct development 
stage of interpretation to distinguish social anxiety from paranoia. Increasing the severity 
of the persecutory items could improve the discriminant validity of the task. 
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3.5.3 Limitations 
The results confirm a trait matched (persecutory) interpretation bias in paranoid 
individuals, as well as the content specificity of interpretation bias in paranoia. However, 
results were less conclusive for negative (SA-related) interpretation bias. Although the 
results confirmed an association between negative interpretations and trait SA, neither 
trait matched interpretation bias nor content specific interpretation bias were observed in 
SA. Conversely, socially anxious individuals had a slight preference for persecutory 
interpretations, and persecutory interpretation bias was slightly more closely related to 
social anxiety than was negative interpretation bias. The limitations of this study relate to 
these findings. 
First, a few items demonstrated poor discriminant validity and are thus likely unsuitable 
to validate a distinction of interpretation bias between the two traits (social 
anxiety/paranoia). Mildly paranoid and severely socially anxious interpretations, such as 
feelings of being ignored, snubbed or rejected, were not sensitive enough to distinguish 
between the two traits. Using these stimuli to represent persecutory interpretations is 
misleading. Second, the picture stimulus cognitive task might not be sensitive in 
identifying interpretation bias. Similar to using non-semantic materials to test 
interpretation bias, a virtual reality experiment (Freeman et al., 2003; Freeman, 2008) 
presents an ambiguous social environment in a three-dimensional setting. Increases in 
anxiety and interpersonal sensitivity were associated with persecutory thoughts about 
virtual characters. The use of dimensional assessments to investigate persecutory 
ideation proved a valuable methodology. This might, however, be due less to the 
sensitivity of the task in adult participants. In one study of anxious children, social 
situation pictures were used to represent social interactions that could be defined as 
positive or negative (In-Albon et al., 2008). The results revealed a disorder-specific 
interpretation bias; the task triggered an emotional response and the picture paradigm 
demonstrated good construct validity. Although the results of this task in the current 
study were not significant, previous work suggests that it is worthwhile to investigate 
interpretation bias using a dimensional assessment rather typical semantic materials. 
Finally, the cross-sectional design of the study means that the role of interpretation bias 
in social anxiety and paranoia cannot be concluded to be causal. The results of 
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Experiments 1 and 2 generated promising findings regarding the role of content 
specificity in paranoia. However, demonstrating the aetiological role of interpretation 
bias is insufficient to distinguish social anxiety and paranoia. It was useful to establish 
significant associations between content specific interpretations and paranoia. However, 
a longitudinal design is essential in order to address the causal role of interpretation bias 
in these traits. 
3.5.4 Implications  
Our experiment has theoretical implications for cognitive theory in paranoia and social 
anxiety. First, future research may examine the hierarchy of paranoid ideation, 
distinguishing paranoia from other emotional traits. According to the hierarchical 
structure of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002), persecutory beliefs in paranoia range from 
social evaluative concerns (fears of rejection) to severe harm and conspiracy. In the 
current study, certain social evaluative concerns were common to social anxiety and 
paranoia; biased interpretation did not distinguish between the two. Including 
persecutory interpretation items phrased as fear of rejection enhanced the association 
between trait social anxiety and persecutory interpretation, compared to between trait 
social anxiety and negative interpretation. However, whether this was the only level in 
the continuous distribution that corresponded to social anxiety remains unclear. Second, 
in addition to the optimistic finding with dimensional assessment in persecutory 
interpretations, the use of picture stimuli should be applied with caution. The negative 
and persecutory interpretations used here did not yield valid results; further investigation 
is required to determine why. A longitudinal study of the causal role of interpretation bias 
in social anxiety and paranoia is recommended. In Experiments 1 and 2, content 
specificity of interpretation bias in paranoia, however, the cross sectional design was not 
allowed any causal conclusion of interpretation bias in its content specific emotional trait.  
Our results also have practical implications for clinical interventions in paranoia and 
social anxiety. Mild persecutory interpretations may not necessarily indicate only trait 
paranoia, but also social anxiety. Patients with social evaluative concerns (e.g., fears of 
rejection) and ideas of reference (e.g., feelings of being talking about) may manifest 
both social anxiety and paranoia traits simultaneously. Approaches focus on 
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experiences such as persecutory thoughts rather than on diagnoses, such as social 
phobia or psychosis, and treats problems as existing on a continuum of severity in the 
population (Freeman, 2007). Based on the findings here, cognitive interventions used to 
treat social anxiety, when suitably modified, will likely also benefit individuals with 
paranoia.  
3.6 Conclusions  
Consistent with the literature, content specificity of interpretation bias in paranoid 
individuals was observed in this study. A significant association between persecutory 
interpretation and its content specific emotion (paranoid) trait was demonstrated. 
Although the findings on trait SA were less conclusive, the common mild persecutory 
interpretations in both traits suggest that similar cognitive intervention approaches might 
be applied. The forced choice design experiment generated promising findings about 
paranoid individuals. This line of research could be extended by investigating the causal 
role of interpretation in SA and paranoia, using a longitudinal design. 
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Chapter 4 Experiment 3 The Aetiological Role of 
Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety and Paranoia 
4.1 Experiment Overview 
The results of the Experiment 1 suggest that interpretation bias is content specific in 
social anxiety and paranoia, supports were also found from Experiment 2 in paranoia. 
Content specific interpretation bias means being biased in the direction of one’s 
emotional concerns, and matching one's core psychopathological trait (e.g., interpreting 
ambiguous social events as negative to exacerbate social anxiety; Mathews & MacLeod, 
1994). Experiment 1, this finding was demonstrated in a multiple cognitive task design, 
and Experiment 2 confirmed findings of paranoia further in the same tasks with 
advanced, two-alternative choice designs. Biased interpretation is thought to be an 
important aetiological factor in the development and maintenance of both affective 
disorders (Clark & Wells, 1995) and paranoid psychosis (Freeman, Dunn, Startup & 
Kingdon, 2015). Specific cognitive content may precede later development of the 
corresponding disorder (Alford, Lester, Patel, Buchanan & Giunta, 1995). In the current 
study, the clinical potential of early identification of and interpretation induction in 
improving mood and reducing negative symptoms (Lester, Mathews, Davison, Burgess 
& Yiend, 2011; Yiend, Mackintosh & Mathews, 2005) has been demonstrated. In 
Experiment 3, we implemented a longitudinal design in a broad population in order to 
test the content specificity and cognitive vulnerability of biased interpretations 
associated with social anxiety and paranoia. Biased interpretations are tested using 
three cognitive experimental tasks with either socially anxious or paranoid congruent 
contents, as in Experiment 1. The same participants from Experiment 1 were tested six 
months later; all procedures were replicated. The focus was whether specific 
interpretation content at a time point could predict emotional traits six months later. For 
example, interpreting ‘A stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘The stranger is 
stalking me’ at one time point predicts high levels of paranoia six months later, while 
interpreting ‘A stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘The stranger is laughing at me’ 
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at one time point predicts high levels of social anxiety six months later. Hierarchical 
regression analyses are used to examine content-specific associations between 
interpretation bias and social anxiety and paranoia.  
4.2 Background 
Content specificity is a key component of the cognitive theory of psychopathology, 
according to which cognitive content is a risk factor for specific psychological disorders 
(Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson & Riskind, 1987). Activation of unique cognitive patterns 
thus corresponds with various clinical syndromes (Alford et al., 1995). Cognitive 
processes, such as the interpretations of a socially anxious individual, for example, 
centre on the theme of negative beliefs of being threatening evaluated by others (Foa, 
Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996). Conversely, over-concern about negative evaluation 
predicts social anxiety. Paranoia is characterised by the theme of persecutory beliefs: a 
paranoid individual tends to misinterpret their experiences as threatening, and to 
overestimate both the intensity and probability of anticipated harm in ambiguous 
situations (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). Conversely, 
persecutory interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information predict paranoia. 
Emotionally ambiguous information may result in positive or negative emotional 
consequences. For example, the whisper of a stranger might be experienced as praise 
or as disrespect, arousing in one encouragement or distress (Savulich, Freeman, 
Shergill & Yiend, 2015). Psychologically vulnerable individuals often make biased 
interpretations when dealing with such information (Beck, 1971). In interpretation bias, 
information is interpreted so as to favor one's pre-existing beliefs, rather than 
considering alternative explanations. Biased interpretations facilitate the endorsement of 
emotionally threatening content, reinforcing a pathological emotional trait (Beck, 1971; 
Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith & Clark, 2007). Those with specific interpretation 
biases might be at risk of developing corresponding psychological disorders (Woud, 
Zhang, Becker, McNally & Margraf, 2014). Interpretation bias might function as a latent 
vulnerability factor in the onset and maintenance of such disorders (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994). 
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Cognitive specificity has been demonstrated in a number of studies (Clark & Beck, 1990; 
Clark, Beck & Stewart, 1990; Laurent & Stark, 1993; Brown et al., 2014; Savulich et al., 
2015). However, few studies have adequately evaluated whether specific cognitive 
content (e.g., factors theoretically related to cognitive vulnerability, such as negative 
interpretation and persecution) distinguish or predict later development of the 
corresponding disorders (Rholes et al., 1985). In a cross-sectional study, Lamberton and 
Oei (2008) assessed whether cognitive disturbance can distinguish anxiety from 
depression in 135 depressed patients. Self-report questionnaires were administered in 
order to assess the affective, cognitive and motivational components of anxiety and 
depression. The results revealed that depressive cognition is associated with and 
predicts depressive but not anxiety symptoms, while anxious cognition is associated 
with and predicts anxiety but not depressive symptoms. These findings were, however, 
limited because only depressed patients and self-report measures were included. The 
specific as opposed to the general cognitive mechanism of the disorder remained 
unclear from their results. Vancleef and Peters (2006) focused specifically on 
interpretation bias and concluded that a global and specific psychological construct is 
associated with content-specific negative interpretations. Trait anxiety specifically 
predicts a negative interpretation of panic. However, using negative interpretation as a 
dependent measure in regression does not elucidate the role of a negative interpretation 
bias in the onset and maintenance of emotional and affective disorders. Using a 
longitudinal design, Alford et al. (1995) tested whether negative interpretations of the 
future (hopeless) would be related to depressive symptoms but not to anxiety, four 
weeks later. They recruited 154 university students and tested them with anxiety and 
depression measuring them four weeks apart. A hopelessness scale was also 
administered at the first appointment, and a life event survey at the second. The findings 
were that hopelessness predicted the severity of future depression but not anxiety in 
male participants. Life stressors also predicted depression, but to a lesser degree than 
hopelessness. This result confirmed the significance of cognitive vulnerability in 
depression. However, we do not know whether this result can be generalised to other 
emotional symptoms. Creswell and O'Connor (2011) investigated the association 
between interpretation and anxiety in 65 children at three points in time over one year. 
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The results showed that different cognitive constructs related differently to anxiety; the 
association between threat interpretation and distress and anxiety anticipation was 
consistently significant. However, the study was limited by small sample size. In a large 
sample of 1538 women, Woud and colleagues (2014) examined biased interpretation as 
potential risk factor in panic disorder onset at two time points, approximately one-and-a-
half years apart. An interpretation questionnaire includes ambiguous scenarios about 
panic- and threat-related information to test biased interpretation. The results provided 
strong support for the aetiological role of panic-related interpretation bias in panic 
disorder. Generalisability was limited, however; only woman were included in the 
sample, and there was the potential confound of an inconsistent time interval between 
the baseline and follow-up test, over one-and-a-half years. In the most recent 
longitudinal study (Schirmbeck et al., 2016), the association between cognitive 
performance and obsessive-compulsive symptoms in psychotic patients and their 
unaffected siblings was assessed. Participants were tested at baseline and at three-year 
follow up. Remission of obsessive-compulsive symptoms was attributed to reduced 
cognitive impairment. However, the study included only two assessments during a three-
year follow up period and the analysis did not account for symptom severity between 
assessments during the large time interval. Studies in cognitive bias modification have 
already established interpretation bias mechanisms as key causal factors in a variety of 
psychopathologies (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 2010; Mackintosh, 2010a, 
2010b; Lee, Mathews, Shergill & Yiend, 2015; Yiend et al., 2014; Yiend, Savulich, 
Coughtrey & Shafran, 2011). Few studies have assessed interpretation bias as a 
cognitive vulnerability factor in distinguishing different emotional symptoms, and none 
has extended this research to psychiatric disorders. This is an obvious next step, given 
that paranoia and social anxiety are highly comorbid in the prodromal stage of 
psychosis, and that cognitive content specificity plays a crucial role in the development 
and maintenance of the related emotional trait and disorders. Although a number of 
studies investigated the content specificity of interpretation bias in different affective 
disorders, very few used a longitudinal setting to test the causal role of interpretation 
bias in the later onset of affective symptoms. 
 147 
Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed the content specificity hypothesis of interpretation bias in 
social anxiety and paranoia. However, their cross-sectional nature limited an aetiological 
interpretation of their findings. Little is known of the natural course of interpretation bias 
and its association with corresponding psychological traits over time. Whether specific 
interpretation bias may precede the development of corresponding psychological traits 
or even syndromes, remains inadequately investigated. The question of whether 
anticipation of content specific interpretation bias predicts social anxiety and paranoia 
remains unaddressed. The present study was designed to evaluate whether specific 
interpretation bias at a given point in time is significantly associated with a specific 
emotional trait at a later point in time. The design allows for cognitive specificity and 
cognitive vulnerability of interpretation bias in social anxiety and paranoia to be 
evaluated simultaneously. Content specificity of interpretation bias refers to bias in the 
direction of one’s emotional concerns and consistent with one's most salient 
psychopathological trait. Cognitive vulnerability refers to specific interpretation bias, 
which precedes the development of corresponding emotional traits or syndromes. The 
participants from Experiment 1 were tested six months later; all procedures were 
replicated. A nonclinical sample was used to determine whether the corresponding 
interpretation biases predicted greater trait vulnerability to social anxiety and paranoid 
psychosis. Interpretation bias scores from three paradigms, the SRT, SST (Husstedt et 
al., 2002), and the Word Sentence Relatedness Paradigms (WSAP), were used to 
predict levels of specific matched emotional traits in a longitudinal study of a 
heterogeneous population tested at two time points over an approximately six-month 
interval. For example, interpreting ‘A stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘The 
stranger is stalking me’ at one time point predicts high levels of paranoia six months 
later, while interpreting ‘A stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘The stranger is 
laughing at me’ at one time point predicts high levels of social anxiety six months later. 
Hierarchical regression analyses are used to examine content specific associations 
between interpretation bias and trait social anxiety and paranoia.  
The study hypotheses are stated below:  
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The major research interest of this project is whether specific interpretation bias 
improves the predictive function of one trait beyond that of another. This covers two 
aspects: cognitive specificity, according to which interpretation bias is associated with 
core psychopathological trait, and cognitive vulnerability, according to which 
interpretation bias is a risk factor for developing corresponding emotional traits. 
I. Negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias predicts 
social anxiety more accurately than does persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias. 
II. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias predicts 
paranoia more accurately than does negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent 
content) interpretation bias. 
III. Negative interpretation bias affects the causal role of persecutory interpretation bias 
in predicting paranoia. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Experimental Design 
Participants with a wide range of scores on SA and paranoia were administered a 
battery of self-report personality measures and tests of interpretation bias at two time 
points over a six-month time interval. To measure interpretation bias for socially 
ambiguous information (“negative evaluation”) versus paranoia relevant information 
(“persecution”), three cognitive experimental tasks (SST, SRT and WSAP) were 
developed, each containing material reflecting both types of content.  
4.3.2 Participants 
84 non-clinical volunteers (59 female, 25 male) all experimental procedures at Time 1, 
and 71 (51 female, 20 male) completed the six-month follow up - Time 2. Participants 
consisted mainly of students and staff at King’s College, London, and were recruited by 
circular email after meeting inclusion criteria for the study. The inclusion criteria were (a) 
being over 18 years of age, (b) fluent in English and (c) not having been diagnosed with 
any psychological or psychiatric disorder and not currently receiving treatment for any 
psychological or psychiatric disorders, including psychopharmacological medication. 
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The sample of 71 participants was predominantly Caucasian (n = 48), also including 
participants of Asian (n = 9), Black/African/Caribbean (n = 5) and other (n = 9) origin. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 60 years (M = 29.82, SD = 12.62). The educational attainment 
of participants ranged from high school (n = 6) to university (n = 65). 
4.3.3 Recruitment 
The Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee (PNM/10/11-62) 
approved the study. Conduct was consistent with all relevant guidance as laid out in the 
King's College London (KCL) Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research. 
Recruitment and the first session (the same as the previously reported in Experiment 1) 
of testing began in June 2011 and lasted for four months. The second session of testing 
started in January 2012 and lasted for four months. Participants were recruited through 
KCL internal circular emails and posters on local public notice boards. Volunteers were 
sent a study information sheet, and were identified by inviting completion of the 
recruitment questionnaire. This included contact details, demographic information and 
mood questionnaires: the SIAS (Ayesa-Arriola, et al.; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and the 
self-report PS (Fenigstein & Vanable). Inclusion criteria were speaking fluent English 
and being aged between 18 and 60 years. Exclusion criteria were currently receiving or 
have received treatment or counselling for mental health problems. Participants were 
purposively sampled to achieve wide-ranging scores on the mood questionnaires. 
Eligible volunteers were invited to participate in the study using the contact details 
provided. 
4.3.4 Materials 
The same materials, except for the FNE, were used at Times 1 and 2, and Time 1 is the 
same as the previously reported in Experiment 1. The FNE was excluded, as it was not 
significantly correlated with any of the interpretation biases in preliminary analyses of 
Experiment 1. Four social anxiety measures were therefore included: the SADS (Watson 
& Friend, 1969), SIAS (Ayesa-Arriola et al. 1998) SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and 
LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); as well as three paranoia measures: GPTS (Green et al., 
2008), the self-report PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and the PDI (Peters et al., 1999), 
and three cognitive tasks to test interpretation bias: the SST (adapted from Wenzlaff & 
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Bates, 1998), SRT (adapted from Eysenck et al. 1991) and WSAP (adapted from Beard 
& Amir, 2010). 
4.3.5 Procedure 
Session 1 lasted approximately one to one-and-half-hours, varying across individuals. 
Session 2 lasted approximately 30 minutes. All participants were informed of the 
inclusion criteria before starting each session. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, in Session 1, 
participants were first asked to complete a consent form and demographic 
questionnaire, followed by self-report measures. This took approximately 20 to 30 
minutes. Finally, to measure interpretation bias representing negative interpretation 
(social anxiety related) and persecutory interpretation (paranoia related), three cognitive 
experimental tasks were used, each containing two sets of material reflecting both types 
of content. Parallel versions of each task were developed and administered in 
counterbalanced order across participants. All measures were presented to participants 
before the interpretation tasks. Self-report measures and tasks were presented in 
counterbalanced, fixed random order across participants. In Session 2, participants were 
asked to complete a consent form, a demographic questionnaire and self-report 
measures. A counterbalanced design reduces the chance of order effects; that is, of 
other factors adversely influencing the results. 
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Figure 4.1 Experimental procedure 
 
Note: Self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of tasks, in 
countbalanced, fixed order: LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 2008); PS: self-report PS (Fenigstein 
& Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters et al., 1999). SRT (based on Eysenck et al., 1991); SST 
(based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP (based on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
4.3.6 Analysis 
The focus of the analysis was to determine the predictive role of interpretation bias on 
emotional trait severity six months later. Composite scores were calculated from the raw 
data. Composite scores were considered best suited to test the hypothesis directly as 
well as to provide a measure of convergent validity for the construct by including several 
measures of the same phenomenon. Results calculated using composite scores should 
reflect the results achieved using individual scores. 
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Figure 4.2 Analytical approach 
PB
 
Note: Self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of tasks, in 
counterbalanced, fixed order. SB = negative interpretation bias represented socially 
anxious meaning and tested in Time 1 session; PB = persecutory interpretation bias 
represented paranoid meaning and tested in Time 1 session; ST = social anxiety trait 
tested in Time 2 session; PT = paranoia trait tested in Time 2 session 
 
Composites were calculated for social anxiety and paranoia related bias at Time 1, and 
for social anxiety/paranoia measures at Time 2. Composites were calculated by 
standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) participant scores on each corresponding measure and 
task and averaging these. They represented Time 1 social anxiety related interpretation 
bias, and paranoia related interpretation bias, Time 2 social anxiety trait and paranoia 
trait. Bivariate correlation was performed on composite scores to identify any linear 
relationships among variables. Finally, hierarchical regression analysis was performed 
to test the causal effect of interpretation bias in social anxiety and paranoia.  
Models for each emotional trait (ST/PT) were analysed separately (see 
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Figure 4.2). In Analysis 1, content matched interpretation bias was entered as an 
independent variable first; content incongruent interpretation bias second. For example, 
to explain ST, SB was entered in the first block; PB in the second. In Analysis 2, the 
converse applied: interpretation bias was entered as an independent variable first; 
content matched interpretation bias, second. Following the example above, PB was 
entered in the first block; SB in the second. Analysis 2 facilitated a strength test of 
content-specific bias in explaining its matched trait composite, when controlling for the 
converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted R² values, and the change in ∆Adjusted R² 
between the two analyses indicated that additional variance in the trait composite is 
accounted for significantly more by one bias composite than by the other. Which 
Adjusted R² value is greater indicated in which direction the interpretation bias explained 
the most variance in the outcome emotional trait. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Participants’ Characteristics 
4.4.1.1 Data Cleaning 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that the assumptions of normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity were not violated. In order to recruit participants with 
wide-ranging scores on all scales, no scores were filtered from the data, except reaction 
time WSAP data. To reduce the influence of spurious response times, we excluded data 
from trials with reaction times shorter than 50ms or longer than 1500ms, following the 
original WSAP design (Beard & Amir, 2010). 3.28% trials were eliminated. 15 data 
points were missing, which were treated by pairwise deletion. The inspection of missing 
data did not suggest any systematic problems with measurement tools or methods, and 
missing data appeared randomly distributed. 
4.4.1.2 Bias Scores Calculation 
In order to compare reaction time or rating indices with self-report indices, bias scores 
for the social scenario sentences were calculated. Bias scores from each task were 
calculated using the equations presented in Table 4.1. We calculated two bias scores for 
 154 
each task, to reflect the social anxiety and persecutory bias.  Larger bias scores indicate 
a greater bias towards threat interpretations, and less towards benign interpretations.  
Table 4.1 Bias score equations  
Task 
name 
Bias score  Equations Range of values 
SST Negative bias Interpretation Bias = (Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias = (Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed)*100 % 
0, 100 
SRT Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 





Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 
Target Paranoia -Mean of ratings on all Target 
Benign 
-3, 3 
WSAP Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Reaction times (Social 





Interpretation Bias = reaction times (Paranoia 
meaning reject – Paranoia meaning endorse) 
-1500, 1500 
 
Note: Negative bias represents social anxiety related interpretation; persecutory bias 
represents social anxiety related interpretation. 
 
4.4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 





Table 4.2 Means and standard deviations of trait scores and bias  scores  
Mean (SD) 
   Social anxiety Paranoia   
  
Time 1  
(n = 84) 
Time 2 
(n = 71)   
Time 1 
 (n = 84) 
Time 2 
(n = 71) 
Emotional 
traits 
FNE 12.20(4.50) 13.21(3.17) PS 33.55(13.02) 32.35(12.71) 
SADS 6.61(6.28) 6.62(7.30) GTPS 48.60(23.28) 44.18(17.68) 
 LSAS 36.01(20.96) 36.14(22.38) 
GPTS_Social
Reference 25.35(11.53) 23.72(10.35) 
 LSAS_Anxiety 19.54(11.09) 20.13(11.55) 
GPTS_Perse
cution 23.25(12.36) 20.46(8.09) 
 
LSAS_Avoida
nce 16.75(11.08) 16.00(12.00) PDI 52.69(42.93) 45.11(41.64) 
 SIAS 19.74(11.94) 19.77(12.40) PDI_YesNo 6.23(4.35) 6.10(4.58) 
 SPS 11.36(11.02) 11.08(11.92) PDI_distress 14.29(13.23) 14.13(14.36) 
    
PDI_preoccu
pation 14.46(13.42) 13.58(13.36) 
       
PDI_convicti
on 17.71(13.48) 17.41(15.05) 
Interpretat
ion bias 
SST (%) 21.87(16.50) 22.51(17.90) SST (%) 28.08(18.03) 27.42(19.10) 
SRT 1.95(0.45) 2.01 (0.60) SRT 1.86(0.46) 1.93(0.56) 














Note: Time 1 = Time 1 session; Time 2 = Time 2 session; LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 2008); self-report PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters 
et al., 1999); SRT (based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST (based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP (based on 
Beard & Amir, 2010) 
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To test the hypothesis that a specific kind of interpretation bias would add to the prediction of 
one kind of symptomatology as opposed to another, correlational analysis and linear 
regression analysis were performed. 
4.4.2 Relationship between Putative Predictors 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), independent variables with a bivariate correlation 
of more than 0.80 should not be included in multiple regression analysis. Correlation 
coefficients between raw and composite predictors in this study reveal that the constructs of 
negative interpretation bias (SA, representing social anxiety related meaning) and 
persecutory interpretation bias (PA, representing paranoia related meaning) traits were not 
so highly correlated as to be indistinguishable. Most r-values are < 0.80, making it 
reasonable to assess them as different constructs and thus as different predictors. 
Table 4.3 Correlations between raw and composite interpretation bias scores 
Time 1 Persecutory interpretation (PA) 











SST 0.63 <.001 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.44 <.001 
SRT 0.22 0.04 0.55 
<.00
1 0.27 0.01 0.49 <.001 
WSAP 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.41 
<.00
1 0.37 <.001 
Composite 




1 0.70 <.001 
 
Note:n=71; SA=represented social anxiety meaning; PA= represented persecutory meaning; 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, N= 79. LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS (Green et al., 2008); PS: self-report PS (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992); PDI (Peters et al., 1999).  
 
From Table 4.3, it is evident that all r-values are < 0.80, negative and persecutory 
interpretation can therefore be assessed as different constructs (Baguley, 2012). Collinearity 
was not an issue. The constructs were to be used as independent variables to test emotional 
traits six months later. 
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4.4.3 Main Analyses 
First, composites for participant scores on interpretation bias from Time 1 session and 
emotional traits from Time 2 session were calculated. There were therefore four composite 
scores representing Time 1 social anxiety related bias (SB) and Time 1 paranoia related bias 
(PB), Time 2 social anxiety trait (ST) and Time 2 paranoia trait (PT). The negative 
interpretation bias scores from Time 1 SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to generate a 
composite score for social anxiety related interpretation bias. The persecutory interpretation 
bias scores from Time 1 SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to generate a composite 
score for paranoia related interpretation bias. Composite score for the social anxiety trait 
was calculated by averaging the Z scores of Time 2 SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS. 
Composite score for the paranoia trait was calculated by averaging Time 2 PS, GTPS and 
PDI.  
4.4.3.1 Bivariate Correlation between Predictors and Dependent Variables 
Correlation patterns in scatterplots 
Scatterplots were generated to check whether the relationship between variables is linear, 
and to identify outliers of composite scores (observations lying away from the main body of 
points).  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the linearity of Time 1 negative interpretation (SB) and Time 2 social 
anxiety trait (ST).  
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Figure 4.3 Correlation between Time 1 SB and Time 2 ST  
 
Note: n = 71; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = 2nd experiment session 6 months 
after Time 1; negative interpretation bias represented social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory interpretation bias represented paranoia related meaning. 
  
In Figure 4.4, the moderate linearity of Time 1 persecutory interpretation bias (PB) and Time 
2 paranoia trait (PT), as well as outliers (21, 25, 36, 38, 39) are illustrated.  
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Figure 4.4: Correlation between Time 1 PB and Time 2 PT 
 
Note: n = 71; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = 2nd experiment session 6 months 
after Time 1; negative interpretation bias represented social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory interpretation bias represented paranoia related meaning. 
 
Residual analysis was performed in order to determine whether the subjects identified above 
were extreme outliers, which residual against predicted values was the most common 
methodology for detecting outliers (Orr, Sackett & Dubois, 1991). Standardised residuals 
were calculated; a scatterplot of standardised residuals and regression predicted values is 
shown in Figure 4.5. According to Rousseeuw and Leroy (2005), a standardised residual 
larger than 2.5 in absolute value generally indicates an outlier, and influences regression 
model fit.  
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Figure 4.5: Standardised residuals and regression predicted values 
 
Note: n = 65; the dependent variable = Time 2 paranoia trait (PT) 
 
Regression analyses were then conducted to determine differences in model fit, with and 
without outliers. The results of two regression models are presented in Table 4.4: 
Table 4.4 Regression models with and without outliers 
 
 R R² Adjusted 
R² 
p Independent  
measures 
B Beta t F  
With 
outliers 
0.18 0.03 0.019 0.13 PB 0.005 0.18 1.53 2.33 
Without 
outliers 
0.36 0.13 0.1145** 0.003 PB 0.006 0.51 5.42 9.40 
 
Note: n = 65; dependent variable = Time 2 paranoia trait (PT); PT = Time 2 composite of 
paranoia trait measures: PS, GTPS and PDI; Predictor = Time 1 persecutory interpretation 
bias; PB = Time 1 baseline composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, 
SRT and WSAP 
 
The predicted responses and significance of the hypothesis test are clearly affected by the 
presence of the named data point. While the data point did not affect estimated slope 
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coefficients, these outliers are deemed influential (Kutner, Nachtsheim & Neter, 2004), and 
could be removed to improve model fit. 
 
Correlation coefficients  
The results of the correlation analysis between Time 1 bias predictors and Time 2 dependent 
measures are presented in Table 4.5. Time 2 social anxiety trait correlates significantly with 
Time 1 negative interpretation bias (SB, represented socially anxious meaning) but not with 
Time 1 persecutory interpretation bias (PB, represented paranoid meaning). Time 2 paranoia 
trait was significantly correlated with both Time 1 persecutory interpretation bias (PB) and 
Time 1 negative interpretation bias (SB). 




r p r p 
Time 2 ST 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.17 
 PT 0.37 0.002 0.36 0.003 
 
Note: n = 66; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = 2nd experiment session 6 months 
after Time 1; PT = paranoia trait; ST = social anxiety trait; PB = persecutory interpretation 
bias represents paranoid meaning; SB = negative interpretation bias represents socially 
anxious meaning 
 
Interaction effect of negative interpretation  
Both the experimental findings from our two previous experiments and the hierarchical 
structure of paranoia proposed by Freeman et al. (2005) suggest the prevalence of negative 
social evaluative concerns in the continuous development of paranoia. Correlation analysis 
of predictors showed that both Time 1 persecutory interpretation bias (PB) (r = 0.37, p = 
0.002) and Time 1 negative interpretation bias (SB) (r = 0.36, p = 0.003) were significantly 
correlated with Time 2 paranoia trait (Table 4.5). The correlation coefficient between PB and 
SB was still significant after removing outliers (Table 4.3; r = 0.46, p < .001). Thus, an 
interaction term (SB*PB) was added into the later regression analysis (see Table 4.6) to 
expand the understanding of the relationship between the two predictors. The presence of a 
significant interaction indicates that the effect of one predictor variable on the outcome 
measure is different at different values of the other predictor variable. The interaction term 
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was calculated by multiplying the two predictors, which equaled SB*PB. 
4.4.3.2 Test of Causal Effect in Regression Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we ran the hierarchical regression analyses to assess the role of 
specific interpretation bias in predicting its content matched emotional trait six months after 
baseline. In Analysis 1, the predictive value of social anxiety trait six months after baseline 
(ST) was analysed: baseline composite of interpretation bias reflecting social anxiety 
meaning (SB) was entered in the first block and baseline composite of interpretation bias 
reflecting paranoia meaning (PB) in the second. The interaction term (SB*PB) was added to 
the third block in order to assess its impact on the regression model. Only Model 1 (entering: 
SB) was significant. Model 1 indicated that 5.59% of the variance in the dependent variable 
could be accounted for by Time 1 baseline SB (Adjusted R² = 0.0559, F(1, 64) = 4.85, p = 
0.03). Thus, baseline SB composite significantly explained the variance in the ST composite. 
When the PB composite was added to the model, the model was no longer significant. The 
model was not significant after adding the interaction term, SB*PB. In Analysis 2, PB was 
entered in the first block, SB in the second. The results showed that none of the models 
were significant. Therefore, only Time 1 baseline SB scores significantly explained variance 
in ST composite six months later, and there were no significant interaction effects between 
SB and PB. In sum, participants who made negative  (social anxiety related) interpretations 
had higher scores on social anxiety measures six months later, while participants who made 
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Table 4.6 Statistical predictors of Time 2 ST composite 
 






B Beta t Sig.  
Analysi
s 1 




SB 0.35 0.27 2.20 0.03 
 Model 2 0.27 0.07 0.0441 0.1
21 
SB 0.31 0.24 1.73 0.09 
 
     PB <.001 0.06 0.46 0.65 
 Interaction  0.33 0.11 0.628 0.0
7 
SB*PB 0.01 0.20 1.50 0.14 
The model was only significant when SB alone were entered 
Analysi
s 2 
Model 3 0.17 0.03 0.0141 0.1
7 
PB .004 .003 0.14 0.17 
 Model 4 0.27 0.07 0.0441 0.0
9 
PB .001 .003 0.46 0.65 
SB 0.31 0.18 1.74 0.09 
None of the two models were significant 
Analysis summary: ST was only explained by baseline SB  at 5.59% 
 
Note: n = 65; dependent variable = Time 2 social anxiety trait (ST); ST = Time 2 composite 
of social anxiety trait measures: SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and SPS; PT = Time 2 composite of 
paranoia trait measures: PS, GTPS and the PDI; SB = Time 1 baseline composite of 
negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and WSAP; PB = Time 1 
baseline composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and WSAP. 
 
In Analysis 1, to predict paranoia traits (PT), Time 1 baseline composite of interpretation bias 
reflecting paranoia meaning (PB) was entered in the first block, and composite of 
interpretation bias reflecting social anxiety meaning (SB) in the second. The interaction term 
(SB*PB) was added to the third block to assess its impact on the regression model. Both 
Models 1 (entering: PB) and 2 (entering: SB) were significant. “In Model 1, 11.45% of the 
variance in the dependent variable was accounted for by PB (Adjusted R² = 0.1145, F(1, 64) 
= 9.40, p = .003). Thus, PB composite significantly explained the variance in the PT 
composite. As shown in Table 4.7, when the SB composite was added to Model 2, the 
change in Adjusted R² suggested that SB accounted for an additional 3.91% of the variance 
in the outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.1536, F(2, 63) = 6.89, p = 0.002). Both PB and SB 
composite reached marginal significance as independent predictors. The interaction term 
SB*PB was added to the model as the last step. As seen in Table 4.7, the model was 
significant after adding the interaction term SB*PB, and the variance increased by 13.78% 
(Adjusted R²= 0.2914, F(3, 62) = 9.91, p < 0.001). Both PB and interaction term SB*PB were 
emerged as significant predictors, which interaction term SB*PB are more weighted than 
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PB.” In Analysis 2, SB was entered in the first block, and PB in the second. Models 3 
(entering: SB) and 4 (entering: SB and PB) were both significant. In Model 3, 12.02% of the 
variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by the SB (Adjusted R²= 0.1202, 
F(1, 64) = 9.88, p = 0.003). When the PB composite was added to the model, the change in 
Adjusted R² suggested that PB accounted for an additional 3.34% of variance in the 
outcome variable (Adjusted R² = 0.1536, F(2, 63) = 2.42, p < .002). Both SB and PB 
composite reached marginal significance as predictors. ∆Adjusted R² from Model 3 to 4 was 
less than ∆Adjusted R² from Model 1 to 2 at ∆Adjusted R² = -0.0056. Therefore, both SB and 
PB composite explained a significant amount of the variance in PT. SB composite 
contributed more than PB composite to variance in the dependent variable. There were also 
significant interaction effects between SB and PB when predicting PT. Thus, the effect of PB 
differs depending on the level of SB in predicting paranoia (PT). In sum, participants who 
tended towards persecutory interpretation bias were highly vulnerable to paranoia six 
months later. This vulnerability depends significantly on the presence of negative 
interpretation bias. 
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Table 4.7 Statistical predictors of the Time 2 PT composite 
 
 






B Beta t Sig.  
Analy
sis 1 
Model 1 0.36 0.13 0.1145* 0.003 PB 0.006 0.51 5.42 0.003
* 
 Model 2 0.42 0.18 0.1536* 0.002 PB 0.004 0.32 2.5 0.07 




0.57 0.32 0.2914** <.001 PB 0.005 0.27 2.28 0.03 
SB 0.07 0.07 0.54 0.59 
SAbia*
PB 
0.01 0.42 3.64 0.001 
Adding SB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0391)=3.91%; 
Adding SB*PB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.1378)=13.78% 
Analy
sis 2 
Model 3 0.37 0.13 0.1202** 0.003 SB 0.37 0.37 3.14 0.003
* 
 Model 4 0.42 0.18 0.1536** 0.002 SB 0.26 0.26 1.99 0.05 
PB 0.004 0.24 1.88 0.07 
Adding PB increases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0334)=3.34% 
Analysis summary: similar variance in PT was explained by SB (3.91%) and PB (3.34 %); adding SB*PB 
increases the variance explained at the most (∆R²= 0.1378)=13.78% 
 
Note: n = 65; The dependent variable = Time 2 social anxiety trait (ST); ST = Time 2 
composite of social anxiety trait measures: SADS, LSAS, SIAS and SPS; PT = Time 2 
composite of paranoia trait measures: PS, GTPS and PDI; SB = Time 1 baseline composite 
of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and WSAP; PB = Time 1 
baseline composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and WSAP. 
 
Only SB predicted ST six months later, and there was no significant interaction effect 
between SB and PB when predicting ST. By contrast, both SB and PB predicted PT six 
months later, while SB was more significant than PB in the prediction model. There was a 
significant interaction effect between the two predictors in predicted PT. The more likely 
participants were to make negative interpretations, the more likely they were to have 
elevated social anxiety six months later. Levels of paranoia bias, however, did not 
significantly impact later levels of social anxiety. By contrast, participants who made negative 
and those who made persecutory interpretations were vulnerable to paranoia six months 
later. Negative interpretation bias showed significant interaction effects when persecutory 
interpretation bias predicted paranoia trait.   
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Interaction effects of negative interpretation bias  
Additional analysis was conducted owing to the significant interaction effects of negative 
interpretation and persecutory interpretation bias in predicting the paranoia trait. As shown in 
Table 4.7, adding the interaction term, SB*PB, increased the variance by 13.78%. SB*PB 
accounted for more in the prediction model (Adjusted R²= 0.2914, p < 0.001, β = 0.01) than 
did PB (β= 0.005) but for less than did SB (β = 0.07). PB affected the outcome measure 
differently at different SB values. As shown in Figure 4.6, each point in the interaction plot (n 
= 66) showed mean paranoia trait composite at combinations of predictor levels. The 
unparalleled lines indicated an interaction between the two predictors (SB/PB).  
Figure 4.6: Regression analysis of persecutory interpretation on paranoia trait when set by different 
severity of negative interpretation groups (n = 66) 
 
Note: n = 66; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = 2nd experiment session six months 
after Time 1; negative interpretation bias represented social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory interpretation bias represented paranoia related meaning. Mild = participants 
made mild degree of negative interpretation; moderate = participants made moderate degree 
of negative interpretation; extreme = participants made extreme degree of negative 
interpretation. 
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As illustrated in Figure 4.6, persecutory interpretation exerted a significant impact on the 
paranoia trait when participants made extremely negative interpretations. Persecutory 
interpretation exerted less impact on the paranoia trait when participants made moderately 
or mildly negative interpretations.  
4.5 Discussion  
In this study, the cognitive specificity and cognitive vulnerability of interpretation bias in 
social anxiety and paranoia were investigated simultaneously. Content specificity of 
interpretation bias refers to biases that tend in the direction of one’s emotional concerns and 
that match one's core psychopathological trait. Cognitive vulnerability refers to specific kinds 
of interpretation biases preceding the development of corresponding emotional traits, or 
even of syndromes. In this study, whether type of interpretation bias is significantly 
associated with its corresponding emotional trait, was examined. Negatively evaluated 
(social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias predicted persecutory interpretation 
bias better than did social anxiety. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias predicted paranoia better than did negatively evaluated (social anxiety 
congruent content) interpretation bias. Three experimental cognitive tasks reflecting the 
same cognitive process (interpretation of ambiguity) were analysed by creating a composite 
score. In the following discussion, these findings are explored and interpreted, unexpected 
findings explained and the implications and limitations of the study discussed.  
4.5.1 Results Summary 
The main hypothesis of the thesis is that specific interpretation bias at a given time predicts 
corresponding emotional trait severity at a later time point. Negatively evaluated (social 
anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias predicted social anxiety better than did 
persecutory interpretation bias. Conversely, persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias predicted paranoia better than did negatively evaluated (social anxiety 
congruent content) interpretation bias.  
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Table 4.8 Key findings 
Dependent 
variables 
Results Does the corresponding bias better 
explain the variance in the related 
(i.e. content matched) traits? 
Time 2 
ST 
ST was only explained by baseline 





When controlling for the alternative 
bias, similar variance in PT was 
explained by SB (3.91%) and PB 
(3.34 %) 
NO 
Interaction Adding SB*PB increases the variance explained at the most (∆R² = 0.0378) = 
13.78% 
 
Note: Social anxiety content matches are shown on grey rows, and paranoid ones are 
shown on white rows. Fenigstein PS ST = composite of social anxiety trait measures: SADS, 
LSAS, SIAS and SPS; PT = the composite of paranoia trait measures: PS, GTPS and PDI; 
SB = the composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and 
WSAP; PB = composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores of the SST, SRT and 
WSAP 
 
4.5.2 Results Interpretation 
A summary of the key findings is presented in Table 4.8. Only negative evaluated 
interpretation bias (SB) explained the variance in social anxiety trait (ST), and PB 
contributed nothing to the model. Only the negative interpretation bias (representing social 
anxiety related meaning) composite significantly predicted social anxiety six months later; 
persecutory interpretation bias did not. Persecutory interpretation bias did not impact in the 
relationship between negative interpretation and paranoia. This suggests that individuals 
who tended towards negative interpretation biases were likely to suffer from social anxiety 
six months later, while participants who tended towards persecutory interpretation bias were 
not. This result was unaffected by persecutory interpretation bias.   
Both persecutory interpretation bias (PB) and negative evaluated interpretation bias (SB) 
explained an almost equal amount of variance in the paranoia trait (PT). When controlling for 
alternative bias, SB (3.91%) and PB (3.34 %) explained a similar amount of the variance in 
PT. Both persecutory and negative evaluated interpretation bias thus predicted paranoia six 
months later. This suggests that both individuals making negative and those making 
persecutory interpretations were likely to suffer from paranoia. 
In addition to the above finding, there was a significant interaction effect of negative 
interpretation bias and persecutory interpretation bias in predicting paranoia. In order to 
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investigate the interaction effects further, we categorised negative interpretation bias into 
three magnitudes: mild, moderate and extreme negativity. The results showed that its 
interaction effects were different in degree and direction. The most significant impact of 
persecutory interpretation on paranoia trait emerged when participants made extremely 
negative interpretations. The effect of persecutory interpretation bias is especially 
pronounced when participants also demonstrate a strong negative interpretation bias: 
individuals who make persecutory interpretations were more likely to develop paranoia if 
they also made extremely negative interpretations, while individuals who made only 
moderately or mildly negative interpretations were less likely to do so. Individuals who 
explained social ambiguity with persecutory intention (e.g., “People harm me”) were thus 
likely to suffer from paranoia six months later, and this chance was increased if they also 
made moderate (e.g., “People criticise me”) or extremely negative interpretations (e.g., 
“People hate me”). 
Overall, the results partially support the hypothesis that cognitive specificity and cognitive 
vulnerability significantly predict social anxiety and paranoia. The test of cognitive specificity 
revealed that only negative interpretation bias (content matched) is associated with social 
anxiety trait after six months, while persecutory interpretation bias is not, supporting the 
content specificity hypothesis. Both negative and persecutory interpretation bias is 
associated with the paranoia trait after six months. The test of cognitive vulnerability 
revealed that individuals who made the most extreme negative interpretation bias were most 
likely to suffer from social anxiety six months later, while participants with persecutory 
interpretation bias were not. Meanwhile, both individuals who made negative and 
persecutory interpretations were likely to suffer from paranoia. In addition, the severity of 
paranoia, predicted by persecutory interpretation bias, depended upon the magnitude of 
negative interpretation bias. The effect of persecutory interpretation bias is especially 
pronounced when participants also demonstrate moderate to extreme negative interpretation 
bias. 
The results clearly support cognitive theories in social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hirsch & 
Clark, 2004; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013) in a subclinical population, especially in terms of 
aetiologically: negatively biased information processing contributes to the development of 
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social anxiety. The results are consistent with cognitive theories of psychopathology in 
emotional disorders, that each emotional trait is characterised by a cognitive bias, content 
specific to that trait (Beck et al., 1991; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). By 
identifying the content of current interpretation biases, future emotional vulnerability can be 
predicted. Few studies have been conducted to distinguish depression from anxiety (Alford 
et al., 1995), panic from general anxiety (Vancleef & Peters, 2008; Woud et al., 2014) and 
anxiety from depression (Baldwin, Evans, Hirschfeld & Kasper, 2002; Cannon & Weems, 
2010). The current findings extend previous research on distinguishing social anxiety from 
paranoia. We demonstrated the causal understanding of interpretation bias by comparing 
the content of interpretation bias (representing socially anxious/paranoid meanings) and its 
predictive role in social anxiety and paranoia. The more one cares about the negative 
evaluations of others, the more they are in danger of suffering social anxiety in the future. 
The persecutory content of one’s interpretations was, however, irrelevant. The finding that 
the severity of paranoia depended upon the magnitude of the negative interpretation bias is 
consistent with dimensional views of negative interpretation in emotional disorders (e.g., Lee 
et al., 2016; Baert, De Raedt & Koster, 2010). For instance, the degree of negative 
interpretive bias is closely related to depression severity and the magnitude of negative 
interpretive bias varies systematically according to the severity of depression (Lee et al., 
2016). Here, these findings extend to other emotional disorders, including social anxiety and 
paranoia. 
4.5.3 Unexpected Finding and Possible Explanations  
Although the social anxiety findings confirmed the study hypotheses, the findings related to 
paranoia were more complex. Both individuals who tended towards negative and those who 
tended towards persecutory interpretation were likely to suffer from paranoia, while the 
severity of paranoia predicted by persecutory interpretation bias depended upon the 
magnitude of negative interpretation bias. The cognitive vulnerability results of Experiment 3 
in paranoia suggest a causal role for persecutory interpretation in the development of 
paranoia. In terms of cognitive specificity and paranoia, persecutory and negative evaluated 
interpretation bias both played a significant role in the development of paranoia. 
Furthermore, these variables interacted in the prediction of paranoia, so that the extent to 
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which persecutory interpretation predicted the severity of paranoia depended upon the 
magnitude of negative interpretation bias. Persecutory interpretation bias is especially 
pronounced when participants also demonstrate a moderate to extremely negative 
interpretation bias. 
Although the role of negative evaluative interpretations in predicting paranoia did not directly 
supported the cognitive specificity hypothesis, it was consistent with what has been 
proposed by many other cognitive theorists of psychosis in the past (McReynols, 1960; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999). Freeman et al. (2005) suggested a hierarchical structure of 
paranoia, according to which the distribution of paranoid beliefs in the general population is 
continuous, including social evaluative concerns (e.g., rejection, ignorance), ideas of 
reference (e.g., judgement, criticism), mild threat (e.g., irritation), moderate threat (e.g., stalk) 
and severe threat (e.g., conspiracy, harm). The less plausible paranoid interpretation (on top 
hierarchy, e.g., people try to cause harm on me) builds upon commoner, more plausible 
ones (on bottom hierarchy, e.g., people ignore/ criticise me) (D. Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Slater, et al., 2005). Anticipation of rejection, a mildly paranoid (Freeman et al., 
2005) yet catastrophic socially anxious interpretation (Stopa & Clark, 2000), was a prominent 
theme common to paranoia and social anxiety. Socially anxious individuals characterise 
themselves in enduringly negative ways (e.g., People think I was boring). This may be 
catastrophic for them, posing disastrous long-term consequences (e.g., People will reject me, 
I will lose all my friends). Anxiety related beliefs play an important a role in the formation and 
maintenance of persecutory beliefs (Garety & Freeman, 1999). Arguably, it is not the content 
of the interpretations that distinguish individuals with persecutory delusions from the general 
population, but the degree of general worry and anxiety, and the degree to which they can 
control these thoughts (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 2004). When anxiety deepens, persecutory 
interpretations or delusions may develop, in an attempt to stabilise and assimilate 
unprocessed information, reducing anxiety (Freeman, Garety & Phillips, 2000). The findings 
here support the above theory, that the severity of paranoia predicted by persecutory 
interpretation bias depends upon the degree of negative interpretation bias. Persecutory 
interpretation bias had the greatest causal impact on paranoia, and related negative 
interpretation bias was to a catastrophic degree.  
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4.5.4 Limitations 
According to these findings, negative evaluative interpretation bias plays a causal role in 
social anxiety, and persecutory and negative interpretation bias in paranoia. However, the 
results on the content specificity and prediction of each emotional trait were complex. 
Although negative interpretation bias alone contributed to the severity of social anxiety, it 
interacted significantly with persecutory interpretation bias in predicting the severity of 
paranoia. This result is consistent with the hierarchical structure of paranoia (Freeman et al., 
2005): that the distribution of paranoia beliefs in the general population is continuous and 
includes social evaluative concerns. First, the small sample size of this study (n = 71) limited 
its power. Conclusions about the significant impact of negative interpretation in the prediction 
model must thus be drawn cautiously. The results need to be replicated with a larger sample 
and in a clinical population. For example, a recent study of attention bias demonstrates a 
pattern of bias opposite to that observed using similar methods in subclinical samples to 
date (Yiend et al., 2015). Second, removing outliers before the main analysis could be 
critical. One may argue that this has been a more optimal approach, and would have 
strengthened the conclusions here. Five subjects were removed as outliers. Although this 
step was statistically justifiable, how best to deal with outliers has always been debated. One 
might argue that outliers are legitimate data points that represent valuable information about 
the variables, and that data are more likely to be representative of the population if outliers 
are not removed (Orr, Sackett & DuBois, 1991). However, the presence of outliers may 
result in inflated error rates and substantial distortions of parameter and statistic estimates 
(Zimmerman, 1998). Removing outliers enhances the accuracy of the overwhelming majority 
of analyses, significantly reducing errors of inference in most cases (Osborne & Overbay, 
2004). Third, maintaining a constant time interval between Times 1 and 2 was impossible. 
Therefore, the six months does not represent an exact planned interval, and we do not know 
whether this affected the results. However, we only allowed for one week before or after the 
priori tested date to minimise unexpected effects. Fourth, our design included two 
experimental sessions and changes in participant trajectories could not be examined. Hence, 
a life event questionnaire would have been added at the follow-up session to monitor the 
effect of major life incidents on the data. Lastly, participants were not drawn from a clinical 
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population. The changes of emotional traits and biases scores in a non-clinical sample may 
be limited. The non-clinical sample was naturally assumed as a psychologically stable 
sample, namely the concerned factors of this study would not significantly fluctuate in this 
population. However, we firstly used a longitudinal design to maximum the chance to 
observe any chances of this data; secondly, we screened the participants, and tested a wide 
range of population, which allowed observations of natural trends of relationship between the 
concerned variables; lastly, any results of changes observed from non-clinical sample would 
be easier to interpret and generalize. Because this sample are most closet to the population 
that was treated in normal life. Furthermore, the continuity of non-clinical and clinical 
mechanisms is suggested by Beck's (1984) cognitive model of psychopathology. Therefore, 
generalising the findings from non-clinical population to a clinical population is not 
unreasonable, as a clinical population already would have significant symptoms. However, 
group comparison analyses should be added in order to demonstrate the interpretation bias 
in the two clinical groups 
4.5.5 Implications  
Our experiment has theoretical implications for the aetiology of paranoia and social anxiety. 
First, our data confirmed the content specific causal effect of negative evaluative 
interpretation bias in developing social anxiety, consistent with major cognitive theories of 
social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; 
Morrison & Heimberg, 2013), as well as with the cognitive specificity of psychopathology in 
emotional disorders (Beck et al. 1976; Williams et al., 1988; Eysenck et al., 1991). Moreover, 
the data provides new insights into how paranoia develops. This becomes even more 
important when considering that the literature on paranoia does not provide many 
demonstrations of the predictive power of interpretation bias. Although the evidence here is 
restricted to the subclinical population, it is anticipated that the findings might generalise to a 
clinical population. Persecutory and negative evaluative interpretation bias should be 
considered causal risk factors at a clinical level, potentially even predictive of new onset of 
psychotic symptoms. Second, the findings here confirm that paranoia is hierarchical in 
structure (Freeman et al., 2005). Paranoia develops from paranoid beliefs that range from 
mild, socially evaluative concerns to severe, persecutory concerns. The results suggest the 
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accuracy with which persecutory interpretation bias predicts the severity of paranoia 
depends upon the degree of negative interpretation bias. Persecutory interpretation bias has 
the greatest causal impact on paranoia; when combined with negative interpretation bias, 
paranoia was most catastrophic. Thus, beyond the initial hypothesis about the content 
specificity of interpretation bias in paranoia, the degree of interpretation bias was also a 
dimension that should be considered in the development of paranoia. Lastly, the data also 
suggests a range of negative interpretative bias tasks that might be useful in such research, 
including semantic and situational contexts, self-report and and reaction time measures. 
The results are also of empirical importance for clinical interventions in paranoia and social 
anxiety. First, our findings have important implications for the selection of intervention targets 
in newer methods, such as cognitive bias modification or existing cognitive therapy. Based 
on the results, negative evaluative interpretation bias is the proposed target for social anxiety 
intervention, while both negatively evaluative and persecutory interpretation bias are the 
targets for paranoia intervention. Second, the linear association between interpretation bias 
and the severity of social anxiety and paranoia suggest that interpretation bias is not only a 
corollary of the traits, but might also be a vulnerability factor in the subsequent development 
of such emotional traits. Further studies should attempt to evaluate prospective cognitive 
vulnerability, together with purely symptom/trait measurement. Third, the significant 
interaction effects between negatively evaluative and persecutory interpretation bias suggest 
the possibility of applying a cognitive model of social anxiety to paranoia. If social anxiety 
related interpretation bias plays a role in paranoia symptoms, then established cognitive-
behavioural anxiety-reduction techniques might reduce paranoia symptoms. Cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) was suggested by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) in the clinical guidelines for all schizophrenic patients, which may be 
applied during either the acute phase (Phase 2) or later, including in inpatient settings. A 
review of 20 randomised controlled trial studies (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004) that used CBT for 
psychosis (CBTp) to treat schizophrenia, provided evidence for its efficacy of CBTp. 
Similarly, a computerised training package that targets reasoning processes was developed 
and was associated with promising improvements in participants (Waller, Freeman, Jolley, 
Dunn & Garety, 2011), suggesting it may be used in combination with CBT to improve the 
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overall efficacy of psychosis interventions. Few studies have documented the lack of effect 
of CBT in reducing psychosis relapse (Garety et al., 2015), the low implementation rate of 
NICE-recommended CBT and the significant shortage of NICE guidelines for CBT in 
schizophrenia (Haddock et al., 2014). Yiend et al. (under review) propose a more targeted 
intervention, focusing on specific symptoms or mechanisms. They tested the clinical 
feasibility of a novel psychological intervention (Cognitive Bias Modification for paranoia), 
manipulating biased interpretations toward more adaptive processing in order to reduce 
paranoia in patients. The results presented here may suggest that targeting content-specific 
cognitive processes may improve the efficiency of intervention.  
4.6 Conclusions  
In the current study, the causal role of interpretation bias in developing content specific 
emotional (paranoid/social anxiety) traits was demonstrated. Overall, the results of this 
longitudinal experiment generated promising findings in a subclinical population. A content 
specific causal role for negatively evaluative interpretation bias in developing the social 
anxiety trait was established. A causal role of persecutory interpretation in the development 
of paranoia was also observed. However, there was a significant interaction effect between 
negatively evaluative and persecutory interpretation bias: the accuracy of persecutory 
interpretation bias in predicting the severity of paranoia depended upon the magnitude of 
negative interpretation bias. Future research may extend this finding by demonstrating the 
cognitive specificity of interpretation bias in a clinical sample. 
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Chapter 5 Experiment 4 Testing Reciprocal Causality: Do 
Trait Emotions Maintain Corresponding Interpretation 
Biases in Social Anxiety and Paranoia? 
5.1 Experiment Overview 
Cognitive theories suggest that there is a rolling cycle between cognition and emotion which 
facilitates the development and maintenance of emotional disorders. Vulnerable emotions 
produce biased cognition, whereas biased cognition maintains and enhances the severity of 
vulnerable emotions. In emotional disorders anxiety is suggested to be strongly associated 
with attention and interpretation to threatening information (Clark, 1999), while depression is 
suggested to be reliably associated with the selective memory of negative self-referent 
information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). In the model of positive symptoms of psychosis, 
Freeman and Garety (2002) argued that persecutory delusions place a greater emphasis on 
cognitive processes that are typically implicated in the maintenance of anxiety disorders; 
however, maintenance factors are presented differently, and psychosis individuals tend to 
hold persecutory beliefs for negative events.  
As shown in Figure 5.1, Experiment 1 raised the possibility of a reciprocal relationship 
between trait emotions and corresponding interpretation biases. For example, in Experiment 
, on one side of the relationship the regression analysis showed that trait paranoia was a 
significant ‘predictor’ of the persecutory interpretation style, while the contrasting side of the 
relationship persecutory interpretation style was also a significant ‘predictor’ of trait paranoia. 
However, the cross-sectional design did not allow any causal explanation for these 
reciprocal relationship, only a direction of possibility. To further demonstrate this reciprocal 
relationship, Experiment 3 collated longitudinal data collected six months apart, and found a 
causal role of content-specific interpretation bias towards the corresponding trait emotion, 
which partially confirmed the vicious cycle proposed by cognitive theories of 
psychopathology. Thus, biased interpretation style (e.g. persecutory beliefs) significantly 
contributed to the increase in trait emotion (e.g. paranoia) level over a six-month time period. 
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However, we do not know if trait emotion (e.g. paranoia) was a significant predictor of the 
biased interpretation style (e.g. persecutory beliefs) across the same time period, enabling 
the forming of the cycle of psychopathology.  
Figure 5.1: Prediction model for Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
 
Note: T1 = first experiment session; T2 = second experiment session 6 month after T1; the 
opposite interpretation bias/emotion was controlled in each prediction model: Interpretation 
bias (T2) was controlled in the prediction model that interpretation bias (T1) predicted 
Emotion (T2); Emotion (T2) was controlled in the prediction model that Emotion (T1) 
predicted interpretation bias (T2).   
This study demonstrates the opposing side of the reciprocal causality model using trait social 
anxiety and paranoia, by asking do interpretation biases in social anxiety and paranoia 
maintain the corresponding trait emotions, and whether there was a prolonged effect of trait 
emotions in the specific biased interpretations. Biased interpretations were tested via three 
cognitive experimental tasks with either socially anxious or paranoid congruent contents, the 
same as in Experiment 1. Data for this study were collected at the same time as Experiment 
3 was being conducted. Data for trait emotions (social anxiety/paranoia) and interpretation 
bias were collected at the start (i.e. Time 1 trait scores, and Time 1 bias scores) and then 
again six months later (i.e. Time 2 trait scores, and Time 2 bias scores). Experiment 3 used 
Time 1 bias scores predicting Time 2 trait scores, while Experiment 4 used Time 1 trait 
scores predicting Time 2 bias scores. We were interested in whether specific trait emotions 
at a time point predict the interpretation style six months later. For example, a high severity 
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of paranoia at one time point predicts interpreting ‘a stranger is standing across the street’ as 
‘the stranger is stalking me’ six months later, while a high severity of social anxiety at one 
time point predicts interpreting ‘a stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘the stranger is 
laughing at me’ six months later. Hierarchical regression analyses are used to examine the 
causal role of trait emotions in biased interpretations. 
5.2 Background  
The cognitive theory of psychopathology suggests a reciprocal relationship between anxiety 
and cognition, which may form the basis of a vicious cycle, and fuel the maintenance of 
anxiety once it is established (Mathew, 1988). It is speculated that negative thinking may 
both have a causal role in developing symptoms of anxiety, as well as being a symptom of 
anxiety. Despite the etiological importance of biased processing in social anxiety, the degree 
to which social anxiety elicits such negative processing may depend upon an individual’s 
stable levels of trait vulnerability (Mathew & MacLeod, 1994). In the cognitive model of social 
anxiety proposed by Clark and Wells (2001), a socially anxious individual usually tends to 
develop negative beliefs about themselves (e.g. ‘I sound boring’), which may lead individuals 
to appraise relevant social events as threatening, and to interpret ambiguous social 
information as signs of negative evaluation by others. Once a social situation is appraised in 
this manner, socially anxious individuals may then feel even more anxious. For example, a 
socially anxious individual usually tends to use internal information to infer how others 
evaluate them, which means they are trapped in a closed system in which most of their 
evidence for their fears are self-generated and other real responses becomes inaccessible. 
These interlinked vicious circles then maintain their anxiety and prevent disconfirmation of 
negative appraisals.  
Johnson and Multhaup (1992) argued that not all emotions are equally amenable to 
cognitive explanations, as individual differences in trait vulnerability to anxiety or other 
emotions seem to be associated with the contents of information processing that are elicited 
by elevated levels of emotions. According to the cognitive model of the positive symptoms of 
psychosis proposed by Garety et al. (2001), ‘dysfunctional negative schemas will be closely 
associated with levels of emotional distress’ and ‘the presence of emotional distress will also 
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contribute to the maintenance of the psychotic appraisal through other processes’ (p. 192). 
Novel features of the suggested model outline the direct role of emotion and persecutory 
explanations in delusion formation; however, it does not make the proposed reciprocal 
nature of the relationship very explicit. Similar to the cognitive theory of social anxiety, 
persecutory delusions are conceptualised as threat beliefs, which is where biased beliefs are 
hypothesised to arise from individuals’ emotionally significant experiences, and lead to the 
receipt of confirmatory evidence and prevent dis-confirmatory processing. The cognitive 
model of persecutory delusions by Freeman et al. (2002), suggests that emotional 
experiences are directly associated with the content of delusional beliefs. ‘The cognitive 
content of emotions will have been expressed in the delusions and, in turn, the content of the 
delusions will contribute to the maintenance and exacerbation of the emotion’ (p. 340). As 
shown in Figure 5.2, although there are dynamic interactions between emotion and cognitive 
bias in the formation and maintenance of a persecutory delusion, the model does not 
explicitly suggest this same reciprocal relationship as proposed here. The vicious cycle 
between cognition and emotion that facilitates the development and maintenance of emotion 
disorders has not yet been applied in psychosis. Therefore, one of the original contributions 
of this thesis is to apply the reciprocal relationship between cognition and emotion in 
psychosis, and to test whether a rolling cycle exists in the formation and maintenance of 
psychosis.  
There are a number of studies that have demonstrated the reciprocal relationship between 
trait emotions (social anxiety/paranoia) and biased interpretations, which were reviewed in 
Experiment 1 (cross-sectional design), but fewer studies have investigated the causal role of 
interpretation bias in social anxiety/paranoia, which were reviewed in Experiment 3 
(longitudinal design). However, rather than specifically testing both directions in the cross-
sectional data obtained, which would directly address the question of reciprocal causality, 
these studies only tested the relationship in one or other direction. We know little about the 
effects of trait emotion on interpretation style in the longer term, and to what extent trait 
emotion can predict one’s interpretation style in the future. Whether trait emotion may 
precede the development of a corresponding interpretation style within a longitudinal setting, 
and whether associations will fade over time remains unknown.  
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Figure 5.2: The formation of a persecutory delusion  
(Freeman et al., 2000) 
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Reviews of previous studies have shown that they are yet to directly investigate the 
reciprocal causality model in one dataset, within a longitudinal setting, and in both directions: 
from emotion to cognition, and from cognition to emotion. Thus, the strong design of this 
study provides a unique opportunity to address these important questions. Following the 
findings of Experiment 3, which tested the causality of interpretation bias and emotion traits, 
this study will evaluate whether a specific trait emotion at a given point in time is associated 
significantly at a later point in time with one interpretation style and not the other.  
Data for this study was collected during Experiments 1 and 3. We used trait scores of social 
anxiety/paranoia to predict composite scores of interpretation bias from three paradigms: the 
Similarity Rating Task (SRT), the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST), and the Word Sentence 
Relatedness Paradigms (WSAP) in a longitudinal study of a wide ranging population tested 
at two time points over an approximately six-month time interval. For example, high paranoia 
level at one time point predict the interpretation of ‘a stranger is standing across the street’ 
as ‘the stranger is stalking me’ six months later, while high social anxiety level at one time 
point predict the interpretation of ‘a stranger is standing across the street’ as ‘the stranger is 
laughing at me’ six months later. Hierarchical regression analyses are used to examine the 
trait specific association between trait social anxiety/paranoia and interpretation biases.  
We have tested the reciprocal relationship between trait emotion and interpretation bias, and 
focus on the causal role of trait emotion in the maintenance of interpretation style: whether a 
specific trait emotion would add to the prediction of the specific content of interpretation 
beyond the effects of other emotion traits.  
I. The trait social anxiety will contribute more to the prediction of negatively evaluated 
(social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias than trait paranoia. 
II. Conversely, the trait paranoia will contribute more to the prediction of the 
persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias than trait social anxiety. 
5.3 Methods 
Data for Experiment 4 was collected at the same time as when Experiment 3 was being 
conducted. In total, 71 individuals with a wide range of scores for social anxiety and paranoia 
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were tested using a battery of self-report personality measures and tests of interpretation 
bias at two time points six months apart. Experiment 4 used trait data from Time 1 
personality measures and interpretation bias data from Time 2 cognitive tasks. 
5.3.1 Procedure 
Session 1 lasted around 1 hour to 90 minutes and varied across individuals, while session 2 
lasted for around 30 minutes. All participants were informed of the inclusion criteria again 
before starting each session. As shown in Figure 5.3, during session 1 participants were 
firstly asked to complete a consent form and demographics questionnaire, followed by self-
report measures; this took approximately 20-30 minutes. In session 2, participants were 
asked to complete a consent form and a demographics questionnaire. In order to measure 
interpretation biases representing negative interpretation (social anxiety related) and 
persecutory interpretation (paranoia related), three cognitive experimental tasks were 
utilised, each containing two sets of materials reflecting both types of content. Two parallel 
versions of each task were developed, and used in in counterbalanced order across 
participants. All measures were presented to participants ahead of the interpretation tasks. 
Self-reported measures and tasks were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed random 
orders across participants. A random/counterbalanced design reduces the chance of order 
effects, whereby a measure/task or other factors adversely influences the results. 
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Figure 5.3: Experiment procedure 
 
Note: Participants were asked to complete the self-report measures ahead of the tasks, 
which were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed orders. LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought 
Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); 
PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task 
(SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; Based on 
Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The Word-Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP, Based 
on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
5.3.2 Analysis Design  
Our key concern during the analyses was the influence of participants’ emotional trait 
severity on their interpretation bias six months later. To test our hypothesis we generated 
four composite scores by standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) each measure/task score, then 
averaging them. The four composites are: Time 1 composite of social anxiety trait (ST) 
measures (SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and SPS); Time 1 composite of paranoia trait (PT) 
measures (PS, GTPS, and PDI); Time 2 composite of negatively evaluated interpretation 
bias (SB) scores (SST, SRT, and WSAP); and Time 2 composite of persecutory 
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interpretation bias (PB) scores (SST, SRT, and WSAP). The reason for using composite 
scores in this analysis is to achieve the clarity possible by employing an analysis based on 
composite trait scores, and the fact that composite bias scores are able to more obviously 
map our hypothesis. Composite scores provide convergent validity for the construct 
measured by including several measures of the same phenomenon, and results using 
composite scores should be a reflection of the results from individual scores. 
Figure 5.4: Analytical approach 
 
Note: The self-report measures were presented to participants ahead of the tasks, which 
were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed orders. ST= Time 1 composite of social 
anxiety trait measures; PT= Time 1 composite of paranoia trait measures; SB= Time 2 
composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores; PB= Time 2 composite of 
persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
In addition, composite scores were calculated for social anxiety/paranoia related bias in 
Time 1, and for social anxiety/paranoia measures in Time 2. We generated the composites 
by standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) participants’ scores for each corresponding measure and 
task, and then averaged across them separately. These represent the Time 1 social anxiety 
trait and paranoia trait, and Time 2 social anxiety related interpretation bias, and paranoia 
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related interpretation bias, separately. Using the composites we employed a bivariate 
correlation to check if the patterns of the relationship between the tested variables are linear. 
Finally, a hierarchical regression was conducted to test the causal effect of trait social 
anxiety and paranoia in interpretation bias.  
In order to test our hypothesis directly, we tested the model explaining the content of the 
interpretation biases (SB/PB) via two analyses. In analysis one we entered the content 
matched trait as the first independent variable firstly, and then the converse (content 
incongruent) trait secondly. For example, in explaining the SB, ST was entered into the first 
block, and PT into the second block.  In analysis two, we entered the converse trait as the 
first independent variable, and the content matched trait as the second. Following the 
example above, we entered PT into the first block, and ST into the second block. Analysis 
two allowed a strength test of the content-specific bias for explaining its matched 
interpretation bias composite, when controlling the converse. This generated two ∆Adjusted 
R², and the change of the ∆Adjusted R² from the two analysis indicated that the additional 
variance in the bias composite is accounted for by one trait composite over, and above the 
other. Which of the ∆Adjusted R² values is the greater indicates which direction of the trait 
explains the most variance in the outcome bias composites. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Participant Characteristics 
5.1.1.1 Data Cleaning 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure there were no violations of the assumptions 
of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. In order to recruit participants with wide-ranging 
scores on all scales, we have not filtered any scores from our data except the reaction time 
data for the WSAP task. To remove the influence of spuriously long response times, we 
excluded data from trials with reaction times shorter than 50ms or longer than 1500ms. This 
time limitation follows the design of the original WSAP by Beard and Amir (2010) and  
resulted in the elimination of 2.65% of trials. There were 11 missing data points, which were 
treated via pairwise deletions. An inspection of the missing data did not suggest any 
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systematic problems with the measurement tools or methods, and the missing data 
appeared to be randomly distributed. 
5.1.1.2 Calculation of Bias Scores  
In order to compare the reaction times or rating indices with the self-report indices, we 
calculated bias scores for the social scenario sentences. Bias scores from each task were 
calculated using the equations listed in Table 5.1. We calculated two bias scores for each 
task, reflecting the negatively evaluated biasand persecutory bias. Larger bias scores 
indicate more bias toward threat interpretations, and further away from benign interpretations.  
Table 5.1: Equations of bias scores 
Task 
name 
Bias score  Equations Range of values 
SST Negative bias Interpretation Bias=(Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias=(Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed)*100 % 
0, 100 
SRT Negative bias Interpretation Bias= Mean of ratings on all 





Interpretation Bias= Mean of ratings on all 
Target Paranoia -Mean of ratings on all Target 
Benign 
-3, 3 
WSAP Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Reaction times (Social 





Interpretation Bias = reaction times (Paranoia 
meaning reject – Paranoia meaning endorse) 
-1500, 1500 
Note: negative bias represents social anxiety related interpretation; persecutory bias 
represents social anxiety related interpretation. 
 
5.1.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Means and standard deviations for each measures and tasks are presented in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Trait scores and bias  scores 
Mean (SD) 
































































































































Note: Time 1= first experiment session; Time 2= second experiment session 6 month after 
Time 1; LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); SPS: Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PS: Self-report Paranoia 
Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 
1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence 
association paradigm (WSAP, Based on Beard & Amir, 2010) 
 
To test the hypothesis that a specific emotional trait would add to the prediction of one 
interpretation type beyond the effects of the other emotional trait, we conducted correlational 
analysis followed by linear regression analysis. 
5.4.2 Relationship between Putative Predictors 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), independent variables with a bivariate correlation 
more than 0.80 should not be included in multiple regression analyses. The correlation 
coefficient between social anxiety trait and paranoia trait was r = 0.69, p<0.001, which is 
< 0.80, and suggests it will be feasible to assess trait social anxiety and trait paranoia as 
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potentially different constructs (Baguley, 2012) and there was arguably no collinearity 
problem. Thus, these can be used as independent variables to test the corresponding 
interpretation bias six months later. 
5.4.3 Main Analyses 
Composites for participants’ scores on emotional traits from Time 1 session and 
interpretation bias from Time 2 session were generated to yield four composite scores 
representing: Time 1 social anxiety trait (ST); Time 1 paranoia trait (PT); Time 2 social 
anxiety related bias (SB); and Time 2 paranoia related bias (PB), individually. The negative 
interpretation bias scores from Time 1 SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to generate a 
composite score which reflected social anxiety related interpretation bias. The persecutory 
interpretation bias scores from Time 1 SST, SRT and WSAP were averaged to generate a 
composite score which reflected paranoia related interpretation bias (see Table 5.1 for the 
calculation of bias scores). The composite score representing paranoia trait was calculated 
by averaging Time 2 PS, GTPS, and PDI, while the composite score representing social 
anxiety trait was calculated by averaging the Z scores of Time 2 SADS, LSAS, SIAS, and 
SPS.  
5.1.1.4 Bivariate Correlation between Predictors and Dependent Variables 
Correlation patterns in scatterplots 
Scatterplots were generated to visually check if patterns of the relationship between the 
tested variables are linear and to identify outliers of the calculated composites (observations 
lying away from the main body of points). Figure 5.5 clearly shows that Time 1 social anxiety 
trait and Time 2 negative interpretation bias are linear, while Figure 5.6 shows that Time 1 
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Figure 5.5: Correlation between Time 1 social anxiety trait and Time 2 negative interpretation bias 
 
Note: n=71; Time 1= first experiment session; Time 2= second experiment session 6 months 
after Time 1; negative interpretation bias represents social anxiety related meaning; 
persecutory interpretation bias represents paranoia related meaning. 
Figure 5.6: Correlation between Time 1 paranoia trait and Time 2 paranoid interpretation bias 
 
Note: n = 71; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = second experiment session 6 
months after Time 1; persecutory interpretation bias represented paranoia related meaning. 
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Correlation coefficients  
The results of the correlation analysis between Time 1 traits predictors and Time 2 
dependent measures are presented in Table 5.3 The Time 2 negative interpretation bias (SB, 
which represents socially anxious meaning) was significantly correlated with the Time 1 
social anxiety trait, but not Time 1 paranoia trait. However, the Time 2 persecutory 
interpretation bias (PB, which represents paranoid meaning) was not significantly correlated 
with the Time 1 paranoia trait, but was significantly correlated with the Time 1 social anxiety 
trait. 





r p r p 
Time 2 SB 0.41 <0.001 0.23 0.056 
 PB 0.35 0.003 0.19 0.108 
 
Note: n = 66; Time 1 = first experiment session; Time 2 = second experiment session 6 
months after Time 1; ST = Time 1 composite of social anxiety trait measures; PT = Time 1 
composite of paranoia trait measures; SB = Time 2 composite of negatively evaluated 
interpretation bias scores; PB = Time 2 composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
 
5.1.1.5 Test of Causal Effect via Regression Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we ran hierarchical regression analyses to assess the role of 
specific emotion traits in the prediction of trait matched interpretation bias 6 months from 
baseline. In analysis 1 the baseline composite of social anxiety trait (ST) was entered into 
the first block, and the baseline composite of paranoia trait (PT) was entered into the second 
block to predict the negative interpretation bias (SB) 6 months from baseline. The results 
showed that both model 1 (entering: ST) and model 2 (entering: PT) were significant. Model 
1 indicated that 15.53% of the variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by 
the ST (Adjusted R² = 0.1553, F (1, 69) = 13.87, p <.001). Thus, the ST composite 
significantly explained the variance in the SB composite. As shown in Table 5.4, when the 
PT composite was added to the model, the change in the Adjusted R² value suggested that 
the variance was decreased by 0.11% when PT was accounted for (Adjusted R² = 0.1542, F 
(2, 68) = 7.38, p = 0.001). Only the ST composite reached significance as an independent 
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predictor. In analysis 2 PT was entered into the first block, and ST into the second block. 
The results showed that the model was only significant after adding ST into the prediction 
model (Adjusted R² = 0.1542, F (2, 68) = 7.38, p = 0.001), indicating that PT alone did not 
significantly predict the model. Therefore, only the Time 1 baseline ST score was able to 
significantly explain the variance in the SB composite 6 months later. In summary, the 
participants that had higher scores in social anxiety measures showed more negative 
interpretation (social anxiety related interpretation) 6 months later, while participants with  
higher scores in paranoia measures showed more persecutory interpretation (paranoia 
related interpretation) 6 months later.  
To predict the persecutory interpretation bias (PB) 6 months from baseline, in Analysis 1, the 
baseline composite of paranoia trait (PT) was entered into the first block, and the baseline 
composite of social anxiety trait (ST) was entered into the second block. The results showed 
that the model was only significant after adding ST into the prediction model (Adjusted R² = 
0.1054, F (2, 68) = 5.13, p = 0.008), and PT alone did not significantly predict the model. In 
analysis 2  ST was entered into the first block, and PT into the second block. The results 
showed that both model 1 (entering: ST) and model 2 (entering: PT) were significant. Model 
1 indicated that 10.96% of the variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by 
ST (Adjusted R² = 0.1096, F (1, 70) = 9.62, p = 0.003). Thus, the ST composite could 
significantly explain the variance in the PB composite. As shown in Table 5.5,, when the PT 
composite was added to the model, the change in the Adjusted R² value suggested that the 
variance was decreased by 0.42% when PT was accounted for (Adjusted R² = 0.1054, F (2, 
70) = 5.13, p = 0.008). Only the ST composite reached significance as an independent 
predictor. Therefore, only the Time 1 baseline ST score was significant in explaining the 
variance in the PB composite 6 months later. In summary, the participants with higher scores 
in social anxiety measures showed more persecutory interpretation (paranoia related 
interpretation) 6 months later. 
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B Beta t Sig. 
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.4091 0.1673 0.1553** <0.0001 ST 0.31 0.41 3.72 <0.001 
 Model 2 0.4224 0.1784 0.1542* 0.001 ST 0.40 0.52 3.24 0.002  
     PT -0.11 -0.15 -0.96 0.34 
Adding PT decreases the variance explained (∆R²= 0.0011)=-0.11%; 
Analysis 2 Model 3 0.2275 0.0518 0.0380 0.06 PT .016 0.23 1.94 0.06 
 Model 4 0.4224 0.1784 0.1542* 0.001 PT -0.11 -0.15 -0.96 0.34 
     ST 0.39 0.52 3.24 0.002 
The model was only significant when ST was added 
Analysis summary: variance in SBs were only explained by ST (15.53%) and ST & PT together (15.42) 
 
Note: n = 71; the dependent variable = Time 2 negative interpretation bias (SB); ST = Time 1 composite of social anxiety trait measures; PT = Time 1 
composite of paranoia trait measures; SB = Time 2 composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores; PB = Time 2 composite of 
persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
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B Beta t Sig. 
Analysis 1 Model 1 0.1924 0.0370 0.0231 0.108 PT 0.14 0.19 1.63 0.11 
 Model 2 0.3619 0.1310 0.1054 0.008 PT -0.10 -0.14 -0.82 0.41 
      ST 0.36 0.45 2.71 0.008 
The model was only significant when ST alone were entered  




0.003 ST 0.28 0.35 3.10 0.003 




0.008 ST 0.36 0.45 2.71 0.008 
      PT -0.10 -0.14 -0.82 0.41 
Adding PT decreases the variance explained (∆R²= -0.0042)=-0.42% 
Analysis summary: variance in PB were only explained by ST (10.96%), and ST & PT together (10.54%) 
 
Note: n = 71; the dependent variable = Time 2 persecutory interpretation bias (SB); ST = Time 1 composite of social anxiety trait measures; PT = Time 
1 composite of paranoia trait measures; SB = Time 2 composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias scores; PB = Time 2 composite of 
persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
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5.5 Discussion  
In this study, we proposed that specific emotion traits at a given time point predict 
corresponding interpretation bias scores at a later time point. Thus, we predicted that the 
trait social anxiety would carry more weight than the trait paranoia in the prediction of 
negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias. Conversely, we 
predicted that the trait paranoia would carry more weight than the trait social anxiety in the 
prediction of persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias. The discussion 
commences with a summary of the results presented in Table 5.6, and explanations for 
these results are then discussed. 
Table 5.6: Summary of the key findings 
Dependent 
variables 
Results Does the corresponding bias better 
explain the variance in the related 
(i.e. content matched) traits? 
Time 2 
SB 
Variance in SB is only explained by 





Variance in PB is only explained by 




Note: social anxiety content matches are shown in the grey row, and paranoid in the white 
row. ST = Time 1 composite of social anxiety trait measures; PT = Time 1 composite of 
paranoia trait measures; SB = Time 2 composite of negatively evaluated interpretation bias 
scores; PB = Time 2 composite of persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
 
In the test of negative evaluated interpretation bias (SB, representing social anxiety related 
meaning), we found that only the trait social anxiety explained the variance, while the trait 
paranoia (PT) contributed nothing to the model. Therefore, only the trait social anxiety 
significantly predicted a negative interpretation bias 6 months later, while the trait paranoia 
did not. This suggests that individuals with a higher severity of social anxiety at the first time 
point maintained a biased interpretation style in a negatively evaluative way 6 months later, 
while individuals with a higher severity of paranoia did not. 
In the test of persecutory interpretation bias (PB, represented paranoia related meaning), we 
also found that the trait social anxiety explained the variance, while the trait paranoia (PT) 
did not significantly contribute to the model. Therefore, only the trait social anxiety 
significantly predicted persecutory interpretation bias 6 months later, while the trait paranoia 
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did not. This suggests that individuals with a higher severity of social anxiety at the first time 
point developed a biased interpretation style in a persecutory 6 months later, while 
individuals with a higher severity of paranoia did not. 
5.5.1 Interpretations of the Results 
Hypothesis I was clearly supported, the trait social anxiety contributed more to the prediction 
of negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias than the trait 
paranoia, while Hypothesis II was not supported, as the trait social anxiety contributed more 
to the prediction of persecutory (paranoia congruent content) interpretation bias than the trait 
paranoia. 
These results support cognitive theories of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hirsch & 
Clark, 2004; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013) at a subclinical level. Socially anxious individuals 
engage in prolonged, negatively biased, post-event processing (Clark, 2001), whereby the 
post event-processing involves interpreting social information in a manner that tends to be 
recurrent and intrusive (Rachman et al., 2000). Furthermore, the results of the previous 
cross sectional study (Experiment 1) and this longitudinal study demonstrate that socially 
anxious individuals produce both a state and a persistent trait interpretation style for 
ambiguous socially information. Thus, when combined with the results of Experiment 3, 
which showed a significantly causal role of interpretation bias in social anxiety, this clearly 
suggests the reciprocal causality of the trait social anxiety in the corresponding interpretation 
bias. The results of this study are also consistent with the cognitive theory of emotional 
disorders. Mathews and MacLeod (1994) argued that emotions could be associated with 
effects that are relatively specific not only to certain types of cognitive processes for that 
information but also to particular cognitive content. Thus, individual differences in trait 
vulnerability to social anxiety or paranoia are associated with the content of interpretive 
information that are elicited by elevated levels of anxiety. 
5.5.2 Unexpected Finding and Possible Explanations  
The results in relation to hypothesis II are both interesting and meaningful, as the trait social 
anxiety contributed more to the prediction of persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias 6 months later, than the trait paranoia. This result is not consistent with 
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the most methodologically robust measure of interpretation bias from the cross sectional 
data of Experiment 1, where paranoia is more strongly associated with persecutory 
interpretation bias than negatively evaluated interpretation bias. Thus, paranoid individuals 
produce persecutory interpretation bias for ambiguous social information, although this 
interpretation style was not persistent. The rolling cycle proposed by cognitive theories has 
not been confirmed by the paranoia data.  
A similar finding regarding the contribution of the trait social anxiety was reported in a study 
with a 3-month interval (Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007). The severity of anxiety was 
found to be associated with high levels of persecutory delusion distress and with the 
persistence of delusions over three months. The notable contributions of the trait social 
anxiety in predicting persecutory interpretation bias, to a certain extent support the cognitive 
model of persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002), where paranoia is one of the key 
components. It is suggested that a high severity of pre-existing anxiety together with social 
ambiguity is particularly significant to the cognitive component of paranoid individuals. For 
instance, anxious feelings may provide the threat content integral to a persecutory belief; 
anxiety and worry processes may lead to paranoid thoughts becoming distressing; and 
anxiety related processes, such as worry and safety behaviours, are hypothesised to 
contribute to the persistence of delusional beliefs (Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007). Given 
the complex nature of psychosis and paranoia, Garety and Freeman (1999) have argued 
that only a multifactorial understanding of symptom development and maintenance may 
adequately reflect the phenomenon. 
5.5.3 Limitations and Implications  
Some limitations and implications for this longitudinal study were discussed in Experiment 3. 
For example, the subclinical sample and small sample size of this study (n = 71) limits the 
power of the results. We need to be cautious in reaching a conclusion concerning the 
significant impact of trait emotions in the prediction model, and the study needs to be 
replicated with a larger sample and in a clinical population. It was impossible to maintain a 
constant time interval between the Time 1 baseline measurements and the Time 2 follow-up, 
and six months was not an exact planned interval; whether this affected our results is 
unclear. In addition, the lack of a contribution due to the trait paranoia to persistent 
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persecutory interpretation bias calls for further investigations to assess the extent that the 
trait paranoia produces persecutory cognition. The design of our study only allowed a six 
month interval, thus we know nothing about the dynamic changes of the relationship 
between the trait paranoia and the persecutory interpretation style.  
The findings of our results are based on a subclinical population, and we do not know if the 
absent influence of the trait social anxiety on persecutory interpretation bias applies to the 
cognitive mechanism of clinically paranoid symptoms. Thus, replicating the study in a clinical 
population is suggested to test the effect of a clinical level of paranoia in the maintenance of 
persecutory interpretation style. Furthermore, our findings are based only on the focus of 
biased interpretation, and a future study could expand the test to other information 
processes, such as attention and memory. Although the findings from subclinical data limit 
the clinical implications of this study, the significant contribution of social anxiety and absent 
contribution of paranoia in the maintenance of persecutory interpretation style benefits the 
clinical prospective, as it highlights directions for applying interventions designed for social 
anxiety to induce paranoia related cognitive bias. 
5.6 Conclusions  
This study has demonstrated the reciprocal causality of the trait emotion (social anxiety/ 
paranoia) in corresponding interpretation bias. We found a reciprocal causality of the trait 
social anxiety in corresponding negatively evaluative interpretation bias, while there was an 
absent contribution of the trait paranoia to persecutory interpretation bias, which was instead 
due to the trait social anxiety. These findings confirm the vicious circle proposed by cognitive 
theories of social anxiety, and offer insight into the relationship between paranoia and 
persecutory interpretation bias. Theoretical accounts of cognitive processes in paranoia 
could be refined and revised in light of this empirical finding obtained from a study with a 
longitudinal design. The absence of the trait paranoia in maintaining persecutory 
interpretation bias should be reassessed in a clinical sample to improve the clinical 
implications. Future studies may also extend the current investigation to other cognitive 
processes in order to assess the reciprocal relationships between emotions and cognitive 
processes. 
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Chapter 6 Experiment 5 Specificity of Interpretation Bias in 
Clinical Disorders: Social Phobia versus Paranoid 
Psychosis  
6.1 Experiment Overview 
Our findings across a subclinical population consistently confirmed cognitive specificity 
(specific type of interpretation bias associated with the matching psychopathological trait), 
and cognitive vulnerability (specific interpretation bias precedes development of 
corresponding emotional traits) in social anxiety and paranoia. The longitudinal data 
(Experiment 3) also suggested the causal effect of the persecutory interpretation bias is 
especially pronounced when participants also display a severe negative interpretation bias. 
However, both our findings and reports in the literature have relied heavily on experimental 
work from subclinical samples, and it is unknown whether the same cognitive pattern can be 
generalised from these subclinical samples to the clinical situation. For example, a recent 
study by Yiend et al. (2015) found that general anxiety disorder patients showed a pattern of 
attentional biases opposite to those observed using similar methods in subclinical samples. 
This challenges current assumptions that studies in subclinical analogue samples can be 
generalised to the corresponding clinical disorder. Therefore, it is important to establish 
whether the results for the subclinically socially anxious groups and paranoid group can be 
generalised to the corresponding clinical groups. This is also crucial in enabling the 
identification of appropriate cognitive mechanisms to target in the treatment of general 
anxiety disorder and psychosis, as biases in different components of interpretation orienting 
could have different clinical implications. Using a group comparison design within three 
clinical samples (SAD, paranoid psychosis, non-paranoid psychosis) and healthy controls, 
this study was conducted to determine whether the content specific pattern previously found 
via correlational data within a wider population range remains valid when compared to each 
diagnosed patient group directly. Furthermore, we included a non-paranoid psychosis group 
in this experiment to further investigate if this specificity would be less apparent in patients 
with fewer paranoid symptoms (‘non-paranoid’ group) compared to those with more paranoid 
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symptoms (‘paranoid’ group).  Four out of six trait measurements from previous experiments 
have been selected to target the current clinical sample. The same cognitive tasks from the 
longitudinal experiment were adopted in order to maintain the consistency of the tested 
interpretation bias. Mixed ANOVA analyses were used to examine whether the symptom 
characteristics of paranoid psychosis and social phobia can be distinguished via the 
interpretation of emotionally ambiguous information, and the same between paranoid and 
non-paranoid psychosis. 
6.2 Background 
Clinical symptoms of social phobia are a significant comorbidity during first-episode 
psychosis, with a co-morbid diagnosis present in 36% of psychosis outpatients (Michail & 
Birchwood, 2009; Pallanti, Quercioli & Hollander, 2004). This is one of the core components 
of psychosis syndrome, and develops in line with positive and negative symptoms 
(Birchwood & Trower, 2006). Some studies found social anxiety to be a pre-morbid and 
vulnerability indicator for psychosis (Johnstone, 2005; Owens, Asmundson, Hadjistavro- 
Poulos & Owens, 2004), while others have argued it emerges as a psychological reaction 
during recovery from psychosis (van der Gaag, Hageman & Birchwood, 2003). A framework 
for understanding social anxiety in psychosis has revealed links between cognitive 
vulnerability and psychosis symptoms, whereby individuals with psychosis experience a 
heightened awareness of their diagnoses (Birchwood et al., 2000). These people feel at risk 
of being either passively avoided (e.g. being ignored) or actively rejected (Gilbert, Boxall, 
Cheung & Irons, 2005), which may alert them to their vulnerability, their lack in social 
competitions (e.g. attractiveness to others, acceptance in social groups), and lead them to 
further evolve various threat-defence emotion (e.g. fear of developing intimate relationships) 
and strategies (e.g. avoiding social contact) (Brown, Harris & Hepworth, 1995). These social 
anxiety-based beliefs are magnified in people with psychosis due to the issue of cognitive 
vulnerability (Gilbert & Trower, 2001). Both socially anxious individuals and those with 
psychosis fear and avoid social contacts (Steel et al., 2010); however, the content they are 
concerned about is not shared. A socially anxious individual will centre around a theme in 
terms of their negative beliefs of being negatively evaluated by others (Foa, Franklin, Perry & 
Herbert, 1996), whereas a paranoid individual will centre on the theme via persecutory 
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beliefs, that overestimate both the intensity and probability of the anticipated harm in social 
contact (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). Both groups tend to 
interpret social content in a way that favours their biased beliefs. This reveals the central 
component of the modern cognitive theory of psychopathology, in which cognitive content is 
suggested as a vulnerability factor that links specifically with different psychological 
disorders (Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson & Riskind, 1987). However, those with 
psychological disorders reveal specific interpretation biases that correspond to their 
disorders (Woud, Zhang, Becker, McNally & Margraf, 2014).  
Most literature on interpretation bias in clinical populations focuses on social phobia. We 
conducted a structured literature search of articles listed in PubMed (NLM), PsycARTICLES 
(Ovid), PsycINFO (Ovid), and ScienceDirect Journals (Elsevier) published between 1st 
January 1990 and 1st April 2017. We searched for the terms (interpretation OR interpretation 
bias) AND (social phobia OR social anxiety OR social anxiety disorder) in April 2017. The 
titles and abstracts of the corresponding articles were examined for relevance, and our 
search strategy identified 58 publications. Duplicates were removed, and the abstracts from 
the remaining 39 publications were screened. Qualitative studies, review articles, 
dissertation abstracts, case studies, and non-English articles (N = 15) were all excluded. The 
remaining 24 articles were selected for further screening, and we further articles were 
excluded for the following reasons: (a) a study did not assess clinically-diagnosed target 
groups (e.g. existing patients of SAD or patients assessed through clinical interview); (b) 
studies with a non-adult population; (c) studies not designed to specifically investigate the 
effect of interpretation bias on target groups, or vice versa; and (e) studies which 
investigated the effects of interpretations that are likely to target different mechanisms (e.g. 
interpretation of self-body image). After applying these exclusions, 17 studies satisfied the 
inclusion criteria. 
Research to date has generated a considerable body of evidence for the role of biased 
interpretation in maintaining social phobia. One mostly consistent conclusion was that 
individuals with social phobia tend to display content specific (negative) biases in their 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios (Amin, Foa & Coles, 1998 & Coles, 1998; Amir, 
Prouvost & Kuckertz, 2012 2012; Stopa & Clark, 2000) and ambiguous emotional facial 
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expressions (Garner, Baldwin, Bradley & Mogg, 2009; Maoz et al., 2016) when various 
alternative interpretations were provided, which means that they may lack the ability to learn 
non-threat (or positive) interpretations of ambiguous scenarios (e.g. Beard & Przeworski, 
2005). Not exclusive to ambiguous information, Voncken, Bogels, and de Vries (2003) 
demonstrated same content specific interpretation also occurred in positive and negative 
social scenarios, in which developmental experiences were found to influence how these 
individuals biased their interpretations (Taylor & Alden, 2005). However, findings against 
these conclusions are also present, for example Hirsch and Mathews (2000) were unable to 
identify biases in GSPs towards negative interpretations, while a study by Jusyte and 
Schonenberg (2014) did not indicate that social phobia is associated with a biased 
interpretation of ambiguous facial expressions. Nevertheless, most literature to date provides 
conclusive evidence for a content specific (e.g. social threat versus non-social threat) 
interpretation within social phobia, and lays the ground work for targeting this specific bias 
using established CBM techniques (Penton-Voak et al., 2013); Stoddard et al., 2016). For 
example, a recent RCT study by Amir and Taylor (2012) revealed initial support for the 
efficacy of interpretation training procedures by significantly decreased threat interpretations 
and increased benign interpretations in individuals diagnosed with social phobia, which was 
later confirmed by Brettschneider, Neumann, Berger, Renneberg, and Boettcher (2015). 
Their results promised a beneficial effect of the interpretation bias modification for social 
phobia patients, and the programme proved to be feasible and acceptable.  
A much smaller body of work on psychosis provides tentative evidence of interpretation bias 
of ambiguous information. A consensus appears to not yet have been reached regarding the 
language used for interpretation bias within psychosis studies, leading to the disparate use 
of terms, such as jumping to conclusion data-gathering/reasoning bias (Startup, Freeman & 
Garety, 2007 2008), and attribution bias (An et al., 2010). We have attempted to capture the 
many ways the term has been applied, and via structured review, the titles and abstracts of 
the corresponding articles were examined for relevance. Relevant articles were identified 
through literature searches of PubMed (NLM), PsycARTICLES (Ovid), PsycINFO (Ovid), and 
ScienceDirect Journals (Elsevier) for article published between 1st January 1990 and 1st 
April, 2017, using the keywords: (interpretation OR interpretation bias OR jumping to 
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conclusion OR attribution) AND (psychosis OR paranoid psychosis OR schizophrenia OR 
paranoid schizophrenia OR persecutory delusion OR paranoid delusion OR auditory 
hallucinations) in April 2017. Our search strategy identified 72 publications, and after 
removing duplicates the abstracts from the remaining 59 publications were screened. 
Qualitative studies, review articles, dissertation abstracts, case studies, and non-English 
articles (N = 15) were excluded. The remaining 40 articles were selected for further 
screening, and articles were excluded for the following reasons: (a) a study did not assess 
clinically-diagnosed target groups (e.g. existing patients of psychosis or patients assessed 
through clinical interview); (b) studies on non-adult populations; (c) studies not designed to 
specifically investigate the effect of interpretation bias on target groups, or vice versa; and 
(e) studies which investigated the effects of interpretations that are likely to target different 
mechanisms After applying these exclusions 15 studies were found to satisfy the inclusion 
criteria. 
Relevant research to date has primarily focused on patients’ interpretation of abnormal 
experiences and associated emotions, and discussions of interpretation in psychosis have 
largely been developed from the clinical literature. The results suggest that individuals with 
psychosis reported more auditory hallucinations (Morrison & Baker, 2000), as well as more 
negative interpretations of their abnormal experiences than non-patient controls (Morrison, 
Nothard, Bowe & Wells, 2004). These negative interpretations were associated with 
perceived distress (Vaughan & Fowler, 2004); however, this may not alter even as the 
frequency and severity of abnormal experiences decreases (Csipke & Kinderman, 2006). 
There were also positive interpretations of abnormal experiences in response to auditory 
hallucinations (e.g. Hayward & Drinnan, 2009), for example patients may feel they are 
accompanied by the voices they hear (Jenner, Rutten, Beuckens, Boonstra & Sytema, 
2008). However, it is clear that negative interpretations elicit fear and resistance to abnormal 
experiences and are thus appropriate targets for intervention.  
Further to the clinical literature there are emerging reports of experimental research adapting 
cognitive experimental methods from affective disorders which are advancing our 
understanding of interpretation processes within psychosis. One key finding to emerge is 
that individuals with psychosis appear to make decisions on the basis of less evidence than 
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healthy people (Dudley, Taylor, Wickham & Hutton, 2016; So, Siu, Wong, Chan & Garety, 
2016), and are less able to integrate disconfirming evidence (Eisenacher et al., 2016; 
Juarez-Ramos et al., 2014). This interpretation style has been referred to as the jumping to 
conclusion bias (Ellett, Freeman & Garety, 2008 2008; Garety et al., 2005; Startup et al., 
2007 2008) and has been most commonly tested using a beads task (Garety & Freeman, 
1999), in which participants are asked to decide from which jar beads are being drawn. 
Making a decision on the basis of far fewer beads is usually taken to indicate the presence 
of a marked jumping to conclusion bias. However, this probabilistic reasoning beads task 
was not designed to determine the content of interpretation and whether it is specific to 
people with psychosis. One other key finding of interpretation style in individuals with 
psychosis is concerned with the causal interpretations that individuals give for their own 
behaviour and the behaviour of others, namely attribution bias (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). 
These studies suggest that paranoid patients tend to show a defensive attributional model of 
persecutory delusions, and choose external attributions that locate blame to other individuals 
(e.g. (Kinderman & Bentall, 2000; Pinkham, Harvey & Penn, 2016)). This bias appears only 
in patients and not healthy individuals (Janssen et al., 2006), and may have evolved prior to 
the onset of psychosis (An et al., 2010). However, this concept goes beyond what 
interpretation bias is concerned about, as it focuses on the casual directions of existing 
positive or negative interpretations, rather than the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information.  
Another group of research studies on paranoid psychosis concerned with interpretation bias 
have tested interpretations of photographs of people’s faces (e.g. positive/negative/neutral 
facial expressions) and paired verbal messages (e.g.  You are so much fun - positive,  You 
are disgusting - negative,  Where is the Opera House? - neutral). The findings suggest in 
paranoid psychosis a way of interpreting communications with negative verbal content (e.g. 
Penn et al., 2000), when compared to depression patients and healthy controls (Davis & 
Stewart, 2001). However, whether this interpretation style is specific to paranoid psychosis is 
not yet clear. A recent study by Savulich, Freeman, Shergill and Yiend (2015) has addressed 
questions of content-specificity further through an experimental study of subclinical paranoid 
individuals. They found that high paranoid participants were negatively biased in their 
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interpretations of ambiguous information when compared to low paranoid participants, and 
this effect was most pronounced for information directly related to paranoid concerns. 
However, the results from a subclinical sample limit the implication for clinical pathology, and 
interpretation biases need to be tested across disorders in order to clarify the content-
specificity.  
Research on interpretation bias across disorders generally proposes that different types of 
interpretation bias may be specific to each individual disorder, and concerns have been 
raised as to whether biased interpretations of social information represent a feature of 
general psychopathology. Wilson and Rapee (2005) compared individuals with social phobia 
and comorbid depression, and individuals with social phobia alone to elucidate the specific 
types of consequences that people with social phobia attach to negative social scenarios. 
They found depressive symptoms in socially anxious individuals increased interpretation 
biases in negative social situations. However, the results from this group setting were not 
able to ascertain if differences in the interpretation were primarily due to social anxiety, 
depression, or both; therefore, no content specific conclusions could be drawn. To test the 
content specificity of interpretation bias Voncken, Bogels, and Peeters (2007) used the 
Interpretation and Judgmental Questionnaire (IJQ) (Voncken et al., 2003) to assess 
interpretation bias (using open-ended responses and forced-interpretations) in both social 
and non-social situations with a social phobia comorbid group, depression group and 
controls. The IJQ allowed participants to rank interpretations of hypothetic scenarios from 
negative to positive, and the results suggested that content-specific biases for social 
situations distinguished social phobic patients from depression patients. Social phobia was 
related to biases specifically related to social situations but not for non-social situations, 
while depressive symptoms were related to general biases, and were present in both social 
and non-social situations. However, the social phobia group in this study had no formal DSM 
IV diagnosis, which limited the validity of these findings in generating clinical implications. In 
addition, the lack of a comparison with a general anxiety disorder group limited the 
conclusions regarding the content specificity of this study, as we do not know if social 
content specific concern was exclusive to social phobic patients or to patients with general 
anxiety disorders. Laposa, Cassin, and Rector (2010) extended this design by including 
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groups of clinical patients with social phobia, general anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. The results indicated that individuals with social phobia 
generated more negative interpretations than those with other disorders, which suggests that 
negative interpretations of positive events is a distinct and characteristic feature of social 
phobia. However, the small sample size limits the power of the results, and including only 
positive social events without neutral or ambiguous stimuli when testing interpretation bias 
may imply comorbidity with cognitive factors, such as perfectionism, rather than social 
phobia itself.  
The findings discussed above support the argument that interpretation bias plays an 
important role in the maintenance of social phobia and psychosis. However, to the best of 
our knowledge no literature to date has targeted interpretation bias related to content 
specificity in social phobia versus paranoid psychosis. Reviews of other studies reveal they 
have yet to adequately investigate whether content specific interpretation bias is represented 
in clinical social anxiety and psychosis groups, especially via a direct comparison of these 
groups. This highlights the need for further research using clinical samples, and raises the 
question of whether or not people with different diagnoses anticipate interpretation bias 
differently. The present study was designed to evaluate whether different clinical groups and 
healthy controls represent distinct interpretation bias that is specific to their symptoms. Three 
cognitive paradigms of Experiment 1: the SRT, the SST (Husstedt et al., 2002), and the 
WSAP, were used to test interpretation bias scores in four groups of participants: paranoid 
psychosis, non-paranoid psychosis, social phobia, and healthy controls. For example, 
participants with paranoid psychosis are expected to be more likely to interpret a stranger 
standing across the street as a stranger is stalking me than the other groups, while 
participants with social anxiety are expected to be more likely to interpret a stranger standing 
across the street as a stranger is laughing at me than the other groups. Group comparison 
analyses are used to address the following issues.  
Firstly, whether all the patient groups (see Table 6.1) are more biased in their interpretations 
of emotionally ambiguous information than the controls: 
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I. The paranoid patient group will show more persecutory interpretation bias than the 
healthy control group.  
II. The social phobia patient group will show more negative interpretation bias than the 
healthy control group.  
Secondly, whether there is content-specific interpretation of emotionally ambiguous 
information within the paranoid psychosis patient group and the social phobia patient group. 
Demonstrating content specificity, as defined in the previous literature, requires evidence of 
a stronger bias on matching content than non-matching content in the target group. This 
finding is taken as the necessary and sufficient condition to provide evidence of content 
specific biased processing.   
III. The paranoid psychosis patient group will show more persecutory bias than negative 
bias. 
IV. The social phobia patient group will show more negative bias than persecutory bias. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is whether interpretations of emotionally ambiguous 
information can distinguish different clinical groups through biases that match to their 
pathology. The presence of a comparator group, e.g. other patients in which the reverse 
pattern of content specificity is found (i.e. a double dissociation), enables even stronger 
evidence of the importance of content specific biased processing to be generated. However, 
it should be noted that the absence of a double dissociation would not normally be taken to 
imply the presence or absence of a content specific effect within a target group. 
Consequently,  two discrete but similar hypotheses have been developed as we have 
separated the content specific effects from the presence/absence of these effects in other 
groups as follows: 
V. The paranoid patient group will show more persecutory interpretation bias than the 
social anxiety patient group.  
VI. The paranoid patient group will show more persecutory interpretation bias than the 
non-paranoid patient group.  
VII. The social phobia group will show more negative interpretation bias than the 
paranoid patient group.  
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Experiment Design 
This experiment is based on a cross-sectional design. For the control group, prospective 
participants were screened by email/phone using a screening questionnaire with 
demographics questions to determine preliminary eligibility. Eligible participants were then 
invited to the IoPPN for the experimental session. Paranoid psychosis patients and non-
paranoid psychosis patients were interviewed by the PANSS at the beginning of the 
experiment session to confirm their eligibility, while social phobia patients were screened by 
phone using a screening questionnaire to determine their preliminary eligibility. Eligible 
participants were then invited to the session and interviewed by the SCID at the beginning of 
the experiment session to confirm their eligibility. Eligible patients were invited to continue 
the experiment session, and were asked to complete baseline measures, before three 
cognitive experimental tasks (SST, the Scrambled Sentences Task; SRT, the Similarity 
Rating Task and WSAP, the Word-Sentence Association Task). 
Power calculations were conducted using G*Power 3.0.8 (Faul et al., 2007). Data selected 
from Experiment 1 with two highly vulnerable groups for social anxiety and paranoia 
indicated that a minimum sample size of 20 per group would be required to detect a 
significant difference with an effect size of d=1.17 on the composites of social anxiety related 
interpretation bias between groups with 80% power (alpha level 0.05, 2 tailed test). 
Therefore, 25 participants were recruited for each group in case data from an individual 
subject cannot be used. 
6.3.2 Participants 
Four groups (n=102) of participants were included in the current experiment based on 
diagnostic screening: (1) individuals meeting criteria for paranoid psychosis according to 
DSM-IV (PA; n=25), response rate (completed experiment/confirmed appointment) 25/27 
(93.59%); (2) individuals meeting the criteria for non-paranoid psychosis according to 
DSM-IV (NPA; n= 23), response rate 23/29 (79.31%); (3) individuals meeting the criteria for 
current social phobia according to DSM-IV (SAD; n=25), response rate 25/107 (23.36%); 
and (4) healthy control group (HC; n=29) which did not meet any criteria of the DSM-IV 
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based on the SCID screening questionnaire, response rate 29/75 (38.67%). Participants 
were predominantly Caucasian (n=51), with the sample also consisting of Asian (n=10), 
Black/African/Caribbean (n = 36), and other (n =4) backgrounds. Ages ranged from 18 to 60 
years (M = 36.33, SD = 10.84).  
6.3.3 Recruitment 
The NHS Health Research Authority and Research Ethics Committee approved the study 
(REC reference: 14/LO/0772), and recruitment commenced in October 2014 and the study 
lasted approximately one year. All participants had to have normal, or corrected to normal 
vision, in order to perform the computer tasks, were fluent English speakers, and aged 
between 18 and 65. Recruitment of the four groups was approached differently according to 
established recruitment routes. The paranoid/non-paranoid psychosis patient sample was 
recruited from the South London and Maudsley Trust, including patients attending the 
Bethlem Psychosis clinic, under the care of consultant psychiatrist Dr Sukhwinder Shergill, 
the lead clinician at the clinic and collaborator on this project. A full time dedicated research 
nurse initially screened, recruited, and scheduled the participant of the psychosis patient 
sample. The doctoral candidate researcher then interviewed (with PANSS and demography 
questionnaire) and tested (baseline measures and tasks) the patients in dedicated lab space 
on the 6th floor of the Institute of Psychiatry. The social phobia patient sample was recruited 
from local GPs, Southdown Housing Association, and self-help groups, including Social 
Anxiety UK, SASH, and Anxiety UK. The doctoral candidate researcher (trained and 
approved by a dedicated psychologist) initially screened (via a screening questionnaire and 
demographics questionnaire), recruited, and scheduled the participants for the social phobia 
patient sample. The chief investigator then interviewed (using SCID) and tested (baseline 
measures and tasks) the patients in a dedicated lab space on the 6th floor of the Institute of 
Psychiatry and at the Southdown Housing Association. The healthy controls sample was 
recruited from KCL via internal circular emails and posters displayed on local public notice 
boards. The chief investigator initially screened (via the SCID screening questionnaire and a 
demographics questionnaire), recruited, and scheduled the participants for the healthy 
control sample. The chief investigator tested (baseline measures and tasks) the participants 
in a dedicated lab space on the 6th floor of the Institute of Psychiatry. The inclusion and 
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exclusion criteria are listed in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Paranoid psychosis (n=25)  
• current diagnosis of schizophrenia with 
significant symptoms of paranoia  
• symptomatically stable with mild to 
moderate positive symptoms 
• not currently in an acute psychotic 
state, and prescribed medication but 
without a change in dose in the last 3 
months 
• stable on medication for at least last 3 
months and expected to remain for 
study duration 
• having received a psychological 
intervention targeting cognitive biases 
within the last 3 months or currently 
receiving, or expected to receive during 
the study period 
• current significant psychiatric comorbidity 
including: social phobia, significant 
(current) use of alcohol or substances, 
bipolar affective disorder, depression, and 
personality disorder 
Non-Paranoid psychosis (n=23)  
• current diagnosis of schizophrenia but 
without significant symptoms of 
paranoia 
• symptomatically stable with mild to 
moderate positive symptoms 
• not currently in an acute psychotic 
state, and prescribed medication but 
without a change in dose in the last 3 
months 
• stable on medication for at least last 3 
months and expected to remain for 
study duration 
• having received a psychological 
intervention targeting cognitive biases 
within the last 3 months or currently 
receiving, or expected to receive during 
the study period 
• current significant psychiatric comorbidity 
including: social phobia, significant 
(current) use of alcohol or substances, 
bipolar affective disorder, depression, and 
personality disorder 
Social phobia (n=25)  
• stable on medication for at least last 3 
months and expected to remain for 
study duration 
• meeting criteria for current social 
phobia according to DSM-IV TR 
• having received a psychological 
intervention targeting cognitive biases 
within the last 3 months, or currently 
receiving, or expected to receive during 
the study period 
• current significant psychiatric comorbidity 
including: psychotic disorders, significant 
(current) use of alcohol or substances, 
bipolar affective disorder, and personality 
disorder 
Healthy control group (n=29)  
• screening negative for all axis 1 and 2 
disorders 
• previously diagnosed with psychological or 
psychiatric problem(s), or currently 
receiving treatment for psychological or 
psychiatric problem(s) 
• taking any psychological or psychiatric 
medication (this does not include 
medications for general health concerns). 
N.B. Paranoid/non-paranoid psychosis patients were screened via PANSS and 
demographics questionnaires; social phobia patients and healthy controls were screened via 
SCID and demographics questionnaires. 
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6.3.4 Materials 
6.3.4.1 Screening Questionnaires 
Healthy controls version 
A screening questionnaire was sent by email to each participant of the healthy control group 
at the recruitment stage to check their eligibility. Participants were asked to answer 
questions using YES or NO to indicate their personal information (e.g. are you currently 
diagnosed with social anxiety disorder/social phobia? Or have you ever been diagnosed in 
the past? ).  
Social phobia patients’ version 
A screening questionnaire was completed by phone for each participant of the social phobia 
group at the recruitment stage to check their eligibility. Participants were asked to answer 
questions using YES or NO to indicate their personal information (e.g. have you ever been 
diagnosed with any mental health problems?). Ethnicity categorisation was provided asked 
at the end of the screening questionnaire.  
6.3.4.2  Clinical interviews 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders, Research Version, Patient 
Edition (SCID-I/P) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 2002)  
This is a semi structured interview for making major DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses (e.g. SAD). 
The social phobia group were interviewed using the SCID at the beginning of the experiment 
session to confirm their eligibility. The SCID is broken down into separate modules allow an 
administrator to ‘skip’ the associated questions if not met. For all diagnoses symptoms are 
coded as 1 (absent), 2 (sub-threshold) or 3 (threshold). Questions may necessitate further 
exploration by the interviewer in order to score a particular item. If a threshold is reached on 
a sufficient number of items, that category of disorder is deemed to be present. The 
instrument demonstrates acceptable test–retest (k=0.68) and interrater reliability (k=0.71) 
and takes up to 1 hour to administer. This study adopted the research version non-patient 
edition of the SCID because this contains most of the information that is diagnostically useful 
to researchers, including disorders, subtypes, severity and course specifiers, and provisions 
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for coding the specific details of past mood episodes.  The SCID-I/P (Patient Edition) is 
designed for use with subjects who are identified as psychiatric patients; in this study 
identified as social phobia patients. 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay, Fiszbein & Opler, 1987)  
This is one of the most widely used measures of psychopathology of schizophrenia within 
clinical research. Since its development the PANSS has become a benchmark when 
screening and assessing change, in both clinical and research patients. It consists of a 
30-item scale which is used to evaluate the presence, absence and severity of positive, 
negative and general psychopathology symptoms of schizophrenia. The 30 items are 
arranged as seven positive symptom subscale items, seven negative symptom subscale 
items, and 16 general psychopathology symptom items. Each item has a definition and a 
basis for rating, and all 30 items are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = absent; 7 = extreme). The 
strengths of the PANSS include its structured interview, robust factor dimensions, reliability, 
the availability of detailed anchor points, and validity. It requires 45 to 50 minutes to 
administer  
The paranoid psychosis group and non-paranoid psychosis group were interviewed using 
the PANSS at the beginning of the experiment session. Both groups of psychosis patients 
were clinically diagnosed before being recruited to this study, although their PANSS scores 
were available in their medical history, our interview was to re-assure the presence and 
severity of paranoid symptoms, and group allocation. This study categorised the paranoid or 
non-paranoid psychosis patient groups based on P6 scores, the suspiciousness/persecution 
item of PANSS. This uses a scale of 1=absent, 2=minimal, may be at upper extreme of 
normal limits, and 3=mildly symptomatic, to measures unrealistic or exaggerated ideas of 
persecution. Scores for this study on item P6 ranged from 1 to 6 within the entire sample:  1 
(13.73%), 2 (12.75%), ,3 (8.82%), ,4 (4.9%), ,5 (3.92%), and 6 (2.94%). According to the 
definition employed by the PANSS (Kay et al., 1987),  that paranoid symptoms are present 
for scores of 3 or higher, and paranoid symptoms are absent or ‘normal’ for scores of 2 or 
lower,  patients scoring 3 or higher were allocated to the paranoid group, which included the 
entire range from mild (e.g. scoring 3) to severe paranoid (e.g. scoring 6) patients. Patients 
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scoring 2 or less were allocated to the non-paranoid group, which included patients with 
absent or normal paranoia. This group classification was consistent with that of a previous 
study (Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, in press) which investigated interpretation bias in same 
group setting. In this study we refer to the groups as ‘paranoid’ (rather than ‘high paranoid’) 
and ‘non-paranoid’, which most accurately reflects the actual distinction between the groups 
as currently defined, i.e. as paranoid symptoms present and paranoid symptoms absent or 
‘normal’ .  
6.3.4.3 Measurement of Emotional Trait 
We selected two social anxiety measures (Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SIAS; Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale, LSAS) and two paranoia measures (Green et al. Paranoid Thought 
Scales, GPTS; Peters Delusions Inventory, PDI) from the previous experiment, as these 
measures are the most sensitive for a clinical population, and are suitable in length for 
clinical patients. The three cognitive tasks testing interpretation bias were: the SST, SRT, 
WSAP (see section 2.3.3 for a detailed description) were adopted to enable results 
consistency. 
6.3.5 Procedure 
The clinical interviews for the patient groups lasted up to 1 hour, and the testing session 
lasted around one to one and half hours and varied across individuals. Thus, the whole 
experiment session lasted 2 to 2 and half hours for the three patient groups, and 1 to 1 and 
half hour for the healthy control group. All the participants were informed of the inclusion 
criteria again before starting the session. As shown in Figure 6.1, they were then asked to 
complete the consent form and the demographics questionnaire, followed by self-reported 
measures; this took approximately 20-30 minutes. Finally, to measure interpretation biases 
representing negative interpretation (social anxiety related) and persecutory interpretation 
(paranoia related), three cognitive experimental tasks were used, each containing two sets 
of materials reflecting both types of content. Two parallel versions of each task were 
developed and used in a counterbalanced order across the participants. All baseline 
measures were presented to participants ahead of the interpretation tasks. Self-reported 
measures and tasks were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed orders across 
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participants. A counterbalanced design reduces the chances of order effects which 
measure/task or other factors adversely influence the results. 
Figure 6.1: Experimental procedure 
 
Note: All measures were presented to participants ahead of the interpretation tasks. Self-
reported measures and tasks were presented in two counterbalanced, fixed orders across 
participants. PA= paranoid psychosis; NPA=non-paranoid psychosis; SA=social phobia; 
HC=healthy controls; SCID= The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Personality 
Disorders (SCID) (First et al., 2002); PANSS=The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987)); LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: Green et al. Paranoid 
Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 
1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence 
association paradigm (WSAP, based on (Beard & Amir, 2009). 
6.3.6 Design of Analysis 
This experiment used a cross-sectional design and four groups of participants were tested 
for emotional trait measures and cognitive tasks. Our key concerns when conducting the 
analyses included the group differences of participants’ ratings on three cognitive tasks 
measuring interpretation bias. 
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To form a rational approach, we firstly analysed the raw data task by task to determine the 
preliminary results of each pen and paper/ computer-based task. Next we calculated the 
composite scores based on the raw data to test our hypothesis more directly. The reason for 
using composite scores in this analysis is to achieve the clarity that analysis based on 
composite trait scores gives, and in addition composite bias scores are able to more 
obviously map our hypothesis. Composite scores provide convergent validity for the 
construct measured by including several measures of the same phenomenon and a mixed 
design ANOVA was therefore used to conduct the analysis. 
Figure 6.2: Diagram of analysis 
 
Note: SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 1991); SST: Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: The word-sentence 
association paradigm (WSAP, Based on Beard & Amir, 2010(Beard & Amir, 2009)); 
Contentrawscore=negative/persecutory rating score on interpretation bias; 
sentencetype=foil/target sentence in SRT; direction=benign/threat meaning of interpretation 
in SRT; contentbias=calculated negative/persecutory interpretation bias scores. 
Composite=mean of standardized bias scores of SRT, SST and WSAP; group= paranoid 
psychosis (PA), non-paranoid psychosis (NPA), social phobia (SAD), health control (HC). 
As shown in Figure 6.2, in order to conduct the task-by-task analysis different mixed design 
ANOVAs were performed using the ratings scores as within group variables, and group 
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(paranoid psychosis, non-paranoid psychosis, social phobia, healthy control) as the between 
group variable. A T-test was conducted following the ANOVA if there was a within group 
interaction; a paired-sample T-test was used to check bias differences within a group, and 
an independent-sample T-test was used to check group differences for specific biases. 
To test our hypothesis directly, composites were calculated for social anxiety/paranoia 
measures, and for social anxiety/paranoia related bias. We generated the composites by 
standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) participants’ scores for each measure and task, and then 
averaging across them separately. These represent the social anxiety trait, paranoia trait, 
social anxiety related interpretation bias, and paranoia related interpretation bias, separately. 
Using the composites we then undertook a two-way mixed design ANOVA followed by a T-
test for the analysis of within group interactions.   
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Participant Characteristics 
6.4.1.1 Data Cleaning 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure there were no violations of the assumptions 
of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. We have not filtered any scores from our data 
except the reaction time data of the WSAP. To remove the influence of spuriously long 
response times, data was excluded from trials with reaction times shorter than 50 ms or 
longer than 1500 ms. This time limitation was set following the design of original WSAP by 
Beard and Amir (2009); this resulted in the elimination of 4.38% of trials There were 57 
missing data points, which were treated by pairwise deletions. The inspection of missing 
data did not suggest any systematic problems with the measurement tools or methods, and 
missing data appeared to be randomly distributed. 
6.4.1.2 Bias Scores Calculation 
In order to compare the reaction times or rating indices with the self-reported indices, we 
calculated bias scores for the social scenario sentences. Bias scores from each task were 
calculated using the equations listed in Table 6.2. We calculated two bias scores for each 
task, which reflected the negatively evaluated biasand persecutory bias.  
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Table 6.2: Bias score equations 
Task 
name 
Bias score  Equations Range of values 
SST Negative bias Interpretation Bias = (Social anxiety 




Interpretation Bias = (Paranoia statements/All 
statements completed)*100 % 
0, 100 
SRT Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 





Interpretation Bias = Mean of ratings on all 
Target Paranoia  -Mean of ratings on all 
Target Benign 
-3, 3 
WSAP Negative bias Interpretation Bias = Reaction times (Social 





Interpretation Bias = reaction times (Paranoia 
meaning reject -Paranoia meaning endorse) 
-1500, 1500 
Note: negative bias represents social anxiety related interpretation; persecutory bias 
represents social anxiety related interpretation. 
 
6.4.1.3 Participant Characteristics 
Scores of 2 for the self-reported measures of LSAS and SIAS reflect the emotional traits of 
social anxiety, while scores of 2 for the self-reported measures of G-PTS and PDI  reflect the 
emotional traits of paranoia. Scores of 3 for the cognitive tasks WSAT, SST and SRT 
represent the interpretation bias in both reaction time self-rating conditions. Means and 
standard deviations for each measure are presented in Table 6.3.  
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N 25 23 25 29 
Age 43.12(7.98) 42.22(8.24) 31.49(10.28) 30.07(9.65) 
Gender (N) M=20 M=18 M=12 M=8 
 
F=5 F=5 F=13 F=21 
PANSS  83.60(16.82) 50.65 (10.96)   
PANSS P6  3.72 (1.28) 1.39 (0.50)   
GTPS 39.56(15.89) 27.68(9.86) 32.32(14.41) 20.69 (5.26) 
PDI Total 125.88(42.74) 44.47(24.10) 61.48(43.01) 29.66(34.92) 
SIAS 53.60(31.06) 44.78(25.71) 84.52(26.71) 27.83(16.74) 
LIAS 79.36(34.39) 53.11(17.97) 56.96(23.73) 39.31(9.20) 
Note: Mean values (std dev) presented, n=84. LSAS: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Liebowitz, 1987); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); GTPS: 
Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (Green et al., 2008); PDI: Peters Delusions Inventory 
(PDI; Peters et al., 1999). SRT: Similarity Ratings Task (SRT, Based on Eysenck et al. 
1991); SST: Scrambled Sentences Task (SST; Based on Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998); WSAP: 
The word-sentence association paradigm (WSAP, Based on Beard & Amir, 2010). 
6.4.2 Task by Task analysis 
Task by task analysis was conducted by comparing the four groups of participants on their 
scores for the three cognitive tasks.  Individual interpretation bias scores were analysed task 
by task using a mixed design ANOVA and a follow-up T-test in order to interpret significant 
interactions between groups, and to investigate group differences in participants’ 
interpretation bias. 
6.4.2.1 Similarity Rating Task  
Preliminary analysis with mean rating score of participants 
A four-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the mean similarity ratings, with factors 
Content (social anxiety, paranoia) x Sentence Type (target, foil) x Stimulus Direction 
(pathological congruent, benign) x Group (paranoid patient, non-paranoid patient, social 
phobia patient, control). This revealed a significant four-way interaction, F (3, 97) = 18.56, p< 
0.0001, partial ηp2 = 0.37, ε = 1 with main effects of Content, F (3, 97) = 12.17, p< 0.0001, 
ηp2 = 0.27, ε = 1 Sentence Type, F (1, 97) = 230.15, p < 0.0001, ηp2= 0.70, ε = 1 and 
Stimulus Direction, F (1,97) = 104.85, p < 0.0001, ηp2 = 0.52, ε = 1. The Sentence Type 
main effect reflected the endorsement of target sentences as more similar in meaning to the 
  218 
original passages than foil sentences (M = 2.26, SD = 0.49 vs. M = 1.78, SD = 47), as might 
be expected and is commonly found on this task. Mean participant ratings and standard 
deviations of each sentence type (targets and foils) for paranoia relevant and social anxiety 
relevant items are indicated in Table 6.4. 
To interpret this four-way interaction, follow up mixed ANOVAs (Sentence Type x Stimulus 
Direction x Group) were conducted for each type of content separately (paranoid, socially 
anxious). 
Paranoid content:  
For paranoid items the corresponding three-way interaction was significant, F (3,98) = 23.37, 
p < 0.0001, ηp2 = 0.42, ε = 1. To interpret this we conducted separate two-way ANOVAs 
(Stimulus Direction x Group) for each Sentence Type (target, foil) on paranoid items only, in 
line with previous studies (Yiend et al., 2011; Yiend et al., 2005; (Savulich et al., 2015)). 
These revealed a significant Stimulus Direction x Group interaction for paranoid targets, F 
(3,98) = 10.78, p < 0.0001, ηp2= 0.25, ε = 1, but not foils, F (3,98) =2.37, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.07, 
ε = 1. The pattern of results for paranoia relevant target items across groups is shown in 
Figure 6.3. Follow-up independent samples t-tests showed that paranoid groups made 
significantly more paranoid interpretations compared to controls  (paranoid vs. control, t (52) 
= 3.15, p = 0.003, d = 0.39, 95% CI, 0.14, 0.64, mean = 2.18, SD = 0.52 vs. mean = 1.78, 
SD = 0.39), while non-paranoid group (non-paranoid group vs. control, t (50) = 1.08, p = 
0.29, d = 0.15, 95% CI, -0.13, 0.44, ε = 1, mean = 1.94, SD = 0.62 vs. mean = 1.78, SD = 
0.39), and social anxiety group (social phobia group vs. control, t (52) = -1.53, p = 0.13, d = -
0.19, 95% CI, -0.43, 0.06, ε = 1, mean=1.59, SD= 0.51 vs. mean=1.78, SD= 0.39) did not. 
Patient groups did not significantly differ in non-paranoid interpretations compared to 
controls, (paranoid vs. control, t (52) = -1.82, p = 0.07, d = -0.27, 95% CI, -0.56, 0.03, ε = 1, 
mean = 2.59, SD = 0.56 vs. mean = 2.85, SD = 0.52; non-paranoid vs. control, t (50) = -3.55, 
p = 0.001, d = -0.52, 95% CI -0.81, -0.22, ε = 1, mean = 2.34, SD = 0.52 vs. mean = 2.86, 
SD = 0.52; social phobia vs. control, t (52) = -2.48, p = 0.02, d = -0.30, 95% CI -0.55, -0.05, ε 
= 1, mean = 2.55, SD= 0.34 vs. mean = 2.86, SD = 0.52). 
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Table 6.4: Mean similarity ratings for each sentence type on the Similarity Ratings task, bias scores of unscrambled sentences for each content type on the Scrambled 










Social anxiety Health controls 
SRT Paranoid  Targets Threatening 2.17(0.54) 1.94 (0.63) 1.60 (0.51) 1.78 (0.39) 
   Benign 2.57(0.46) 2.39 (0.63) 2.55 (0.34) 2.86 (0.52) 
  Foils Threatening 1.92 (0.55) 1.70 (0.68) 1.19 (0.20) 1.17 (0.19) 
   Benign 2.27 (0.58) 2.08 (0.68) 1.53 (0.35) 1.32 (0.29) 
 Socially anxious Targets Threatening 2.26 (0.42) 2.10 (0.46) 2.16 (0.52) 2.10 (0.45) 
   Benign 2.70 (0.44) 2.64 (0.56) 2.31 (0.44) 2.60 (0.45) 
  Foils Threatening 2.15 (0.54) 2.04 (0.51) 1.61 (0.44) 1.50 (0.35) 
   Benign 2.28 (0.54) 2.50 (0.66) 1.74 (0.38) 1.83 (0.46) 
SST Paranoid   33.96 (22.90) 28.78 (20.56) 39.22 (30.95) 19.69 (19.87) 
 Socially anxious   22.42 (24.07) 38.83 (26.12) 42.13 (22.95) 21.03 (13.57) 
WSAP Paranoid   9.31 (149.84) -1.88 (108.12) -39.94 (112.71) - 
       36.84 (116.26) 
 Socially anxious   23.49 (152.17) 7.47 (115.36) 27.65 (126.90) -8.90 (105.55) 
Composite Paranoid   0.31 (0.65) 0.21 (0.65) -0.04 (0.67) -0.39 (0.64) 
 Socially anxious   -0.12 (0.61) 0.15 (0.67) 0.33 (0.79) -0.24 (0.52) 
Note: paranoid content = items showing persecutory content that represented paranoia related meaning; socially anxious content = items showing negatively 
evaluative content that represented social anxiety related meaning; target sentence: with content, relevant to the previous passage; foil sentence: with 
content, irrelevant to the previous passage; Threatening direction: persecutory/ negatively evaluated interpretation; benign direction: neutral interpretation. 
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The paranoid patient group and non-paranoid patient group did not differ significantly from 
each other in their biased interpretations of paranoia relevant material (on paranoid 
sentences: paranoid vs non-paranoid patients t (46) = 1.43, p = 0.158, d = 0.24, 95% CI -
0.09, 0.57, mean = 2.17, SD = 0.10 vs. mean = 1.93, SD = 0.13); on non-paranoid 
sentences: paranoid vs non-paranoid patients t (46) = 1.59, p = 0.118, d = 0.25, 95% CI -
0.07, 0.56, mean = 2.59, SD = 0.56 vs. mean = 2.34, SD = 0.52).  
The paranoid patient group and social anxiety patient group differed significantly from each 
other in their biased interpretations of paranoid items: paranoid vs social phobia patients t 
(48) = 3.99, p = < 0.4 0001, d = 0.58, 95% CI 0.29, 0.87, mean = 2.18, SD = 0.52 vs. mean = 
1.59, SD = 0.51), but not on non-paranoid items: paranoid vs social phobia patients t(48) = 
0.28, p = 0.78, d = 0.04, 95% CI -0.23, 0.29, mean = 2.59, SD = 0.56 vs. mean = 2.56, SD = 
0.34).  
Figure 6.3: Patterns of interpretation bias on the Similarity Ratings task across groups 
 
Note: Higher ratings reflect more pathological interpretations; pattern of results for target 
material only. Mean similarity rating indicates relatedness between sentence and passage 
stimuli, which they can rate from 1, 2, 3, or 4 (1 = very different in meaning, 4 = very similar 
in meaning), and reflect the significant Stimulus Direction x Group interaction reported in the 
text. 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the findings from this task, reflecting the above two-way interaction (F = 
10.78, p < 0.0001), namely significant group differences in the specific interpretation of 
ambiguous material (i.e. target items) only when that material content permits interpretations 
relevant to persecutory thinking (i.e. paranoia relevant content only). These findings 
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supported hypotheses I and III by revealing a specific bias in the interpretation of ambiguity 
related to potentially paranoid content in paranoid patients. In contrast, hypothesis VI was 
not supported as the degree of content specificity did not differ significantly between 
paranoid and non-paranoid patient groups. 
Socially anxious content:  
For social anxiety items, the three-way interaction Sentence Type x Stimulus Direction x 
Group was not significant, F (3,98) = 1.67, p = 0.178, ηp2 = 0.05, ε = 1, while the Stimulus 
Direction x Group interaction was also not significant, F(3,98) = 1.73, p < 0.165, ηp2 = 0.05, 
ε = 1. Thus, hypotheses II and IV were not supported by the mean rating scores from 
participants, as the degree of content specificity did not differ significantly between the social 
phobia patient group and control group, social phobia patient group and paranoid patient 
group, social phobia patient group and non-paranoid patient group. 
In order to test if there was content-specific interpretation bias in paranoid patients and 
social phobia patients, we conducted paired-samples t-tests between the persecutory bias 
scores and negative bias scores for each concerned group separately (paranoid patient 
group, social phobia patient group). In the paranoid psychosis patient group, paired-sample 
t-tests showed there was no significantly difference between their bias scores when 
completing persecutory material and negative material. In the social phobia patient group, 
paired-sample t-tests showed that this group had significantly higher bias scores when 
completing negative material (mean = -0.14, SD = 0.85) than persecutory material (mean = -
0.96, SD = 0.52), t (25) = -5.57, p <0.0001). Thus, only hypothesis IV was supported, the 
social phobia patient group showed significant content-specific interpretation bias. 
6.4.2.2 Scrambled Sentence Task  
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the generated bias scores (bias scores 
calculated based on equation presented in Table 6.2), with Bias Content (negative, 
persecutory) x Group (paranoid patient, non-paranoid patient, social phobia patient, control). 
This revealed a significant two-way interaction, F (3, 97) = 3.18, p = 0.03, partial ηp2 = 0.09, 
ε = 1, with significant main effects of Bias Content, F (3, 97) = 5.34, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.14, ε 
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= 1. Mean participant bias scores and standard deviations for persecutory (paranoia 
relevant) and negative (social anxiety relevant) items are indicated in Table 6.4. 
To interpret this two-way interaction follow up independent samples t-tests were conducted 
for each type of bias content separately (persecutory, negative). 
Paranoid content:  
Follow-up independent sample t-tests showed that all patient groups had significantly higher 
persecutory bias scores compared to controls (paranoid vs. control, t (52) = 1.85, p = 0.07, d 
= 0.11.28, 95% CI, -0.97, 23.54, ε = 1; non-paranoid vs. control, t (50) = 2.36, p = 0.02, d = 
12.49, 95% CI, 1.87, 23.12, ε = 1; social phobia vs. control, t (52) = 2.79, p = 0.007, d = 
19.53, 95% CI, 5.52, 33.55, ε = 1). The two psychosis patient groups did not differ 
significantly from each other in their bias scores of persecutory material, t (46) = -0.19, p = 
0.85, d = -1.21, 95% CI 13.89, 11.47, ε = 1). Finally, the paranoid psychosis patient group 
and social phobia patient group also did not differ significantly from each other in their bias 
scores of persecutory material, t (48) = -1.04, p = 0.11, d = -0.8.25, 95% CI -24.24, 7.75, ε = 
1) 
Socially anxious content: 
Follow-up independent sample t-tests showed that the social phobia patient group had 
significantly higher negative bias scores compared to controls, (social phobia vs. control, t 
(52) = 4.18, p = < 0.0001, d = 21.09, 95% CI, 10.96, 31.23, ε = 1), while the psychosis 
groups and control group were not significantly different in their negative bias scores. The 
difference between the social phobia patient group and paranoid psychosis patient group in 
their bias scores of socially anxious material reached marginally significance, t (48) = -1.96, 
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Figure 6.4: Patterns of interpretation bias on the Scrambled Sentences task across groups  
 
Note: Increased value indicates more biases of interpretation. Interpretation bias scores of 
SST calculated based on the percentage of unscrambled sentences using equation in Table 
6.2, which represented negatively evaluative content (social anxiety related) and persecutory 
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Figure 6.4 illustrates the specific finding from the SST bias scores, reflecting the above two-way 
interaction (F (3, 97) = 3.18, p = 0.03), namely significant group differences in the specific interpretation 
of ambiguous material, only when that material permits interpretations relevant to symptom congruent 
thinking (i.e. persecutory content). These findings support hypothesis I by revealing a specific bias in 
the interpretation of ambiguity related to potentially paranoid content in paranoid patients when 
compared to the healthy control group, and supported hypotheses II and IV by revealing a specific bias 
in the interpretation of ambiguity related to potentially socially anxious content in social phobia patients. 
In contrast, hypothesis VI was not supported as the degree of content specificity did not differ 
significantly between the two psychosis patient groups. Hypothesis V was also not supported as the 
degree of content specificity related to potentially paranoid content did not differ significantly between 
the paranoid psychosis patient group and the social phobia patient group. 
In order to test if there was content-specific interpretation bias in paranoid patients and 
social phobia patients we conducted paired-sample t-tests between persecutory bias scores 
and negative bias scores for each group separately (paranoid patient group, social phobia 
patient group). In the paranoid psychosis patient group paired-sample t-tests showed that 
the group had significantly higher bias scores when completing persecutory material (mean 
= 33.96, SD = 22.89) than negative material (mean = 22.42, SD = 24.07), t (25) = -2.18, p = 
0.039). In the social phobia patient group paired-sample t-tests showed that the group did 
not differ in their bias scores when completing negative material and persecutory material. 
Thus, only hypothesis III was supported that the paranoid patient group showed a 
significantly content-specific interpretation bias. 
6.4.2.3 Word-Sentence Association Paradigm Task  
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted for the generated bias scores (calculated 
based on equation shown in Table 6.2), for Bias Content (negative, persecutory) x Group 
(paranoid patient, non-paranoid patient, social phobia patient, control). Mean participant 
scores and standard deviations of interpretation bias for negative and persecutory content 
are presented in Table 6.4. No significant main effect of group was observed, suggesting 
that bias scores of WSAP did not significantly differ between groups, while there was also no 
significant interaction of bias content.  
In order to test if there was content-specific interpretation bias in paranoid patients and 
social phobia patients we conducted paired-sample t-tests between persecutory bias scores 
and negative bias scores for each group separately (paranoid patient group, social phobia 
patient group). In the paranoid psychosis patient group paired-sample t-tests showed that 
there was no significant difference between their bias scores when completing persecutory 
material and negative material. In the social phobia patient group paired-sample t-tests 
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showed that the group had significantly higher bias scores when completing negative 
material (mean = 27.65, SD = 126.90) compared to persecutory material (mean = -39.94, SD 
= 112.71), t (24) = -2.71, p = 0.012). Thus, only hypothesis IV was supported that the social 
phobia patient group showed a significantly content-specific interpretation bias. 
6.4.3 Composite Bias Score Analysis 
Design of analysis and data preparation 
We calculated the composite scores based on the raw data to test our hypothesis directly. 
Composite interpretation bias scores were analysed using a two-way mixed design ANOVA 
and follow-up T-test (interpreting significant interactions between groups) to investigate the 
group differences in participants’ interpretation bias. 
Two composite scores represented the social anxiety related bias  and the paranoia related 
bias separately. We generated the composites by standardising (M = 0, SD = 1) participants’ 
scores for each measure and task, and then averaging across them separately. The social 
anxiety related bias scores from the SST, SRT and WSAP tasks were averaged to generate 
a composite score for displayed social anxiety related interpretation bias. The paranoia 
related bias scores from the SST, the SRT and the WSAP tasks were averaged to generate 
a composite score for displayed paranoia related interpretation bias (see calculation of bias 
scores presented in Table 6.2).  
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted on bias composites for Bias Content 
(negative, persecutory) x Group (paranoid patient, non-paranoid patient, social phobia 
patient, control). This revealed a significant two-way interaction, F (3, 98) = 5.87, p = 0.001, 
partial ηp2 = 0.152, ε = 1, with significant main effects of Bias Content, F (3, 98) = 4.62, p = 
0.005, ηp2 = 124, ε = 1. Mean participant bias composites and standard deviations for 
persecutory (paranoia relevant) and negative (social anxiety relevant) items are indicated in 
Table 6.4. To interpret this two-way interaction follow up independent sample t-tests were 
conducted for each type of bias content separately (persecutory, negative). 
Paranoid content:  
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Follow-up independent sample t-tests showed that all patient groups had significantly higher 
persecutory bias composites compared to controls (paranoid vs. control, t (52) = 4.04, p < 
0.0001, d = 0.71, 95% CI, .35, 1.07, ε = 1; non-paranoid vs. control, t (50) = 3.39, p = 0.001, 
d = 0.59, 95% CI, 0.24, 0.95, ε = 1; social phobia vs. control, t (52) = 1.93, p = 0.05, d = 0.34, 
95% CI, -.001, 0.70, ε = 1). The two psychosis patient groups did not differ significantly from 
each other in their bias composites of persecutory material, t (46) = 0.63, p = 0.54, d = 0.12, 
95% CI -0.26, 0.48, ε = 1). Finally, the paranoid psychosis patient group and social phobia 
patient group did differ significantly from each other in their bias composites of persecutory 
material, t (48) = 1.97, p = 0.05, d = 0.37, 95% CI -0.01, 0.75, ε = 1). 
Socially anxious content:  
Follow-up independent sample t-tests showed that the social phobia patient group had 
significantly higher negative bias composites compared to controls, t (52) = 3.18, p = 0.003, 
d = 0.57, 95% CI, 0.21, 0.93, ε = 1, while both psychosis groups were not significantly 
different in their negative bias composites compared to the control group. The social phobia 
patient group did not differ in persecutory bias composites compared to the paranoid 
psychosis patient group (social phobia vs. paranoid, t (48) = 1.83, p = 0.07, d = 0.36, 95% 
CI, -0.04, 0.76, ε = 1), and to the non-paranoid psychosis patient group (social phobia vs. 
non-paranoid, t (46) = 1.15, p = 0.26, d = 0.25, 95% CI, -0.19, 0.69, ε = 1).  
Figure 6.5: Patterns of interpretation bias on the composite bias scores across groups  
 
Note: Interpretation bias composite scores calculated based on raw bias score of the SRT, 
SST, and the WSAP, as referred back to Section 5.4.3, which represented negatively 
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evaluative content (social anxiety related) and persecutory content (paranoia related) 
separately.  
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the findings from the SST bias composites, reflecting the above two-
way interaction (F (3, 97) = 3.18, p = 0.03), namely, that significant group differences in the 
interpretation of ambiguous material were detected, which vary in strength and direction 
according to the match between the type of material and the primary symptoms involved in 
the psychopathology of each group. These findings support hypothesis I by revealing a 
specific bias in the interpretation of ambiguity related to potentially paranoid content in 
paranoid patients when compared to the healthy control group, and support hypothesis II by 
revealing a specific bias in the interpretation of ambiguity related to potentially socially 
anxious content in social phobia patients. In contrast, hypothesis VI was not supported as 
the degree of content specificity did not differ significantly between the two psychosis patient 
groups. Hypothesis VII was also not supported as the degree of content specificity did not 
significantly differ in negative content between the social phobia and paranoid psychosis 
patient groups. 
In order to test if there was content-specific interpretation bias in paranoid patients and 
social phobia patients we conducted paired-sample t-tests between persecutory bias 
composites and negative bias composites for each group separately (paranoid patient group, 
social phobia patient group). In the paranoid psychosis patient group paired-sample t-tests 
showed that the group had significantly higher bias composites when completing 
persecutory material (mean = 0.33, SD = 0.66) than negative material (mean = -0.04, SD = 
0.60), t (24) = 2.69, p = 0.013). In the social phobia patient group, paired-sample t-tests 
showed that the group had significantly higher bias composites when completing negative 
material (mean = 0.33, SD = 0.79) than persecutory material (mean = -0.04, SD = 0.67), t 
(24) = 3.06, p = 0.005). Thus hypotheses III and IV were supported as both paranoid 
psychosis patient groups and the social phobia patient group show content-specific 
interpretation bias in their symptom congruent material. 
6.5 Discussion  
This study has addressed three related questions and it tested the main hypothesis of this 
thesis, whether interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information can distinguish different 
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clinical groups via biases that match to their pathology. We expected that the paranoid 
patient group would show more persecutory interpretation bias than the social anxiety 
patient group, and the non-paranoid patient group, while the social phobia group would show 
more negative interpretation bias than the paranoid patient group. We also examined if all 
the patient groups would be more biased in their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous 
information than the controls. We expected that the paranoid patient group would show more 
persecutory interpretation bias than the healthy control group, while the social phobia patient 
group would show more negative interpretation bias than the healthy control group. Finally, 
we examined whether there is content-specific interpretation of emotionally ambiguous 
information in the paranoid psychosis patient group and the social phobia patient group. We 
expected that the social phobia patient group would show more negative bias than 
persecutory bias, while the paranoid psychosis patient group would show more persecutory 
bias than negative bias. Three experimental cognitive tasks reflecting the same cognitive 
process (interpretation of ambiguity) were analysed separately in order to address these 
three questions. Composite interpretation bias scores were created in line with previous 
experiments to address the same questions. This discussion deals with each question in 
turn, first providing a summary of the results in a tabulated form, then providing an 
interpretation, followed by explanations of unexpected findings, a discussion of the 
limitations, and the implications of the study.  
6.5.1 Summary and Interpretation of the Results 
A summary of the key findings is presented in Figure 6.5, and the results of the composite 
bias scores are the most compelling in this thesis. As explained previously, composites 
provide convergent validity for the construct measured by including several measures of the 
same phenomenon. The composite data showed that all patient groups were more biased in 
their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information than the controls. Two of the three 
tasks (SRT and SST) showed consistently that the paranoid psychosis patient group showed 
more persecutory interpretation bias than the healthy control group. One of the three tasks 
(SST) showed consistent results whereby the social phobia patient group showed more 
negative interpretation bias than the healthy control group. Thus, the results generally 
support hypothesis II. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies 
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comparing interpretation bias between patient groups and healthy controls (Voncken et al., 
2003 de Viries, 2003; Voncken et al., 2007 2007). 
Table 6.5: Summary of the key findings 



















































Paranoid    
Note: Social phobia patients group matches is shown on grey rows, and social phobia 
patients group is shown on white rows. SA = social phobia patients group; PA = paranoid 
psychosis patients group, NPA=non paranoid psychosis patient group 
In support of our second hypothesis, the results of the composite data clearly follow the 
proposed trend. More paranoid interpretation than socially anxious interpretation was found 
in the paranoid psychosis patient group, while more socially anxious interpretation than 
paranoid interpretation was found in the social phobia patient group. Furthermore, one of the 
three tasks showed consistent findings with the composite results of the paranoid psychosis 
patient group, and two of the three tasks showed consistent findings with the composite 
results of the social phobia patient group. Thus, hypothesis three on the content specificity of 
interpretation bias was firmly confirmed. However, the content specificity in paranoid 
interpretation was not supported by the comparison between the paranoid and non-paranoid 
psychosis patient groups, although there was a clear trend in all data which showed that the 
paranoid psychosis patient group scored higher than the non-paranoid patient group, but 
statistical significance was not reached. 
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The third question addresses the major concern of this thesis: whether interpretations of 
emotionally ambiguous information can distinguish between different clinical groups via 
biases that match to their pathology. Results from the paranoid content of interpretation bias 
were convincing, while the results from the socially anxious content of interpretation bias 
were less so. The most important composite data showed that the paranoid psychosis 
patient group had significantly higher scores for paranoid content than the social phobia 
patient group and controls, while the SR task yielded consistent results. However, the 
difference in socially anxious content between the social phobia patient group and the 
paranoid psychosis patient group was not significant, and reached only the marginal 
probability of 0.07, while one of the three tasks showed significant result that supported our 
first hypothesis. Thus, hypothesis I was firmly supported by the data on interpretation bias 
with paranoid content, which is in line with our findings from previous studies (Savulich et al., 
2015) in subclinical populations. It also supports the cognitive theory of paranoia (Freeman 
et al., 2002), which suggests a distinct cognitive bias in the understanding of paranoia and 
paranoid psychosis. Although there was less support for the interpretation of socially anxious 
content, the data showed a clear trend that social phobia patients had higher bias scores in 
interpreting socially anxious content than the paranoid psychosis patient group.  
6.5.2 Unexpected Findings and Possible Explanations  
Although the results were generally promising, there were a few inconsistent findings within 
each task analysis. The composite bias scores and SRT scores did not show a significant 
difference between the social phobia patient group and paranoid psychosis patient group in 
the socially anxious interpretation bias. There was also no significant difference between the 
paranoid and non-paranoid psychosis groups in the persecutory interpretation bias. 
However, the mean value of the bias scores from each group showed a clear trend that 
social phobia patients had higher bias scores when interpreting socially anxious content than 
the paranoid psychosis patient group. We therefore argue that the small sample size could 
be a reason for this unexpected finding.  
SST data was unable to reveal a significant difference in the interpretation of paranoid 
content between the paranoid psychosis patient group and the social phobia patient group. 
More interestingly, the mean figure showed a trend that the social phobia patient group had 
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higher scores than the paranoid psychosis patient group in paranoid content, which is 
opposite to that proposed. This resembles the findings from Experiment 3, where the effect 
of the persecutory interpretation bias in paranoia trait is especially pronounced when 
participants also display a strong negative interpretation bias. Thus, a similar investigation 
into the interactive effect of persecutory interpretation at the severe end of social anxiety is 
suggested for future research.  
Although conclusions about the content specificity of the current  data were mainly clear, a 
few task results did not show clear evidence of differences in interpretation bias according to 
content. The social phobia patient group did not demonstrate a statistical difference in 
interpretation bias according to content on the SST task, while the paranoid psychosis 
patient group did not present a statistical difference in interpretation bias according to the 
content for SRT and WSAP tasks. However, the mean trend showed notable differences 
between the content of interpretation bias, and followed the proposed trend that the social 
anxiety group showed more negatively evaluative interpretation bias than persecutory bias in 
the SST task, while the paranoia anxiety showed more persecutory interpretation bias than 
persecutory bias in the SRT task. We therefore argue that the small sample size could be a 
reason for this unexpected finding, and a future study with a larger sample size is 
recommended.  
Lastly, the WSAP task was not able to show any main effect and interaction effect during the 
group analysis, while a content-specific difference of interpretation bias was only found in the 
social anxiety group. One possible reason for the lack of a significant effect across these 
findings may be due to the insufficient power of the study sample. A future study could 
pursue the proposed questions with a more powerful design. Moreover, there was the 
possibility of a material effect, as the items developed to distinguish social anxiety and 
paranoia interpretation were less valid or sensitive in the WSAP task. However, the same 
strict rating and balancing of new materials across all tasks was employed, which minimised 
this possibility. A more plausible explanation of the insufficient findings of the WSAP task 
may be related to the nature of the parameter it tested. WSAP uses response latencies 
(making relatedness decisions for threat and benign interpretations) as a measurement of 
interpretation bias. Its reliability and validity has been questioned repeatedly in previous 
  232 
studies of social anxiety and non-social anxiety groups (Amir et al., 2012 2012; Beard & 
Amir, 2009). The social anxiety group was characterised by a larger bias score than the non-
social anxiety group, indicating more bias toward threat and away from benign interpretation 
(Beard & Amir, 2009). However, the present data enables us to argue that response 
latencies may not be a sufficient parameter to characterise the difference between the social 
anxiety group and the paranoid psychosis group. Response latencies data reflects the ease 
with which individuals accept or reject interpretations. Thus, another possibility is that our 
response latencies data may assess a different type of interpretation bias compared to the 
other two tasks employed in this study. 
6.5.3 Limitations 
There are limitations to this study. Firstly, only a few of the group analysis results showed 
the expected patterns on means plot with the absence of statistical significance, suggesting 
the possibility of the study sample having insufficient power. A future study may extend the 
findings via a more powerful design. Although the cognitive bias literature has not 
established a consistent pattern of gender differences in interpretation bias, this could be an 
important consideration for future research, particularly as psychosis is more prevalent in 
men (1.4:1; (Aleman, Hijman, de Haan & Kahn, 1999), while social phobia is more prevalent 
in woman (1.3:1; (McLean, Asnaani, Litz & Hofmann, 2011). Although we suspect a gender 
difference effect, this is not our primary research question, and this study did not study 
gender differences as an important effect. In addition, the sample size of this study was too 
small and imbalanced to allow this question to be meaningfully addressed. Secondly, 
although there were conclusive findings of interpretation differences between the groups, 
and group differences between interpretation content, there was no direct modification of 
interpretation, and whether interpretation bias is a cause or consequence of corresponding 
symptoms has yet to be investigated. This limited the ability to infer causal relationships 
between interpretation bias and the development of corresponding clinical symptoms. A 
future study could pursue this question with respect to the cognitive models of information 
processing bias in emotional disorders (Beck, 1971; Weintraub, Segal & Beck, 1974). 
Thirdly, response latency measured in the WSAP task may be a less sensitive parameter to 
detect interpretation differences between the social anxiety group and paranoia group. 
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However, this should be suggested with caution, as there are replicated findings which show 
interpretation differences between social anxiety and non-social anxiety group using 
response latency data from the WSAP task (Amir et al., 2012 2012; Beard & Amir, 2009).  
6.5.4 Implications  
Our experiment has both theoretical and practical implications. Findings from a clinical 
sample can be applied directly to the clinical understanding of social anxiety and paranoia. 
These are consistent with the existing knowledge of the content specific role of interpretation 
bias in the maintenance of clinical symptoms (Weintraub et al., 1974). Differences of 
interpretation bias can be distinguished by the related symptom characteristics, while 
differences in symptom characteristics can be distinguished by the related interpretation 
bias. For example, a vulnerable individual negatively interprets strangers whispering, 
indicating the presence of social anxiety traits/symptoms, and when an individual interprets 
the same information as having a harmful intention then this indicates the presence of 
paranoid traits/symptoms. Considering content differences in their biased interpretations 
could be important in gaining insight into the progression of their symptoms, and may 
warrant specific assessments of symptoms with pathology matched interpretation bias.   
The results of this study emphasise the importance of interpretation bias in cognitive bias 
modification (CBM). In targeting the core biased interpretation processes underlying 
symptoms, the CBM technique has focused on the potential to modify negative interpretation 
biases so that ambiguity is resolved more positively (Mathews and Macleod, 2000; 
(Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway & Cook, 2006). For example, studies have 
successfully demonstrated that a single session of CBM can have a significant impact on 
both interpretation bias and anxiety levels (Hays et al., 2010; (Salemink, van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2009). This study has extended the previous findings by demonstrating biased 
interpretation in psychosis, and how the biased interpretation of socially relevant information 
differs in the compared groups with relevant diagnoses. A more direct approach focusing on 
persecutory interpretation biases underlying the maintenance of paranoid psychosis could 
be considered in future CBM studies. 
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6.6 Conclusions  
This study has demonstrated whether different content of interpretation bias can distinguish 
social anxiety from paranoid psychosis. Overall, the results of the group comparison analysis 
generated consistent findings across the clinical and control groups. We found a content 
specific interpretation bias in both the social anxiety and paranoid psychosis groups. In 
addition, the expected group differences for each type of interpretation bias (socially anxious 
resolutions/paranoid resolutions) were confirmed. Differences of interpretation bias can be 
distinguished by the related symptom characteristics, while differences of symptom 
characteristics can be distinguished by the related interpretation bias. However, the WSAP 
was not able to show any valid results and there was also no significant difference between 
paranoid and non-paranoid psychosis groups in persecutory interpretation bias. However, 
the mean value of the bias scores from each group showed a clear trend, with  social phobia 
patients having higher bias scores in interpreting socially anxious content than the paranoid 
psychosis patient group. Future studies may strengthen the present findings by employing a 
more powerful design. The efficiency of using response latency (WSAP) to test interpretation 
differences between clinical groups is questionable and a future study could replicate the 
design to confirm the findings.  
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Chapter 7 General Discussion 
7.1 Brief Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate: (1) whether differences in trait/symptom 
characteristics can be distinguished by the related interpretation bias; and (2) the etiological 
role of interpretation bias in social anxiety and paranoia. To answer these questions 
Experiment 1 (n = 84) investigated whether the magnitude of matched interpretation bias is 
associated with social anxiety and paranoia. Experiment 2 (n = 80) extended Experiment 1 
by using a two alternative choice design in cognitive tasks to investigate the content 
specificity of interpretation bias in social anxiety and paranoia. Based on the promising 
findings from the cross-sectional data obtained from Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 (n = 
71) investigated whether specific interpretation bias precedes the development of 
corresponding emotional traits during a 6-month longitudinal study. By using a combination 
of existing and new data collected over a six month period, Experiment 4 tested the 
hypothesis of reciprocal causality: do traits contribute to the exacerbation of congruent 
biases in addition (Experiment 4) to biases maintaining traits (Experiment 3), such that a 
vicious cycle is established? Extending the findings from a subclinical population, 
Experiment 5 (n = 102) compared a group of social anxiety disorder patients and a group of 
psychosis patients to investigate whether differences in symptom characteristics can be 
distinguished by the related interpretation bias. The following section summarises the main 
findings of each of the experiments, and then discusses the theoretical and clinical 
implications. Finally, the strengths and limitations are discussed with suggestions for future 
research.    
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7.2 Main Findings 
Experiment 1: Investigation of interpretation bias in social anxiety and 
paranoia 
Experiment 1 examined if there were specific responses to interpretation bias which were 
dependent on trait characteristics. Evidence was found that matched biases were 
significantly associated with the severity of social anxiety and paranoia. Individuals were 
more severely vulnerable to social anxiety when they produced a negatively evaluated 
interpretation compared to a persecutory interpretation of socially ambiguous information 
during the cognitive tasks, while individuals were more severely vulnerable to paranoia when 
they produced a persecutory interpretation rather than a negatively evaluated interpretation. 
These results are consistent with previous literature which has looked at other traits 
associated with psychopathology, and established promising findings for developing the 
subsequent experiments presented in this thesis. With respect to the questions investigated 
in this thesis, this study also examined the opposing view of the first finding: whether specific 
vulnerability to trait characteristics is dependent on the content of biased interpretations. The 
negatively evaluated (social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias was found to be 
more strongly associated with social anxiety than the persecutory (paranoia congruent 
content) interpretation bias. Conversely, the persecutory (paranoia congruent content) 
interpretation bias was more strongly associated with paranoia than the negatively evaluated 
(social anxiety congruent content) interpretation bias. Although due to the cross-sectional 
design the results were limited in explaining the etiological importance of interpretation bias, 
this experiment established promising directions for later studies. 
Experiment 2: Content specificity of interpretation bias in social anxiety and 
paranoia 
Experiment 2 was an extension of Experiment 1 and altered the task design to directly 
contrast paranoid and socially anxious interpretations (rather than contrasting paranoid 
versus non-paranoid, and then separately, socially anxious versus non-socially anxious). In 
addition, this experiment used the image based Relatedness Judgment Task (RJT) instead 
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of the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP) from Experiment 1, in order to enrich 
the testing dimensions and seek evidence in another media context rather than text alone. 
The same analytical strategy was applied, which first examined if there were specific 
responses to interpretation bias dependent on the trait characteristics, and then tested the 
questions investigated in this thesis. Under the forced-choice experimental design, the 
results showed that there was a significant association between persecutory interpretation 
and its content-specific emotion (paranoia). This was consistent with the findings from 
Experiment 1, and enhances the content specificity findings by directly contrasting paranoid 
and socially anxious interpretations. It was suggested that individuals with high paranoia 
severity made more persecutory interpretations than negatively evaluated interpretations 
when these two alternative possible interpretations were presented simultaneously. 
However, the results were less conclusive and were not in line with Experiment 1 in the 
association between negative interpretation and its content-specific emotion (social anxiety). 
Individuals with high social anxiety severity made more persecutory interpretations than 
negative interpretations. In respect of the etiological questions investigated in this thesis, 
Experiment 2 found that both types (negatively evaluated and persecutory) of interpretation 
bias were significantly associated with social anxiety trait. This suggested that in the forced 
choice setting, individuals with high severity of trait anxiety were likely to adopt more 
severely threatening interpretations of ambiguous information, according to the hierarchy of 
paranoia proposed by Freeman and colleagues (2005). It was proposed that the severity of 
threatened harm increased from social anxiety worry, which is suggested as the most 
common type of suspiciousness, to severe harm and conspiracy, which is at the top of the 
hierarchy of paranoia. 
Experiment 3: The etiological role of interpretation bias in social anxiety and 
paranoia 
Experiment 3 extended the cross-sectional findings through a longitudinal design with a six 
month follow up to test the etiological role of interpretation bias in social anxiety and 
paranoia. Evidence of a predictive role of interpretation bias was found respectively in the 
two traits. When controlling for the effect of persecutory interpretation bias, there was a 
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content-specific temporally predictive role of negatively evaluative interpretation bias in the 
presence of social anxiety traits, while there was a temporally predictive role of persecutory 
interpretation in the presence of paranoia when controlling for the effect of negatively 
evaluated bias. Thus, individuals who showed negative interpretations were more likely to 
later display elevated trait social anxiety, while individuals who showed persecutory 
interpretations were more likely to report elevated trait paranoia 6 months later. Of particular 
interest was the interaction effect between negatively evaluative and persecutory 
interpretation bias, which showed that the effect of the persecutory interpretation bias was 
especially pronounced when participants also displayed a strong negative interpretation 
bias. This suggested that individuals who explained social ambiguity with persecutory 
intention (e.g. ‘people harm me’) were likely to suffer from higher paranoia 6 months later, 
and this was increased if they also assumed moderately (e.g. ‘people criticise me’) to 
extremely negative intentions (e.g. ‘people hate me’). 
Experiment 4: Testing reciprocal causality: do trait emotions maintain 
corresponding interpretation biases in social anxiety and paranoia?    
Experiment 4 extended Experiment 3 by using a combination of existing and new data 
collected over a six month period to test the hypothesis of reciprocal causality: do traits 
contribute to the exacerbation of congruent biases in addition (Experiment 4) to biases 
maintaining traits (Experiment 3), such that a vicious cycle is established? It was proposed 
that a specific trait emotion at one time point predicts an individual’s interpretation style six 
months later. The results suggested a reciprocal causality of trait social anxiety in 
corresponding negatively evaluative interpretation bias. However, there was no similar 
contribution of the trait paranoia to persecutory bias, and the trait social anxiety was instead 
the only significant contributor. These findings confirmed the vicious circle proposed by 
cognitive theories of social anxiety, and were in line with the cognitive model proposed by 
Freeman and colleagues (2002). They suggested a high severity of anxiety with social 
ambiguity should be given a central role in the model of paranoia. Levels of anxiety are high 
many years before the development of psychosis (Jones, Rodgers, Murray & Marmot, 1994) 
and significantly contribute to the cognitive component of paranoia. Future work should re-
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examine the role of the trait social anxiety and the trait paranoia in maintaining persecutory 
interpretation bias in a clinical sample to improve its generalisability in a clinical setting. 
Theoretical accounts of cognitive processes in paranoia may need to be refined and revised 
in the light of the above empirical findings.  
Experiment 5: Distinguishing clinical social anxiety from paranoia: roles of 
interpretation bias 
Experiment 5 extended the findings from the subclinical sample into a clinical population 
using a group comparison design. It first examined if all the patient groups would be more 
biased in their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information than the controls, if there 
is content-specific interpretation of emotionally ambiguous information in the paranoid 
psychosis patient group and social phobia patient group, and finally, the main hypothesis of 
this thesis, if interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information can distinguish different 
clinical groups by biases that match to their pathology, in other words  can a double 
dissociation be observed. The results showed that all the patient groups were more biased in 
their interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information than the controls, and the content 
specificity hypothesis was confirmed in social phobia patients and paranoid psychosis 
patients. More paranoid interpretations than socially anxious interpretations were found in 
paranoid psychosis patients, while more socially anxious interpretations than paranoid 
interpretations were found in social phobia patients. However, the double dissociation 
comparison between paranoid and non-paranoid psychosis patients showed no significant 
difference in persecutory interpretation bias.  
7.3 Theoretical and Clinical Implications  
Promising evidence was observed across the results presented in this thesis, which have 
significant theoretical and clinical implications. 
7.3.1 The Magnitude of Interpretation Bias is Associated with Trait Severity of Social 
Anxiety and Paranoia 
Beck’s cognitive theory (1971) of psychopathology posits that affective characteristics are 
determined by persistent cognitive patterns, and a specific affect is congruent with its 
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specific thought content (Beck, 1976). Thus, if an individual’s interpretation of a situation has 
an unpleasant content, then they will experience a corresponding unpleasant affective 
response. Based on this notion, previous studies showed that there was characteristic 
negative bias within different affective disorders (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & 
Beck, 1988; Clark & Wells, 1995; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998). For example, socially anxious patients were pre-occupied with fearful automatic 
thoughts about socially danger and risk (e.g. Stopa and Clark; 2000; Amir, Beard & Bower, 
2005; Wilson & Rapee, 2005). Cognitive behaviour therapy developed from this model thus 
focuses on the catastrophic misinterpretation of symptoms and the extinction of avoidance 
behaviour. More recently, studies of psychiatric disorders have also started to test and apply 
this notion, and it has been found that the misinterpretation of auditory hallucination as 
threatening can lead to distress (e.g. Morrison & Baker, 2000; Vaughan & Fowler, 2004), 
with this notion was being investigated in both psychiatric and psychotic disorders. Links 
between disorders have remained mainly on the epidemiological level (e.g. Martin & Penn, 
2001; Johns et al. 2004), or affective concerns (Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman & Garety, 
2000). A boundary has been established in between, and the highly comorbid nature of 
cognitive vulnerabilities has been neglected. Consequently, we do not know whether the 
content of interpretation bias differs depending on the severity of characteristic symptoms.   
Experiment 1 was the first to investigate the association between biased interpretations and 
trait characteristics involving both social anxiety and paranoia. As expected, severe trait 
characteristics were associated with catastrophic interpretation bias, which was significantly 
related with its content congruent trait severity. The results indicated an incremental linear 
pattern between interpretation bias and trait severity of social anxiety or paranoia. The more 
individuals exhibited negatively evaluated interpretation the more they were vulnerable to 
severe social anxiety, while the more individuals exhibited persecutory interpretation the 
more they were vulnerable to severe paranoia. Understanding this pattern is important for 
several reasons, the first being it will help further refine cognitive theories of social anxiety 
(Clark & Wells, 1995, Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Williams et al., 1988; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998) and paranoia (Bentall et al., 1994; Freeman et al., 2002). For example, 
the findings of Experiment 1 support these theories by confirming the assumption that an 
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incremental linear relationship exists between emotion traits and trait congruent 
interpretation bias. Experiment 2 further confirmed the assumption that each emotional 
disorder is associated with a specific biased cognitive pattern (Williams et al., 1988), and 
found that an interpretation bias (e.g. persecutory interpretation) is more strongly associated 
with one content matched emotion trait (e.g. paranoia) over another (e.g. social anxiety). 
Nevertheless, there are also findings which suggest a revision of the current theoretical 
assumption is required, as Experiment 4 only confirmed the assumption of a reciprocal 
relationship between emotion and cognition on the social anxiety side but not the paranoia 
side.  
The lack of contribution from the trait paranoia to persecutory interpretation calls for a 
revision of the existing theories. Investigating the relationship between the severity of 
emotion traits and interpretive bias is likely to be helpful in guiding existing and future 
interventions and therapies. For example, findings of the interaction effect of negatively 
evaluated interpretation and the linear pattern between persecutory interpretation and 
paranoia suggests that both negatively evaluative and persecutory interpretation biases 
might be targets for paranoia intervention, and the applicability of adopting the cognitive 
therapies of social anxiety symptoms for paranoia symptoms, as promoted by a recent 
research trend in this area (e.g. (Freeman, 2014 #1001); (Freeman, 2015 #1017). 
7.3.2 There is Content Specificity of Interpretation Bias in Content Congruent 
Emotion Traits 
It was hypothesised that there was a content-specific association between interpretation bias 
and its content-matched emotion traits. An individual’s trait characteristics might differ 
depending on the content of their interpretation styles (Williams et al., 1988; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998), and there is support for this from each experiment presented in this 
thesis to some extent. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the linear pattern of this 
relationship, and demonstrated a significant association between interpretation and its 
content-specific emotion trait (e.g. the negatively evaluated interpretation bias was more 
strongly associated with social anxiety than the persecutory interpretation bias, while the 
persecutory interpretation bias was more strongly associated with paranoia than the 
negatively evaluated interpretation bias). Experiment 2 extended this by altering the task 
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design to directly contrast paranoid and socially anxious interpretations (rather than 
contrasting paranoid versus non-paranoid, and separately socially anxious versus non-
socially anxious in Experiment 1) to achieve a direct test of content specificity. This 
demonstrated consistent results between persecutory interpretation and paranoia, whereby 
individuals with high paranoia severity made more persecutory interpretations than 
negatively evaluated interpretations when two alternative possible interpretations were 
presented simultaneously, and persecutory interpretations were weighted more than 
negatively evaluated interpretation in the linear pattern of the relationship with the trait 
paranoia. Furthermore, the same pattern was confirmed in the clinical setting of Experiment 
5, where more paranoid interpretation than socially anxious interpretation was found in the 
paranoid psychosis patient group, while the paranoid psychosis patient group had 
significantly higher scores in paranoid content than the social phobia patient group.  
However, the results of the longitudinal data from Experiments 3 and 4 are more complex. In 
the test of the causal role of interpretation bias in Experiment 3,  persecutory interpretation 
bias and negative evaluated interpretation bias explained the variance of the paranoia trait 
almost equally. In addition, it was suggested that the persecutory interpretation bias is 
especially pronounced when participants also display a moderately to extremely negative 
interpretation bias. This results support the existing hierarchical structure of paranoia 
(Freeman et al., 2005), whereby there is a continuous distribution of paranoia beliefs in the 
general population; however, they also implied a refining of this structure. The less plausible 
paranoid interpretation (in top hierarchy ‘people try to cause harm to me’) builds upon 
commoner, more plausible, socially anxious ones (in bottom hierarchy ‘people ignore/ 
criticise me’), and the existing interactions between these interpretation biases should be 
considered, as each level of bias in the hierarchy may not purely stand alone. In the test of 
the reciprocal causality of different traits (social anxiety versus paranoia) in persecutory 
interpretation, an absence of the proposed content-specific match was found, and the trait 
social anxiety contributed more to the prediction of the persecutory interpretation bias six 
months later. Although one may argue that the high severity of pre-existing anxiety together 
with social ambiguity is particular significant in the cognitive component of paranoid 
individuals (Freeman et al., 2002), given the complex nature of psychosis and paranoia 
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further investigation was suggested to re-assess this finding. Finally, the content specificity 
in paranoid interpretation was not supported in a comparison between the paranoid and non-
paranoid psychosis patient groups.  
There are much more solid results for the content-specific association between negatively 
evaluated interpretation bias and social anxiety. The findings from the cross-sectional data 
(Experiment 1), longitudinal data (Experiments 3 and 4), and clinical data (Experiment 5) all 
confirmed the proposed content specificity assumption. However, the results of Experiment 2 
were less conclusive and were not in line with the other findings.  
When participants were forced to make interpretations of socially ambiguous information 
between negatively evaluative and persecutory choices, individuals with high social anxiety 
severity were found to make more persecutory interpretations than negative interpretations. 
In respect of the etiological questions investigated in this thesis, both types (negatively 
evaluated and persecutory) of interpretation bias were found to be significantly associated 
with the social anxiety trait. These findings raised questions regarding whether there was 
also a quantitative difference between negatively evaluated interpretations and persecutory 
interpretations, in addition to the generally agreed qualitative differences (‘concerning 
negative evaluation’ versus ‘concerning harmful intention’). For example, the lower end of 
the persecutory interpretation bias indicated the most common type of suspiciousness with a 
social evaluative theme, such as fears of rejections (Freeman et al., 2005). As the severity of 
the threatened harm increased, the less common theme and more suspicious content was 
involved, such as severe harm, conspiracy (at the top of the hierarchy). The results thus 
suggested cognitive concerns for the comorbid symptom of social anxiety at the lower 
severity of paranoia symptoms.  
7.3.3 The Etiological Importance of Interpretation Bias in Social Anxiety and 
Paranoia 
Cognitive bias is thought to be an important etiological factor that contributes to the 
psychopathological understanding of affective disorders (Clark 2001). Specific cognitive 
content may precede the later development of corresponding disorders (Alford et al., 1995). 
A limited number of studies have investigated whether specific cognitive content (e.g. factors 
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that theoretically are related to cognitive vulnerability, such as negative interpretation, and 
persecutory) distinguish or predict the later development of the corresponding disorders 
(Rholes et al., 1985). Few have assessed interpretation bias as a cognitive vulnerability 
factor in distinguishing different emotional symptoms, even fewer have used a longitudinal 
setting to test the causal role of interpretation bias, and none have expanded their research 
to psychiatric disorders through comparisons with affective disorders, although socially 
anxiety is highly prevalent during the prodromal stage of psychosis (Freeman et al., 2005). 
Combining these notions, Experiment 3 is the first to investigate whether specific 
interpretation bias at a given point in time can predict one emotional trait severity over 
another within social anxiety and paranoia. As expected, social anxiety was predicted by 
negatively evaluative interpretation alone, thus individuals with severe negative interpretation 
bias were most likely to suffer from social anxiety six months later, while individuals with 
persecutory interpretation bias were not. Meanwhile, both interpretation contents predicted 
paranoia, although persecutory interpretation was weighted more than negatively evaluated 
interpretation in the prediction model. The effect of persecutory interpretation bias is 
especially pronounced when individuals also display a moderately to extremely negative 
interpretation bias. This suggested a more complex causality between the different types of 
interpretation bias and the paranoia trait, which is beyond the common psychopathology 
proposed by most cognitive theories (e.g. Williams et al., 1988). Given the complex nature of 
paranoia, the hierarchical structure of paranoia proposed by Freeman and colleagues (2005) 
explains the findings, as they argued that the anticipation of rejection is a prominent theme 
of paranoia that is shared with social anxiety. Anxiety-related beliefs play an important a role 
in the formation and maintenance of persecutory interpretation bias (P. A. Garety & Freeman, 
1999).  The degree to which individuals could control those beliefs distinguished them as 
experiencing persecutory delusions compared to the general population (D. Freeman, 
Garety & Phillips, 2000). However, caution needs to be taken when drawing the conclusion 
that there is a significant impact of negative interpretation in the prediction model, and the 
results need to be replicated in a larger sample and a clinical population. For example, a 
recent study of attention bias showed a pattern of biases opposite to that observed using 
similar methods in subclinical samples to date (Yiend et al., 2015). 
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When looking into the predictive role of each interpretation bias, persecutory interpretation 
predicted only paranoia severity and not social anxiety severity. This confirmed relevant 
cognitive theories in psychosis (Bentall et al., 1994; Freeman, Garety and colleagues, 2001), 
and suggested the content-specific role of persecutory interpretation bias in predicting 
paranoia severity. Although social anxiety and paranoia were highly comorbid and even 
shared some cognitive vulnerability, biased interpretation with persecutory content only 
pointed towards the later development of paranoia. Experiment 5 strengthened this finding in 
the clinical group comparisons, as persecutory interpretation bias was more common in the 
paranoid psychosis group rather than the social anxiety group and all other groups. Thus, 
persecutory interpretation bias may distinguish paranoia from social anxiety in the data 
presented in this thesis, and it was evidenced that there was an etiological role of 
persecutory interpretation bias in explaining paranoia and maybe even paranoid psychosis. 
The findings on negatively evaluative interpretation were much more complex, as there was 
an interaction effect between negatively evaluative interpretation and persecutory 
interpretation bias in the prediction of paranoia. Interpretations could be categorised into 
three magnitudes: mild negativity, moderate negativity, and extreme negativity, and it was 
found that the greatest positive impact of persecutory interpretation was on paranoia traits 
when participants showed extremely negative interpretation. Thus the extent to which 
paranoia severity predicted persecutory interpretation bias depended on the magnitude of 
co-occurring negative interpretation bias. This pattern was consistent with Freeman and 
colleagues’ (2005) hierarchical structure of paranoia, where the distribution of paranoia 
beliefs in the general population is continuous from mild to severe by socially related 
concerns. Furthermore, it clarified how negative social concerns interacted with persecutory 
beliefs, and contributed to the formation of paranoia. For example, it was found that: (1) 
persecutory thoughts were not absent from the mild level of paranoia; and (2) persecutory 
beliefs have the greatest causal impact on paranoia, when there was an also catastrophic 
negatively evaluative concern applied. No theoretical or empirical support can be identified 
for this last finding. One implied explanation could be that the far end of mild negativity was 
unlimited and close to the neutral/positive interpretation in the continuous distribution of 
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paranoia beliefs. Thus the nearer one’s socially negative concerns are to neutral, the less 
likely one’s persecutory beliefs may lead to a stable paranoia trait. 
7.3.4 Clinical Relevance of the Findings 
Higher levels of comorbid mood disorders may hinder progress during treatment for 
psychosis, thus the identified cognitive factors differentiating paranoid psychosis from social 
phobia are clinically important. The identification of cognitive vulnerability facilitates the 
prediction of potential mental health disorders (e.g. Garety & Freeman, 1999; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005; Fiszdon & Reddy, 2012; Casey et al., 2013). This not only benefits the 
understanding of potential symptoms, but also benefits the targeting of possible early 
interventions. This thesis has provided subclinical evidence on social anxiety and paranoia, 
and the data revealed that interpretation bias as a cognitive vulnerability factor represents 
the possibility for predicting potential emotional vulnerability or even clinical symptoms. 
Excessive concern regarding negatively evaluative information leads to a great likelihood of 
social anxiety, while excessive concern regarding persecutory information leads to a greater 
likelihood of paranoia. Thus, knowing whether an individual’s interpretation style is 
persecutory rather than negatively evaluated may suggest that the potential clinical condition 
is paranoia related and not social anxiety related. This improves the efficiency of locating the 
target symptom during diagnosis by implying more precise ways to parse differences 
between social anxiety and paranoia. Furthermore, it improves the accuracy of applying 
possible early interventions.  
The findings of this thesis also suggest that effects of persecutory interpretation bias are 
especially pronounced in predicting the trait paranoia when participants also display a 
moderate to extremely negative interpretation bias. This implies that both negatively 
evaluative and persecutory interpretation biases could become the target for paranoia 
intervention, thus if social anxiety related interpretation bias is shown to have a role in 
paranoia symptoms then the established cognitive behavioural anxiety-reduction techniques 
might also reduce paranoia symptoms. This result also implies the possibility that when a 
negatively evaluated interpretation is of sufficient severity, then this may lead to the 
development of a secondary/comorbid mood disorder in psychosis. Contrastingly, it implies 
an equally plausible alternative that the observed interpretation biases among individuals 
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with paranoia may be a consequence of either or both disorders. Thus, a comorbid disorder 
should be considered if corresponding interpretation bias is detected.  
A careful and thorough assessment is critical to intervention planning and clinical research. 
The significantly linear relationship between interpretation bias and relevant symptoms found 
in this thesis suggests the advantage of including interpretation bias as one measurement 
dimension. Assessment measures for social anxiety and paranoid psychosis have typically 
involved cognitive assessment procedures, such as information processing paradigms 
(Arnkoff & Glass, 1989; Elting & Hope, 1995; Heimberg, 1994; Andreasen et al, 1992; Green 
et al, 2004; Pino et al., 2006; Ana et al., 2016). However, most of these assessments have 
focused only on a limited content type (e.g. Morrison & Baker, 2000; Freeman & Garety, 
2008). The interaction effects between different contents of interpretation bias in predicting 
paranoia symptoms found in this thesis suggested that focusing on one type of content in 
interpretation may not be sufficient to understand symptoms and produce a larger effect in 
predicting later onset disorders. The contents of interpretation bias interact with each other 
and should be considered accordingly. 
Clinical interventions for early psychosis suggest the aetiological role of cognitive bias in 
both the development and maintenance of psychosis (Gumley et al., 2006; Freeman, 
Hasson-Ohayon & Roe, 2009). Thus the identified interpretation bias as one mechanism 
related to paranoia highlights the potential to improve the focus of existing cognitive-
behavioural therapies (Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995), metacognitive training (Moritz et al., 
2010) and other cognitive and social interventions (Roder & Medalia, 2010) for psychosis. 
Modifying such biases may improve corresponding symptoms, and cognitive bias 
modification studies have directly tested this assumption. Experimentally designed training 
programmes for intended interpretation biases (either positive or negative) can be 
successfully induced, which in turn affect mood, and indicate a causal role for interpretation 
biases in target mood (Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006). An increasing number of 
studies are providing evidence from clinical populations (Yiend et al., 2011, 2013, 2014; 
Mackintosh et al., 2006; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2007; Yiend et al., 2005). 
Therefore, relevant findings from this thesis may contribute to the development of effective 
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cognitive bias modification training for psychosis, clarifying the pre-existing bias mechanisms 
which the training targets. 
7.4 Strengths and Limitations 
This thesis has a number of strengths, with the first being the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal design experimental designs. Data from the cross-sectional experiment 
illustrated the relationship between interpretation bias and trait characteristics at baseline, 
which suggested the neutral correlation of the investigated variables. The significant results 
provided the opportunity to test the relationship further in a predictive model in order to 
investigate the causal role of interpretation bias in the development of social anxiety and 
paranoia. Longitudinal data provided a dynamic picture of the correlation between the 
variables, and showed how trait/symptom characteristics are related to interpretation bias 
over a given time period, and whether baseline interpretation bias predicts the later 
development of trait characteristics. Taken together, these addressed the proposed question 
of the etiological role of interpretation bias in the development of social anxiety and paranoia. 
One experiment in this thesis involved a group comparison design of clinical groups and 
control groups, which strengthens the results from regression analysis. Regression data 
from a wide ranging population, including low to high socially anxious individuals, and 
paranoid individuals, illustrated the relationship between interpretation bias and trait 
characteristics in the general population. Further group setting analysis then explained how 
interpretation bias was represented in the higher end of each trait characteristic group, and 
in the concerned control groups. This allowed findings to be generated on how individuals 
with social anxiety or paranoia differed in interpretation bias compared to the general 
population. As such, it answered the research question on whether specific interpretation 
biases distinguish social anxiety from paranoia. Moreover, including clinical data extended 
the potential of where these findings can be applied. For example, they can contribute 
directly to the clinical understanding of social anxiety and paranoia, which may further direct 
cognitive intervention targets. 
The design of items in the cognitive task, included content directly reflected social anxious 
(negatively evaluative) concerns and paranoid (persecutory) concerns. This extended 
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previous common designs for testing interpretation bias, which have mostly adopted either 
negative or positive content as a control interpretation condition. Previous designs have 
revealed the magnitude of interpretation bias in relation to the severity of trait characteristics; 
however, they are limited in generating content-specific explanations. The cognitive tasks in 
this thesis used items which reflected trait matched contents in order to clarify the direction 
of the biased interpretation, which allowed an investigation into the content specificity of 
interpretation bias for corresponding trait characteristics. The content specificity of 
interpretation bias referred to biases specifically in favour of an individual’s emotional 
concerns matched to core psychopathological traits (e.g. interpreting ambiguous social 
events as negative to exacerbate social anxiety) (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). This has 
been suggested as the central component of the modern cognitive theory of 
psychopathology (Beck, 1987). 
Adopting a forced alternative choice design (Fechner, 1889) in Experiment 2 to strengthen 
the content-specific finding from Experiment 1 is also a strength of this thesis. This design 
forced participants to make a choice from two alternatives in a forced setting between 
socially anxious and paranoid interpretations. The two-alternative choice task data robustly 
supported the findings from Experiment 1. The rational of this design was to exaggerate the 
difference between the two closely related variables and allowed the direct testing of content 
specificity between socially anxious and paranoid concerns. 
Most research to date has only focused on one type of the interpretation bias. Experiments 
in this thesis used cognitive measurements of interpretation bias in multiple dimensions, 
which allowed measurements covering all stages of biased interpretation processing. This 
was accomplished by including pre-exiting stereotype interpretations, such as the WSAP, 
and encountered interpretations within a social context, such as the SRT. Data from self-
reported ratings to response latencies were measured, which allowed a more 
comprehensive explanation of the generated results. The image-based RJT was also 
employed to enrich the testing dimensions, and was expected to identify whether the content 
specificity of interpretation bias can be evidenced in another context rather than text alone. 
Although there were few meaningful findings from this task, the idea of testing interpretation 
bias with multiple dimensions was still worthwhile. 
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Despite these strengths, there are also limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. Firstly, insufficient power of the study sample may be one of the limitations, even 
though power calculations were used to ensure that the sample size was large enough for 
the purpose of the experiments. There were a few group analysis results (Experiment 5) 
which showed the expected patterns on means plot but which were not statistically 
significant. This might suggest the possibility of insufficient power of the study sample. Thus, 
increasing the sample size or decreasing the variability in the sample may be of benefit in 
future research, and a  future study could replicate this study with a more powerful design.  
All trait measurements were self-reported and cognitive tasks can also be subject to 
researcher bias. The social desirability bias/the defence mechanism, in which participants 
may provide socially desired answers rather than their actual response, due to thought 
suppression making them embarrassed to reveal private details, could not be controlled for. 
The only image-based task (RJT) did not yield any valid results and it would be worth 
conducting further investigations to explain this unexpected finding. Research considering 
this task may need to be carefully considered. Finally, the, experiments in this thesis did not 
include various ranges of demographical information that could be controlled at baseline, for 
example, IQ, education, and employment status may be critical factors related to social 
anxiety and paranoia, and have the potential to vary the results. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The five studies presented in this thesis suggest that interpretation bias may show an 
etiological role in the development of social anxiety and paranoia, as the content of biased 
interpretation predicted the corresponding trait characteristics, and may even distinguish one 
from the other. This confirms the cognitive theories of psychopathology in social anxiety and 
early psychosis. This thesis also demonstrated a reciprocal causality between social anxiety 
and both persecutory and negatively evaluated interpretation bias. It has confirmed the 
vicious circle proposed by cognitive theories of social anxiety, and suggested a mechanism 
for the maintenance of persecutory interpretation bias in paranoia. The experimental design 
in this thesis adopted a more precise specification of both the magnitude and content of 
interpretation bias that best matched the emotional concerns in socially anxious or paranoid 
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individuals. The data revealed that although content-specific interpretation bias was 
weighted the most in the prediction of its corresponding trait characteristics, the effects from 
the content-unmatched interpretation bias could not be neglected. This was found in the 
prediction of paranoia, in which the severity of paranoia is predicted by persecutory 
interpretation bias dependent upon the magnitude of negative interpretation bias. This 
indicates that the more individuals explain social ambiguity through persecutory intention 
(e.g. ‘people harm me’) the more likely they are to suffer from paranoia in 6 months, and this 
likelihood was found to be significantly increased if they also showed an extremely negative 
intention (e.g. ‘people hate me’) instead of a more mild (e.g. ‘people criticise me’) intention. 
This finding extends previous observations using similar methods in subclinical samples, and 
suggests an etiological pattern that goes beyond the notion of content specificity. Future 
work should attempt to replicate this finding and to explore this notion for other cognitively 
comorbid disorders. This is particularly important in the context of developing efficient 
diagnoses and cognitive interventions designed to modify specific biases that may be used 
in facilitating future therapies. It is important to have a deeper understanding of the nature 
and type of interpretation biases that occur in social anxiety and paranoia, before we can be 
confident that inducing specific biases is likely to have clinical effects. The present data 
points to a need for further research into the interaction effects of interpretation orienting in 
cognitive comorbid disorders.  
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Appendix 1. Similarity rating task Version 1 and 2 items 
Two parallel versions of each task were developed and counterbalanced in 
order across participants to minimise order effects and the influence of other 
potentially confounding factors. 
Version 1- Social anxiety related items (20 items) 
Experiment 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 
 
1. PRESENTATION 
You give a presentation during class. 
People look interested and applaud at the end. 
However, you feel you cannot answer the last qu-s-i-n (question). 
 
Did you give a presentation during class? YES 
 
Your presentation is successful 
Your presentation is unsuccessful 
You are generally a good writer 
You are generally a bad writer 
 
2. EMAIL FROM YOUR BOSS 
A project you are working on is in its final stage.  
This morning, you receive an email from your boss that asks you to visit 
his office this afternoon.  
Your colleague told you that your company is struggling, and some will 
be fired s-on 
(soon) 
  
Did you visit to your boss’s office this afternoon? YES 
  
Your boss will praise your progress so far and give you a new project 
Your boss will tell you the bad news that you will be fired soon 
You have had a good relationship with your colleagues 
You have endured some problems with your colleagues 
 
3. TEAM MEETING 
 
You have a team meeting about a new project. 
Your boss seems to actively listen to your idea and compliments you. 
Your boss also seems to give good feedback to your c-l-e-g-es 
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(colleagues) 
  
Do you have a team meeting about the last project? NO 
  
Your boss’s compliments mean that you are doing very well 
Your boss’s compliments mean nothing 
Having a new experience is very exciting 
Having a new experience is intimidating   
 
4. OVERCOOKED DINNER 
 
You invite some guests who do not know each other to a dinner party.  
You are so focused on making your guests feel comfortable. 
While talking to your guests, you realize your meal is o-e-co-k-d 
(overcooked) 
  
Do you invite friends who knew each other? NO 
 
The whole dinner is good, and everyone looks happy  
The whole dinner is messed up, and everyone notices how inadequate 
you are 
You are happy when you receive great wine from your guests 
You are unhappy when you receive nothing from your guests 
 
5. VIOLIN PERFORMANCE 
 
You play the violin in an orchestra and recently gave a concert in the 
town hall. 
You have worked very hard for a perfect performance, but your playing 
was slightly out of tune at the end.  
The audience clap their hands enthusiastically as your performance 
came to an (end) 
  
Did you play the violin at a town hall? YES 
  
You are very good at playing the violin  
You are very bad at playing the violin  
You finished your music degree with distinction  
You barely passed your music degree    
 
6. FIRST MEETING 
 
Your friend introduced someone to you last Sunday.  
You think you have a really good time together, and they are really your 
type. 
Today, they left a message saying that they also had a good time, but just 
wants to be good fr-e-d- (friends) 
 
Did your friend introduce someone to you on Saturday? NO 
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There will be many opportunities to meet the right person in the future 
You have never been attractive, and no one loves you 
Your outfit for the date was a bit old-fashioned 
Your outfit for the date was trendy 
 
7. LISTEN TO YOUR MUM 
 
You listen to your mum complaining about her relationships. 
You spend all afternoon supporting her. 




Do you spend all afternoon with your grandmother? NO 
  
Your support is useful to your mum, and she will be getting better 
Your support is useless to your mum, and she will always stay the same 
Your mum looks happy with the new skirts she got as her birthday 
present 
Your mum looks unhappy with the new skirts she got as her birthday 
present 
 
8. IN THE LIBRARY 
 
You went to the library to prepare for an exam. 
The study room was full of students, but you found a seat.  
When you got a seat and started reading, a person sitting across from 
you started looking at you o-t-n 
(often) 
 
Are you studying at the library? YES 
 
The person across from you kept looking at you because you look very 
attractive  
The person across from you kept looking at you because you must smell 
bad 
You will get a very good grade on the exam 
You will get a very bad grade on the exam 
 
9. TEST RESULTS 
 
You are in the final year of your studies.  
You get a 50 on the final-term assignment and are waiting for the results 
of the other exams.  
You think about how the other results could affect your f-t-r- 
(Future) 
  
Are you in the second year of your studies? NO 
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You believe that you will get good marks overall and get a job 
successfully 
You believe all your grades will be unsatisfactory and will struggle to get 
a job 
You have tried to get as much experience in your field as possible  
You have never tried to get experience in your field 
 
10. YOUR BOSS’S FACIAL EXPRESSION 
 
You have a meeting with your boss in the afternoon.  
When you report your progress and discuss new project ideas, you 
observe your boss scowling. 




Did you have a meeting with your boss in the morning? NO 
 
He scowled and interrupted you because he felt sick or had another 
meeting soon 
He scowled and interrupted you because you made mistakes or reported 
unsatisfactory results 
Your boss’s secretary has been very polite in the office 
Your boss’s secretary sometimes has been very rude in the office 
 
11. UPHOLSTERY CLASS 
 
You have always been passive in relationships and want others to 
approach you first.  
Recently, you have enrolled in an evening upholstery class, and there are 
many people. 
You notice some people who interest you and who you would like to get 
cl-s- t-   
(close to) 
  
Are you attending an upholstery class? YES 
  
You imagine that when you approach them they will be friendly 
You imagine that when you approach them they will reject you 
All subjects in the upholstery class are interesting 
All subjects in the upholstery class are boring 
 
12. COFFEE SHOP 
 
You work at a coffee shop and have gotten good feedback from the 
manager and customers during the last week of your probationary 
period. 
Today is the last day of probation. 
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While you are serving coffee to a customer, you spill it on the t-b-e  
(table) 
 
Are you working at a coffee shop? YES 
  
You are generally a qualified employee and will continue working there 
You are not a qualified employee and will not continue working there 
You get on well with your friends 
You do not get well with your friends 
 
13. PROJECT 
Recently, you took on a big project that is very important for your next 
promotion. 
You had worked hard on it and submitted the final report. At a meeting 
with your bosses,  
they tell you that your progress was impressive, though your report had 
a few spelling  
(errors) 
   
Did you submit a mid-term report? NO 
  
Your achievement on the project was praiseworthy 
Your achievement on the project was inadequate 
You got home early and slept well last night 
You got home late and slept poorly last night 
 
14. READING CLUB 
You led a discussion in a local library reading club last week.  
A small number of people joined and had an animated discussion. At the 
end, the members gave you good feedback, but you doubt the feedback, 
wondering why there were a lot of a-g-e-ents 
(arguments). 
 
Did you lead a reading club this week? NO 
 
The members find the discussion you led was useful and pleasant 
The members find the discussion you led was unpleasant 
The members got along after the discussion 
The members hurried home after the discussion 
 
15. COVERSATION WITH YOUR PARTNER 
 
While you are having a very happy dinner with your partner, you speak 
of  
your future marriage plans. 
Soon after, your partner talks to you about recent difficulties in the 
office. You try to support him, but he keeps t-l-ing 
(talking)  
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Does your partner keep talking about difficulties at school? NO 
 
The conversation you have with your partner is enjoyable and 
constructive 
The conversation you have with your partner is terrible and exhausting 
When you arrived home, you were greeted by your friendly housemates 
When you arrived home, you were greeted by your unfriendly 
housemates 
 
16. BREAKING OFF A FRIENDSHIP 
 
Two weeks ago, you had a row with your best friend. 
Since then, you have not been in touch with her. 
When you open your email inbox, you find an email from h-r 
(her)  
 
Did you argue with your friend one week ago? NO 
  
You can make up with your friend over email and mend the relationship 
You cannot make up with your friend; your relationship has been broken 
for good 
Your friend looks happy because she just got engaged  
You friend looks unhappy because she just got engaged 
 
17. WRITING AN ESSAY 
 
You work very hard at writing an essay and send it to your supervisors. 
They arrange a meeting to give you feedback. 




Do you meet classmates? NO 
  
The feedback on the essay is positive 
The feedback on the essay is negative 
You arrive at the meeting on time 
You arrive at the meeting late 
 
18. BIRTHDAY PLANS 
 
Your birthday is approaching and you notice your friends being secretive 
and laughing.  
For your birthday you have organised a small dinner.  
You are looking forward to it very m-ch [much]. 
 
It is your sister’s birthday? [No] 
 
Your friends are criticisng your birthday plans 
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Your friends are planning a surprise party 
Your family gossips about you 
Your family praises you  
 
19. CORNER SHOP 
 
You’re at the counter of your local corner shop waiting to be served.  
When it’s your turn you find the shop assistant particularly unfriendly. 
However, they had been noticeably friendly to the previous c-st--er 
[customer]. 
 
You are in your local corner shop? [Yes] 
 
The shop assistant doesn’t like you 
The previous customer was a friend of the shop assistant’s 
Your colleagues envy your success 
Your colleagues respect your success 
 
20. FOOTBALL INVITATION  
 
A group of friends invite you to play football.  
You have already made plans to meet a friend at the cinema and politely 
decline.  
As the group leaves you hear them l--ghing [laughing].   
 
Have you been invited to play football? [Yes] 
 
The group is making fun of you 
The group is having a good time 
Your boss slanders you to your co-workers 
Your boss names you Employee of the Year 
 
Version 1-Paranoia related items (20 items) 
Experiment 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 
 
1. WHISPERS  
After a long morning you enter the canteen for lunch. Whilst waiting in 
the queue, you look for your colleagues and hope to join them. Across the 
room, two girls begin to wh-sp-r [whisper]. 
 
Did you enter the canteen for lunch? [Yes]  
 
The girls are plotting against you 
The girls are talking about their friend 
Your doctor gives you suspicious medication  
Your doctor gives you beneficial medication  
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2. MEETING WITH A FRIEND  
You arrange to meet your friend for lunch at 1:00 p.m. sharp. You have 
not seen him in ages and look forward to catching up. At quarter to two 
your friend has still not arr-v-d [arrived].  
 
Have you arranged to meet your friend at the park? [No]  
 
Your friend is deceiving you 
Your friend is running late 
Your professor enjoys bullying you 
Your professor is frequently stern  
 
3. BAG 
It is a Tuesday morning and you are running late for work. You are 
walking quickly to the station when you hear something drop out of your 
bag. You turn around and a stranger is kneeling on the floor holding your 
wallet 
You are going shopping? [No] 
 
The stranger is a pickpocket 
The stranger is helping you pick up your wallet 
Your family punishes you  
Your family admires you  
 
4. FOOTBALL 
It is a Saturday afternoon and you are walking through the park. It is a 
lovely sunny day and you are looking into the distance at the ducks by 
the pond. Suddenly a football just misses hitting you on the he-d [head]. 
 
Are you walking through the park? [Yes] 
 
The children were deliberately aiming at you 
The children accidentally kicked the ball at you 
A stranger is threatening you 
A stranger is defending you 
 
5. CLASS ACTIVITY 
You enrol in a Public Speaking course to improve your presentation 
skills. Your class is instructed to write and present a persuasive speech. 
Your peers unexpectedly nominate you to present f-rst [first].  
 
Have you enrolled in a Public Speaking course? [Yes] 
 
Your peers are conspiring against you  
Your peers admire your work 
You think your neighbour wants to punch you 
You think your neighbour plans to help you 
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6. NEW JOB 
After months of anticipation you are promoted to a managerial position. 
You are now required to interact with prospective clients on a daily 
basis. A client you have just met seems unexpectedly f--ndly [friendly].  
 
Have you been sacked from your job? [No] 
 
The client is trying to manipulate you 
The client is attracted to you 
A man trespasses onto your porch   
A man arrives to meet your housemate  
 
7. LECTURE 
You are required to attend a Statistics lecture twice a week. You enjoy 
sitting with a group of friends you made last term. After greeting one of 
your friends, she does not answer b-ck [back].   
 
Are you attending a lecture? [Yes]  
 
Your friend is deliberately annoying you 
Your friend did not hear you 
You believe evil forces are targeting you  
You believe you are in control  
 
8. BUSINESS MEETING 
You present a list of new ideas at your monthly office meeting. You hope 
to encourage positive change within the company. Your co-workers 
challenge a few of your p--nts [points].  
 
Are you attending the office Christmas party? [No]  
 
Your co-workers are trying to undermine you   
Your co-workers are interested in your ideas    
There is an intruder in your kitchen 
There is a cat in your kitchen  
 
9. FLAT-WARMING PARTY 
You look forward to your friend’s flat-warming party. You plan to bring a 
cheese appetizer you often make. The morning of the party, your partner 
suggests you prepare a native d-sh [dish].   
 
Are you attending a flat-warming party? [Yes]  
 
Your partner is purposely upsetting you 
Your partner wants you to show off your excellent culinary skills  
The government secretly regulates you  
The government openly supports you 




You prepare for a prestigious interview. You are determined to impress 
your potential employer. Your peers recommend applying to several 
other positions to avoid d-s-pp--ntm-nt [disappointment].  
 
Are you writing a novel? [No]    
 
Your peers are intimidating you  
Your peers are offering sensible advise  
You are distressed by sounds from an unknown source 
You are soothed by music from the flat above  
 
11. WALKING HOME  
As the weather gets warmer, you begin walking to and from work. Whilst 
walking home, you notice a man looking at you from across the street. 
You recognize him as the same man you noticed y-st-rd-y [yesterday]. 
 
Are you walking home from work? [Yes]  
 
The man is stalking you  
The man walks a similar route as you 
Your neighbour is trying to irritate you  
Your neighbour is trying to comfort you  
 
12. BIRTHDAY PARTY  
It is the night of your mother’s 50th birthday party. You are hosting the 
party and hope she has a good time. All of a sudden you begin to feel 
dizzy, and an acquaintance offers to pour you a dr-nk [drink]. 
 
Is it the night of your mother’s 80th birthday party? [No]  
 
Your acquaintance is poisoning you 
Your acquaintance is calming you 
Your friend’s child is deliberately annoying you  
Your friend’s child wants to play with you  
 
 
13. GROCERY STORE 
After a half-day at work, you decide to go food shopping. You drive to the 
local grocery store. Whilst driving, you keep noticing the same car 
behind you in your rear view w-nd-w [window].  
 
Are you driving to the grocery store? [Yes] 
 
The car is following you  
The car is going to the grocery store  
Your brother purposely neglects your call  
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Your brother accidentally misses your call 
 
14. QUIET EVENING 
Your partner is away on business for the weekend. You expect a quiet 
evening tidying the house and watching a film. Outside, you hear 
movement as footsteps approach the front d--r [door].  
 
Is your partner away on holiday? [No]  
 
Someone is intruding on your property 
A friend is stopping by 
Your boss is abusing you 
Your boss is supporting you  
 
15. GROUP PROJECT 
You are selected to work with a group of colleagues on a project. You 
have a lot of stress at home and you struggle to remain focussed. Your 
colleagues express disappointment with your c-ntr-b-t--n [contribution].  
 
Have you been selected to work on a project? [Yes]  
 
Your colleagues have it in for you 
Your colleagues are keen to make the project succeed  
A group of students harass you   
A group of students assist you  
 
16. STREET CROSSING 
You rush to the chemist by foot. You hope to pick up a prescription 
before the store shuts. As you are crossing the street, a stranger 
suddenly puts his hand on your sh--ld-r [shoulder].  
 
Are you travelling to the cinema? [No] 
 
The stranger is about to assault you 
The stranger is protecting you from the traffic  
A man walking behind you is following you 
A man walking behind you is going to the same destination.  
 
17. CONFERENCE PRESENTATION 
You give your first presentation at a business conference. Immediately 
afterwards, the audience is given the opportunity to ask questions. In 
particular, you are asked several difficult q--s--ns [questions].  
 
Are you presenting at a business conference? [Yes]  
 
The audience is trying to confuse you   
The audience is engaged in your work  
You think a stranger has a gun in his pocket   
You think a stranger has a wallet in his pocket   
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18. FRIDAY NIGHT 
You are socialising with friends at a pub after work. Unexpectedly, a 
group of nearby students begin arguing and break into a fight. You keep 
quiet as one of the students approaches y-u [you].  
 
Are you at a swimming pool? [No] 
 
The student is going to hit you  
The student is leaving the fight 
A young woman is chasing you  
A young woman is in a rush 
 
19. WORK COLLABORATION  
You are collaborating with a new colleague on a work project. You do not 
know each other very well but are determined to work agreeably. 
Despite your reminders, your colleague misses a critical m--t-ng 
[meeting].  
 
Are you collaborating at work? [Yes]  
 
Your colleague is sabotaging you 
Your colleague is forgetful  
Your cocktail is drugged  
Your cocktail has the wrong ingredients   
 
20. HIGH SCHOOL REUNION 
You arrive at your high school reunion where there are lots of people 
you have not seen for many years. All your old friends greet you warmly. 
However one friend does not talk to y-u [you].  
 
Have you graduated high school recently? [No]  
 
Your friend is hostile toward you 
Your friend does not recognise you  
There is a conspiracy against you  
There is a plan for you 
 
 
Version 2-Social anxiety related items (20 items) 
Experiment 1 & 3 
 
1. THE WEDDING RECEPTION 
 
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. 
You prepare some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet.  
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As you speak, you notice some people in the audience start to laugh 
 
Did you stand up to speak? YES 
 
As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively 
As you speak, some people in the audience find your efforts laughable 
As you speak, everyone in the audience bursts into applause 
As you speak, you notice somebody in the audience start to yawn 
 
2. THE LOCAL CLUB 
 
You are invited to attend a social at a local club, although you don't know any of 
the members very well.  
As you approach the door you can hear conversation and loud music, but as you 
enter the room it stops for a moment  
 
Do you know most of the club members? NO 
 
As you enter the room the music stops for a moment 
As you enter the room everyone stops and stares at you 
As you enter the room someone greets you warmly 
As you enter the room someone asks why you are there 
 
3. THE BUS RIDE 
 
You get on a bus and find an empty seat, next to one that has a small rip in it.   
At the next stop several people get on who know you,  
but all of them go and sit somewhere else so the seat next to you remains vacant 
 
Were the people who got on strangers to you? NO 
 
No one can sit next to you because the seat has a rip in it 
No one chooses to sit with you so the seat next to you stays empty 
The person in the seat next to you talks to you in a friendly way 
The person in the seat next to you makes a rip in the fabric 
 
4. THE JOB INTERVIEW 
 
You see a job advertised that you would really like.   
You apply and are invited to an interview, where you answer the questions as 
well as you can.  
Reflecting later, you think that the quality of your answers decided the outcome 
 
Did you think about your answers later? YES 
 
You think it must have been your clear answers that got you the job 
Reflecting later, you think the quality of your answers lost you the job 
Reflecting later, you think it was a good thing you did not take the job 
You think that your appearance may have made a bad impression 
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5. YOUR FIRST PAINTING 
You have taken up painting as a hobby, and have just finished your first picture.   
You hang it on the wall for your friends to see.   
Later you overhear your friends making remarks that make clear their opinion of 
your picture 
 
Did you leave the painting on an easel? NO 
 
You overhear your friends saying how much they loved your painting 
You overhear some friends making critical remarks about your picture 
You overhear some complimentary remarks about your furniture 
You overhear your friends making fun of your taste in furniture 
 
6. THE HOUSE-WARMING  PARTY 
Your neighbour has a house warming party and you are invited.   
You arrive to find many other guests whom you do not know.   
You try talking to some of them, and get an impression of how much they are 
interested in your conversation 
Was the party thrown by a relative of yours? NO 
 
You meet some guests and they find your comments very entertaining 
You talk to some guests but see they find your conversation uninteresting 
You meet a lot of guests whom you know and arrange to meet again 
You don't know any guests and they all ignore you completely 
 
7. A DIFFERENT HAIRCUT 
Whilst at the hairdressers, you are persuaded to try a completely different cut.  
In doubt about it, you ask a friend, who comments that  
the style makes you look very different. 
 
Have you changed your hairstyle? YES  
 
You friend thought this hairstyle makes you look attractive 
Your friend thought the new style makes you look terrible 
Your friend likes to make comments on your hair style. 
Your friend doesn’t like to make comments on your hair style. 
 
8. ARRIVING AT A PARTY 
You are going to a party at the weekend  
and decide to wear a new outfit you have just bought.  
Everyone turns to look at you as you arrive  
 
Did you stay in at the weekend? NO  
 
People at the party thought your outfit was flattering 
People at the party thought your outfit was awful. 
You know a lot of people at the party. 
You know few people at the party. 
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9. SWIMMING WITH FRIENDS 
Your friend persuades you to go swimming in an attempt to get fit.  
As you pull on your costume beforehand,  
you realise that it is a long time since it was last worn 
 
Did you go running with your friend? NO 
 
You think that other people will think you look fine in your swimsuit 
You think that other people will think you look strange in your swimsuit 
People think you are a good swimmer. 
People think you are a bad swimmer. 
  
10. JOINING A DINNER 
Your colleagues decide to go for a meal from the office and ask you to join them.  
You accept, but realize you will have to wear your work clothes.  
When you arrive, the other diners turn to look 
 
Did you go out to eat with your colleagues? YES 
 
The other diners look at you because you look very smart.   
The other diners look at you because you aren’t dressed appropriately.  
You found the company during the meal enjoyable   
You found the company during the meal boring 
  
11. MEETING YOUR DATE 
You arrange to meet your date at 8 p.m. in a local pub.  
You arrive on time and find that they are not there yet.  
You think back to when you last met and remember the conversation  
 
Did you start your date in the pub? YES 
 
You think your date is late because have been held up 
You think your date is late because they are not sure about meeting you again. 
You think the local pub is a great place for the date.  
You wish you were not meeting at the local pub  
 
12. WEARING A NEW SUIT 
You buy a new suit, which is very different from your normal style of clothes.  
When you show it to a friend,  
they make some strong comments  
 
Did you show your new clothes to your friend? YES 
 
Your friend comments that the new style makes you look fetching. 
Your friend comments that the new style makes you look ridiculous. 
Your friend likes to go shopping with you. 
Your friend doesn’t like to go shopping with you. 
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13. LETTER FROM OLD FRIENDS 
You receive a letter out of the blue from an old friend who you have not seen for 
ages.  
She wants to meet and explains that she has changed a lot since you last saw her.  
You feel that she will think you have also changed  
 
Did you meet an old friend? YES 
 
You expect your friend to think you have changed for the better 
You expect your friend to think you have changed for the worse 
Your friends like to keep in touch with you. 
Your friends never call you unless you call them. 
 
14. LATE HOME FROM WORK 
One evening, you are late home from work.  
The family have prepared a meal and eaten theirs, but they did not wash up.  
As you begin to clear up, your neighbor arrives.  
 
Were you late home from work? YES 
 
You neighbour thinks you look after the family well.  
You neighbour thinks you are untidy. 
Your neighbor comments favorably on the family’s cooking 
Your neighbor comments unfavorably on the family’s cooking  
 
15. A DINNER PARTY 
A friend invites you to a dinner party that she is holding.  
She tells you who the other guests are, but you do not recognize any of the 
names.  
You go anyway and on the way there, you imagine what the other guests will 
think 
 
Were several of your friends going to the party? NO 
 
You think that the other guests will find you sociable 
You think that the other guests will find you tiresome 
You are pleased to be going to a dinner party 
You do not want to go to the dinner party 
 
16. A PEN-PAL IN BELGIUM 
You have been writing to a pen-pal in Belgium for several years and finally 
arrange for him to come and stay with you.  
As you stand at the airport waiting for his flight to arrive,  
you wonder what will be his first impression  
 
Is your penpal form Belgium? YES 
 
You think your penpal’s first impression of you will be that you are charming. 
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You think your penpal’s first impression of you will be that you are lifeless. 
Your pen-pal likes the gift you sent. 
Your pen-pal doesn’t like the gift you sent. 
 
17. FUND RAISING EVENTS 
As a member of a local charity you are asked to promote your fund raising events 
on local radio the following week.  
You know that the station is widely listened to  
and you wonder what other committee members will think. 
 
Were you asked to promote your fund raising events on local radio? YES 
 
The other committee members will think you spoke convincingly. 
The other committee members will think you spoke hurriedly. 
You find fund raising rewarding and would like to do more of it 
You are thinking of giving up your fund raising work 
 
 
18. LOCAL PUB 
You have just moved to a new area and your neighbour asks if you would like to 
go to your local pub that evening.  
When you arrive, they are not yet there.  
You imagine what they think about you after your earlier conversation. 
 
Did your neighbour ask you to a local pub? YES 
 
After your earlier conversation, they probably thought you were likeable. 
After your earlier conversation, they probably thought you were dull. 
Your find the new area pleasant 
You find the new area unpleasant 
 
 
19. MEETING FRIEND IN TOWN 
You arrange to meet a friend in town.  
Last time you met, you had a quarrel and parted on bad terms.  
Just before you leave, she phones to say that she can't make it. You wonder why 
she is (cancelling). 
 
Did you arrange to meet a friend in town? YES 
 
You think that this is because she is feeling unwell.  
You think that this is because she is feeling angry.  
Your friend likes to chat with you online.   
Your friend doesn’t like to chat with you online.   
 
 
20. RINGING FROM WORK 
You work in a large office along with your supervisors.  
One morning, you have to ring your mother. Everyone else is working quietly 
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and can hear what you say.  
You guess what they will think of your behavior. 
 
Did you ring your father from work? NO 
 
You guess that they think calling your mother from work means you are 
troubled. 
You guess that they think calling your mother from work means you are shirking. 
You think your colleagues like you. 
You think your colleagues don’t like you. 
 
 
Version 2-Paranoia related items (20 items) 
Experiment 1, & 3 
 
1. RUSH HOUR 
You are seated on a busy train at rush hour. The train stops and many people 
get off leaving a number of empty chairs.  Immediately the passenger next to 
you gets up and changes s-at [seat]. 
 
You are travelling by bus? [No] 
 
The passenger wants more legroom 
The passenger does not want to sit next to you 
Your friend is ignoring you 
Your friend is busy at work 
 
2. PARTY 
You’ve had a long morning and are looking forward to your lunch break. You 
walk into the canteen and meet your friends who are discussing a party hosted 
by a good friend of all of you. This is the first you hear about the p-r-y [party]. 
 
Are you eating breakfast? [No] 
 
Your friend is excluding you 
Your friend forgot to invite you 
Your colleagues are jealous of you 
Your colleagues admire you 
 
3. CHRISTMAS CARD 
It has been a busy last few months at work and everyone is looking forward to 
the Christmas holidays. Christmas is only a week away and in a couple of days 
your holidays will begin. Every year you receive a Christmas card from your 
colleague but this year you did not receive one in the p-st [post]. 
 
Is it Easter? [No] 
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Your card got lost in the post 
Your colleague has fallen out with you 
Some children are laughing at you 
Some children are laughing at a joke 
 
4. THE LOCAL RESTAURANT 
You invite your parents to dinner at a local restaurant. When you arrive the 
restaurant is busy and you are happy to be seated without waiting. Every time 
you glance up you make eye contact with your w--t-r [waiter].  
 
Are you dining with your sister? [No]  
 
Your waiter is irritated by you 
Your waiter is attentive to you 
You think you have a bad reputation 
You think you have a good reputation  
 
5. BIRTHDAY PLANS 
Your birthday is approaching and you notice your friends being secretive and 
laughing. For your birthday you have organised a small dinner. You are looking 
forward to it very m-ch [much]. 
 
It is your sister’s birthday? [No] 
 
Your friends are criticisng your birthday plans 
Your friends are planning a surprise party 
Your family gossips about you 
Your family praises you  
 
6. CORNER SHOP 
You’re at the counter of your local corner shop waiting to be served. When it’s 
your turn you find the shop assistant particularly unfriendly. However, they had 
been noticeably friendly to the previous c-st--er [customer]. 
 
You are in your local corner shop? [Yes] 
 
The shop assistant doesn’t like you 
The previous customer was a friend of the shop assistant’s 
Your colleagues envy your success 
Your colleagues respect your success 
 
7. HOCKEY MATCH 
Your friend has just been chosen to play on the hockey team. You decide to 
attend your friend’s hockey match to cheer him on. When he comes near you 
you cheer and shout his name but he never looks at you or acknowledges you 
being th-re [there]. 
 
Are you at a tennis match? [No] 
 
  295 
Your friend is deliberately ignoring you 
Your friend doesn’t hear you and is engrossed in the match 
Your peers laugh at you 
Your peers laugh at your jokes 
 
8. SUPERMARKET 
You are in a supermarket and cannot find what you are looking for. You 
approach a woman stacking shelves and ask where to go to find the particular 
item. She does not look up or respond at a-l [all]. 
 
You are in a supermarket? [Yes] 
 
She is rude and doesn’t want to help 
She is busy and did not hear you 
You are humiliated by new office rules 
Your are protected by new office rules  
 
 
9. DAY OUT 
You agree to a day out at the local park with friends and are the first to arrive, 
after 30 minutes no one else has turned up. You call a friend asking where 
everybody is and she mentions the joint decision to change the meeting time. 
This is the first you have heard of th-s [this]. 
 
You are going ice-skating? [No] 
 
Your friends are trying to annoy you 
You didn’t receive the text message 
Your friend fancies your partner  
Your friend gets on well with your partner  
 
10. BUS JOURNEY 
It is a Friday afternoon and you are making your way home. You are seated on a 
busy bus at rush hour. A stranger gets on board the bus and appears to turn 
around and look at you several t-mes [times]. 
 
You are on a tram? [No] 
 
The stranger is suspiciously staring at you 
The stranger is looking for a place to sit 
Your partner is ignoring you  
Your partner did not hear you  
 
11. SATURDAY NIGHT DRINKS 
It’s a Saturday night and you are at a bar with some friends. You offer to buy the 
first round of drinks whilst your friends sit down at a table. Whilst at the bar 
you notice your friends are talking and looking in your dir-c-ion [direction]. 
 
Are you going bowling? [No] 
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Your friends are talking about you 
Your friends are looking to see if you need help with carrying the drinks 
Your neighbour does not trust you to babysit 
Your neighbour does not trust anyone to babysit 
 
12. CAR PARK 
You have parked your car in the supermarket car park and just done your 
weekly food shopping. On your return to your car you notice a man sat in a 
nearby car. He is sitting alone and looking out the win-ow   [window]. 
 
Have you just been to the supermarket? [Yes] 
 
The man is watching you as you unpack your shopping 
The man is looking out for a friend he is meant to be meeting 
Your friend is talking about you  
Your friend is talking about the weather  
 
13. THE TRAIN 
You are on the train home from work. At the next stop a spare seat becomes 
available so you sit down.  
You look around the train carriage and notice a couple opposite you who are 
talking about bad haircuts they have recently se-n [seen]. 
 
Do you manage to find a seat?   [Yes] 
 
The couple’s comments are referring to your haircut 
The couple’s comments are referring to other peoples’ haircuts 
Your friend has been avoiding you lately 
Your friend has been very busy lately 
 
14. AN EVENT 
You are meeting some friends from the year below for lunch in the canteen. As 
you sit down they are talking about an event that is coming up which they don’t 
really want to go to. In two months it will be your gr-d--tion [graduation]. 
 
Are you planning a party for your birthday? [No] 
 
The event which your friends don’t want to go to is your graduation 
The event which your friends don’t want to go to is a revision class  
Your brother is trying to hack into your phone 
Your brother is trying to fix your phone 
 
15. HOUSE PARTY 
It’s a Friday night and you are at a friend’s house party. At the party you are 
talking to some girls when two of them get up to leave the room and go outside. 
They tell you that they will be back sh-rt-y [shortly]. 
 
Is it a Thursday night?  [No] 
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The girls are going to talk about you 
The girls are going to smoke 
Your cousin gives you the cold shoulder 
Your cousin is preoccupied  
 
16. THE GYM 
You are at a gym class by yourself and are standing near the front of the room. 
As there is a large wall of mirrors in front of you you are able to see the two 
women behind you. The women are looking into the mirror and t-lking [talking]. 
 
Are there two women behind you? [Yes] 
 
The women are watching you in the mirror 
The women are looking at themselves in the mirror 
Your friends whisper about you  




You have gone shopping for the afternoon. You walk into a large store with not 
many customers inside it. There is a sales assistant who is walking around and 
who occasionally looks in your d-r-ct-on [direction]. 
 
Are there lots of customers in the store?  [No] 
 
The sales assistant is closely watching you 
The sales assistant is closely watching over the shop 
The waiter doesn’t like serving you 
The waiter is distracted 
 
18. A WORK PROJECT 
You have been asked to be mentor on a new project at work. You are working 
with the new interns and a few other members of staff who are also mentors. 
You overhear one of the interns talking about how strict their mentor has be-n   
[been]. 
 
Are you an intern?  [No] 
 
The intern is talking about you 
The intern is talking about one of the other mentors 
A shop assistant is trying to give you the wrong amount of change back 
A shop assistant has miscalculated how much change you need 
 
19. SHOPPING TRIP 
It is a Saturday and you have gone to the local shopping centre. You are waiting 
outside a coffee shop to meet your friend. Just inside the coffee shop are two 
boys who keep looking through the windows to ou-si-e   [outside]. 
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Are you inside the coffee shop?  [No] 
 
The two boys are watching you  
The two boys are watching the people go by 
Your boss is dropping hints about your poor performance 
Your boss is discussing your recent achievements.  
 
20. FOOTBALL INVITATION  
A group of friends invite you to play football. You have already made plans to 
meet a friend at the cinema and politely decline. As the group leaves you hear 
them l--ghing [laughing].   
 
Have you been invited to play football? [Yes] 
 
The group is making fun of you 
The group is having a good time 
Your boss slanders you to your co-workers 
Your boss names you Employee of the Year 
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Appendix 2. Scrambled Sentences Task Version 1 and 2 
items 
Version 1- Social anxiety related items and paranoia related items mixed (20 
items) 
Experiment 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 
 
1. unhelpful advice friends my constructive found 
Social anxiety: friends found my advice unhelpful 
Benign: friends found my advice constructive 
2. pleasant people to me hostile are 
Paranoia: people are hostile to me 
Benign: people are pleasant to me 
3. disappointed my I friends have pleased 
Social anxiety: I have disappointed my friends 
Benign: I have pleased my friends 
4. I frequently applauded am more persecuted 
Paranoia: I am more frequently persecuted 
Benign: I am more frequently applauded 
5. usually most like people me dislike 
Social anxiety: people usually dislike me most 
Benign: people usually like me most 
6. people me amiable are cruel to 
Paranoia: people are cruel to me 
Benign: people are amiable to me 
7. nobody‘s see pleased to me everybody’s 
Social anxiety: nobody‘s pleased to see me 
Benign: everybody’s pleased to see me 
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8. people most have kind intentions hurtful 
Paranoia: most people have hurtful intentions 
Benign: most people have kind intentions 
9. befriend tend ridicule me people to 
Social anxiety: people tend to ridicule me 
Benign: people tend to befriend me 
10. have protecting people threatening me tried 
Paranoia: people have tried threatening me 
Benign: people have tried protecting me 
11. havoc much I create pleasure can 
Social anxiety: I can create much havoc  
Benign: I can create much pleasure 
12. I harassed by am strangers unbothered 
Paranoia: I am harassed by strangers 
Benign: I am unbothered by strangers 
13. ignored I am welcomed know I 
Social anxiety: I know I am ignored 
Benign: I know I am welcomed 
14. please my usually friends disappoint me 
Paranoia: my friends usually disappoint me  
Benign: my friends usually please me 
 
15. stupidity my reflect my wit words 
Social anxiety: my words reflect my stupidity 
Benign: my words reflect my wit 
16. accepted I by feel rejected others 
Paranoia: I feel rejected by others 
Benign: I feel accepted by others 
17. criticism peoples’ I other  praise notice 
Social anxiety: I notice other peoples’ criticism 
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Benign: I notice other peoples’ praise 
18. tried helping others me have harming 
Paranoia: others have tried harming me  
Benign: others have tried helping me 
19. lacking your skills impressive social are 
Social anxiety: your social skills are lacking 
Benign: your social skills are impressive 
20. I assisted by am others defeated 
Paranoia: I am defeated by others 
Benign: I am assisted by others 
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
In the spaces above, write down the number you learned, or as much as you can remember of it. 
 
21. withdrawn people skilled you are say 
Social anxiety: people say you are withdrawn 
Benign: people say you are skilled 
 
22. trust others it’s to better nobody 
Paranoia: it’s better to trust nobody 
Benign: it’s better to trust others 
23. audience presentation your tires the entertains 
Social anxiety: your presentation tires the audience 
Benign: your presentation entertains the audience 
24. tell usually the truth rarely people 
Paranoia: people rarely tell the truth 
Benign: people usually tell the truth 
25. bad your usually good are relationships 
Social anxiety: your relationships are usually bad 
Benign: your relationships are usually good 
26. find interesting other me people boring 
  302 
Paranoia: other people find me boring  
Benign: other people find me interesting 
27. personal you receive compliments often rarely 
Social anxiety: you often receive personal compliments 
Benign: you rarely receive personal compliments 
28. others acknowledged am by ignored I 
Paranoia: I am ignored by others 
Benign: I am acknowledged by others 
29. a returns friend your call avoids 
Social anxiety: a friend avoids your call 
Benign: a friend returns your call 
30. praise me circulate gossip about others 
Paranoia: others circulate gossip about me 
Benign: others circulate praise about me 
31. badly teammates perform well you say 
Social anxiety: teammates say you perform badly 
Benign: teammates say you perform well 
32. strangers me smile often stare at 
Paranoia: strangers often stare at me 
Benign: strangers often smile at me 
33. colleagues angry are with you happy 
Social anxiety: colleagues are angry with you 
Benign: colleagues are happy with you 
34. me people peer at wink other 
Paranoia: other people wink at me 
Benign: other people peer at me 
35. with people pleased you displeased feel 
Social anxiety: you feel displeased with people 
Benign: you feel pleased with people 
36. whisper to talk other colleagues each 
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Paranoia: colleagues whisper to each other 
Benign: colleagues talk to each other 
37. to admiringly people talk impatiently you 
Social anxiety: people talk to you impatiently 
Benign: people talk to you admiringly 
38. ignore me tend neighbours to befriend 
Paranoia: neighbours tend to ignore me 
Benign: neighbours tend to befriend me 
39. friends accept new invitations reject my 
Social anxiety: new friends reject my invitations 
Benign: new friends accept my invitations 
40. badly of me speak highly others 
Paranoia: others speak badly of me 
Benign: others speak highly of me 
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
In the spaces above, write down the number you learned, or as much as you can remember of it. 
Version 2- Social anxiety related items and paranoia related items mixed (20 
items) 
Experiment 1, & 3 
1. think I pathetic friends am entertaining  
Social anxiety: friends think I am pathetic 
Benign: friends think I am entertaining 
2. me frequently quite friends commend criticise  
Paranoia: friends quite frequently criticise me 
Benign: friends quite frequently commend me 
3. hideous is people your-outfit think glamorous  
Social anxiety: people think your-outfit is hideous 
Benign: people think your-outfit is glamorous 
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4. friendly someone toward aggressive me was  
Paranoia: someone was aggressive toward me 
Benign: someone was friendly toward me  
5. clever you dense a idea suggest  
Social anxiety: you suggest a dense idea 
Benign: you suggest a clever idea 
6. upset others laugh try me making 
Paranoia: others try making me upset 
Benign: others try making me laugh 
7. boring you are colleagues think enchanting  
Social anxiety: colleagues think you are boring 
Benign: colleagues think you are enchanting 
8. helping me have manipulating tried others  
Paranoia: others have tried manipulating me 
Benign: others have tried helping me 
9. is think terrible friends your-haircut nice  
Social anxiety: friends think your-haircut is terrible 
Benign: friends think your-haircut is nice 
10. someone assisting was me stalking home  
Paranoia: someone was stalking me home 
Benign: someone was assisting me home 
11. was fantastic your-party friends disastrous thought  
Social anxiety: friends thought your-party was disastrous 
Benign: friends thought your-party was fantastic 
12. others 
controlling thoughts my encouraging try  
Paranoia: others try controlling my thoughts 
Benign: others try encouraging my thoughts 
13. ignore conversation friends enjoy always your  
Social anxiety: friends always ignore your conversation 
Benign: friends always enjoy your conversation 
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14. me people befriend tend to injure  
Paranoia: people tend to injure me 
Benign: people tend to befriend me 
15. reject you the people accept new 
Social anxiety: new people reject the new you 
Benign: new people accept the new you 
16. sabotaging tried supporting others me have  
Paranoia: others have tried sabotaging me 
Benign: others have tried supporting me 
17. tedious people your-work think outstanding is 
Social anxiety: people think your-work is tedious 
Benign: people think your-work is outstanding 
18. to me follow policemen protect try  
Paranoia: policemen try to follow me 
Benign: policemen try to protect me 
19. attracted you people repelled by are  
Social anxiety: people are repelled by you 
Benign: people are attracted by you 
20. can security me catch cameras safeguard  
Paranoia: security cameras can catch me 
Benign: security cameras can safeguard me 
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
In the spaces above, write down the number you learned, or as much as you can remember of 
it. 
21. rarely friends me out always ask  
Social anxiety: friends rarely ask me out 
Benign: friends always ask me out 
22. me single out others help frequently  
Paranoia: others frequently single me out 
Benign: others frequently help me out 
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23. boring new acquaintances find me entertaining 
Social anxiety: new acquaintances find me boring 
Benign: new acquaintances find me entertaining 
24. watch me store normally assistants help  
Paranoia: store assistants normally watch me 
Benign: store assistants normally assistants me 
25. inappropriately I’m guests think dressed appropriately  
Social anxiety: guests think I’m dressed inappropriately 
Benign: guests think I’m dressed appropriately 
26. implicate me strangers’ normally disregard conversations  
Paranoia: strangers’ conversations normally disregard me 
Benign: strangers’ conversations normally implicate me 
27. neighbour of my me approves disapproves  
Social anxiety: my neighbour disapproves of me 
Benign: my neighbour approves of me 
28. like to flatter me belittle friends  
Paranoia: friends like to belittle me 
Benign: friends like to flatter me 
29. I sure sound myself unsure of  
Social anxiety: I sound unsure of myself 
Benign: I sound sure of myself 
30. relaxed I to observed tend feel  
Paranoia: I tend to feel observed 
Benign: I tend to feel relaxed 
31. I many unpleasant comments pleasant receive  
Social anxiety: I receive many unpleasant comments 
Benign: I receive many pleasant comments 
32. on watched I comfortable trains feel  
Paranoia: I feel watched on trains 
Benign: I feel comfortable on trains 
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33. people listen absently to attentively me 
Social anxiety: people absently listen to me 
Benign: people attentively listen to me 
34. at strangers point wave me often  
Paranoia: strangers often point at me 
Benign: strangers often wave at me 
35. my friends helpful advice useless find  
Social anxiety: friends find my advice useless 
Benign: friends find my advice helpful 
36. approvingly strangers at look me critically  
Paranoia: strangers look at me critically 
Benign: strangers look at me approvingly 
37. my-clothes friends outdated think fashionable are 
Social anxiety: friends think my-clothes are outdated 
Benign: friends think my-clothes are fashionable 
38. envy people my support ideas other  
Paranoia: other people envy my ideas 
Benign: other people support my ideas 
39. at mistakes everyone jokes laughs my  
Social anxiety: everyone laughs at my jokes 
Benign: everyone laughs at my mistakes 
40. rumors about me others compliments pass  
Paranoia: others pass rumors about me 
Benign: others pass compliments about me 
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 
In the spaces above, write down the number you learned, or as much as you can remember of 
it. 
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Appendix 3. Word-sentence association paradigm Version 1 
and 2 items 
Version 1- Social anxiety related items (55 items) 
Experiment 1, 3, 4, & 5 
 
Words Sentences 
Benign Negative  
1. Well-
Liked  
Disliked A friend comments on your music choice for 
the party  
2. Attractive Ugly An old friend comments on how you look 
different now 




Hideous Someone comments on your new outfit at a 
party 
5. Cool Weird Someone looks at you as you walk by 
6. Admire Pity Someone you like says hello to you 




You blush when someone smiles at you 
9. Respecte
d 




Boring You make a first impression on your new co-
worker 
11. Praise  Criticize Your boss wants to meet with you 





Your friend comments on your new haircut 
14. Impresse
d 
Aghast The audience is surprised at the speech you 
gave 
15. Fantastic Disaster Friends thought your Christmas party turned 
out different from last year 
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16. Bewitchin
g 
Tedious A friend sets you up on a blind date 
17. Captivatin
g 
Dull Your interviewer comments later on your 
performance  
18. Beautiful Unsightly People saw you playing at the beach 
 
19. Graceful Clumsy You handle the ball in a baseball game 
20. Distinctio
n 
Fail Your tutor wants to talk to you about your 
essay 









Breakup Your partner wants to talk about your 
relationship 
24. Well-liked Disliked Your friends are surprised at your painting 
25. Respecte
d 
Mocked Everyone stops talking when you enter the 
room 
26. Graceful Clumsy You handle the ball in a baseball game 
27. Attractive Ugly You just got your yearbook pictures back 
28. Respecte
d 
Mocked A coworker begins saying the same phrases 
you do 
29. Distracted Mad A friend does not respond when you wave 
hello 





In an interview the people do not smile  
32. Smart Stupid People believe you have to think about stuff 
for a long time 
33. Funny Embarrassi
ng 
People laugh after something you said 
34. Admire Pity Someone introduces themselves to you 
35. Graceful Clumsy Someone you do not know asks you to dance 
36. Distracted Mad While returning a jacket  the clerk is abrupt 
37. Good-
looking 
Hideous You are on a first date 
38. Smile Look away You are standing next to an attractive person 
39. Clever Dense You ask for assistance from you professor 
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40. Graceful Clumsy You carry a tray of food at a party 
41. Smart Stupid You think harderthan others during an 
intelligence test 
42. Well-liked Disliked You have to throw a party for the office 
43. Smart Stupid You just finished taking an oral exam 
44. Cool Weird You laugh differently than other people 
45. Good-
looking 
Hideous You notice someone pointing in your 
direction 
46. Accepted Rejection You receive a call from a company you 
interviewed with 
47. Clever Dense You share an idea with someone 
48. Calm Worried Your advisor examines your schedule for 
next year 
49. Success Disaster Your classmates are surprised by your 
project 
50. Busy Bored Your date has to leave early 
51. Happy Disappointe
d 




Boring Your friends think of you differently after a 
long road trip 
53. Praise Criticize Your parents talk to you about your grades 
54. Excited Panicky Your picture is going to be in the newspaper 




Version 1- Paranoia related items (55 items) 
Experiment 1, 3, 4, & 5 
 
Words Sentences 









Mugger You can hear someone running up from 
behind. 
3. Friendly Aggressive A stranger comes up to you in the street. 
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The strength of your friend’s punch took you 
by surprise. 
6. Forgetful Plotting At work you find out that the team you lead 
has had a meeting without you.   
7. Joking Aggression Your brother is walking towards you with a 
strange expression on his face. 
8. Kindness Poison A stranger offers you some coffee. 
9. Respecte
d  




Unwelcome The group discussion suddenly stops when 
you join them. 
11. Attentive Irritated Your waiter keeps looking over at your table 
during dinner.  
12. Appreciat
ed 
Persecuted You overhear your name when colleagues’ 
are talking  
13. Adored Leering A stranger gets on board the bus and 
appears to turn around and look at you 
several times. 
14. Praised Scheming Whilst at the bar you notice your friends are 
talking and looking in your direction. 










Intentional A classmate bumped into you when you were 
entering the classroom 
19. Interrupte
d 
Betrayed Your friend immediately turns to talk to 
another guy after you tell them something 
20. Neighbor Following Someone has been walking behind you for 
two blocks 
21. Athlete Terrorist A strong man sits next to you on the flight 
22. Full Mean At the hotel you are given a shared room 
although you booked a private one 








A van was parked outside your house 
yesterday 
26. Calm Trap Your interviewer is leading you to a small 
closed room 
27. Amusing Aggravation The people walking behind you are 
constantly raising their voices  
28. Rushed Thug A stranger bumped into you and left without 
apologizing 
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29. Congestio
n 
Pursue The same car has been behind you for a long 
time now 
30. Surprise Trap You received a parcel with no information of 
who sent it 
31. Fair Penalize Your supervisor gave you a low score but 
gave your classmate a higher one 
32. Clever Underminin
g 
A colleague frequently challenges your points 
in a meeting 
33. Urgent Hostile Someone is knocking loudly on the door of 
your house  
34. Protect Assault A stranger suddenly puts his hand on your 
shoulder 
35. Interested Sabotage One person asked several difficult questions 
during your presentation 
36. Flower Weapon The person walking towards you  is hiding 
something under his clothes  
37. Curious Sinister The man in the car next to you looks at you 
38. Admire Set Up Someone you do not know asks you to dance 
39. Idea Raid A colleague suddenly runs into your office  
40. Attracted Spying You’re at a party and notice that a stranger is 
looking in your direction 
41. Intimate Infecting Your colleague stands very close to you even 
though they have a cold.   
42. Relaxing Harmful You feel sleepy occasionally after taking the 
medication your doctor has given you 
43. Kind Suspicious A classmate offers you some snacks without 
eating them themselves 
44. Kind Noxious You are offered a glass of wine by stranger 
45. Introducti
on 




You spill your drink over a very large man 
and he gets up from his seat 
47. Borrowed Stolen You cannot find your favorite shirt 
48. Summer Burglar Your front door is open 
49. Bank Stolen Your money is not here 
50. Fireworks Robber You hear a loud noise at night 
51. Sports Fight You and your partner start yelling 
52. Sleepover Kidnapped Your child does not sleep at home tonight 
53. Playing Killed Your dog does not return home 
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54. Family Stranger You hear a rustling noise on the second floor 
55. Mistake Angry A colleague leaves your office and the door 
slams 
 
Version 2- Social anxiety related items (55 items) 
Experiment 1, 3, & 4 
 
Words Sentences 
Benign Negative  
1. Thoughtful Jumbled People are confused by your opinions 
2. Entertainin
g 
Foolish People at the wedding laugh at your toast 
 
3. Confident Shy People judge the speech you just gave 
4. Joke Opinion People laugh after something you said 
5. Attractive Strange People stare at you at a restaurant 
6. Good-
looking 
Foolish People stare at you while you shop 
7. Calm Nervous You are on a first date 
8. Organized Lazy You have been asked to take on a new 
responsibility at work 
9. Funny Derogatory You hear a friend make a joke about you 
10. Valued Offended You hear your name mentioned in a nearby 
conversation 
11. Politely Irksome You make small talk with people at a wedding 
reception 




Rejection You receive a call from a company that 
interviewed you 
14. Noticed Ridicule You see an attractive person looking at you in 
the store 
15. Brilliant Stupid You share an idea with someone 
16. Busy Angry Your boss ignores your input 





Your career advisor wants to meet with you 
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19. Vacation Rejection Your friend does not return your call 
20. Wonderful Uninspired Your friends are surprised at your painting 
21. Committed Difficulty Your partner wants to talk about your 
relationship 
22. Dance Concerned Your friend asks you to go to a party 
23. Good Poor An interviewer tells you your chances of being 
offered the job 
24. Keen Slow Your manager comments on your first day at 
the new job  
25. Exciting Immaterial Your boss comments on your ideas in the 
discussion. 
26. Ill Annoyed Your brother cancels your trip after you argued 
with him  
27. Unwell Disintereste
d 
Your friend postpones your lunch date 
28. Skilled Lousy Your tennis partner discusses your 
performance in the match  
29. Forgetful Disintereste
d 
Your friend does not call you back 
30. Commitme
nt 
Breakup Your partner wants to talk about your 
relationship 
31. Skilful Incompetent Your work is being closely observed. 
32. Entertain Ridicule Your presentation made the class laugh. 
33. Attraction Repulsion A friend finds it hard to disguise their feelings 
for you. 
34. Pleasure Horror Your friends are surprised at your painting 









A friend sets you up on a blind date 
38. Funny Embarrassi
ng 
You and a classmate accidentally bump into 
each other 
39. Friendly Refused You offer an acquaintance some coffee 
40. Success Fail You are unsure of your test score 
41. Impressive Disaster You have to write an essay about your life's 
achievements 





You stand up to introduce yourself at a meeting 
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44. Careful Confused You take a long time to reply to peoples’ 
questions 
45. Helpful Scary Your career advisor wants to meet with you 
46. Wide None You think about your circle of friends 
47. Late Abandoned Your date is not here yet 





Your teacher calls on you to answer 
50. Shy Outgoing You are at a party with a friend 
51. Excited Cancel You are going to a meeting and feel jittery 
52. Fun Avoid You are invited to a party 
53. Funny Embarrassi
ng 
You spill a little water on your shirt at dinner 
54. Enjoyment Go home You start to sweat at a party 
55. Praise Reprimand Your boss calls you into his office 
 
Version 2- Paranoia related items (55 items) 
Experiment 1, 3, & 4 
 
Words Sentences 
Benign Paranoid  
1. Reconcile Humiliate A colleague who you quarreled with asks you to 
dinner 
2. Date Stalker Someone has been standing in front of your door 
for long time 
3. Admire Thief Someone on the bus glances frequently at your 
bag  
4. Tired Provoke A colleague is frequently bickering with you. 




Suspicious Someone in a house stares at you when you are 
passing by 




A stranger on the bus asks for your phone 
number 
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9. Cleaner Intrusion Things on your desk have been moved 
10. Spice Spiked Someone in the pub buys you a drink that tastes 
different 
11. Busy Provoked You are kept waiting for your appointment to 
start  
12. Surplus Cheated A shop assistant gave you the wrong amount of 
change  
13. Unlucky Tricked At a party none of the friends who invited you 
were there 








Vindictive The cashier let someone behind you in the 
queue go first 
17. Accidenta
l 
Pinch A stranger is sitting on your chair when you go 
back to your seat in the library 
18. Friendly Aggressive Someone smacked your shoulder from behind 
19. Lost Stolen You cannot find your car in the parking area 
20. Postman Bomber Someone walks toward your door with a 
package in their hand 
21. Attraction Imperil People stare at you in a restaurant 
22. Beautiful Intimidate People stare at you while you are shopping 
yourself 
23. Kindness Trap Someone you do not know asks you out for a 
drink 
24. Sinister Traffic The car behind you is following closely 
25. Attractive Watching The man in the library next to you looks at you 
26. Playing Abducted You cannot find your young sister 
27. Passing Defiant You see a group of teenagers approaching 
28. Wallet Stolen You can’t find your money in your pocket 
29. Celebrate Murder There are a lot of people crowded around the 
bar 
30. Van Shot You hear a noise outside your window 
31. Party Ransom Your partner does not sleep at home tonight 
32. School Abducted You child is not home when you wake up 
33. Coinciden
ce 
Thief Someone just passes you holding a wallet like 
yours 
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34. Squashed Thief You feel someone is touching your bag 





You notice a man looking at you from across the 
street 
37. Drunk Doped You feel strange after drinking the wine an 
acquaintance bought you 
38. Traffic 
jam 
Stalker You notice the same car behind you in your rear 
view window  






Your colleague calls you three times one 
evening 
41. Busy Bully Someone blocks your way 
42. Colleague Intruder Someone is shouting from your office 
43. Kind Risky A stranger asks you for a drink 
44. Deaf Aggressive Your roommate calls you loudly 
45. Disease Abuse Your dog becomes very thin while you are away 
46. Mistake Bully You receive an call from a stranger 
47. Windy Stolen The clothes you hung to dry in the garden have 
disappeared 
48. Dog Pinched Half of your snacks on the table were eaten  
49. Friend Fraud You receive a phone message asking for money 
50. Unseen Deliberate The bus does not stop for you although you 
wave your hand 
51. Jogging Assailant Someone is running toward you on the path in 
the park  
52. Typo Hacker You cannot log into your laptop with your 
password 
53. Mislaid Swiped You cannot find your phone when you are 
shopping in the market 
54. Healthy Negligent The doctor sends you home without giving any 
medicine 
55. Friendly Drugged You are offered some coffee by a new 
acquaintance 
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Appendix 5. Ethics approval letters 




Institute of Psychiatry 
PO63 









Dear Yuanyuan,   
 
PNM/10/11-62 Distinguishing social anxiety from paranoia: testing the aetiological role 
of interpretative biases. 
 
Thank you for sending in the amendments requested to the above project. I am pleased to 
inform you that these meet the requirements of the PNM RESC and therefore that full 
approval is now granted. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 11 May 2014. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior 
to this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application 
will not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your 
approval is for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research 
Ethics Office. Should you need to modify the project or request an extension to approval you 
will need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved 
applications: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/applicants/modifications.html 
 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to 
the approving committee/panel. In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full 
report must be made to the Chairman of the approving committee/review panel within one 
week of the incident. 
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Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to 
time to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/contacts.html). We wish you every success with this 
work. 
 






James Patterson - Senior Research Ethics Officer 
For and on behalf of 
Professor Gareth Barker, Chairman 
Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee 
 
Cc: Jenny Yiend 






Institute of Psychiatry 
Kings College London 




07 October 2011 
 
Dear Yuanyuan 
PNM/10/11-62 Distinguishing social anxiety from paranoia: Testing the aetiological role 
of interpretative biases.  
Thank you for submitting a modification request for the above study.  I am writing to confirm 
approval of this.  The modifications and proviso regarding this request are summarised below: 
1. The duration of the testing session will be one hour.  
2. There are content changes to The Scrambled Sentence Task and the Similarity 
Rating Task.  The Word Sentence Related Task will be replaced by a picture task: 
The Relatedness Judgement Task.  
3. The Scrambled Sentence Task and the Similarity Rating Task have been adapted by 
juxtaposing social anxiety with a paranoid interpretation in the task.  
4. Participants will receive £7 as compensation for their time. 
5. You will inform the Research Ethics office of additional researchers in due course. 
If you should have any further queries about your application, please do not hesitate to 
contact the Research Ethics office. 
Yours sincerely 
Catherine Fieulleteau 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
 
cc: Dr Jenny Yield 
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Appendix 6. Information sheet 
Experiment 1, 3, & 4 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: [PNM/10/11-62] 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project.  You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before 
you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why this research is 
being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Feel free to contact us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
Current theories of cognitive processing specifically target the way people explain information. 
We would like to find out the different ways individuals understand, explain and respond to 
everyday information. We are also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For 
example, whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. If so, therapies 
may be improved and become more effective. We also hope our findings from this study may 
contribute to the establishment of a model of how people process information, and strengthen 
understanding of variations in thinking style and help therapies more successfully address 
them. 
 
Who do we need for this study? 
 
 Participants for this study only need to meet the four criteria below. 
 
1. Over 18 years old 
2. Can speak fluent English 
3. Have not been diagnosed with any psychological or psychiatric problem(s), or 
not currently receiving treatment for any psychological or psychiatric 
problem(s); and not taking any psychological or psychiatric medication (this 
does not include medications for general health concerns). 
4. Available for 2 testing sessions 6 months apart.  
(Please think carefully about whether you will be available in 6 months time, 
because we cannot use any of your data unless you attend BOTH sessions.) 
 
• If you are eligible and interested to participate, you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
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“If you meet the criteria described above and decide to participate, please complete and return 
the attached questionnaire. We may then contact you to invite you to take part in the main 
study. You are free to decline our invitation. If you are not approached to take part in the study 
we will deal with your data according to the check boxes provided on the screening 
questionnaire. There you are asked to indicate 1) whether or not you consent for us to keep & 
use your contact details (name, email, mobile and postal address) in case of further studies 
and 2) whether or not you consent for us to keep & use your data so that we can report 
statistics on recruitment to the current study (demographic information and current mood).” 
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in both sessions 
described below. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at any point 
during any session.  
 
2. Session 1 
 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to: 
 
 
• Judge whether certain words are related to a series of sentences. First, a word will be 
presented followed by a sentence. You will then judge if whether that word is related 
to the sentence (This task is computer-based).   
• Make sensible sentences from a list of mixed up words. You will reorder five out of 
six scrambled words to produce grammatically correct sentences.  
• Read a series of passages of text and rate a series of answers related to the 
passages. These passages reflect a variety of situations commonly experienced 
(This task is computer-based). 
• Complete personality questionnaires about yourself at the end of the session. 
 
3. Session 2 
 
You will be asked to complete exactly the same procedures as Session 1: 
 
• Judge whether certain words are related to a series of sentences. First, a word will be 
presented followed by a sentence. You will then judge if whether that word is related 
to the sentence (This task is computer-based).   
• Make sensible sentences from a list of mixed up words. You will reorder five out of 
six scrambled words to produce grammatically correct sentences.  
• Read a series of passages of text and rate a series of answers related to the 
passages. These passages reflect a variety of situations commonly experienced 
(This task is computer-based).   
• Complete personality questionnaires about yourself at the end of the session. 
 
➢ Please note that all the above tasks are paper and pen, unless specifically stated otherwise.   
➢ Following completion of session 1, participation of session 2 will be arranged for 6 months time. 
Please note that we hope you could attend both sessions, otherwise we cannot use your data for 
the research. 
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Where will our experiment be conducted and how long will it take? 
 
Sessions will take place in dedicated testing rooms in the main building, Institute of Psychiatry, 
Kings College (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 8AF). Each session will take approximately 1½ 
hours. You will be paid £20 in total to compensate for your time and travel expenses.  
 
What are the benefits of participation? 
 
There are no direct benefits to you. We hope that results of this study will contribute to the 
understanding and ongoing development of psychologically based theory and therapies.  
 
What are the risks of participation? 
 
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in the tasks or 
questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher can stop the session 
immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different item. You also can contact 
researchers if you feel any upset after the session. Please note you have the right to decline 
or withdraw from the study at any point without reason or penalty.  
 
Will I get any support? 
 
In case you need any support or help, we provide all those who respond with a list of 
supportive organizations including useful resources which refer you to other organizations 
where you can receive help. Also, if this study has harmed you in any way you can contact 
King’s College London using the details below for further advice and information. 
 
Will my data remain anonymous?  
 
All information you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of the law, 
whether or not you finished the experiment procedures. An identification number will be used 
to substitute your name on all personal data to ensure anonymity. You may withdraw your 
data from the project at any time up until it is transcribed for use in the final report. 
 
➢ It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
➢ If you agree to take part you will be asked whether you are willing to be contacted about 
participation in future studies.  Your participation in this study will not be affected should 
you choose not to be recontacted.  
 
Thank you for reading this letter. We hope you can participate in this study. Meanwhile, if you 




Yuanyuan Huo                                                                                         
Mphil.PhD student 
yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk 
Tel. 020 7848 0512 
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Dr. Jenny Yiend 
Programme Director, Mental Health Studies Programme 
Jenny.yiend@kcl.ac.uk
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Sources of help, information and support inside the UK 
 
• In a crisis 
If you are having a crisis contact The Samaritans. 
Tel: 08457 909090, or visit the web site. 
 
• Violence 
If you or anyone else is in immediate danger of physical harm contact the 
police. 
The police are generally very sympathetic to issues of mental illness. 
Dial 999 to contact the police in an emergency. 
 
• NHS Direct 
NHS Direct operates a 24-hour nurse advice and health information service, 
providing confidential information on: 
o What to do if you or your family are feeling ill. 
o Particular health conditions. 
o Local healthcare services, such as doctors, dentists or late night opening 
pharmacies. 
o Self help and support organisations. 
The telephone number is 08454647. The service is available in England and 
Wales and a similar service called NHS24 is available in Scotland or by 
calling 084542424 24. 
 
• SANELINE 
SANELINE is the only national, out of hours, mental health helpline providing 
support and information to anyone coping with mental illness. It is open every 
day of the year from 6pm until 11pm on lo-call number 0845 767 8000. 
 
SANELINE offers emotional support, crisis care and detailed information to 
people experiencing mental health problems, their families carers, health and 
other professionals, and all organisations dealing with people affected by 
mental illness. 
For more information please visit www.sane.org.uk 
 
• Rethink services National Advice Service 
Rethink’s National Advice Service provides advice about schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder and other mental illness as well as related issues including 
legal rights and benefits. Call 0845 456 0455 weekdays between 10am and 
2pm or e-mail: advice@rethink.org 
 
Rethink, the leading severe mental illness charity, works to help everyone 
affected by mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder to 
recover a better quality of life. We provide hope and empowerment through 
effective services and support to all those who need us. We also campaign 
for change through greater awareness and understanding. 
 
Rethink is the largest national voluntary sector provider of mental health 
services. Our wide range of services includes advocacy, carer support, 
community support, employment and training, helplines, housing, nursing 
and residential care and services dedicated to black and minority ethnic 
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communities. Visit Rethink’s website for information about mental illnesses 
such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and how we help everyone 
affected by them. 
(Rethink were formerly known as the National Schizophrenia Fellowship.) 
• Also see link: http://www.mentalhealthcare.org.uk/ 
 






INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: [PNM/10/11-62] 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project.  You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before 
you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why this research is 
being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Feel free to contact us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
Current theories of cognitive processing specifically target the way people explain information. 
We would like to find out the different ways individuals understand, explain and respond to 
everyday information. We are also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For 
example, whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. If so, therapies 
may be improved and become more effective. We also hope our findings from this study may 
contribute to the establishment of a model of how people process information, and strengthen 
understanding of variations in thinking style and help therapies more successfully address 
them. 
 
Who do we need for this study? 
 
 Participants for this study only need to meet the four criteria below. 
 
5. Over 18 years old 
6. Can speak fluent English 
7. Have not been diagnosed with any psychological or psychiatric problem(s), or 
not currently receiving treatment for any psychological or psychiatric 
problem(s); and not taking any psychological or psychiatric medication (this 
does not include medications for general health concerns). 
 
• If you are eligible and interested to participate, you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
 




“If you meet the criteria described above and decide to participate, please complete and return 
the attached questionnaire. We may then contact you to invite you to take part in the main 
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study. You are free to decline our invitation. If you are not approached to take part in the study 
we will deal with your data according to the check boxes provided on the screening 
questionnaire. There you are asked to indicate 1) whether or not you consent for us to keep & 
use your contact details (name, email, mobile and postal address) in case of further studies 
and 2) whether or not you consent for us to keep & use your data so that we can report 
statistics on recruitment to the current study (demographic information and current mood).” 
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in the testing session 
described below. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at any point 
during any session.  
 
5. During the testing session  
 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to: 
 
 
• Judge whether certain pictures are related to a series of sentences. First, a picture 
will be presented followed by a sentence. You will then judge if whether that picture is 
related to the sentence (This task is computer-based).   
• Make sensible sentences from a list of mixed up words. You will reorder five out of 
six scrambled words to produce grammatically correct sentences.  
• Read a series of passages of text and rate a series of answers related to the 
passages. These passages reflect a variety of situations commonly experienced 
(This task is computer-based). 
• Complete personality questionnaires about yourself at the end of the session. 
 
➢ Please note that all the above tasks are paper and pen, unless specifically stated otherwise.   
 
Where will our experiment be conducted and how long will it take? 
 
The session will take place in dedicated testing rooms in the main building, Institute of 
Psychiatry, Kings College (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 8AF). It will take approximately 1 hour. 
You will be paid £7 in total to compensate for your time and travel expenses.  
 
What are the benefits of participation? 
 
There are no direct benefits to you. We hope that results of this study will contribute to the 
understanding and ongoing development of psychologically based theory and therapies.  
 
What are the risks of participation? 
 
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in the tasks or 
questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher can stop the session 
immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different item. You also can contact 
researchers if you feel any upset after the session. Please note you have the right to decline 
or withdraw from the study at any point without reason or penalty.  
 
Will I get any support? 
 
  347 
In case you need any support or help, we provide all those who respond with a list of 
supportive organizations including useful resources, which refer you to other organizations 
where you can receive help.  
 
Will my data remain anonymous?  
 
All information you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of the law, 
whether or not you finished the experiment procedures. An identification number will be used 
to substitute your name on all personal data to ensure anonymity. You may withdraw your 
data from the project at any time up until it is transcribed for use in the final report. 
 
 
➢ It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
➢ If you agree to take part you will be asked whether you are willing to be contacted about 
participation in future studies.  Your participation in this study will not be affected should 
you choose not to be recontacted.  
 
Thank you for reading this letter. We hope you can participate in this study. Meanwhile, if you 
have any questions, please feel free to contact me (general queries): 
 
Yuanyuan Huo                                                                                         
Mphil.PhD student 
Tel. 020 7848 0512 
yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk  
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London using the 
details below for further advice and information. 
 
Dr. Jenny Yiend 





Sources of help, information and support inside the UK 
 
• In a crisis 
If you are having a crisis contact The Samaritans. 
Tel: 08457 909090, or visit the web site. 
 
• Violence 
If you or anyone else is in immediate danger of physical harm contact the 
police. 
The police are generally very sympathetic to issues of mental illness. 
Dial 999 to contact the police in an emergency. 
 
• NHS Direct 
NHS Direct operates a 24-hour nurse advice and health information service, 
providing confidential information on: 
o What to do if you or your family are feeling ill. 
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o Particular health conditions. 
o Local healthcare services, such as doctors, dentists or late night opening 
pharmacies. 
o Self help and support organisations. 
The telephone number is 08454647. The service is available in England and 
Wales and a similar service called NHS24 is available in Scotland or by 
calling 084542424 24. 
 
• SANELINE 
SANELINE is the only national, out of hours, mental health helpline providing 
support and information to anyone coping with mental illness. It is open every 
day of the year from 6pm until 11pm on lo-call number 0845 767 8000. 
 
SANELINE offers emotional support, crisis care and detailed information to 
people experiencing mental health problems, their families carers, health and 
other professionals, and all organisations dealing with people affected by 
mental illness. 
For more information please visit www.sane.org.uk 
 
• Rethink services National Advice Service 
Rethink’s National Advice Service provides advice about schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder and other mental illness as well as related issues including 
legal rights and benefits. Call 0845 456 0455 weekdays between 10am and 
2pm or e-mail: advice@rethink.org 
 
Rethink, the leading severe mental illness charity, works to help everyone 
affected by mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder to 
recover a better quality of life. We provide hope and empowerment through 
effective services and support to all those who need us. We also campaign 
for change through greater awareness and understanding. 
 
Rethink is the largest national voluntary sector provider of mental health 
services. Our wide range of services includes advocacy, carer support, 
community support, employment and training, helplines, housing, nursing 
and residential care and services dedicated to black and minority ethnic 
communities. Visit Rethink’s website for information about mental illnesses 
such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and how we help everyone 
affected by them. 
(Rethink were formerly known as the National Schizophrenia Fellowship.) 
• Also see link: http://www.mentalhealthcare.org.uk/ 
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Experiment 5 








We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. 
You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Part 1 tells you the 
purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you decide to take part. Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you 
decide to take part in the study you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
The study is part of an educational project conducted at the Institute of 
Psychiatry by Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill and Professor 
Michael Eysenck. We are hoping to learn more about the different ways 
individuals understand, explain and respond to everyday information. We are 
also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For example, 
whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. We also hope 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles  
(14/LO/0772) 
Please read this for more information regarding participation in our research 
Participation is entirely voluntary 
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our findings from this study may contribute to the establishment of a model of 
how people process information, and strengthen understanding of variations in 




Why have I been invited? 
You are an adult between the ages of 18 and over; speak fluent English; have not 
been diagnosed with any psychological or psychiatric problem; not currently 
receiving treatment for any psychological or psychiatric problem; and not 
taking any psychological or psychiatric medication (this does not include 
medications for general health concerns). We will be inviting 30 individuals 
who have had similar experiences to you.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to join the study. We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet with you. If you agree to take part, 
we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any 
time without reason or penalty.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
If you meet the criteria we described and decide to participate, you will be 
contacted by phone/email for screening.  If eligible we may then contact you to 
invite you to take part in the main study. You are free to decline our invitation.  
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in the 
testing session. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at 
any point during any session. You will meet Yuanyuan Huo (the researcher) for 
the testing session at the Institute of Psychiatry (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 
8AF). This session will last approximately 1½ hours. You will be asked to read 
descriptions of situations presented on a computer and answer questions on 
your reactions to them. You will answer some questions about yourself, 
complete a series of tasks and complete personality trait questionnaires.  
 
Expenses and payment 
Up to £10 will be given to reimburse your expenses. 
 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to:  
• You will be asked to complete a range of questionnaires about your 
thoughts and mood. Most of the questionnaires will require true/false 
and scale/rating responses to statements concerning your thoughts or 
mood (such as how you have been feeling over the past two weeks) 
while some tasks will involve you thinking about past or forth-coming 
events (such as thinking back to a time when you went to the theatre). 
• You will then be asked to complete some computer-based tasks, 
including (1) We will give you a list of mixed up words (e.g., ‘has green 
child the eyes blue’), and ask you to sort them into a proper sentence 
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(e.g., ‘the child has blue eyes’); (2) We will ask you to read short stories 
and later, answer some simple questions about them; (3)We will ask you 
to read a word and a sentence, and decide if the word is related to the 
sentence (e.g., ‘apple’-‘Friends invite me to a party’, Is the word related 
in meaning to the sentence?); (4) We will show you lists of words. The 
words are coloured Inks. We will ask you to say out loud the ink colour 
of each word (e.g., ‘red’ if the word is written in red ink). 
• After the session, the researcher will spend a few minutes with you, 
providing a brief outline of the experiment and checking how you found 
the experience. The researcher will check how the experiment has made 
you feel and if you have any questions before leaving.                         
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in 
the tasks or questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher 
can stop the session immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different 
item. You also can contact researchers if you feel any upset after the session. 
Please note you have the right to decline or withdraw from the study at any 
point without reason or penalty. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There are no direct benefits to you personally.  However, it is hoped that the 
results of this project will contribute to the understanding and ongoing 
development of relevant psychologically based theory and therapies. You will be 
reimbursed your expenses as described above. 
 
What happens when the research study stops?  
Data from this study will be reported as part of a doctoral degree undertaken by 
Yuanyuan Huo. You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up 
until it is used in the final report in September 2018. At this time you will be 
offered a lay summary of the study if you request this.   
 
What if there is a problem?  
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. Further details are included in Part 2.  
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision.  
Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available?  
You will be notified immediately in the event this study is stopped for any 
reason. Arrangements of your continuing care will not be affected.   
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What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study and at any time without reason or 
penalty. Any data that is not identifiable to the research team may be retained.  
 
What if there is a problem? (Continued from Part 1) 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (please call 
Yuanyuan Huo 020 7848 5233 in the first instance). If you remain unhappy and 
wish to complain formally, NHS Direct (0845 4647) can advise on complaints 
procedures.  
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for 
a legal action for compensation against the South London and Maudsley NHS 
Trust, but you may have to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms will still be available to you (if appropriate). 
Please note King’s College London insurance indemnity will apply. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? (Continued from 
Part 1) 
Everything you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of 
the law.  
Anonymity will be ensured by assigning you with a code number. All 
information provided by you will then be labelled using this number to ensure 
that sensitive data will not be directly identifiable to you. Code numbers will be 
stored on a password protected computer. Consent forms and administrative 
records will be retained in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s office. Only 
members of the research team will have access to personal data and 
information relating to this study. Please note you have the right to check the 
accuracy of data held about you and correct any errors. Data will only be used 
for this study and will be destroyed 7 years after its completion. The only 
exception is if the researcher believes that there is a risk of severe harm to 
yourself or others, in which case the researcher will discuss this with you and 
seek your permission to break confidentiality. In life-threatening emergencies 
confidentiality may have to be overridden. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Results from this study are intended to be published. You will not be personally 
identified in any report or publication. You can request a summary of the results 
(please check the appropriate box on the consent). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Westminster Ethics Committee. 
The study has also been reviewed by an expert in the methods used to collect 
the data.   
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Further information and contact details 
If you would like to receive independent information or advice about your 
rights as research participant you can contact the Patients Advice and Liaison 
Service (PALS) at SLaM on 0800 7312864. Please use the contact details below 
if you would like more specific information about this study, advice as to 
whether you should participate or if you are unhappy with any aspect of the 
study after you participated:  
 
• Yuanyuan Huo: yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk or 020 7848 5233 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information. 
 
• Dr. Jenny Yiend: jenny.yiend@kcl.ac.uk or 07977978655 
 
Thank you for considering participating and taking the time to read this 
sheet. 
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We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. 
You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Part 1 tells you the 
purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you decide to take part. Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you 
decide to take part in the study you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
The study is part of an educational project conducted at the Institute of 
Psychiatry by Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill and Professor 
Michael Eysenck. We are hoping to learn more about the different ways 
individuals understand, explain and respond to everyday information. We are 
also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For example, 
whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. Prior 
research has suggested that different thinking styles contribute to different 
moods in the general population. However we do not know if it is going to be 
the case in people who are socially anxious or experience paranoia. If so, 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles  
(14/LO/0772) 
Please read this for more information regarding participation in our research 
Participation is entirely voluntary 
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therapies may be improved and become more effective. We also hope our 
findings from this study may contribute to the establishment of a model of how 
people process information, and strengthen understanding of variations in 
thinking style and help therapies more successfully address them.  
 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You are an adult between the ages of 18 and over, speak fluent English, and have 
been diagnosed with a social anxiety disorder by your lead care clinician. We 
will be inviting 30 individuals who have had similar experiences to you.  
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to join the study. We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet with you. If you agree to take part, 
we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any 
time without reason or penalty.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
If you meet the criteria we described and decide to participate, you will be 
contacted by phone/email for screening.  If eligible we may then contact you to 
invite you to take part in the main study. You are free to decline our invitation.  
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in the 
testing session. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at 
any point during any session. You will meet Yuanyuan Huo (the researcher) for 
the testing session at the Institute of Psychiatry (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 
8AF). This session will last approximately 2½ hours. You will be asked to read 
descriptions of situations presented on a computer and answer questions on 
your reactions to them. You will answer some questions about yourself, 
complete a series of tasks and complete personality trait questionnaires.  
 
Expenses and payment 
Up to £20 will be given to reimburse your expenses. 
 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to:  
• Provide background information including your current and previous 
mental health histories. This will include a short semi structured clinical 
interview. Please note that it is our responsibility to report to the police 
if we find illegal activities or substance abuse breaking the law during 
the interview. However, please be assured that the interview 
questionnaire we are using would not result in them being reported to 
the police.  
• You will be asked to complete a range of questionnaires about your 
thoughts and mood. Most of the questionnaires will require true/false 
and scale/rating responses to statements concerning your thoughts or 
mood (such as how you have been feeling over the past two weeks) 
while some tasks will involve you thinking about past or forth-coming 
events (such as thinking back to a time when you went to the theatre). 
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• You will then be asked to complete some computer-based tasks, 
including: (1) We will give you a list of mixed up words (e.g., ‘has green 
child the eyes blue’), and ask you to sort them into a proper sentence 
(e.g., ‘the child has blue eyes’); (2) We will ask you to read short stories 
and later, answer some simple questions about them; (3)We will ask you 
to read a word and a sentence, and decide if the word is related to the 
sentence (e.g., ‘apple’-‘Friends invite me to a party’, Is the word related 
in meaning to the sentence?); (4) We will show you lists of words. The 
words are coloured Inks. We will ask you to say out loud the ink colour 
of each word (e.g., ‘red’ if the word is written in red ink). 
• After the session, the researcher will spend a few minutes with you, 
providing a brief outline of the experiment and checking how you found 
the experience. The researcher will check how the experiment has made 
you feel and if you have any questions before leaving.              
            
PLEASE NOTE you should continue to take your medication during this study  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in 
the tasks or questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher 
can stop the session immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different 
item. You also can contact researchers if you feel any upset after the session. 
Please note you have the right to decline or withdraw from the study at any 
point without reason or penalty. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There are no direct benefits to you personally.  However, it is hoped that the 
results of this project will contribute to the understanding and ongoing 
development of relevant psychologically based theory and therapies. You will be 
reimbursed your expenses as described above. 
 
What happens when the research study stops?  
Data from this study will be reported as part of a doctoral degree undertaken by 
Yuanyuan Huo. You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up 
until it is used in the final report in September 2018. At this time you will be 
offered a lay summary of the study if you request this.   
 
What if there is a problem?  
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. Further details are included in Part 2.  
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision.  
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Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available?  
You will be notified immediately in the event this study is stopped for any 
reason. Arrangements of your continuing care will not be affected.   
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study and at any time without reason or 
penalty. Any data that is not identifiable to the research team may be retained.  
 
What if there is a problem? (Continued from Part 1) 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (please call 
Huo 020 7848 5233 in the first instance). If you remain unhappy and wish to 
complain formally, NHS Direct (0845 4647) can advise on complaints 
procedures.  
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for 
a legal action for compensation against the South London and Maudsley NHS 
Trust, but you may have to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms will still be available to you (if appropriate). 
Please note King’s College London insurance indemnity will apply. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? (Continued from 
Part 1) 
Everything you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of 
the law.  
Anonymity will be ensured by assigning you with a code number. All 
information provided by you will then be labelled using this number to ensure 
that sensitive data will not be directly identifiable to you. Code numbers will be 
stored on a password protected computer. Consent forms and administrative 
records will be retained in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s office. Only 
members of the research team will have access to personal data and 
information relating to this study. Please note you have the right to check the 
accuracy of data held about you and correct any errors. Data will only be used 
for this study and will be destroyed 7 years after its completion. The only 
exception is if the researcher believes that there is a risk of severe harm to 
yourself or others, in which case the researcher will discuss this with you and 
seek your permission to break confidentiality. In life-threatening emergencies 
confidentiality may have to be overridden. 
 
Involvement of your General Practitioner (GP) 
We will inform your General Practitioners of your participation in this study. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Results from this study are intended to be published. You will not be personally 
identified in any report or publication. You can request a summary of the results 
(please check the appropriate box on the consent). 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Westminster Ethics Committee. 
The study has also been reviewed by an expert in the methods used to collect 
the data.   
 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to receive independent information or advice about your 
rights as research participant you can contact the Patients Advice and Liaison 
Service (PALS) at SLaM on 0800 7312864. Please use the contact details below 
if you would like more specific information about this study, advice as to 
whether you should participate or if you are unhappy with any aspect of the 
study after you participated:  
• Yuanyuan Huo: yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk or 020 7848 5233 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information. 
• Dr. Jenny Yiend: jenny.yiend@kcl.ac.uk or 07977978655 
Thank you for considering participating and taking the time to read this 
sheet. 
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We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. 
You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Part 1 tells you the 
purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you decide to take part. Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you 
decide to take part in the study you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
The study is part of an educational project conducted at the Institute of 
Psychiatry by Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill and Professor 
Michael Eysenck. We are hoping to learn more about the different ways 
individuals understand, explain and respond to everyday information. We are 
also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For example, 
whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. Prior 
research has suggested that different thinking styles contribute to different 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles  
(14/LO/0772) 
Please read this for more information regarding participation in our research 
Participation is entirely voluntary 
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moods in the general population. However we do not know if it is going to be 
the case in people who are socially anxious or experience paranoia. If so, 
therapies may be improved and become more effective. We also hope our 
findings from this study may contribute to the establishment of a model of how 
people process information, and strengthen understanding of variations in 
thinking style and help therapies more successfully address them.  
 
Why have I been invited? 
You are an adult between the ages of 18 and over, speak fluent English, and have 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia without significant paranoid features by 
your lead care clinician. We will be inviting 30 individuals who have had similar 
experiences to you.  
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to join the study. We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet with you. If you agree to take part, 
we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any 
time without reason or penalty.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
If you meet the criteria we described and decide to participate, you will be 
contacted by phone/email for screening.  If eligible we may then contact you to 
invite you to take part in the main study. You are free to decline our invitation.  
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in the 
testing session. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at 
any point during any session. You will meet Yuanyuan Huo (the researcher) for 
the testing session at the Institute of Psychiatry (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 
8AF). This session will last approximately 2½ hours. You will be asked to read 
descriptions of situations presented on a computer and answer questions on 
your reactions to them. You will answer some questions about yourself, 
complete a series of tasks and complete personality trait questionnaires.  
 
Expenses and payment 
Up to £20 will be given to reimburse your expenses. 
 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to:  
• Provide background information including your current and previous 
mental health histories. This will include a short semi structured clinical 
interview. Please note that it is our responsibility to report to the police 
if we find illegal activities or substance abuse breaking the law during 
the interview. However, please be assured that the interview 
questionnaire we are using would not result in them being reported to 
the police.  
• You will be asked to complete a range of questionnaires about your 
thoughts and mood. Most of the questionnaires will require true/false 
and scale/rating responses to statements concerning your thoughts or 
mood (such as how you have been feeling over the past two weeks) 
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while some tasks will involve you thinking about past or forth-coming 
events (such as thinking back to a time when you went to the theatre). 
• You will then be asked to complete some computer-based tasks, 
including: (1) We will give you a list of mixed up words (e.g., ‘has green 
child the eyes blue’), and ask you to sort them into a proper sentence 
(e.g., ‘the child has blue eyes’); (2) We will ask you to read short stories 
and later, answer some simple questions about them; (3)We will ask you 
to read a word and a sentence, and decide if the word is related to the 
sentence (e.g., ‘apple’-‘Friends invite me to a party’, Is the word related 
in meaning to the sentence?); (4) We will show you lists of words. The 
words are coloured Inks. We will ask you to say out loud the ink colour 
of each word (e.g., ‘red’ if the word is written in red ink). 
• After the session, the researcher will spend a few minutes with you, 
providing a brief outline of the experiment and checking how you found 
the experience. The researcher will check how the experiment has made 
you feel and if you have any questions before leaving.              
            
PLEASE NOTE you should continue to take your medication during this study  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in 
the tasks or questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher 
can stop the session immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different 
item. You also can contact researchers if you feel any upset after the session. 
Please note you have the right to decline or withdraw from the study at any 
point without reason or penalty. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There are no direct benefits to you personally.  However, it is hoped that the 
results of this project will contribute to the understanding and ongoing 
development of relevant psychologically based theory and therapies. You will be 
reimbursed your expenses as described above. 
 
What happens when the research study stops?  
Data from this study will be reported as part of a doctoral degree undertaken by 
Yuanyuan Huo. You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up 
until it is used in the final report in September 2018. At this time you will be 
offered a lay summary of the study if you request this.   
 
What if there is a problem?  
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. Further details are included in Part 2.  
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If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision.  
Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available?  
You will be notified immediately in the event this study is stopped for any 
reason. Arrangements of your continuing care will not be affected.   
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study and at any time without reason or 
penalty. Any data that is not identifiable to the research team may be retained.  
 
What if there is a problem? (Continued from Part 1) 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (please call 
Yuanyuan Huo 020 7848 5233 in the first instance). If you remain unhappy and 
wish to complain formally, NHS Direct (0845 4647) can advise on complaints 
procedures.  
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for 
a legal action for compensation against the South London and Maudsley NHS 
Trust, but you may have to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms will still be available to you (if appropriate). 
Please note King’s College London insurance indemnity will apply. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? (Continued from 
Part 1) 
Everything you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of 
the law.  
Anonymity will be ensured by assigning you with a code number. All 
information provided by you will then be labelled using this number to ensure 
that sensitive data will not be directly identifiable to you. Code numbers will be 
stored on a password protected computer. Consent forms and administrative 
records will be retained in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s office. Only 
members of the research team will have access to personal data and 
information relating to this study. Please note you have the right to check the 
accuracy of data held about you and correct any errors. Data will only be used 
for this study and will be destroyed 7 years after its completion. The only 
exception is if the researcher believes that there is a risk of severe harm to 
yourself or others, in which case the researcher will discuss this with you and 
seek your permission to break confidentiality. In life-threatening emergencies 
confidentiality may have to be overridden. 
 
Involvement of your General Practitioner (GP) 
We will inform your General Practitioners of your participation in this study. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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Results from this study are intended to be published. You will not be personally 
identified in any report or publication. You can request a summary of the results 
(please check the appropriate box on the consent). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Westminster Ethics Committee. 
The study has also been reviewed by an expert in the methods used to collect 
the data.   
 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to receive independent information or advice about your 
rights as research participant you can contact the Patients Advice and Liaison 
Service (PALS) at SLaM on 0800 7312864. Please use the contact details below 
if you would like more specific information about this study, advice as to 
whether you should participate or if you are unhappy with any aspect of the 
study after you participated:  
• Yuanyuan Huo: yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk or 020 7848 5233 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information. 
• Dr. Jenny Yiend: jenny.yiend@kcl.ac.uk or 07977978655 
 
Thank you for considering participating and taking the time to read this 
sheet. 
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We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. 
You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Part 1 tells you the 
purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you decide to take part. Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you 
decide to take part in the study you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
The study is part of an educational project conducted at the Institute of 
Psychiatry by Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill and Professor 
Michael Eysenck. We are hoping to learn more about the different ways 
individuals understand, explain and respond to everyday information. We are 
also interested in how these processes relate to each other. For example, 
whether there are strong links between thinking styles and mood. Prior 
research has suggested that different thinking styles contribute to different 
moods in the general population. However we do not know if it is going to be 
the case in people who are socially anxious or experience paranoia. If so, 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles  
(14/LO/0772) 
Please read this for more information regarding participation in our research 
Participation is entirely voluntary 
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therapies may be improved and become more effective. We also hope our 
findings from this study may contribute to the establishment of a model of how 
people process information, and strengthen understanding of variations in 
thinking style and help therapies more successfully address them.  
 
Why have I been invited? 
You are an adult between the ages of 18 and over, speak fluent English, and have 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia with significant paranoid features by your 
lead care clinician. We will be inviting 30 individuals who have had similar 
experiences to you.  
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to join the study. We will describe the 
study and go through this information sheet with you. If you agree to take part, 
we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any 
time without reason or penalty.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
If you meet the criteria we described and decide to participate, you will be 
contacted by phone/email for screening.  If eligible we may then contact you to 
invite you to take part in the main study. You are free to decline our invitation.  
 
If you are contacted about taking part you will be asked to participate in the 
testing session. Even if you agree to participate, you are still free to withdraw at 
any point during any session. You will meet Yuanyuan Huo (the researcher) for 
the testing session at the Institute of Psychiatry (16 De Crespigny Park, SE5 
8AF). This session will last approximately 2½ hours. You will be asked to read 
descriptions of situations presented on a computer and answer questions on 
your reactions to them. You will answer some questions about yourself, 
complete a series of tasks and complete personality trait questionnaires.  
 
Expenses and payment 
Up to £20 will be given to reimburse your expenses. 
 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to:  
• Provide background information including your current and previous 
mental health histories. This will include a short semi structured clinical 
interview. Please note that it is our responsibility to report to the police 
if we find illegal activities or substance abuse breaking the law during 
the interview. However, please be assured that the interview 
questionnaire we are using would not result in them being reported to 
the police.  
• You will be asked to complete a range of questionnaires about your 
thoughts and mood. Most of the questionnaires will require true/false 
and scale/rating responses to statements concerning your thoughts or 
mood (such as how you have been feeling over the past two weeks) 
while some tasks will involve you thinking about past or forth-coming 
events (such as thinking back to a time when you went to the theatre). 
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• You will then be asked to complete some computer-based tasks, 
including: (1) We will give you a list of mixed up words (e.g., ‘has green 
child the eyes blue’), and ask you to sort them into a proper sentence 
(e.g., ‘the child has blue eyes’); (2) We will ask you to read short stories 
and later, answer some simple questions about them; (3)We will ask you 
to read a word and a sentence, and decide if the word is related to the 
sentence (e.g., ‘apple’-‘Friends invite me to a party’, Is the word related 
in meaning to the sentence?); (4) We will show you lists of words. The 
words are coloured Inks. We will ask you to say out loud the ink colour 
of each word (e.g., ‘red’ if the word is written in red ink). 
• After the session, the researcher will spend a few minutes with you, 
providing a brief outline of the experiment and checking how you found 
the experience. The researcher will check how the experiment has made 
you feel and if you have any questions before leaving.              
            
PLEASE NOTE you should continue to take your medication during this study  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There is a very slight chance that you may find some of the words & passages in 
the tasks or questionnaires upsetting or unpleasant. If you do, the researcher 
can stop the session immediately, or you can choose to move onto a different 
item. You also can contact researchers if you feel any upset after the session. 
Please note you have the right to decline or withdraw from the study at any 
point without reason or penalty. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There are no direct benefits to you personally.  However, it is hoped that the 
results of this project will contribute to the understanding and ongoing 
development of relevant psychologically based theory and therapies. You will be 
reimbursed your expenses as described above. 
 
What happens when the research study stops?  
Data from this study will be reported as part of a doctoral degree undertaken by 
Yuanyuan Huo. You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up 
until it is used in the final report in September 2018. At this time you will be 
offered a lay summary of the study if you request this.   
 
What if there is a problem?  
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. Further details are included in Part 2.  
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision.  
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Part 2 
What if relevant new information becomes available?  
You will be notified immediately in the event this study is stopped for any 
reason. Arrangements of your continuing care will not be affected.   
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study and at any time without reason or 
penalty. Any data that is not identifiable to the research team may be retained.  
 
What if there is a problem? (Continued from Part 1) 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (please call 
Yuanyuan Huo 020 7848 5233 in the first instance). If you remain unhappy and 
wish to complain formally, NHS Direct (0845 4647) can advise on complaints 
procedures.  
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for 
a legal action for compensation against the South London and Maudsley NHS 
Trust, but you may have to pay your legal costs. The normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms will still be available to you (if appropriate). 
Please note King’s College London insurance indemnity will apply. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? (Continued from 
Part 1) 
Everything you tell us will remain completely confidential within the limits of 
the law.  
Anonymity will be ensured by assigning you with a code number. All 
information provided by you will then be labelled using this number to ensure 
that sensitive data will not be directly identifiable to you. Code numbers will be 
stored on a password protected computer. Consent forms and administrative 
records will be retained in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s office. Only 
members of the research team will have access to personal data and 
information relating to this study. Please note you have the right to check the 
accuracy of data held about you and correct any errors. Data will only be used 
for this study and will be destroyed 7 years after its completion. The only 
exception is if the researcher believes that there is a risk of severe harm to 
yourself or others, in which case the researcher will discuss this with you and 
seek your permission to break confidentiality. In life-threatening emergencies 
confidentiality may have to be overridden. 
 
Involvement of your General Practitioner (GP) 
We will inform your General Practitioners of your participation in this study. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Results from this study are intended to be published. You will not be personally 
identified in any report or publication. You can request a summary of the results 
(please check the appropriate box on the consent). 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Westminster Ethics Committee. 
The study has also been reviewed by an expert in the methods used to collect 
the data.   
 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to receive independent information or advice about your 
rights as research participant you can contact the Patients Advice and Liaison 
Service (PALS) at SLaM on 0800 7312864. Please use the contact details below 
if you would like more specific information about this study, advice as to 
whether you should participate or if you are unhappy with any aspect of the 
study after you participated:  
• Yuanyuan Huo: yuanyuan.huo@kcl.ac.uk or 020 7848 5233 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information. 
• Dr. Jenny Yiend: jenny.yiend@kcl.ac.uk or 07977978655 
 
Thank you for considering participating and taking the time to read this sheet. 
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Appendix 7. Consent form 
Experiment 1, 3, & 4 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM/10/11-62 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research 
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions 
arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the 
researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent 




• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from 
it immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to withdraw my data up to the point of publication. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained 
to me.  I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the 







agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 
Signed      Date 
Please tick 
or initial 
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Experiment 2 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM/10/11-62 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research 
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions 
arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the 
researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent 




• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from 
it immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to withdraw my data up to the point of publication. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained 
to me.  I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the 







agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
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Experiment 5 







Participant Identification Number for this trial:  
 
CONSENT FORM Version 2  04/06/2014 
 
 




Name of Researcher: Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill 
 
  Please initial 
box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated 04/06/2014 (Version 2) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my 

















   
 _______________________     ____________          _____________________ 
Name of participant      Date                          Signature 
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     ________________________        ____________          _____________________ 
       Name of Person taking consent          Date                          Signature  
 
 
[Optional]  Please tick if you’d like to receive a summary of the study 
findings                                                        
 
I would like to receive a summary of the study findings                                                      
Yes  
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Participant Identification Number for this trial:  
 
CONSENT FORM Version2 04/06/2014 
 
Title of Project: Individual Differences in Interpretation Styles  
 (14/LO/0772) 
 
Name of Researcher: Yuanyuan Huo, Dr. Jenny Yiend, Dr. Sukhi Shergill 
 
  Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated 04/06/2014 (version 2) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my 












I agree that my GP will be notified of my participation in this 
study 
 
I agree to take part in the above study       
 
 
   
 _______________________     ____________          _____________________ 




     _____________________             ____________          ________________ 
       Name of Person taking consent          Date                          Signature  
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[Optional]  Please tick if you’d like to receive a summary of the study 
findings                                                        
 
I would like to receive a summary of the study findings                                                   
Yes 
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Appendix 8. Questionnaires 
Measures of social anxiety 




Carefully read each of the 30 statements listed below. Decide whether each 
statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. If you are unsure 
which is the better answer, decide which one is slightly more applicable to 
how you are feeling AT THE MOMENT and answer accordingly. Try to 
answer based on your first reaction to the statement. DON’T spend too long 
on any one item. 
 
(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may 




1. I rarely worry about seeming foolish to others   
2. I worry about what people will think of me even when I 
know it doesn’t make any difference 
  




4. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an 
unfavourable impression of me 
  
5. I feel very upset when I commit some social error   
6. The opinions that important people have of me cause me 
little concern 
  
7. I am often afraid that I may look ridiculous or make a fool 
of myself. 
  
8. I react very little when other people disapprove of me   
9. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my 
shortcomings 
  
10. The disapproval of others would have little effect on me   
11. If someone is evaluating me I tend to expect the worst   
12. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making 
on someone 
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13. I am afraid that others will not approve of me   
14. I am afraid that people will find fault with me   
15. Other people’s opinions of me do not bother me   
16. I am not necessarily upset if I do not please someone   
17. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they 
may be thinking about me 
  
18. I feel that you can’t help making social errors sometimes, 
so why worry about it 
  
19. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I 
make 
  
20. I worry a lot about what my superiors think of me   
21. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me   
22. I worry that others will think I am not worthwhile   
23. I worry very little about what others may think of me   
24. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other 
people think of me 
  
25. I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things   
26. I am often indifferent to the opinions others have of me 
 
  
27. I am usually confident that others will have a favourable 
impression of me 
  
28. I often worry that people who are important to me won’t 
think very much of me 
  
29. I brood about the opinions my friends have about me   
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Social Avoidance and Distress (SADS) Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969)  
Experiment 1, 3, & 4 
 
Carefully read each of the 28 statements listed below. Decide whether each 
statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. If you are unsure 
which is the better answer, decide which one is slightly more applicable to 
how you are feeling AT THE MOMENT and answer accordingly. Try to 
answer based on your first reaction to the statement. DON’T spend too long 
on any one item. 
 
(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may 
have had under the influence of drugs.) 
Statement True False 
1. I feel relaxed even in unfamiliar social situations   
2. I try to avoid situations which force me to be very 
sociable 
  
3. It is easy for me to relax when I am with strangers   
4. I have no particular desire to avoid people   
5. I often find social occasions upsetting   
6. I usually feel calm and comfortable at social occasions   
7. I am usually at ease when talking to someone of the 
opposite sex 
  
8. I try to avoid talking to people unless I know then well   
9. If the chance comes to meet new people, I often take it   
10. I often feel nervous or tense in casual get-togethers in 
which both sexes are present 
  
11. I am usually nervous with people unless I know them 
well 
  
12. I usually feel relaxed when I am with a group of people   
13. I often want to get away from people   
14. I usually feel uncomfortable when I am in a group of 
people I don’t know 
  
15. I usually feel relaxed when I meet someone for the first 
time 
  
16. Being introduced to people makes me tense and 
nervous 
  
17. Even though a room is full of strangers, i may enter it 
anyway 
  
18. I would avoid walking up and joining a large group of 
people 
  
19. When my superiors want to talk with me, I talk willingly   
20. I often feel on edge when I am with a group of people   
21. I tend to withdraw from people   
22. I don’t mind talking to people at parties or social 
gatherings 
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23. I am seldom at ease in a large group of people   
24. I often think up excuses in order to avoid social 
engagements 
  
25. I sometimes take the responsibility for introducing 
people to each other 
  
26. I try to avoid formal social occasions   
27. I usually go to whatever social engagement I have   
28. I find it easy to relax with other people   
 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Ayesa-Arriola et al.)  
 






The following questions ask about how you have been feeling over THE 
PAST TWO WEEKS. For each item, please circle the number to indicate the 
degree to which you feel the statement is characteristic or true for you. The 
rating scale is as follows: 
       1  =  Not at all characteristic or true of me 
       2  =  Slightly characteristic or true of me 
       3  =  Moderately characteristic or true of me 
       4  =  Very characteristic or true of me 
       5  =  Extremely characteristic or true of me 
 






SLIGHTLY MODERATELY VERY EXTREMELY 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with 
someone in authority (teacher, boss). 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I have difficulty making eye contact 
with others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about 
my feelings or myself. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I find it difficult mixing comfortably 
with the people I work with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I find it easy to make friends of my 
own age. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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6. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance in 
the street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. When mixing socially, I am 
uncomfortable. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one 
person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I am at ease meeting people at 
parties, etc. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difficulty talking with other 
people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk 
about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in 
case I appear awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with 
another’s point of view. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I have difficulty talking to attractive 
persons of the opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I find myself worrying that I won’t 
know what to say in social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I 
don’t know well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing 
when talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself 
worrying I will be ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet 
someone I know only slightly. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Social Phobia Scale (SPS) (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
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The following questions ask about how you have been feeling over THE 
PAST TWO WEEKS. For each item, please circle the number to indicate the 
degree to which you feel the statement is characteristic or true for you. The 
rating scale is as follows: 
       0  =  Not at all characteristic or true of me 
       1  =  Slightly characteristic or true of me 
       2  =  Moderately characteristic or true of me 
       3  =  Very characteristic or true of me 
       4  =  Extremely characteristic or true of me 
 




AT ALL SLIGHTLY MODERATELY VERY EXTREMELY 
1. I become anxious if I have to write in front 
of other people 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I become self-conscious when using public 
toilets 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I can suddenly become aware of my own 
voice and others listening to me 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I get nervous that people are staring at me 
as I walk down the street 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I fear I may blush when I am with others 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel self-conscious if I have to enter a 
room where others are already seated 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. I worry about shaking or trembling when 
I’m watched by other people 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I would get tense if I had to sit facing other 
people on a bus or a train 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I get panicky that others might see me faint 
or be sick or ill 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I would find it difficult to drink something if 
in a group of people 
0 1 2 3 4 
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11. It would make me feel self-conscious to eat 
in front of a stranger at a restaurant 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I am worried people will think my behaviour 
odd 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I would get tense if I had to carry a tray 
across a crowded cafeteria 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I worry I’ll lose control of myself in front of 
other people 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I worry I might do something to attract the 
attention of other people 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. When in an elevator, I am tense if people 
look at me 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I can feel conspicuous standing in a line  0 1 2 3 4 
18. I can get tense when I speak in front of 
other people 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry my head will shake or nod in front of 
others  
0 1 2 3 4 
20. I feel awkward and tense if I know people 
are watching me 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS, Liebowitz, 1987)  
 





Please read each situation carefully and answer two questions about that 
situation.  
The first question asks how anxious or fearful you feel in the situation.  
The second question asks how often you avoid the situation.  
If you come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, we ask 
that you imagine "what if you were faced with that situation," and then rate 
the degree to which you would fear this hypothetical situation and how often 
you would tend to avoid it. Please base your ratings on the way that the 
situations have affected you in THE LAST WEEK. 
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(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may 
have had under the influence of drugs.) 
Situation Fear or 
Anxiety: 
0 = None 
1 = Mild 
2 = Moderate 





0 = Never (0%) 
1 = Occasionally 
(1—33%) 
2 = Often (33—67%) 
3 = Usually (67—
100%) 
 
1. Telephoning in public   
2. Participating in small groups   
3. Eating in public places   
4. Drinking with others in public places   
5. Talking to people in authority   
6. Acting, performing, or giving a talk in 
front of an audience 
  
7. Going to a party   
8. Working while being observed   
9. Writing while being observed   
10. Calling someone you don't know very 
well 
  
11. Talking with people you don't know 
very well 
  
12. Meeting strangers    
13. Urinating in a public bathroom    
14. Entering a room when others are 
already seated  
  
15. Being the center of attention    
16. Speaking up at a meeting    
17. Taking a written test   
18. Expressing appropriate disagreement 
or disapproval to people you don't 
know very well 
  
19. Looking at people you don't know 
very well in the eyes  
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20. Giving a report to a group    
21. Trying to pick up someone    
22. Returning goods to a store where 
returns are normally accepted 
  
23. Giving an average party   






Measures of paranoia 
Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (GTPS, Green et al., 2008)  
 
Experiment 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 
 
  384 
Please read each of the statements carefully. They refer to thoughts and feelings you may have 
had about others over the LAST MONTH. Think about THE LAST MONTH and indicate the 
extent of these feelings from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Totally).  Please complete both Part A and 
Part B.   
 
(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may have had under the 
influence of drugs.) 
 
Part A.          
1.  I spent time thinking about friends gossiping about me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.  I often heard people referring to me     1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.  I have been upset by friends and colleagues    
     judging me critically       1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.  People definitely laughed at me behind my back   1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  I have been thinking a lot about people avoiding me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.  People have been dropping hints for me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  I believed that certain people were not what they seemed  1 2 3 4 5 
 
8.  People talking about me behind my back upset me   1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  I was convinced that people were singling me out   1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I was certain that people have followed me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Certain people were hostile towards me personally  1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. People have been checking up on me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I was stressed out by people watching me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. I was frustrated by people laughing at me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I was worried by people’s undue interest in me   1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. It was hard to stop thinking about people talking  










1.  Certain individuals have had it in for me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.  I have definitely been persecuted     1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.  People have intended me harm     1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.  People wanted me to feel threatened, so they stared at me 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  I was sure certain people did things in order to annoy me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.  I was convinced there was a conspiracy against me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  I was sure someone wanted to hurt me    1 2 3 4 5 
 
8.  I was distressed by people wanting to harm me in some way 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  I was preoccupied with thoughts of people trying     
     to upset me deliberately      1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I couldn’t stop thinking about people wanting to confuse me 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I was distressed by being persecuted    1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. I was annoyed because others wanted to deliberately  
      upset me         1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. The thought that people were persecuting me  
       played on my mind       1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. It was difficult to stop thinking about people  
      wanting to make me feel bad      1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. People have been hostile towards me on purpose   1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. I was angry that someone wanted to hurt me   1 2 3 4 5 
  
  
Self-report Paranoia Scale (PS, Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992)  
 





The following questions ask about how you have been feeling OVER THE PAST TWO 
WEEKS. For each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as follows: 
       1  =  Not at all characteristic or true of me 
       2  =  Slightly characteristic or true of me 
       3  =  Moderately characteristic or true of me 
       4  =  Very characteristic or true of me 
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       5  =  Extremely characteristic or true of me 
 













1. Someone has it in for me. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I sometimes feel as if I’m being followed. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I believe that I have often been punished 
without cause. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Some people have tried to steal my ideas and 
take credit for them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. My parents and family find more fault with me 
than they should. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. No one really cares much about what 
happens to you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am sure I get a raw deal from life. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Most people will use somewhat unfair means 
to gain profit or an advantage; rather than lose 
it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I often wonder what hidden reason another 
person may have for doing something nice for 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. It is safer to trust no one. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I have often felt that strangers were looking at 
me critically. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Most people make friends because friends are 
likely to be useful to them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Someone has been trying to influence my 
mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I am sure I have been talked about behind my 
back. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Most people inwardly dislike putting 
themselves out to help other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I tend to be on my guard with people who are 
somewhat more friendly than I expected. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. People have said insulting and unkind things 
about me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. People often disappoint me. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I am bothered by people outside, in cars, in 
stores, etc. watching me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. I have often found people jealous of my good 
ideas just because they had not thought of 
them first. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999)  
 
Experiment 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 
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